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ABSTRACT 
This thesis adopts an empirical approach to examine various market microstructure issues, using data 
from the National Stock Exchange of India (NSE). Whilst the respective empirical analyses may be 
considered as self-contained investigations, they are primarily linked through the common objective of 
understanding the mechanics of the pricing process as it occurs on actual markets, using the NSE as 
exemplar. 
The first major focus of the dissertation is non-synchronous trading: empirical evidence of non- 
synchronicity is obtained by testing for predictability as between indices of different levels of liquidity. 
A simple test of the analysis of trading-break returns is proposed to infer whether predictability may be 
mainly attributable to non-synchronous trading or whether it constitutes a delayed adjustment of 
traders' expectations. 
The second question tackled in the thesis is whether volatility on the NSE may be considered as 
justified or excessive. Rather than adopting the established methodology of comparing stock price 
changes to information about expected dividends, the research question is split up into two subsidiary 
ones. The first question is whether volatility is related to information flows, whilst the second related 
question concerns the relationship between volatility and returns. Three sources of excessive volatility 
are pin-pointed. Monday effects are found in index data but not in the underlying stocks - indicating 
index fluctuations which are not information-related. A second indicator of excessive price movements 
is the pronounced volatility which coincides with the fiscal year end of quoted companies but which is 
not accompanied by a similar increase in long-term returns. A third indication of unjustified price 
fluctuations is that volatility seems unrelated to returns when considering a long-term time series. 
The third topic of the thesis relates to the efficacy of opening and closing call auctions. This issue may 
be considered as the crux of the dissertation and it is tackled by analysing the effects of the suspension 
of a call auction system on NSE. Changes in volatility, efficiency and liquidity following the 
suspension are analysed, and an event study is presented. The relationship between call auctions and 
long-term volatility is also investigated. The findings suggest that the expected benefits of call auctions 
may not always materialise, possibly due to an inappropriately structured auction, or because a liquidity 
threshold for stocks must be surpassed for the expected benefits to accrue. 
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EMERGING STOCK MARKET 
MICROSTRUCTURE: 
EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF THE 
NATIONAL STOCK EXCHANGE OF 
INDIA 
1. INTRODUCTION 
CHAPTER 1: 
INTRODUCTION 
Asset pricing is a central issue in finance. Traditionally, stock prices were considered to be 
determined by a simple intersection point between demand and supply curves; yet this 
approach abstracts from numerous features of real markets, including information 
asymmetries, differing expectations of market participants, the trading setup, and fluctuations 
in liquidity. The study of market microstructure endeavours to understand the pricing process 
taking place on real markets whilst accounting for the special features of individual markets, 
particularly the trading setup. 
Market microstructure studies are relevant to emerging markets. Considering that the 
discipline is relatively new, the majority of publications tended to focus on established 
markets such as US and UK ones. Yet, the discipline may be further enriched through studies 
using emerging markets data since one may expect differences between the microstructure 
effects of stock market trading in emerging economies and those in the industrial economies. 
As compared with developed stock markets, emerging markets tend to exhibit: higher serial 
correlation, less frequent trading, slower adjustment of prices to news, and indirect evidence 
of more insider trading as discussed by Bekaert and Harvey (2002). Extending market 
microstructure research to focus on emerging markets also constitutes an important objective 
when considering the increased interest in such markets on part of finance practitioners. 
This dissertation takes an empirical approach in analysing distinct market microstructure 
issues relating to price formation. Empirical studies offer particular advantages. For instance, 
the behaviour of market participants may be modelled without resorting to unobservable 
factors such as indifference curves, the degree of risk aversion, and inventory holdings. 
Whilst the empirical investigations in this dissertation tackle different market microstructure 
aspects, they are linked through the quest to understand and to model the pricing process as it 
occurs on actual markets. In par-ticular,. thc dissertation tackles three major issues as outlined 
below. 
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The first issue relates to the way in which stock prices may be subject to non-synchronous 
trading effects, emanating from temporary trading pauses of particular securities. Such pauses 
imply that the last trading price will typically become outdated as new information becomes 
available. The detection of non-synchronous trading effects is important on several grounds. 
Non-synchronicity may be mistakenly interpreted as a delayed adjustment of traders' 
expectations or as an opportunity for realising abnormal profits given that the latest trading 
price does not fully reflect all available information. In addition, the detection of non- 
synchronous trading effects constitutes an important step in understanding particular 
characteristics of high-frequency data and in designing market setups which minimise trading 
pauses and thus curtail non-synchronous trading. The first empirical investigation of this 
dissertation, presents evidence of the outcomes of non-synchronicity in terms of lead-lag 
effects. A new methodology is proposed in order to infer whether predictability may be 
attributed mainly to non-synchronicity or to delayed adjustments of traders' expectations. It is 
noted that non-synchronous trading effects may become more evident in high-frequency data 
- and this may be attributed to the fact that the surge in trading activity at the end of the day 
may dampen the degree of non-synchronicity as inferred through daily closing prices. 
The second major aspect of the dissertation is the deviation of prices around their "true" 
values - particularly the seasonal pattern of volatility. The importance of this issue lies not 
only in the fact that volatility is directly related to risks and to returns, but also in view of 
market designers' efforts at curtailing excessive volatility. The starting point of the second 
empirical investigation consists of the well-established seasonality patterns documented in 
prior literature - such patterns were used to pin-point sources of excessive volatility in stock 
prices. This investigation is particularly important in that it evaluates determinants of asset 
price fluctuations in the absence of data about dividend expectations, which constitutes the 
established method of detecting unjustified price fluctuations. 
The third major issue is whether call auctions may enhance the pricing process in terms of 
inducing higher efficiency and liquidity and curtailing volatility. This topic relates to one of 
the main branches of market microstructure since it involves the design of trading protocols 
and the evaluation of their efficacy. One noteworthy feature of the two empirical 
investigations relating to call auction efficacy is the focus on the suspension of a call auction 
system. This approach is not only significant given that it was not adopted in prior research, 
but also since other features of the trading protocol remained unchanged. Thus changes 
following call auction suspension are more likely to be the result of the suspension itself rather 
than accompanying modifications of the trading protocol. The third and the fourth empirical 
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investigations evaluate whether the suspension of a call auction system resulted in 
improvements (or deterioration) in volatility, efficiency and liquidity. Whilst the overall 
results are not clear-cut, only little evidence was obtained to suggest that call auctions are 
necessarily beneficial, and possible reasons for this are proposed. 
The empirical investigations in this dissertation have a common ultimate goal: to gain further 
understanding of the pricing process on securities markets. This goal is pursued from three 
different viewpoints. The dissertation presents a number of findings which broaden the body 
of academic knowledge, and are also relevant for market designers to formulate policies to 
improve the pricing process and to enhance market efficiency. 
The empirical investigations in this dissertation can be viewed as four self-contained studies. 
However, there also are important links among these studies. For instance, non-synchronous 
trading effects are relevant to explain particular volatility features, such as a Monday effect in 
index data which is not evident in individual stock data. Similarly, the results on volatility 
seasonality help to interpret the empirical results on volatility changes following the call 
auction suspension. Thus, the first two empirical chapters also serve as a detailed background 
to the subsequent studies of the call auction suspension. 
The setting which was selected for conducting the empirical studies was the National Stock 
Exchange of India (NSE). This choice is attributable to different reasons. Firstly, it offers the 
opportunity to investigate the microstructure of an emerging market when most of the existing 
research is concerned with mature markets. An additional noteworthy feature was the 
availability of detailed data obtained from NSE. Furthermore, the increased interest in Indian 
markets on part of finance practitioners implies a higher potential for conducting studies 
which are of interest both from a scholarly and from a practical point of view. India provides 
an interesting empirical setting in view of the considerable improvements which were 
undertaken in the Indian capital market during the 1990s. These include the establislunent of 
a regulator (Securities and Exchange Board of India), the setting up of NSE which proved a 
significant competitor of the Bombay (Mumbai) Stock Exchange (BSE), and the 
dematerialization of securities. 
This dissertation is structured as follows. Chapter 2 shows a review of the basic literature, 
consisting of core market microstructure papers. Further literature searches were also required 
in the context of the empirical studies, namely: non-synchronous trading effects, volatility, 
and the efficacy of call auctions. This body of focused literature is presented as an individual 
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section within each empirical study. The fourth empirical investigation should be read in the 
context of the third one, and therefore it does not have a designated literature section. 
Chapter 3 describes the empirical setting and outlines the main features of the data set. The 
subsequent four chapters show the empirical investigations. Chapter 4 analyses the impacts of 
non-synchronous trading on predictability, whilst Chapter 5 inquires whether NSE stock 
prices are excessively volatile. Chapter 6 investigates the general market impacts of the 
suspension of an opening and closing call auction system and this may be considered as the 
most important chapter of the dissertation. The subsequent chapter elaborates on the same 
issue by considering changes in volatility following the suspension. Chapter 8 concludes. 
The main contributions of this thesis may be summarised as follows: 
a) It proposes a new test which may be applied to infer whether asset price predictability 
is the result of non-synchronous trading or other sources of delayed price adjustment; 
b) It explores the link between the seasonality of volatility and "unjustified" price 
movements. It thus proposes an innovative way in which one may pinpoint excessive 
volatility in the absence of data about dividend expectations; 
c) It adds new empirical evidence on the efficacy of call auctions suggesting that the 
expected theoretical benefits of auctions may not always materialise, giving reasons 
why this may be the case; 
d) It investigates the microstructure of a trading setup. in an emerging market, when most 
research has up to now focused on established markets; 
e) It presents new empirical evidence on the January effect and Monday effect in stock 
market data; and 
f) The thesis puts forward practical suggestions to be considered by market designers 
which may enhance pricing efficiency. 
2. STOCK MARKET MICROSTRUCTURE: A REVIEW OF SALIENT LITERATURE 
CHAPTER 2: 
STOCK MARKET MICROSTRUCTURE: A REVIEW OF 
SALIENT LITERATURE 
2.1 Introduction 
The increased availability of detailed stock market data enabled researchers to investigate 
financial trading in more detail than was previously possible. Classical economics predicts 
price formation to be a function of demand and supply. Whilst there are fundamental truths in 
this theory, it is mainly applicable in a setting in which an equilibrium price can be 
established. Trading sequences may be thought of as a process with the ultimate aim of 
establishing the "equilibrium price" Of a financial asset - and market microstructure is 
concerned with studying the latter process which classical economics tended to take for 
granted. In practice demand or supply may be unusually low or high at a particular point in 
time, and in such cases the equilibrium demand-supply approach may be too simplistic a 
model of price determination. Different trading structures are designed to minimize the 
adverse impact of such temporary fluctuations, and this partly explains some of the theoretical 
findings discussed below, that market structure can affect the pricing process - at least in the 
short term. 
Market microstructure studies investigate the trading and the pricing processes, and the 
behaviour of market participants with particular reference to how they react to asymmetric 
information. The ultimate aim . is to detect possible relationships between such factors, and 
perhaps propose better trading structures and policies. Given that trading systems vary from 
one exchange to the other, researchers often argue that findings cannot usually be generalised 
across markets. It is the aim of this chapter to outline the basic features that are commonly 
witnessed in a cross-section of markets, and the main explanations that have been proposed to 
account for such characteristics. Thus, the chapter describes the different types of market 
participants, trading orders and trading system types. The approaches of the inventory and 
information-based models as explanations of the bid-ask spread are summarised, and typical 
features such as volatility variations across the trading day are described. 
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Infortnation is a central concept in market microstructure studies, and it may be considered as 
the interlinking idea throughout this chapter. Whilst the initial market microstructure models 
tended to abstract from the concept of information, the latter has now gained a fundamental 
role in the area. Indeed, most of the concepts discussed in this chapter, may be linked to the 
notion of how information affects security prices. For instance, theoretical models of market 
microstructure usually feature an informed traderwho avails himself of inside information to 
trade profitably. This notion may influence the types of orders submitted on the market, given 
that limit orders submitted by uninformed traders may be "picked off'by informed ones who 
trade profitably. Asymmetric information models predict that the bid-ask spread is affected by 
the perceived degree of inside information available to particular traders. Similarly, the higher 
spreads at the beginning of the trading day may be explained by the notion that information 
asym-metry is typically higher at the opening, following the overnight trading break. Trading 
volumes (and therefore liquidity) may be responsive to new information on the market. 
Information provision is thus an important consideration which is taken into account when 
designing trading setups. This explains why market designers devote attention to market 
transparency, in terms of the promptness of information disclosure, and which kinds of 
information should be disclosed (such as unfilled order data). 
This chapter constitutes a brief description of basic market microstructure ideas - more 
detailed literature accounts relating to the specific areas tackled in this dissertation are shown 
in the empirical chapters themselves. The chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 
contains an outline of the main issues that have been tackled in market microstructure. Given 
that exchanges are continuously automating their operations, and a number of exchanges and 
electronic communication networks (ECNs), are increasingly converging to a limit order book 
form of trading, the concept of limit order trading is also discussed. Section 2.3 of the 
literature review presents a brief account of the multi-dimensional concept of liquidity and 
how various authors have quantified liquidity in the finance discipline. Section 2.4 concludes. 
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2.2 Brief Overview of Market Microstructure Issues 
2.2.1 A Basic Framework 
Market microstructure models endeavour to explain a mixture of issues pertaining to the 
trading process. Most market microstructure models are constructed through the predicted 
behaviour of three kinds of participants described below. 
Liquidity traders enter the market because they have surplus cash to invest or they 
may require currency and therefore sell their assets. Such traders submit their orders 
to brokers, who then forward these instructions to the trading system or to the 
appropriate exchange officials. It is expected that over time, the random patterns of 
liquidity traders cancel out, and therefore liquidity trading is not usually associated 
with any long-term price movements. 
9 Informed traders have access to inside information which is not available to the rest of 
the market. Given this, insiders can trade profitably on mispriced assets and it is 
expected that such strategic trading will result in long-term price movements reflecting 
this information. 
The last category of participants consists of the market makers who are also called 
specialists or dealers! Market makers are assumed to facilitate the trading process and 
hold an inventory of the assets in which they are "making a market". They are 
expected to supply liquidity to the market, by quoting schedules of bid-ask prices at 
which they are willing to trade. Typically, the schedule will quote less favourable 
prices in respect of larger transactions, and this may be explained both by inventory 
management and asymmetric information factors as outlined in Sections 2.2.3 and 
2.2.4. One main problem faced by market makers is trader anonymity - market 
makers are assumed not to know whether their counterparty is a liquidity trader or an 
informed trader. In the former case, the specialist expects to make a profit through the 
' For theoretical purposes, the differences between these terms are largely immaterial, maybe except for the fact 
that a specialist on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) is the sole person in charge of the trading process for a 
particular security, whereas dealers on NASDAQ are not accorded such "monopolies". Specialists do not 
necessarily behave as monopolists given that their quotes have to compete with offers from limit order traders and 
their performance is supervised by exchange officials. Yet, NYSE specialists' operations were investigated in 
2003, with a special emphasis on whether they use the exclusive knowledge of future order flow to their favour. 
Research has also questioned the fairness of the spreads quoted by dealers on NASDAQ (Christie and Schultz; 
1994 and Demsetz; 1997). 
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bid-ask spread, while in the latter case he expects to make losses (since otherwise the 
informed trader would refrain from trading). 
Most market microstructure, models have been constructed to explain various empirical 
outcomes which are witnessed on real markets, through the optimal decision processes of 
these three building blocks. 
2.2.2 Types of Orders and Trading Systems 
Orders submitted by traders may include different specifications, as outlined by Teweles and 
Bradley (1998; pp. 154-169). One basic choice faced by traders is whether to specify a price 
at which they are prepared to trade, or to submit an order that transacts "at the going prices". 
In the former case traders would be submitting limit orders, while in the latter case they are 
submitting market orders. In both cases, traders specify the amount which they are willing to 
transact. 2 Trading through limit orders is expected to result in more favourable trading terms, 
given that the trader might be able to transact at a price which is slightly more favourable than 
the prevailing one, if the limit order enables her to take advantage of short-term price 
movements. However, while a market order maybe executed immediately by trading against 
the best prevailing offers, a limit order may have to wait prior to execution; indeed limit 
orders may end up unexecuted. Besides, a limit order may also be considered as a "free 
option" submitted to the market at large, which will only execute when it is favourable to the 
counterparty, as discussed in Section 2.2.8. 
The differences between limit and market orders also imply that limit order traders are patient 
traders who are providing liquidity to the markets by making offers to trade. Conversely, 
market order traders are "impatient" and they consume the liquidity which is available on the 
market. 3 At times, the idea that limit order traders provide liquidity to the market is 
questioned, as these orders frequently get cancelled when prices move towards the specified 
2 Some types of orders also allow traders to submit "flexible" quantities , usually depending on the going market 
nee. 
Foucault, Kadan, and Kandel (2005) argued that patient traders may include institutions or long-term investors 
whose original intention was to invest in the security for a long period of time. Impatient traders may be 
arbitrageurs who trade on temporary price differentials, and brokers who have to watch out against adverse price 
movements which impact on the prices they obtain for their clients. 
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limit price. 4 In addition, one should not rely on limit order traders as a liquidity source in 
exceptional circumstances such as the October 1997 New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) 
market crash. For example, through an empirical investigation, Goldstein and Kavajecz 
(2000) noted that limit order traders largely withdrew their liquidity supply on the day 
following the crash. 
The limit order book is a collection of limit orders submitted by the traders who intend to 
transact different securit ies. Limit orders accumulated in the book trade against incoming 
market orders or, at times, match with limit orders on the opposite side of the market. Limit 
orders are selected for trade through pre-established priority rules. The first limit orders which 
are executed are those with the maximum price priority, i. e. those with the highest bid prices 
and the lowest ask prices. Multiple orders with the same limit price are then prioritised 
according to the time at which they were submitted, the earliest orders getting the highest time 
priority. 5 
The trading systems of most stock exchanges are a mixture of order-driven and quote driven 
processes. In pure quote driven markets, such as the NASDAQ system up to the early 1990s, 
transactions occur on the basis of the quotes supplied by market makers, which are the main 
source of liquidity. In contrast, order driven markets such as the Tokyo Stock Exchange, and 
ECNs such as Island and Instinet depend on limit orders as a source of liquidity. 6 Other 
markets rely on both liquidity sources, notably the "hybrid markets" NYSE and AMEX. For 
instance, on NYSE small orders are processed through the, limit order book, while larger 
orders entail a more active role on part of market makers. 
One main disadvantage of a pure limit order book trading system is that it depends on public 
limit orders for liquidity, which may not always be forthcoming - especially in the case of 
smaller stocks. A lower degree of liquidity may translate into higher temporary volatility, as 
prices become more vulnerable to liquidity shocks. Foucault, Kadan and Kandel (2005), used 
a dynamic model of the limit order book and predicted that introducing a market maker in 
such a system, enhances competition among liquidity providers, when the ratio of liquidity 
providers to total traders is small. A further disadvantage of a limit order book trading system 
4 For example Hasbrouck and Saar (2002) found that on Island ECN, more than a quarter of the submitted limit 
orders are withdrawn unexecuted within two seconds. Similar concerns were also stated by Hasbrouck (undated). 
5 Orders may be revised or cancelled at any time prior to execution; however they might lose time priority upon a 
revision. When an order is partially executed, the unfilled portion does not usually lose its time priority. 
6 As pointed out by Coppej ans, Domowitz and Madhavan (200 1), one should not assume a total absence of 
market making activities in "pure" limit order systems. The anonymity of these systems implies that anyone who 
is willing to undertake market making activity can do so, despite not being officially identified as a market maker. 
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is that the execution of large trades (blocks) usually requires some form of human interaction 
or some kind of prior arrangements given that otherwise the share price may fall drastically as 
a large number of shares get "dumped" on the market. Despite this, one should also note that 
an electronic trading process such as a limit order book is likely to lower trading costs, as 
empirically outlined by Domowitz (2002). 
2.2.3 Inventory Control Models 
Inventory control models, such as the theoretical studies of Garman (1976), Stoll (1978) and 
Amihud and Mendelson (1980), tend to view the spread as the market maker's compensation 
for holding a level of inventory which deviates from his desired holding. Therefore larger 
transactions are associated with higher spreads, given that they result in larger deviations from 
the market maker's optimal holdings. In such models, the position of the spread may be 
adjusted up or down, so that the specialist encourages trades on one particular side of the 
market, in order to avoid diverting excessively from his optimal inventory position. Overall, 
such models envisage the liquidity supplier as a trader who is better equipped to take on the 
risks inherent in liquidity supply, given that he holds a diversified portfolio of securities which 
minimizes his overall risk profile. While inventory control models can explain some 
categories of movements in the spread, it is generally. accepted that this class of models tends 
to abstract from the possibility of asymmetric information. Indeed, authors such as Madhavan 
and Smidt (199 1) who used NYSE data for a Bayesian model of the specialists' quoting 
process, showed that evidence of inventory control costs is not particularly strong. 
2.2.4 Asymmetric Information Models 
Bagehot (197 1) suggested that market makers are faced with liquidity-motivated transactions 
and transactions based on inside information. Glosten and Milgrorn (1985) developed an 
econometric model showing that due to the possibility of informed trading, the dealer revises 
his quotes downwards (upwards) after satisfying a sell (buy) order. This results in the time 
11 
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series of transaction prices following a martingale. 7 
Kyle (1985), in a sequential auction model, showed that the trading strategy of the insider 
partly depends on the variance of the uninformed order flow, given that the latter is a source 
through which the informed trader can hide his strategic trading. The market makers. adjust 
prices by some proportion of the observed total order flow. Thus: 
P-Po=2 (x+P) (2. i) 
where p- po is the price adjustment, x is the informed order flow and y is the uninformed order 
flow. The larger A is, the smaller the depth of the market, given that the adjustment for a given 
order flow will be higher. A further insight as to how market makers adjust quotes is found in 
the empirical studies of Lee, Mucklow and Ready (1993) and Kavajecz (1999) who suggested 
that specialists actively manage both the prices they quote as well as the depth committed on 
their schedules. Easley and O'Hara (1992a) developed a theoretical model and showed 
through simulations that higher volumes may slow the adjustment towards efficient prices, on 
the grounds that it would be more difficult for the market maker to distinguish between 
informed and uninformed order flow. 
Easley and O'Hara (1987) argued that if infon-ned traders always profit on their trades, they 
would prefer to trade in larger quantities. Given this, the market maker will assume that larger 
transactions are more likely to be informed and she sets a higher spread for large transactions. 
Similarly, the market maker will adjust her price expectations by a larger amount, after 
witnessing a large trade and this partly explains the price drops observed after large scale sales 
of stock. The authors developed an econometric model showing that order flow patterns can 
be a source through which market makers adjust their beliefs about the probability of informed 
trading, and therefore the spread. In this way, prices follow a martingale but they are not 
Markov (i. e. the future movement partly depends on the history of prices rather than simply on 
the current value). 
'A martingale is a stochastic process which is weaker than a random walk. The random walk model requires 
uncorrclated price changes, yet a martingale process allows for possible serial dependence in the series. The main 
requirement of a martingale process is that the expected future value of an asset, given all available information is 
the current value i. e. E(P,., 10, ) = P, where 0, is current information which contains at least the past history of P, 
This results in, at least, semi-strong efficiency, where market prices reflect all publicly available information. A 
martingale process allows for dependency in higher conditional moments of the price changes, such as the 
conditional variance. The latter is an empirical feature of financial markets, which often shift in between high 
volatility periods, and low volatility ones. 
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Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) categorized uninformed traders into non-discretionary and 
discretionary liquidity traders. In their econometric model, the latter category of traders 
choose the time of the day during which to trade and take account of the possible strategies of 
informed traders. Discretionary liquidity traders choose the lowest cost period inwhich to 
transact, and this is the period with the highest uninformed trade variance and lowest X. Thus 
discretionary uninformed traders transact together in one particular period. In mimicking 
uninformed order flow, informed traders transact comparatively more in this particular period 
and therefore they amplify this pattern. This may explain the volume clustering patterns 
observed during trading days, however, it does not explain why clustering tends to occur at the 
beginning and closing of the trading days. 
In some practical circumstances, market makers might be able to distinguish between 
informed and uninfon-ned order flow. For example, a specialist might ask a broker about the 
identity of the ultimate trader or the motives behind the transaction. Forster and George 
(1992) and Benveniste, Marcus, and Wilhelm (1992) model a situation where market makers 
can partially distinguish between informed and uninformed trading. Both studies predict a 
reduction in trading costs for uninformed traders. This may draw more uninformed trading to 
the market, resulting in a lower overall spread as compared to the completely anonymous 
trading framework. 
2.2.5 Sources of the Bid-Ask Spread 
Demsetz (1968) developed the idea that the immediacy of transacting has a cost and therefore' 
specialists require a compensation for providing liquidity - the spread. He argued that active 
securities have lower spreads, partly because the competition between limit order traders is 
fiercer, given that the shorter expected waiting time to execution encourages traders to submit 
more limit orders. Copeland and Galai (1983) built a theoretical model which viewed the 
dealer's quotes as two options provided to (infonned) traders - one option to buy and another 
to sell stock. The spread reflects the value of these options. 
Madhavan (1992), constructed a theoretical model, and amongst his predictions, he showed 
that when decomposing volume, one may detect different effects on the bid ask spread. The 
latter tends to be positively correlated to transaction size but negatively correlated to 
transaction frequency. 
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Tinic (1972) empirically found that the bid ask spread is positively correlated to price of the 
stock, and the level of trading concentration on NYSE, and negatively correlated to the 
continuity and extent of trading activity. Similarly, Roll (1984) empirically showed that the 
calculated bid ask spread is strongly negatively correlated to firm size. This is in line with the 
fact that larger firms attract larger volumes of trading, resulting in lower trading costs. In 
addition, Roll theoretically showed that jumps in between the bid and the ask induce negative 
serial correlation in time series of transaction price changes. 
Various empirical studies such as Mclnish and Wood (1992) and Chung, Van Ness and Van 
Ness (1999) found that the spread follows a U-shaped pattern throughout the trading day. 
Such a pattern has been attributed to inventory effects, asymmetric information effects as well 
as specialist market power, where dealers try to trade on their superior knowledge of order 
flow. 8 
In their empirical analyses, Glosten and Harris (1988), Hasbrouck (1988) and Madhavan and 
Smidt (199 1) distinguished between the information component of the spread and other 
components such as order processing costs, specialist monopoly power and inventory 
components. One possible distinction criteria for doing this, is that information-related effects 
tend to cause permanent price changes whereas the other components only lead to temporary 
price changes. Such studies indicate that the asymmetric information component of the spread 
is more significant than the other factors. 
Amihud and Mendelson (1986) theoretically and empirically investigated the relation between 
spreads and expected returns. They showed that assets with higher spreads yield higher 
expected returns, and therefore investors with a long enough holding period, tend to favour 
assets with higher spreads. The finding that long-term investors (rather than short term ones) 
tend to prefer high-spread assets, may be explained by the fact that the former can amortise 
their trading costs over a longer holding period and in addition, the low liquidity of high 
spread assets makes them an unfavourable choice among short-term investors. The authors 
noted that these effects are consistent with market efficiency, and the results imply that 
companies may reduce their cost of capital by improving the liquidity of their shares. These 
findings were subsequently questioned by Eleswarapu and Reinganurn (1993) who empirically 
showed that the return premium associated with the spread follows a seasonal pattern. 
8 See Stoll and Whaley (1990). 
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2.2.6 Short-Run Price Patterns 
Wood, Mclnish and Ord (1985) examined one minute interval returns for NYSE equities and 
noted defined patterns. There is a tendency for higher returns and standard deviations during 
the opening and closing of the trading day. The standard deviations of returns tend to be U- 
shaped across the day, and they are thicker in the initial period. Large price changes also tend 
to happen after larger no trade intervals. Such time series patterns tend to cast doubts on 
models which assume independent identically distributed price changes, such as random walk 
processes. 
Harris (199 1) empirically showed that observed prices on various US markets tend to cluster 
on even-eights, and a possible reason for this is that traders use discrete price sets (e. g. based 
on quarters, halves or whole numbers) to simplify their negotiation process. Further evidence 
on price clustering was garnered from other markets, including derivative contracts e. g. 
McGroarty, Thomas and ap Gwilym (2005). The latter study focused on Euronext-LIFFE 
short-term interest rate futures and suggested that price clustering may account for a 
substantial portion of the bid-ask spread. Similar results were obtained by McGroarty, ap 
Gwilyrn and Thomas (2004) in the context of foreign exchange market spreads. 
Kraus and Stoll (1972) empirically studied block trading in stocks by institutional investors, 
and noted that the price effect of blocks which trade on plus ticks (buys) is mostly of a long- 
term nature, while price effects of blocks which trade on minus ticks (sales) tend to be 
transitory. This difference has been explained by the fact that the specialist does not typically 
go short to accommodate a large purchase, and therefore his participation in the transaction 
will be less significant and in this way he has a lower incentive to negotiate a price away from 
equilibrium. An alternative explanation as noted by Chan and Lakonishok (1995) is that 
buyer-initiated trades have a larger probability of being informative, given that there are many 
liquidity-related reasons to sell, but not as many to buy. In the latter empirical study, the 
authors noted that the price impact of large trades is significantly related to the identity of the 
transacting fund management firm, which may be attributed both to the differing immediacy 
demands across fund managers, and to the possibility that some particular fund managers are 
more likely to be perceived as being informed. 
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Hausman, Lo and MacKinlay (1992) using an ordered probit model, found that the sequence 
of trades affects the conditional distribution of price changes, especially for the larger stocks 
and the more active ones. Larger trades tend to have larger price impacts, and the magnitude 
of the price movement is affected by the sequence of past price changes, and whether orders 
were buyer or seller initiated. 9 The authors showed that price discreteness is useftil in 
explaining price changes and they found that prices tend to revert in between transactions. 
The latter effect in their sample was higher than may be explained by prices bouncing between 
the bid and the ask. 
Easley, Kiefer and O'Hara (1997) and Easley, Engle, O'Hara and Wu (2002) showed that order 
flow and trade patterns are an important complementary source of infonnation. 10 In particular, 
one may argue that a prolonged period where no orders aresubmitted to the market may signal 
some sort of information, as suggested by the theoretical models of Diamond and Verrecchia 
(1987) and Easley and O'Hara (1 992b). 
2.2.7 Market Design 
Trading mechanisms function in order to satisfy the demand and supply of financial assets, 
first and foremost through establishing prices. Given that market mechanisms vary in terms of 
the timing at which transactions may occur, the role of dealers (if any), the types of orders that 
may be submitted, minimum price variations and the information dissemination processes, the 
pricing process varies in between settings as well. In this way trading mechanisms can affect 
transitory price behaviour and market liquidity. The idea that market structure can affect the' 
pricing process has been investigated since Demsetz (1968), who suggested that factors such 
as the number of traders can affect the spread. Theoretical models of market design include 
Garbade and Silber (1979), Ho and Stoll (1983), Madhavan (1992) and Glosten (1994). 
Detailed discussions of the findings of these models are beyond the scope of this analysis, 
however one should note that different trading systems tend to have both good points and 
limitations. In this way, the "optimum" trading system for a given market is likely to be a 
9 Lee and Ready (199 1) developed an algorithm to distinguish between buyer and seller initiated trades. 
Transactions are classified according to the direction in which they deviate from the prevailing mid-quote. Trades 
executing at the mid-quote, are classified using a tick-test. An alternative methodology was proposed by Ellis, 
Michaely, and O'Hara (2000). 
" In both studics, 'the authors specified an econometric model and subsequently presented an empirical 
application. 
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complex decision, which partly depends on market designers' objectives which often prove to 
be conflicting, as noted by O'Hara (1995; Chapter 9). 
Empirical investigations of different trading systems include Tinic and West (1974), Amihud 
and Mendelson (1987), Lee (1993), Jegadeesh (1993), Christie and Huang (1994), Christie 
and Schultz (1994), Chang, Hsu, Huang and Ghon Rhee (1999), Chung, Van Ness, and Van 
Ness (2001) and Huang (2002). Again, one should note that such empirical comparisons 
usually cannot be generalised across markets given that different venues trade different assets 
under different conditions. 
2.2.8 Limit Order Trading 
Trading systems for financial assets such as equities, bonds and foreign exchange, have 
become increasingly automated during the twentieth century. In cases such as the Tokyo 
Stock Exchange, and various Electronic Communication Networks (ECNs) such as Island, this 
means that the system has become totally order-driven, with virtually no inbuilt liquidity- 
enhancing functions such as market makers, dealers or specialists. Such frameworks 
completely function as limit order books. Other exchanges with inbuilt market making 
functions such as NYSE and AMEX, still allow limit order trading. In the latter settings the 
limit order book may be thought of as part of a larger trading system having different liquidity 
enhancing features. 
Order driven systems, although conceptually simple frameworks, may differ in the way they, 
are be structured. For example, market orders might be submitted and they trade against the 
best prevailing limit orders on the other side of the market. Other systems, such as the Stock 
Exchange. of Hong Kong (SEHK), only provide for the submission of limit orders, and 
therefore when a trader submits a market order to her broker, the latter will have to set a 
"target price", so that the instructions are forwarded as a limit order. A sufficiently large 
market order typically "moves along the book", which means that if the order is larger than the 
number of securities available for trading at the current best offer, the remaining part of the 
order transacts at the next best offer. This goes on until all the order is executed. In other 
systems such as the (former) Paris Bourse, the unexecuted portion of the market order is 
converted to a limit order at the price prevailing for the executed portion. 
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Limit order traders enhance liquidity on the market, since their orders constitute offers to trade 
instantaneously at a given price. One way in which dealers' quotes and limit orders differ as 
sources of liquidity, is that in the former case, it is reasonable to assume that quotes are 
adjusted on a regular basis, depending on the new flow of information and inventory positions. 
On the other hand, not all limit order traders can monitor their orders continuously, and in 
addition the cancellation of a limit order may take several minutes to effect, once it reaches the 
broker. Therefore, prices could be less flexible in case of limit orders. Jang and Venkatesh 
(199 1) found that actual quote revisions on NYSE are different from what would be predicted 
by market microstructure theory, and they attributed this to the fact that quotes from the limit 
order book are updated less frequently. 
The above "inflexibility" is related to the "free option" property of limit orders. The latter 
concept refers to the fact that a limit order trader is providing an option to other market 
participants to transact a given quantity of stock at a specific price. " This option may 
eventually go in the money, as the expected value of the stock changes, and when this 
happens, the limit order trader will transact at a negative expected profit unless he withdraws 
his order. This may lead to inferior performance for limit orders. Given that limit order 
traders may end up providing a free "in the money option" to the market, Glosten (1994) 
argued that the monitoring cost of limit orders should be considered when estimating trading 
costs. 
Following an empirical analysis of large limit orders on the European Options Exchange 
(EOE), Berkman (1996) argued that there is a larger tendency for limit order traders to lose to 
informed traders, at the arrival of new information and when the limit order traders do not 
monitor their quotes frequently. In addition, the longer the waiting time for execution of a 
limit order, the higher the probability that the order will be "picked off. This means that the 
limit order trades against an order which was submitted by a trader with superior information, 
including new public announcements which were not yet available at the time that the limit 
order was submitted. This is partly confirmed byAnand and Martell (2001) who found that 
for their sample of buy limit orders, the longer the waiting time, the worse the performance of 
the order. However, for sell orders the reverse was true: the longer the waiting time, the better 
the performance. 
11 Copeland and Galai (1983) used this "option concept"to analyse the quotes provided by market makers. 
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One way in which the risk of having limit orders "picked off' can be minimized is to mark up 
(down) the order prices in response to positive (negative) public announcements. Such 
"indexed limit orders" were described by Black (1995) and algebraically modelled by Brown 
and Holden (2002). The possibility of the limit order being "picked off'may also be reduced 
if the order provides for its own cancellation after a specified period. 
Jarnecic and Mclnish (1997) empirically calculated the option value provided by limit orders 
on the Australian Stock Exchange, and found that the option value is higher in case of both the 
less liquid and the most liquid stocks. The higher option value for the former is explained by 
the fact that less liquid stocks tend to be more volatile and option pricing models predict that 
option values increase as the underlying volatility increases. The higher option value for limit 
orders on most liquid stocks is due to the fact that the latter assets exhibit lower spreads, and 
therefore limit order traders would have to specify a more competitive limit price for their 
orders. 
The value of the "free option" provided by limit order traders is also dependent on the degree 
of transparency in the market. For instance, Madhavan, Porter and Weaver (2005), examined 
a change in transparency policy on the Toronto Stock Exchange, when the latter publicly 
disseminated the limit order book on both the traditional floor and on its automated trading 
system. The authors reported a reduction in liquidity following the increased transparency, 
and this was attributed to an increase in the "free option" cost of limit-orders, resulting in limit 
order withdrawals. The authors also found an increase in execution costs and volatility after 
the increase in transparency. These results were partly confirmed by Boehmer, Saar and YU 
(2005), who analysed increased pre-trade transparency on the NYSE. The authors reported 
that traders tended to submit smaller limit orders and an increased tendency for limit orders to 
get cancelled. Despite this, the authors still reported higher overall liquidity following 
increased transparency, and a pronounced tendency towards limit order trading. 
Bloomfield, O'Hara and Saar (2005), after conducting an experimental study, argued that one 
important factor in the liquidity generating process of electronic markets is the submission of 
limit orders on part of informed traders. During the initial periods of the day, when . 
mispricings tend to be higher, informed traders tend to submit market orders so that they "pick 
off' limit orders -in this way informed traders initially consume liquidity. Lateronduring 
the day, informed traders shift to a limit order strategy. The authors also confirmed that 
uninformed traders tend to follow an opposite pattern, i. e. they start by submitting limit orders 
and then trade through market orders in order to reach their targets. The authors concluded 
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that such processes enable electronic markets to generate liquidity, even when the information 
process is asymmetric. 
2.3 Measuring Liquidity 
One important question that persistently crops up in academic literature relates to the 
measurement (and at times the definition) of liquidity. 
Kyle (1985) argued that there are different dimensions to liquidity, namely: 
0 Tightness: the cost of liquidating a position over a short period of time; 
9 Depth: whether shares may be transacted with minimal price impact; and 
9 Resiliency: the swifiness at which prices converge to their fundamental values. 
Given these different facets of liquidity, empirical studies used different measures of liquidity, 
some of which are described below. 
The most commonly used liquidity measure since Demsetz (1968), was the bid-ask spread, 
given that this is the market maker's compensation for supplying liquidity. From a trader's 
point of view, the spread determines the fee that he pays for the ability to transact shares 
promptly and therefore the higher the spread, the lower the liquidity. Despite this, the spread 
often proves to be an imprecise measure of transaction costs given that a portion of market 
orders execute against limit orders and therefore trade at more favourable prices. Conversely, 
large transactions often execute at prices beyond the spread. 
A second related measure of liquidity is market depth, in terms of the amount of shares 
available at each bid and ask price. In this way, reductions in liquidity may occur through a 
decrease in depth even if the quoted or effective spreads remain unchanged. 
Another measure of liquidity is trading frequency i. e. the number of trades'which are, executed 
in a specific time interval, irrespective of trade size. The relevance of trading frequency to 
liquidity was mentioned by Demsetz (1968), whereby a higher frequency is an indicator of 
higher liquidity. Despite this, as pointed out by Jones, Kaul and Lipson (1994) a higher 
trading frequency may also be associated with higher volatility (and therefore lower liquidity). 
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Elyasiani, Hauster, and Lauterbach (2000), in an empirical investigation of the impacts of 
changing the listing venue from NASDAQ to NYSE or AMEX, used five liquidity measures 
as shown below: 
a) The percentage bid-ask spread, calculated as: 
0/ 
(ask - bid) 
0 0 , ospread = 
[(ask 
+ bid)/ 21] 
X100 (2.2) 
This measure accounts for the fact that absolute spreads are positively related to the price of 
the security. Thus, higher spreads might prevail due to higher overall stock prices, rather than 
due to low liquidity. 
b) The volume of trade in the stock, i. e. the dollar amount and / or number of transacted 
shares. 
c) The volume divided by absolute return, which is an estimate of how much volume causes a 
one cent change in stock price. This measure is thus related to Kyle's ?, (Equation 2.1). 
d) The standard deviation of the pricing error - a, - as defined by Hasbrouck (1993). The 
pricing error s, is the difference between the actual transaction price and the fundamental 
value. An approximation for the latter may be the random walk component of the price, 
following the assumption that efficient prices follow a random walk. Thus, this liquidity 
measure relates to the market's ability to price assets efficiently. 
e) The non-systematic variance of stock returns. This is related to the market model: 
Ri'l = ai +AR.,, + ei,, (2.3) 
Rij the return of stock i on day t, is explained as a function of a constant aj, the market return 
R,,, and a residual error Ejj. The authors used the variance of ej, ' as a measure of noise. The 
authors noted that while the above five measures tended to be consistent in signalling 
improved liquidity, researchers may still detect different patterns and information if they 
consider more than one measure. 
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Ngugi, Murinde and Green (2002), in an empirical investigation of market microstructure 
changes on the Nairobi Stock Exchange, cited the following four liquidity measures applicable 
to emerging markets: 
The ratio of value traded to market capitalisation; 
b) The bid-ask spread; 
c) Trading volume; and 
d) The ratio of trading volume to the sum of squared price changes. This measure adjusts the 
trading volume in respect of the volatility. Chang, Hsu, Huang and Ghon Rhee (1999) used 
this measure when comparing the liquidity of two different trading methods on the Taiwan 
Stock Exchange, on the grounds that these regimes lead to different volatilities and therefore 
one has to ad ust for this factor when comparing the liquidity associated with different trading j 
methods. In addition, this measure assesses the order flow size which can be absorbed by the 
market, without any significant price change. 
2.4 Conclusion 
The principal aim of this chapter was to provide a summary of the basic theoretical and 
empirical literature relating to market microstructure. The main models were briefly described 
and supplemented with references to actual market setups in various countries. More detailed 
accounts of the literature relating to the main topics tackled in the dissertation are found in the 
respective empirical chapters. 
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CHAPTER 3: 
A DESCRIPTION OF THE EMPIRICAL SETTING AND THE 
DATA SET 
This chapter discusses the issues relating to the organisation of the data set and it provides a 
background for the analysis of this data in the subsequent empirical chapters. The chapter is 
structured as follows: The statistical principles involved in modelling stock market data are 
reviewed in Section 3.1, whilst Section 3.2 includes a background to the Indian securities 
markets, which is the setting of this empirical research. The subsequent section provides 
details of those events which occurred during the sample period, and which might have 
affected the pricing process. Section 3.4 considers basic statistical properties of NSE data. 
Section 3.5 concludes. 
3.1 Statistical Principles of Stock Market Data 
Most econometric tools presume that data is stationary. A time series may be defined as 
stationary if its properties such as the mean and variance are unchanged over different sub- 
samples of the data set. Financial time series tend to deviate from stationarity and they often 
exhibit a time-cbanging mean and variance, as outlined by Mills (1999; pp. 37). Researchers 
usually avoid the application of econometric techniques to non-stationary data given that this 
may lead to flawed conclusions. For example, spurious regression results may be obtained 
(Granger and Newbold; 1974), or a high level of serial correlation may be misinterpreted as 
predictability. 
Therefore non-stationary series are usually transfonned to stationary ones, for instance by 
using log returns worked out as follows: 
r, =- log(I + R) = log 1+ 
P'- p'-' log-fl- A- Pt-I 
I( 
PI-I PI-I 
where P, is the price level, R, is the (simple) return level, andp, =- log P,. Using log returns 
presents inherent advantages such as modelling non-linear relationships through linear ones. 
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Taking the logarithms of prices does not guarantee stationarity and at times further 
transformations may be required. In addition, the distribution of log returns often deviates 
from the normal distribution. Various authors such as Fama (1965) presented empirical 
evidence which exposed the drawbacks of using a normal distribution to model logarithmic 
returns. Financial log return distributions tend to be peak-shaped (leptokurtic) and fat-tailed. 
This characteristic of financial log returns has been explained by patterns in the arrival of 
information, as well as patterns in traders' reactions to news, as discussed in Peters (199 1). 
Dacorogna et. al. (2001; pp 133), in an empirical investigation of USD exchange rate returns, 
showed that as the frequency of the data increases (say from weekly to hourly) the tails of the 
distribution become fatter. 
Stock markets usually go through periods of substantial volatility interspersed with other 
periods of lower volatility. This implies a time-changing variance of returns, as reviewed in 
Bollerslev, Chou, and Kroner (1992). Franses and van Dijk (2000; pp. 13-19) used stock 
index data to present empirical evidence of two further characteristics which are commonly 
evident in log returns: 
a) Large negative returns are more common than large positive returns. This feature was not 
confirmed by Longin (1996) in an empirical analysis of US stock market data, and by Jondeau 
and Rockinger (2003) who studied different stock market indices. The latter authors 
suggested that the common "perception" that left tails are thicker than the right ones might 
have been cultivated by the presence of data outliers. 
b) Franses and van Dijk (2000) also noted that high volatility often follows large negative 
returns. These authors showed that the fonner two features are not as clearly evident in 
exchange rate returns data. 
The degree to which the above characteristics are evident in the sample being used throughout 
this dissertation, is preliminarily investigated in Section 3.4. 
Stock market data present other challenges to researchers as outlined below: 
a) Stock prices are usually discrete prices; for example price changes have to be in one- 
sixteenth of a dollar, or multiples thereof. Possible effects of price discreteness include price 
clustering'(Harris; 1991). Such effects might still be present to some degree in price series 
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where trading is decimalised, given that in such cases prices have to be quoted in cents and 
therefore they are not "continuous". According to Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay (1997; pp. 
110-112), the impacts of price discreteness become more evident in case of lower-priced 
stocks and as the sample period shortens. 
b) When analysing stock market data which span over a considerable period of time, one 
should be aware that the conditions which underlie the pricing process are likely to change. 
For example, a long sample period may include changes in the composition of stock indices 
and changes in company structure due to merger and takeover activity. At times changes in 
the trading procedures and changes in the trading hours might also be present. Dacorogna et. 
aL (2001; pp. 5) refer to these effects as the "breakdown of the permanence hypothesis" and 
the authors also question whether a researcher can claim that he is analysing the same market 
when working with a long time-series. 
c) Transactions occur at random times and this results in irregular sampling intervals. Most 
econometric techniques assume a homogeneous time series i. e. regularly spaced intervals. 
Thus, the researcher may have to homogenise the data sets by extracting equidistant 
transaction prices. When adopting such an approach, one should keep in mind that the 
homogenised data set is not the original one; indeed Dacorogna el. aL (2001; pp. 2) refer to 
such sets as "artefacts" obtained from the actual price series. 
When homogenising a data set, say by extracting hourly prices, one may find instances when 
the stock does not trade. If this gap is filled by inserting the previous trading price in the 
homogenised sample, this results in a return of zero for the particular period, and perhaps a 
"jump" in the return for the successive period. According to Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay 
(1997; pp. 84), this may induce negative serial correlation in returns, as well as bias in the 
moments of the return distribution. An alternative approach might be to fill the gaps through 
linear interpolation of the values of mighbouring observations. Yet, this might be undesirable 
given that such approach partly conditions the price in period t on the price in period t+], 
when researchers usually assume that the price at time t depends on the information which is 
available up to that time. Nonetheless, according to Dacorogna et. al. (2001; pp. 37), most 
statistical research may employ both interpolation methods. 
Finally, one should note that when data are homogenised, the researcher is disregarding 
valuable information which may be gleaned from order flow and trading patterns. For 
example, Diamond and Verrechia (1987) assumed that a no-trade interval might signify the 
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presence of unfavourable information which cannot be traded upon through short sales. As 
outlined in the previous chapter, several other papers have shown that order flow patterns are a 
relevant source of information. 12 
3.2 A Background to the Indian Financial Markets and the National 
Stock Exchange (NSE) 
The data for this research were obtained from the National Stock Exchange of India (NSE) 
with the help of Dr. Joy Suppakitjarak. Financial practitioners are becoming increasingly 
interested in emerging markets given that these may present diversification benefits, as well as 
potentially higher growth rates. Researching emerging markets more thoroughly is an 
important prerequisite for the academic community to catch up with this increased interest. 
The selection of Indian stock market data is thus a step in this direction. In addition, the 
choice of this exchange presents the following distinct advantages: 
9 Throughout the sample period approximately 1,100 equities traded onNSE. 13 Such a 
number of securities enables a researcher to select a large sample of most liquid 
stocks, and this enhances the power and statistical significance of the analysis, due to a 
higher expected amount of observations. 
NSE provides access to a large market for shares in terms of trading volumes. Around 
400,000 transactions were usually processed during a typical trading day in the sample 
period. Observations in the region of 500,000 transactions were also common. 
9 The data set is reasonably detailed. Apart ftom the price and volume of each trade, the 
set also includes high-frequency observations of the value of the main indices. 
* Detailed data were available for the period March 1999 - March 2000 (both months 
included). This is a reasonably long period with which a researcher may conduct 
proficient time series and event studies. In addition, longer time series data sets 
relating to the main indices were available from the NSE website. 14 Tests shown in 
12 See Easley, Kiefer and O'Hara (1997), Easley and O'Hara (1992b), and Easley, Engle, O'Hara and Wu (2002). 
13 This contrasts with other emerging markets, where relatively few shares are traded. 
14 www. nse-india. com 
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this chapter were conducted on data from the former sample period, although the 
sample was extended in the empirical studies when a longer time series was required. 
India provides the potential to test the degree to which theoretical and other empirical 
market microstructure findings are applicable to this particular venue. Whilst research 
on emerging markets has been increasing, one may argue that there is still a high 
potential for further empirical investigations relating to Indian capital markets. Such 
research is even more required nowadays, given the financial market practitioners' 
increasing interest in India and similar countries. 
3.2.1 Indian Securities Markets 
A historical background to India's economy and financial system is given in Green, Manos, 
Murinde and Suppakitjarak (2003). Traditionally, India's economy was reliant on state 
policy. New share issues were controlled by the government, as per the Capital Issues 
(Control) Act 1947 and the Companies Act 1956. The Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act 
1956 regulated secondary market trading. The Indian state traditionally restricted foreign 
investors from participating in stock market activity. This environment largely discouraged 
companies from using capital markets as a source of finance. Regulatory reform of the Indian 
capital markets took off in the early 1990s., The Securities and Exchange Board of India 
(SEBI) was established as regulator, and securities issues were liberalised. 
Despite this, distinct "negative characteristics" of the Indian securities markets still remained. ' 
Such factors aslisted by Shah and Sivakumar (2000), include: 
a) The Indian securities markets were characteri. zed by a high degree of insider trading, 
market manipulation and inadequate regulation to deal with these practices. Evidence 
on insider trading in India in the late 1990s and details about the problems with 
enforcing insider trading regulations are found in Agarwal and Singh (undated). With 
respect to market manipulation, NSE implemented a system of price limits which 
decreases the potential for such activities. In addition, the sample which was selected 
for the event study shown in Chapter 6 consisted of the most liquid stocks. Market 
manipulation tends to be a costly activity in liquid stocks. In addition, when NSE was 
set up in 1994, it brought about various improvements on the Indian securities markets 
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as outlined in Section 3.2.2. These improvements included improved transparency and 
tighter checks to reduce the potential for market manipulation. Thus, one may state 
that the scope for market manipulation was higher in the early 1990's, which falls 
outside the sample periods used in the dissertation. Market manipulation and insider 
trading activities are an important issue which may be investigated in detail; yet this 
goes beyond the scope of the dissertation. 
b) The traditionally oligopolistic structure of the Indian brokerage industry resulted in 
high brokerage fees. Despite this, the establishment of NSE may have contributed to a 
reduction in brokerage costs, resulting from a more transparent system of transacting 
as well as a reduction in barriers to entry for brokerage activity. 
C) Traditionally Indian securities lending activities were disorganised. During the sample 
period, NSE was fostering initiatives with respect to securities lending in particular 
stocks, through the Automated Lending and Borrowing Mechanism (ALBM). 
Therefore, the absence of an organized securities lending function might not be a 
relevant drawback for the purpose of this research. 
d) Up to the 1990's the Indian financial markets did not feature any organised derivatives 
trading system. During the sampling period, NSE was embarking on an initiative to 
establish derivatives activities on particular indices and stocks. This activity started on 
12'h June 2000, with ftitures trading on the Nifty Index. 
e) Liquidity levels on the Indian markets might be comparatively low, and this is a 
recurrent characteristic on most emerging markets. Stocks with low liquidity levels 
may be more likely to feature price inefficiencies, and this may lead to flawed 
inferences, for instance when conducting event studies. This possibility is minimised 
in the dissertation by focusing on a sample of the most liquid stocks. On the positive 
side, this feature presents a potential to select a cross-selection of stocks of varying 
liquidity; for instance in Chapter 6 the effect of a call auction suspension is analysed 
across stocks with varying liquidity. 
f) Indian capital markets also suffered from inadequate settlement systems. Despite this, 
NSE's weekly settlement system in force during the sample period was relatively 
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effective, as compared to those of other Indian exchanges. 15 Towards the end of the 
sample period a number of (dematerialised) shares started to trade on a rolling 
settlement basis. 
Up to the end of the sample period, India still restricted the access of capital markets to 
foreign investors, both through controls on the absolute investment amount, and through 
capital gains taxes. According to Shah and Sivakumar (2000), only about fifty overseas 
institutional investors, out of a total of 553 registered ones, were active on the markets. These 
restrictions might have adverse impacts on the liquidity, efficiency and volatility of the 
markets. 16 
3.2.2 The National Stock Exchange (NSE) 
NSE is a limited liability company that was set up in 1994. NSE is one of the major Indian 
exchanges, together with the Bombay (Mumbai) Stock Exchange (BSE). The exchanges are 
regulated by SEBI. As outlined byKrishnamurti and Lim (1999), ownership, management 
and trading membership on NSE are separated, which overall minimizes the risks of conflicts 
of interest which could arise when a person acts in multiple roles. NSE activity commenced 
in June 1994 with the trading of debt instruments; capital market activity initiated in 
November 1994 and derivatives activity started in June 2000. During the year 2000, around 
1,300 equities traded on NSE, through 960 brokerage firms. 17 Most major stocks are quoted 
on both NSE and BSE and therefore these exchanges compete both for listings and for order 
flow. The major indices on NSE during the sample p eriod were NIFTY (NSE-50 Index), 
NIFTY Junior (Midcap-50 Index) and DEFTY Index (Dollar-denominated Nifty Index). Nifty 
was the main index and it included the fifty most liquid stocks, which accounted for roughly 
50% of the market capitalisation in India. Nifty Junior (Mideap) included a further fifty 
medium-capitalisation stocks, and accounted for a ftirther 10% of market capitali sation. 
15 During the sample period, NSE mainly followed an account period settlement, whereby trades occurring during 
the week were settled on Tuesdays, with the exception of Tuesday evening trades which were settled on a T+5 
basis. Whilst such methods of settlement involve considerable counterparty risk, NSE required brokers to deposit 
margins which were partly dependent on their trading involvement. In addition, the risk of non-settlement was 
bome by the National Securities Clearing Corporation (NSCC) which was the legal counterparty in charge of 
settlement in between NSE brokers. NSCC monitored the required broker margins in real time, as the values and 
the volatilities of different securities changed. 
16 For example Ngugi, Murinde and Green (2002) empirically found that on the Nairobi Stock Exchange of 
Kenya, the entry of foreign investors lead to higher liquidity and efficiency and lower volatility. 
17 Shah and Sivakumar (2000). 
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Subsequently to the sample period, ftirther indices were added, including a broader based 
index Nifty 500. 
According to Dalal (1999), NSE's net%vork links over 4000 terminals in 280 cities. The 
trading system of NSE, called NEAT (National Exchange for Automated Trading) is order- 
driven with no physical trading floor. Orders are matched automatically by the limit order 
book system, and therefore the main role of the brokers is the submission of orders and 
settlement of transactions on behalf of clients. Brokers have access to the best five prices 
prevailing for each stock and the respective quantities on offer at each price. The last traded 
price is also shown, together with other data. This information is displayed in real time. The 
trading system is anonymous and does not disclose the identity of the traders. 
During the sample period the volume of a typical trading day was around 400,000 
transactions. According to Shah and Sivakumar (2000) orders may be confirmed and matched 
within 1.5 seconds of being submitted to the system. On average, the system handles 1,000 
trades per minute, although this may go up to 6,000 orders per minute in peak times - such as 
the end of the trading day. According to Shah and Sivakumar (2000), this level of intensity is 
one of the highest in the world - for example the aveTage intensity on NYSH is 1,300 trades 
per minute. 
The electronic system functions as a continuous pure limit order book market. During the 
initial months of the sample period, opening and closing call auctions were also held. Time 
and price priorities apply to incoming orders. Any unexecuted orders (or parts thereof) remain 
on the book until cancelled or executed. Unexecuted orders may be cancelled at any time, yet 
trades cannot usually be cancelled. 
Different kinds of orders may be submitted and these include "minimum fill", "all or none", 
"immediate or cancel", "good till day", "good till date" and "good till cancelled". Orders may 
also allow for undisclosed portions, however there is a minimum disclosed quantity 
specification of 10% of the total order. "Good till cancelled" orders are cancelled by the 
system after seven calendar days. A minimum tick size is also specified by the exchange, and 
during the sample period this was Rs. 0.05. 
Negotiated trades taking place off the system during trading hours are to be reported to the 
system within 15 minutes. Those effected outside trading hours should be reported on the 
subsequent trading day. Negotiated trades are then reported to the market at large. A 
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minimum trading quantity of 10,000 shares applies for these negotiated trades. Off-market 
deals were no longer permitted in case of dernaterialised stocks as from 30"' September 1999. 
As a newly established exchange, NSE initiated various changes on the Indian securities 
market, including enhanced transparency, the risk management of broker defaults and more 
efficient settlement procedures. Traditionally, fake trades accompanied by false share 
certificates constituted a problem in Indian securities trading. In 1998, NSE began to verify 
trading orders, and therefore one may be confident that the chosen sample period is of 
sufficient reliability. During this sample period, dernaterialized trading in various securities 
was introduced, and this should have controlled the problem of fake trades to an even higher 
extent. Yet, some instances of false trades still persisted after the sample period. 
3.2.3 Market Wide Circuit Breakers and Price Bands 
At the time of writing, India follows a system of Market Wide Circuit Breakers, which was 
introduced in July 2001. Following specified movements in the NSE Nifty or the BSE 
Sensex, equity and derivative trading activity stops throughout the country. 18 Trading resumes 
after a period of time, which depends on the magnitude of the movement of the index, and 
whether the movement occurred in the morning or in the afternoon. A more detailed 
description of this system is shown in Appendix 3.1. 
During the sample period a system of price bands was applicable for individual stocks. 19 The 
objective of such bands is to reduce volatility. Daily price bands are calculated with referenc& 
to the previous day's closing price. During the sampling period, the price bands in the normal 
market r anged from 8% to 50%, where the lower margins applied to higher priced stocks. 
Price bands in the auction market ranged from 15% to 50%. Different methods of calculating 
price bands were applicable to illiquid securities when they failed to trade for a number of 
days. Orders submitted to the exchange are validated by the trading system in terms of 
whether they conform to price limits. This implies that the data set was "pre-filtered" to some 
degree for any errors, including possible typing errors by the people who input the order in the 
system. 
18 Trading is halted following 10%, 15% or a 20% fluctuation of the indices in either direction. 
19 This system still applies at the time of writing. 
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According to a descriptive account by Vaidya Nathan (2001), stock-specific circuit breakers 
merely served to slow down the pricing process over a number of trading days. Yet, 
Narasimhan (2000) specified that when SEBI reduced daily price limits in 1998, it had to 
reverse its decision on account of the subsequent increased volatility. The author attributed 
(part of) the increased volatility to higher day trading activity, facilitated by lower brokerage 
costs and the possibility of trading in smaller quantities following dematerialisation. 
3.2.4 Borrowing of Securities and Short Sale Activity 
ALBM is a system which is designed to enable brokers to borrow and lend securities, thereby 
assisting in short sale activity. Such activities take place during special ALBM sessions 
usually held on Wednesdays. The daily security price bands are applicable during these 
sessions as well. The closing price of the ALBM session is quoted as the weighted average of 
the last 30 minutes' trading prices in the session. The ALBM procedure was modified in 
December 1999 with the intention of making it more efficient. 
Brokers indicate whether sell orders are long or short, by specifying short sales as "Open". 
When traders buy stock to offset short positions, the order is specified as "Close". Similarly 
long buys (where shares are bought without intending to take the actual delivery at the time of 
settlement) are specified as "Open" and "Close" when such positions are undertaken. 
3.2.5 Market Timings 
The sample period is characterized by frequent changes in trading hours as outlined in 
Appendix 3.2 . 
20 Trading on NSE (usually) occurs from 09: 55 till 15: 30. The exchange may 
extend trading hours if 5% or more of the users experience problems with the computer 
system or due to other significant reasons. The timings for the ALBM sessions were also 
frequently revised e. g. 14: 00 - 16: 00,14: 30 - 16: 00,14: 30 - 16: 30,10: 00 - 12: 00. 
20 Changes in trading hours may alter some properties of the time series when sampled at high frequency 
intervals, as empirically found by ap Gwilym, Brooks, Clare and Thomas (1999) in the context of various futures 
contracts. 
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During some periods, pre-opening and post-closing call auctions were held. Pre-opening call 
auctions were usually held between 09: 30 and 09: 45, followed by continuous trading till 
15: 30, and subsequently by a post-closing call auction between 15: 30 and 15: 45. As from 9 Ih 
June 1999, the initial and closing auctions were no longer held. Continuous trading was held 
between 10: 00 and 15: 30. The pre-opening and post-closing auctions were resumed on the 
17ý'Novcmber 1999 and were suspended again, as from 18dNovember 1999. These changes 
were part of NSE's initiatives to introduce call auctions to an otherwise continuous trading 
system. 
3.2.6 Pre-Open Algorithm 
The main aim of pre-open sessions is to facilitate the establishing of appropriate opening 
prices, by way of "integrating" various expectations of different traders. 21 This is important 
when one considers that information asymmetries may be more pronounced after non-trading 
periods, such as the opening. Once the pre-open session is terminated, the remaining orders 
are considered in establishing the first price in the open (continuous trading) session. 
The NSE pre-open algorithm followed the basic rule that the opening price maximises the 
total traded quantity. Orders which include bargain conditions such as "All-Or-None" were 
not considered in the pre-open. Orders could also be modified and cancelled during the pre- 
open session. Market buy (sell) orders were considered as orders which were prepared to 
trade at the highest (lowest) available price. Thus, market orders obtained the best price 
priority and were listed at the top of the order book in the pre-open session. The main 
advantage of considering market orders in the pre-open session is that a price may still be 
calculated in cases -when limit orders specify prices that preclude any matching. 
21A detailed review of the literature relating to pre-open sessions and call auctions is shown in Chapter 6. 
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3.3 Events During The Sampling Period and Their Possible Impacts 
on the Data 
The events which took place during the sample period should be kept in mind when 
interpreting the empirical results of this research. Whilst the sample Nvas filtered in order to 
minimize such occurrences, some remaining "noise" remains inevitable in a continuously 
evolving securities market. The following account of pertinent items and events was compiled 
after reading through the circulars issued by NSE during the sample period. 
3.3.1 Dematerialisation 
During the sample period, NSE was implementing a programme of securities 
dernaterialisation. According to Shah and Sivakumar (2000), the traditional method of using 
share certificates as a proof of ownership led to a high rate of false trades. NSE, together with 
other institutions, established the National Securities Depository where ownership of 
securities by investors is registered. As at February 1999, just before the sampling period, 
institutional investors were obliged to trade around 300 securities in dernaterialized format. 22 
Over one half of the settlements were done electronically. 23 Trading in dernaterialized fon-nat 
facilitated the settlement of transactions, on the grounds that shares are simply transferred in 
the name of the new holder, whilst a net cash settlement occurs in between brokers. Despite 
this, not all of the securities traded in dernaterialised form as at the end of the sample period. 
When securities dernaterialized, their minimum trading lot was usually adjusted to one unit. 
In case of other securities, the adjustment in delivery units was not necessarily related to 
dernaterialisation. 
3.3.2 Security Borrowing and Lending Activities 
When particular shares were included in the Nifty Index or when they were dematerialised, 
lending and borrowing activities for such securities was usually allowed. Conversely, 
22 NSE News, February 1999, pp. 10. 
23 Shah and Sivakumar (2000). 
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borrowing and lending activity was discontinued during the sample period in case of other 
shares. These changes in borrowing and lending activities might have affected the pricing or 
volatility for the stocks involved. 
3.3.3 Irregular Trading Sessions 
A list of trading holidays throughout the sample period is given in Appendix 3.3. On the 7 Ih 
November 1999, which was meant to be a national holiday, mithai-at trading was conducted 
from 19: 00 till 20: 30. This trading day was deleted from the sample in case of the event study 
shown in Chapter 6, given that the number of trades was less than 180,000, which is 
considerably lower than a typical NSE trading day. Yet, the observation was retained in the 
sample when using longer time series of daily data. 
The timings for the trading session of Tuesday 29h February 2000 were modified "on account 
of the presentation of Union Budget", as specified in Circular NSE/CMTR/01482. The 
exchange opened at IIa. m. and closed at 5.30 p. m. Given that market participants were 
advised four days beforehand of the change in trading hours, it might be reasonable to assume 
that the change in trading hours itself did not lead to any material changes in traders' pricing 
decisions, and therefore this trading day was retained in the sample. 
The NSE organised additional trading sessions to test the system in a remote trading site 
(Pune). These sessions were deleted from the sample given that the trading flow on these 
abnormal sessions is probably different from that on the rest of the trading days. The sample' 
period also includes the "new millennium" date -I January 2000. NSE conducted mock 
trading sessions in order to ensure that the computing system could handle the date transition. 
These mock sessions were excluded from the final sample. Months ahead of the year 2000, 
traders' systems were to be certified as Y2K compliant, other-wise they were disabled from 
operation. A contingency plan for continuity of trading following Y2K problems was also set 
up. 
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3.3.4 Other Initiatives 
During the sample period, National Securities Clearing Corporation Limited occasionally 
changed the list of stocks which were permitted to be deposited as security by brokers. This 
might have affected the pricing or volatility of the stocks involved. 
During the period January - March 2000, a number of securities had additional margins 
applicable to them i. e. brokers had to deposit additional security in respect of open positions 
on these stocks. These additional margins were imposed mainly in respect of outstanding 
positions in illiquid or highly volatile securities. This might have affected the pricing process 
of these securities. 
Other initiatives taken during the sample period involved shortening the settlement account 
period and facilitating internet based trading. 
3.4 Statistical Properties of the Sample 
The aim of the following preliminary analysis is to inquire whether the statistical properties 
described in Section 3.1 are evident in the NSE indices being used for this research. The 
investigation uses the daily closing values of the Nifty and Midcap Indices, following the 
assumption that these approximate the main characteristics of the stocks traded on NSE. This 
study focuses on the degree to which the properties listed hereunder are evident in these 
indices. The hypotheses are as follows: 
3.4.1 The original price series are non-stationary, however transforming the series to 
logarithmic returns induces stationarity; 
3.4.2 Logarithmic returns are not normally distributed - they are peak-shaped and fat tailed; 
3.4.3 Logarithmic returns exhibit a time-changing variance; 
3.4.4 The left tail of the distribution is fatter than the right tail which implies that large 
negative returns are more common than large positive returns; and 
3.4.5 High volatility often follows large negative returns. 
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3.4.1 Stationarity of the Original and Logarithmic Series 
Plots of the original price series of the Nifty and Midcap 50 indices are shown in Figure 3.1. 
in inquiring about the stationarity properties of the data, the autocorrelation of the log returns 
was considered, together with the tests of Dickey and Fuller (1979). 
Figure 3.1: Original Nifty and Midcap Index Data 
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The sample autocorrelation function of the time series x,, at lag k is defined in Mills (1990; pp. 
65) as follows: 
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The standard errors of the autocorrelation coefficients were computed using the Bartlett 
(1946) formula, also quoted in Mills (1990; pp. 65-66): 
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ý(I+Tpý+... 
+2pck-j) (3.3) 
where n is the number of observations. 
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Table 3.1 shows the autocorrelation coefficients of both indices. The autocorrelation 
coefficients reveal a high level of serial correlation suggesting that the price levels are non- 
stationaty. 
Table 3.1: Autocorrelation Coefficients of Nifty and Midcap Indices 
(Levels Data - Daily Frequency) _ 
Nifty Index Midcap Index 
Lag Autocorrelation T-ratio Autocorrelation T-ratio 
Coefficient Coefficient 
1 0.98745 (16.07) 0.99325 (16.17) 
2 0.97483 (9.24) 0.98540 (9.30) 
3 0.96347 (7.12) 0.97753 (7.18) 
4 0.95169 (5.98) 0.96975 (6.04) 
5 0.93985 (5.24) 0.96212 (5.31) 
6 0.92744 (4.71) 0.95409 (4.78) 
7 0.91582 (4.30) 0.94656 (4.38) 
8 0.90298 (3.97) 0.93885 (4.06) 
9 0.89224 (3.71) 0.93095 (3.80) 
10 0.87980 (3.48) 0.92157 (3.57) 
The table shows the serial correlation coefficients and respective t-ratios of the levels 
data up to the tenth lag. Statistical sig nificance at the 99% level of confidence is 
denoted by ***. 
Figure 3.2: Nifty Index Log Returns 
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The log return plots for both indices are shown in Figures 3.2 and 3.3 whilst the 
autocorrelation coefficients are shown in Table 3.2. Most of the autocorrelation coefficients 
are insignificant, suggesting that the log returns are stationary. 
Figure 3.3: Midcap Index Log Returns 
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The augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test was also used to confinn the stationarity properties 
of the levels data and log returns. The first differenced time series is expressed as a function 
of a constant, (an optional) trend, a lag of the levels, and n lags of the first difference. Thus: 
Ax, =f (constant, trend, x, - Ax, -1, ... , Axt, ) 
(3.4) 
A unit root test may by formulated by comparing the coefficient of x, _1 with 
its standard error. 
The null hypothesis is that the series contains a unit root and is therefore non-stationary; 
whilst the alternative hypothesis is that the series does not have a unit root. The critical values 
which are used in this hypothesis test are those of Dickey and Fuller (1979). 
The ADF results are shown in Table 3.3. The null hypothesis of a unit root cannot be rejected 
in case of the levels data, yet it may be rejected in case of the log returns series, indicating that 
the log prices are difference stationary. 
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Table 3.2: Autocorrelation Coefficients of Indices Log Returns (Daily Frequency) 
Nifty Log Returns Midcap Log Returns 
Lag Autocorrelation T-Ratio Autocorrelation T-Ratio 
Coefficient Coefficient 
1 -0.04486 (0.73) 0.06205 (1.01) 
2 -0.06367 (1.03) -0.01559 (0.25) 
3 0.05555 (0.90) 0.03815 (0.62) 
4 0.01003 (0.16) -0.05990 (0.97) 
5 0.06013 (0.97) 0.11715 * (1.89) 
6 -0.11911 (1.91) -0.09017 (1.44) 
7 0.05235 (0.83) 0.04293 (0.68) 
8 -0.09735 (1.54) -0.00021 (0.00) 
9 0.03610 (0.57) 0.06560 (1.03) 
10 0.16969 *** (2.66) 0.17574 *** (2.76) 
11 -0.13216 ** (2.02) -0.07240 (1.11) 
12 -0.08460 (1.27) 0.00538 (0.08) 
13 0.04388 (0.66) 0.13629 ** (2.07) 
14 -0.00524 (0.08) 0.01751 (0.26) 
15 -0.13742 (2.05) -0.02303 (0.34) 
16 -0.14549 (2.14) -0.18520 *** (2.77) 
17 0.12306 (1.78) 0.03171 (0.46) 
18 -0.02197 (0.31) -0.03003 (0.44) 
19 -0.03322 (0.47) -0.04308 (0.63) 
20 0.07871 (1.12) 0.05813 (0.84) 
The table shows the serial correlation coefficients and respective t-ratios of log returns up 
to the twentieth lag. Statistical sig nificance at the 99%, 95% and 90% level of confidence 
is denoted by and * respectively. 
Overall, the above tests indicate that it is reasonable to analyse the log returns series. 
3.4.2 Distribution of Logarithmic Returns 
The histograms of the log returns of the Nifty and Midcap Indices shown in Figures 3.4 and 
3.5 seem to indicate that the data are somewhat peak-shaped, although they do not disclose 
strong evidence of fat-tails. Further analysis shown below, focuses on the skewness and 
kurtosis, and the normality tests proposed by Jarque and Bera, (1980). 
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I Table 3.3: Unit Root Aucimented Dickev-Fuller Tests I 
NIFTY LEVELS (Daily frequency) 
Lag Length Test Statistic 
0 -1.263 
1 -1.231 
2 -1.182 
3 -1.202 
4 -1.209 
5 -1.228 
MIDCAP LEVELS (Daily frequency) 
-ag Length Test Statistic 
0 -0.781 
1 -0.858 
2 -0.837 
3 -0.834 
4 -0.773 
5 -0.852 
# of Observations 260 # of Observations 260 
95% Critical 
95% Critical Value 
I 
Value -2.873 
LOG RETURN NIFTY (Daily frequency) 
Lag Length Test Statistic 
0 -16.709 
1 -12.362 
2 -9.313 
3 -7.965 
4 -6.625 
5 -6.872 
LOG RETURN MIDCAP (Daily frequency) 
Lag Length Test Statistic 
0 -15.030 
1 -11.181 
2 -8.800 
3 -8.190 
4 -6.388 
5 -6.649 
# of Observations 259 4 of Observations 259 
95% Critical 
95% Critical Value -2.873 
1 
Value -2.873 
The reported Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests assume that the time series are not trended. 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests assuming a trended time series lead to the same 
inferences. The null hypothesis of a unit root in the series is not rejected in case of the 
Nifty and Midcap price levels. The null hypothesis of a unit root is rejected in case of the 
Nifty and Midcap log returns. 
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Table 3.4 shows the basic characteristics of the log returns of both indices. 
Table 3.4: Distributional Statistics of Nifty and Mldcap Daily Log Returns 
Nifty Index Midcapindex 
First Day in Sample 2 March 1999 2 March 1999 
No. of Observations 265 265 
Mean 0.0015 0.0026 
Standard Deviation 0.0188 0.0244 
Skewness 0.2953 -0.1412 
Excess Kurtosis 1.6022 0.9580 
Minimum -0.0530 -0.0624 
Maximum 0.0755 0.1029 
Coeff. Of Variation 12.2066 9.3784 
Correlation (r2t, rt. 1) -0.0246, -0.0202 
Jarque-Bera Statistic 32.20 11.01 
(99% X2 (2) Critical Value) (9.21) (9.21) 
0.01 Percentile (of standardised 
returns) -2.4841 -2.5912 
0.2 Percentile -0.7568 -0.7713 
0.4 Percentile -0.2418 -0.1314 
0.6 Percentile 0.2294 0.2670 
0.8 Percentile 0.6754 0.7952 
0.99 Percentile 2.5741 2.0287 
LM(I) ARCH test 4.9452 10.4349 
(95%, 99% X2(1) Critical Value) (3.841,6.635) (3.841,6.635) 
Significance at the 99% and 95% level of confidence is denoted by and ** respectively. 
The kurtosis of the distribution indicates whether the data are more peak-shaped or flatter than 
the normal distribution. The kurtosis is defined as: 
n 
Ky 
p)4 
4 
n, =, 
& 
(3.5) 
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where n is the number of observations, r, is the log return at time t, li is the mean, and U is the 
standard deviation. The kurtosis of a normal distribution is equal to 3, and a higher kurtosis 
value indicates a peak-shaped distribution. The excess kurtosis (kurtosis -3) values for the log 
returns of both indices are shown in Table 3.4, and confirm that the series are peak-sbaped. 
In addition, one may also look at the position of the central 0.2 percentile. These mid-20% 
observations in a normal distribution lie between the standardised values of +/- 0.25 1. The 
mid-20% (standardised) observations for the Nifty index fie between -0.242 and +0.229, 
'whilst in case of the Midcap they lie between -0.131 and +0.267, indicating that the 
distributions are peak-shaped. 
In inquiring whether the distributions of the index log returns are fat-tailed, one may compare 
the "extreme percentiles" of these distributions to those of the normal distribution. The 0.01 
and 0.99 percentiles for the normal distribution occur at -/+ 2.326. As shown in Table 3.4, the 
0.01 percentile occurs "earlier" than expected, indicating fat left tails for both indices. As 
regards the right tails, the position of the 0.99 percentile for the Nifty index indicates that the 
tail is fatter than normal, given that we enter this percentile "later" than expected. This does 
not occur in case of the Midcap index. Yet, the histogram of the latter index shown in Figure 
3.5, indicates that the right tail becomes relatively fat at some point. 
The asymmetry of the distribution is measured through the skeNvness defined as: 
In (r 
_, 
D)3 
SKý, =-Y Vi 
17 1=1 , 63 
(3.6) 
where n is the number of observations, rt is the log return at time t, p is the mean, and a is the 
standard deviation. 
As shown in Table 3.4, the skewness of the Nifty log returns is positive, indicating a longer 
and/or fatt. er right side, whilst that of the Midcap log returns is negative, indicating a longer 
and/or fatter left side. Given this, one may state that NSE returns during the sample period 
were not considerably biased towards any one direction, although a more fon-nal investigation 
would require analysing individual stock returns. 
The final test of norinality is the Jarque-Bera (1980) test, This testjointly considers the 
skewness and kurtosis of the distribution as follows: 
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2 LK 
), Jýy 
1 
3! _+ 4! 
(3.7) 
where SKY and KY are the skewness and kurtosis of the distribution respectively. The test 
statistic is )? (2) distributed. As shown in Table 3.4, the Jarque-Bera statistic enables the 
rejection of the null hypothesis of a normal distribution at the 99% level of confidence, for 
both indices. 
3.4.3 Hete roskedasti city of Logarithmic returns 
The plots of logarithmic returns shown in Figures 3.2 and 3.3 indicate that it is plausible that 
both series feature a time-cbanging variance. A more formal yardstick which may be applied 
is the Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test statistic. The log returns are regressed on a constant, a 
lag and an error term as follows: 
r, =, 80 +Ar,. i + Ill. (3.8) 
The LM statistic is then used to test whether there are autoregressive conditional 
heteroskedasticity (ARCH) effects in the error term it,, (Engle, 1982). The squared residuals 
(u2, ) are regressed on q squared residual lags: 
r, 2 1= ao + pjeý, -, -ý'PAý1-2 
+ 
-- -+ Pqeýt-q- (3.9) 
The null hypothesis of no ARCH effects (p, =p2 = ... =pq 0) is tested against the alternative 
hypothesis that p, 0 0; P2 0 0) ... Pq 0 0. The LM statistics for both indices are shown in 
Table 3.4 for ARCH(l) effects. These show that the null hypothesis of no ARCH effects can 
be rejected, at least at the 95% level of confidence. This is a typical feature of heteroskedastic 
time series Nvhcrc large returns tend to occur in clusters. 
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3.4.4 Symmetry of the Tails of the Logarithmic Distribution 
In case of the NIFTY log returns, both the histogram as well as the 0.01 and 0.99 percentiles 
indicate asymmetry, in the sense that the right tail seems fatter than the left one. As for the 
Mideap index, the 0.01 and the 0.99 percentiles indicate asymmetry where the left tail is fatter 
than the right. Yet in this case, the right tail becomes fatter than the normal distribution at 
higher standardised values and the histogram seems to suggest a fatter right tail. Therefore, 
these indices do not confirm the observation of Franses and van Dijk (2000) that large 
negative returns occur more often than large positive returns. However, they are in line with 
the suggestions of Longin (1996) and Jondeau and Rockinger (2003), that asymmetry in the 
tails in any one particular direction is not a general characteristic of stock market returns. 
3.4.5 High Volatility often follows Large Negative Returns 
The methodology used by Franses and van Dijk (2000) to show that high volatility often 
follows large negative returns, was to work out the correlation between the squared return at 
day t and the return at day t_j. 24 A negative correlation coefficient indicates that the larger 
returns were likely to be preceded by a negative return. Table 3.4 reports negative correlation 
coefficients (1-2, r, -, 
) for both indices, and this is in line with the observation of the above 
authors. 
3.5 Concluding Comment 
This chapter offered a background to the NSE and a preliminary analysis of the data set at 
hand. It is not claimed that all of the features evident in this sample are general characteristics 
of stock market data - indeed some may have been the result of a relatively short sampling 
period. Nonetheless, these features reveal that the sample does not deviate by much from the 
basic "stylized facts" of stock market data. Overall, there are numerous features which relate 
specifically to NSE. Some of these characteristics fall outside the sample period and therefore 
24 An alternative methodology for detecting the asymmetric response to volatility was outlined by Engle and Ng 
(1993). This methodology is adopted in Chapters 5 and 7. 
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do not affect the research results. Other features will be specifically analysed or accounted for 
in the empirical chapters where possible. 
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APPENDIX 3.1 
Market Wide Circuit Breakers 
The Market Wide Circuit Breakers system was introduced in July 2001. Trading halts in 
equity and derivatives markets are triggered by specified movements in the NSE Nifty or the 
BSE Sensex. Trading resumes after a period of time, which depends on the magnitude of the 
movement of the index, and whether the movement occurred in the morning or in the 
afternoon. When the fluctuation occurs in the afternoon, trading usually stops for the rest of 
the day. This happens to avoid resuming trading for a brief period given that the trading 
session usually stops at 15: 30. Short trading sessions may not be desirable following large 
fluctuations. The NSE website specifies the following procedures in relation to circuit 
breakers: 
"In case of a 10% movement of either of these indices, there would be a one-hour 
market halt if the movement takes place before 1: 00 p. m. In case the movement takes 
place at or after 1: 00 p. m. but before 2: 30 p. m. there would be trading halt for 1/2hour. 
In case movement takes place at or after 2: 30 p. m. there will be no trading halt at the 
10% level and market shall continue trading". 
"In case of a 15% movement of either index, there shall be a two-hour halt if the 
movement takes place before I p. m. If the 15% trigger is reached on or after 1: 00p. m. 
but before 2: 00 p. m., there shall be a one-hour halt. If the 15% trigger is reached on or 
after 2: 00 p. m. the trading shall halt for remainder of the day". 
"In case of a 20% movement of the index, trading shall be halted for the remainder of 
the day". 
Source:. ivmv. nse-indfa. com; accessed 3rd September 2003. 
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APPENDIX 3.2 
Changes in Market Timings 
During the initial part of the sample period, pre-opening and post-closing call auctions were 
held. Pre-opening call auctions were usually held between 09: 30 and 09: 45, followed by 
continuous trading till 15: 30, and subsequently by a Oost-closing call auction between 15: 30 
and 15: 45. Unexecuted orders from the continuous trading session were carried forward to the 
closing call auction. As from 9ý'June 1999, the initial and closing auctions were no longer 
held. Continuous trading was held between 10: 00 and 15: 30. The pre-opening and post- 
closing auctions were resumed on the. 17"' November 1999. The trading hours were as 
follows: 
Pre-open Session: 09: 45 to 09: 55 
Nonnal Market Open: 09: 55 
Non-nal Market Close: 15: 30 
Post-close Session: 15: 35 to 15: 50 
Yet, during the above trading day, whilst the auction algorithm was working correctly, some 
display problems on the trading screen occurred, and the pre-open and post-closing auctions 
were suspended again, as from 18'h November 1999. 
The trading hours were amended as follows: 
Normal Market Open: 10: 00 
Normal Market Close: 15: 30 
The market timings were revised again on 30'h December 1999, as follows: 
Normal Market Open: 09: 00 
Normal Market Close: 13: 00 
The above change was affected in connection with the preparation for any problems which 
might have arose due to the change in date at the start of the year 2000. 
As from 3 rd January 2000, the trading hours were: 
Normal Market Open: 10: 00 
Normal Market Close: 15: 30 
As from 86 March till 17"' March 2000, the market timings were: 
Normal Market open: 09: 55 
Non-nal Market suspended from 11: 00 till 11: 30 
Normal Market re-open: 11: 35 after a pre-open of five minutes 
Non-nal Market close: 16: 00 
The final revision in timings during the sample period occurred on 21" March 2000: 
Normal Market Open: 09: 55 
Normal Market Close: 15: 30 
Information obtainedfront NSE Circulars: CAITR101015, CM TR101289, CAITRIO. 1297, CAITR101344, 
CC101362,01TRIO1501, CAITR101504 and CAITRIO. 1531. 
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APPENDIX 3.3 
Trading Holidays 
02-Mar-99 Tuesday Holi 
29-Mar-99 Monday Bakri-ld (ld-ul-zuha) 
02-Apr-99 Friday Good Friday 
27-Apr-99 Tuesday Moharrum 
13-Sep-99 Monday Ganesh Chaturthi 
19-Oct-99 Tuesday Dasara 
07-Nov-99 Sunday Diwali (Laxmi Puja)* 
08-Nov-99 Monday Diwali 
23-Nov-99 Tuesday Guru Nanak Jayanti 
26-Jan-00 Wednesday Republic Day 
17-Mar-00 Thursday Bakri-ld (ld-ul-zuha) 
20-Mar-00 Monday Holi 
* Mitharat trading was conducted during this holiday from 19: 00 till 20: 30. Yet, this trading 
day was deleted from the sample, given that the number of trades was less than 180,000, when 
a typical NSE trading day for the sample period featured around 400,000 trades. 
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CHAPTER 4: 
AN ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACTS OF NOW 
SYNCHRONOUS TRADING ON PREDICTABILITY 
4.1 Introduction 
Theoretical models of market microstructure are often formulated in continuous time, yet 
empirical studies of securities markets use data sets which are necessarily in discrete time. 
This discrepancy may constitute a challenge to researchers aiming to investigate the validity of 
theoretical models by analysing empirical data. This challenge becomes more pronounced 
when the data include non-synchronous trading effects, meaning that some particular stocks 
do not trade for prolonged periods - yet researchers typically assume that the cross-section of 
prices was sampled simultaneously. Such assumptions may be vital for the sake of research 
manageability, yet they might also affect the validity of any inferences. For instance, the 
degree of efficiency on the market may be underestimated given that non-synchronous trading 
might give the impression that stock prices are not adjusting immediately to news. 
For this reason, the market microstructure discipline stands to gain from a deeper 
understanding of non-synchronous trading effects as well as the increased availability of 
empirical evidence of these effects, gleaned through various methodologies. The main 
objective of this empirical study is to provide new evidence on this question. The strength of 
this analysis lies in three important respects: first, a new test method is proposed to identify 
the relation between predictability and non-synchronicity; second, it employs a high quality, 
high frequency dataset; and third, it uses data from an emerging stock market. 
Most existing studies which tackled non-synchronous trading effects have focused on the 
autocorrelation structures of stock market data. In this chapter, I take a different approach, 
and focus on predictability and lead-lag effects in the values of two indices. Predictability 
effects are tested for using three different techniques; namely Pesaran-Timmermann tests, 
Vector Autoregressions and Granger-Causality, and Impulse Response Functions. The 
analysis then proposes a simple test in order to infer whether any predictability effects may be 
attributed to non-synchronous trading or whether they constitute actual delayed adjustments of 
traders' expectations. 
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A second important aspect of this empirical investigation lies in the use of high-frequency 
data, in addition to daily data - and the analysis breaks new ground in this respect. Following 
the notion that trading activity varies throughout the trading day, one may deduce that non- 
synchronous trading effects become more amplified during those periods when trading 
activity abates - usually towards the middle of the day. This implies that an intra-day data set 
is a prerequisite to obtain unbiased empirical evidence of non-synchronous trading effects. 
A third noteworthy feature is the use of emerging market data in the context of non- 
synchronous trading. One may expect differences between the microstructure effects of stock 
market trading in emerging economies and those in the industrial economies, especially given 
the macro evidence on market differences. Emerging markets tend to exhibit higher serial 
correlation, less frequent trading and slower adjustment of prices to news (Bekaert and 
Harvey; 2002). The NSE provides an interesting setting for the analysis since it includes a 
significant proportion of less liquid securities. This enables the thorough investigation of the 
issues of efficiency and non-synchronou5 trading across stocks with different liquidity levels, 
using daily and higher frequency data:. 
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows: Section 4.2 reviews the existing literature 
whilst Section 4.3 describes the methodology and fonnulates the expected results for this 
study. Section 4.4 describes the data sets. Sections 4.5 - 4.7 test for predictability effects in 
the data set through different techniques. Section 4.8 investigates whether the observed 
predictability effects are more attributable to non-synchronous trading as opposed to actual 
delayed adjustments of expectations on part of traders. Section 4.9 concludes. 
4.2 Research Background 
Non-synchronous trading effects take place when different shares are traded at different 
intervals - in particular transactions in less liquid securities occur less frequently. In the latter 
cases, the last transaction price quotations might cease to reflect the fundamental value of the 
firm as new information becomes available. In this way, at each point in time, the cross- 
section of last trade prices reflects different overlapping information, some of which may be 
partly out-of-date. At face value, this gives the impression that the prices of some stocks 
delay in adjusting to new information; yet the underlying cause of the apparent inefficiency is 
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that the most recent trading price relates to a past transaction, and the time since the last 
transaction varies across securities. Last transaction prices of infrequently traded securities 
might be used for calculating the value of a portfolio of stocks or the value of a market index. 
At times, the validity of this methodology is undennined since such calculations might be 
based on partly outdated data due to non-synchronous trading. The latter data does not imply 
that there still exist market participants who are willing to trade at those prices. 
One problem with non-synchronous trading effects is that it is usually cumbersome for 
researchers to inquire the last transaction time for each and every stock and it is often assumed 
that securities prices were sampled simultaneously. Yet this might not necessarily be the case, 
say when working with a cross-section of security closing prices, and it might therefore 
amount to a limitation in the research methodology. 
Non-synchronous trading induces particular characteristics in stock price data. For instance, 
stock price indices tend to exhibit higher levels of serial correlation than individual stocks, as 
discussed by Fisher (1966). Cohen, Maier, Schwartz and Whitcomb (1979) showed that non- 
synchronous trading induccs serial correlations in market returns. Clare, Smith and Thomas 
(1997) in an analysis of UK stock data, found that smaller stocks feature higher levels of serial 
correlation, which they attributed to thin trading. 
Atchison, Butler and Simonds (1987) compared the serial correlation of a portfolio of NYSE 
stocks to that predicted by a model of non-synchronous trading as proposed by Scholes and 
Williams (1977). They found that the actual serial correlation was higher than that predicted 
by the non-synchronous trading model, and they attributed this to other sources of delayed 
price adjustment. There might be various reasons why prices take longer to adjust to new 
information. For instance, as discussed in Chapter 2, market participants who submit limit 
orders do not necessarily monitor these orders continuously. As new information becomes 
available, such orders may become mispriced and other participants might "pick off 'these 
orders to trade profitably. In this way a transaction which occurs at an outdated price might 
still be consistent with market efficiency, since an efficient market does not require all market 
participants to adjust expectations instantaneously. A further reason why a delayed price 
adjustment may occur is that participants might not devote enough time in monitoring less 
liquid stocks, as they do. with the most liquid ones. Thus, new information relating 
specifically to the former stocks might take longer to get priced in. Therefore, not all of the 
pricing delays which are evident in stock price data are the result of non-synchronous trading. 
A related idea as discussed by Jegadeesh and Titman (1995) is that the serial correlation of 
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returns is the result of stock price over-reactions rather than actual lead-lag relationships. In 
particular, stock prices tend to overreact to company-specific news, but there tends to be a 
delayed reaction to general economic news. 
Clare, Morgan and Thomas (2002) used monthly data for shares trading on the London Stock 
Exchange in order to gauge the serial correlation characteristics of those stocks which are less 
prone to non-trading periods. The use of monthly data enabled the authors to adopt an 
innovative approach based on the notion that shares trading at the close. of the sampling 
interval (i. e. the last day of the month) do not suffer from non-trading. In this way, the authors 
created a control portfolio, comprising stocks which trade at the end of the month which 
should be less prone to non-synchronicity. The authors reported positive serial correlation 
across size-sorted portfolios, which becomes more pronounced in the case of those portfolios 
comprising smaller stocks. One key result of the study is that the control portfolio still 
features significant serial correlation, and therefore this feature may not be exclusively 
attributed to the non-trading of stocks. One possible source which may account for the 
correlation which may not be attributed to non-trading is the presence of "positive feedback 
traders" who buy/sell stocks as prices rise/fall. 
Various authors have investigated the effects of non-synchronous trading on the 
autocorrelation of stock returns, and these include Lo and MacKinlay (1990), Boudoukh, 
Richardson and Whitelaw (1994ý and Kadlec and Patterson"(1999). All these studies conclude 
that non-synchronous trading increases return serial correlation, but they disagree as to what is 
the specific autocorrelation level which emanates from non-synchronous trading. Part of the 
discrepancy in between the studies may be attributed to the differing assumptions as regards 
the non-trading intervals of securities. 
An "explicit" case of non-synchronous trading was analysed by Papachristou (1999) in the 
context of the Athens Stock Exchange. Prior to 1989 the trading day on this exchange 
consisted of successive trading sessions, and shares of a particular industry traded in each of 
the sessions. Thus, the returns reported at the end of the day - and therefore the closing index 
value - constituted partly "outdated" information since they related to transactions which took 
place earlier on during the day. The non-trading periods for the particular stocks in this case 
were determini stic, and the author called this "deterministic non-synchronicity". The author 
showed that the overall effects are similar to those of stochastic non-synchronicity, including 
serial correlation in market index returns and cross-correlation in between stocks. 
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A further possible source of serial correlation in returns on some exchanges is the existence of 
price limits (Chang, McLeavey and Rhee; 1995). When the prices of particular stocks are 
adjusting to news, prices might hit the limit, and thus the required adjustment would have to 
resume at a later stage. Now, according to the empirical evidence of Kim and Limpaphayom 
(2000) in the context of Asian markets, active stocks and small stocks tend to hit price limits 
more frequently. In the context of India, NSE adopted a system of price limits ranging from 
8% to 50%, as outlined in Chapter 3. For price limits to result in frequent lead-lag effects 
from larger to smaller capitalisati on stocks, it would be required that smaller stocks hit price 
limits more frequently than larger capitalisation ones. Yet, this does not seem to be the case, 
since intuitively both the larger and the smaller stocks are more prone to hit price limits. 
Smaller stocks are more prone to hit price limits (Kim and Limpaphayom; 2000), whilst given 
that larger NSE stocks trade more actively (Tables 4.3 and 4.4) the latter stocks are more 
prone to hit price limits as well, as per the evidence of the former authors. Thus, we may not 
speak of any possible lead-lag effects as between stocks with varying liquidity characteristics, 
due to price limits. 
Furthermore, given that this investigation uses index data computed through a cross-section of 
fifty stocks, the effect of one single stock occasionally hitting a price limit is not likely to lead 
to material restraints on the indices from reflecting the fundamental value. This argument is 
not applicable to non-synchronous trading effects. Whereas one may only expect a handful of 
stocks in an index to hit price limits on a particular day, non-synchronous trading effects 
should transpire in a larger number of stocks in the smaller-capitalisation index. This is due to 
the fact that smaller stocks trade less frequently as compared to the larger ones (Tables 4.3 and 
4.4). 
Overall, the presence of price limits does not affect the main notion of this analysis (in that the 
main research question is whether any lead-lag effects are resulting from actual delays in 
traders' adjustments to news as opposed to market microstructure effects). Such 
microstructure effects are likely to constitute non-synchronous trading rather than price limits, 
given that price limits are not expected to lead to causality in any given direction. In addition, 
whilst any presence of non-synchronous trading is likely to affect a high proportion of less 
traded stocks, it should be unlikely that a similar proportion of stocks comprising the index hit 
the price limit simultaneously. Furthermore, whilst non-synchronous trading effects tend to 
recur throughout the year on those stocks which suffer from this factor (since lower trading 
activity would be typical in such stocks throughout most trading days), securities tend to hit 
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price limits only on a handful of days. 25 In this way, any market microstructure effects 
observed in this analysis are more likely to constitute non-synchronous trading rather than 
stocks hitting price limits. 
Despite this, one cannot discard the possibility that any lead-lag effects which are not related 
to delayed traders' adjustments are due to price limit restrictions rather than to non- 
synchronous trading. Both phenomena imply less frequent transactions - non-synchronous 
trading is related to temporary absence of transactions, whilst price limits are likely to result in 
lower trading activity given that trading in the particular stock may be suspended upon hitting 
the price limit. In addition traders may take the view that prices close to the limit are "fake" 
and they may be reluctant to trade at such prices. 
Given that changes in expectations may take longer to show up in share price fluctuations if 
the latter trade infrequently, non-synchronous trading may result in lead-lag effects in between 
the prices of various stocks. This induces predictability in the data. Yet, this degree of 
predictability does not necessarily translate into abnormally profitable trading opportunities, 
as shown by Day and Wang (2002) after simulating a trading strategy in the Dow Jones 
Industrial Average index which was adjusted for non-synchronous trading effects. 
The aim of this study is to investigate the lead-lag effects as between two indices which differ 
in their degree of non-synchronous trading. Intuitively, one may expect that the index which 
features the less liquid securities will "take longer to adjust to new information" and therefore 
the more liquid index will lead the less liquid one. This is one of the first studies that analyse 
lead-lag relationships between two indices, in the context of non-synchronous trading effects 
as the central issue. Previous non-synchronous trading studies tended to focus on the serial 
correlation structure of the return data. Conversely, most studies of lead-lag relationships as 
between indices or stock portfolios do not place their principal emphasis on non-synchronous 
trading. However, some of the findings of the latter studies are relevant to non-synchronous 
trading, for example Lo and MacKinlay (1990) and Conrad, Gultekin and Kaul (199 1). 
Lo and MacKinlay (1990) analysed US stock price data which were sampled at different inter- 
day frequencies. They found that large-capitalization stocks tend to lead the stocks of smaller 
companies. One important factor which results in such "causality" is the cross-correlation 
25 No statistics regarding the frequency of price limit hits on NSE were available, but relying on similar statistics 
reported by Kim and Limpapbayorn (2000) for the period 1990-1993, stocks on average hit price limits on 27 
trading days on the Taiwan Stock Exchange, whilst they hit price limits on 8 trading days on the Thailand Stock 
Exchange. 
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between stocks over time. The latter may be a by-product of non-synchronous trading, as 
shown by various authors such as Cohen, Maier, Schwartz and Whitcomb (1979). Conrad, 
Gultekin and Kaul (1991) used GARCH methodology to study the transmission of volatility 
between different size-sorted portfolios comprising various US stocks, sampled at weekly 
intervals. The authors found that volatility in larger stocks affects the volatility of smaller 
stocks, but the reverse does not apply. The authors noted that one possible cause of these 
dynamics is that general economic news might first be impounded in the larger-capitalisation 
stocks, and subsequently in smaller stocks. The related findings of Chan and Hameed (2006) 
in the context of various emerging markets, indicate that stocks which attract more attention 
on part of analysts lead those stocks which are analysed less closely, even after controlling for 
firm size. 
The only papers which directly addressed lead-lag effects in the context of non-synchronous 
trading are Chiao, Hung and Lee (2004) and Poshakwale and Theobald (2004). Chiao, Hung 
and Lee (2004) reported a contemporaneous relationship between Taiwanese stocks of 
different market capitalisation, implying that smaller stocks do not take longer to adjust than 
larger ones. Yet, the latter study used weekly and monthly data; whereas non-synchronous 
trading should be essentially a shorter-term phenomenon. In particular, with the typical surge 
in trading activity at the end of the trading day, it might be the case that the smaller stocks 
"make up" for the delayed adjustments during the day, and thus no non-synchronous trading 
effects would be detected using daily data frequency. Thus, one may expect that the analysis 
of non-synchronous trading effects using high frequency data should be an important 
supplement to the existing literature. . 
Like the present study, Poshak%vale and Theobald (2004) employed Indian data from the 
National Stock Exchange and the Bombay Stock Exchange. 26 The authors used daily data 
frequency, and in contrast to Chiao, Hung and Lee (2004), they found traces of lead-lag 
effects in the data from larger to smaller stocks, even after adjusting for thin trading effects in 
the smaller stocks. The authors found that roughly 50% of the predictability derives from 
non-synchronous trading, whilst the rest is attributable to a mixture of non-synchronous 
trading and different speeds of adjustment. Whilst the paper by Poshakwale and Theobald 
(2004) is similar to this investigation, there is still an -added value in the latter analysis. In 
particular, this analysis employs higher frequency data which offer higher potential for 
2' This paper was published after finishing the preliminary draft of this investigation. 
56 
4. AN ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACTS OF NON-SYNCHRONOUS TRADING ON PREDICTABILITY 
gleaning evidence of non-synchronous trading effects, and in addition, there is still a 
possibility of obtaining contrasting results. 
This analysis seems to be the first one that tests for lead-lag relationships between two indices, 
using high-frequency data with the specific aim of gleaning evidence of non-syncbronous 
trading effects. Using a high-frequency data set is important given that intra-day factors might 
be more relevant to analysing such effects from a market microstructure point of view as 
discussed in Section 4.3.5. 
4.3 Methodology and Expected Results 
This analysis applies various methodologies to investigate the effects of non-synchronous 
trading on data predictability, in terms of lead-lag effects. These methodologies constitute 
Pesaran-Timmermann tests, Granger Causality and Vector Autoregressions (VARs), and 
Impulse Response Functions (IRFs), as described in Sections 4.3.1,4.3.2 and 4.3.3. The 
methodology which is used to infer whether the observed predictability emanates from non- 
synchronous trading or market inefficiency is to investigate the returns during and following 
trading breaks, as discussed in Section 4.3.4. The subsequent section considers result 
expectations. 
4.3.1 Pes aran -Timmerman n Tests 
The test proposed by Pesaran and Timmermann (1992) measures the dependence between two 
time series, in terms of whether they fluctuate in the same direction. Therefore, this non- 
parametric test considers the direction of the changes and ignores the magnitude of the 
fluctuations. The procedure tests the null hypothesis that the series are independent, and the 
test statistic is normally distributed in case of large samples. 
The test statistic for assessing the relationship between variables x, and y, is computed as 
follows: 
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and the function Sign(Z) takes a value of I when the variable is positive and zero otherwise. 
Thus, P is a measurement of the number of occurrences where both time series changed in 
the same direction - it takes a maximum value of 1 when all the respective changes are in the 
same direction, and a minimum value of 0 when all contemporaneous changes are always in 
A^ 
an opposite direction. The terms P., V(P), and V(P. ) adjust this "crude" measurement by 
considering the individual proportions of negative and positive changes in both of the series, 
and scale the original measurement to a normal distribution. 
Pesaran-Timmermann tests may be used to detect lead-lag effects when applied to the 
relationships between x, and y, -, or 
between x, -, and y,. 
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4.3.2 Vector Autoregression and Granger-Causality 
Vector Autoregression (VAR) methodology is based on the principle of Granger-Causality. 
Granger (1969) argued that if shocks in a particular time series lead to shocks in another time 
series, then the former series is "Granger-causing" the latter. In this way, VARs model a time 
series as an AR process, with the added lagged terms of another time series and an error terni. 
If the lags of the second time series are significant, then one may argue that the latter is 
Granger-Causing the dependent variable. Thus, VARs offer the potential for modelling causal 
and feedback effects, where two or more time series Granger-cause each other. 
The term "Granger-Causality" does not imply actual causality. For instance, it might be the 
case that the inter-relationships between the time series might be caused by an exogenous 
variable. Therefore, Granger-Causality modelling should be accompanied by an underlying 
theoretical relationship since otherwise the model may be incorrectly specified. 
A bivariate VAR may be formulated as follows: 
nn 
x, = a,, x, -, + Aty, -, + m, 
(4.8) 
nn 
yt = a2iXt-I + 1821YI-i + 1121 
(4.9) 
where x, and y, are the variables that are assumed to Granger-cause each other, whilst u, is an 
error ten-n. 
This can be written in vector-matrix notation: 
[x, ]=[crii A, ]Fx, -il,. [tllt (4.10) Y, a2,82, ]Ly, -il 112t] 
Granger-Causality methodology has been used to analyse relationships between stock prices 
and a variety of other variables. For instance, the relationship between fundamentals (such as 
the dividend growth rate) and stock prices was tested by Mavrides (2000), the relationship 
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between stock prices and trading volume was analysed by Hiemstra and Jones (1994) and 
Silvapulle and Choi (1999), the interdependence of asset markets in different countries was 
analysed by Ostermark (1998) and Hamori and Imamura (2000), and the relationship between 
stock prices and exchange rates was analysed by Granger, Huang and Yang (2000). 
One persistent argument concerning Granger-Causality is whether the latter implies market 
inefficiencies, in the sense that if an index fluctuation leads to a fluctuation in another index, 
this would mean that if the first fluctuation was justified on the grounds of new information, 
the latter fluctuation should have occurred at the same time, ruling out lead-lag effects. 
Various authors such as Niarchos and Alexakis (1998) argue that Granger-Causality from one 
price series to the other may be taken as evidence against market efficiency. 
Therefore when testing for Granger-Causality using daily data, one should expect 
contemporaneous (but not lagged) relationships if the markets are efficient and if there are no 
non-synchronous trading effects. This research also uses high frequency data sampled at one 
minute intervals. In the latter case, one may reasonably expect some lagged relationships. For 
instance prices of the most liquid stocks adjust instantly to news, whilst in case of less liquid 
stocks one may expect that the adjustment occurs later. The latter effect might not necessarily 
imply that traders are inefficient. Following non-synchronous trading arguments, it might be 
the case that the security does not trade immediately after the news; in this way the prices 
which are used for the purpose of calculating index values might be "outdated ones", giving 
the impression that the traders did not adjust their view about the value of the security. Thus 
when consider-ing high frequency data, one may expect not to reject the existence of Granger- 
Causality. 
VAR and Granger-Causality are subject to a number of limitations as outlined underneath. 
Firstly, Granger-Causality does not imply actual causality. In the current context, the indices 
may be influenced by an exogenous variable, and therefore the actual causality might run from 
the extraneous variable to the time series being studied. This argument may be relevant to the 
Indian stock markets, when considering the empirical evidence presented by Lamba (2003) 
that Indian equities are influenced by the markets of developed countries such as US, UK and 
Japan. Capelle-Blancard and Raymond (2002) show that cross-country linkages may emanate 
both from market-wide information and non-fundamental factors such as herding and traders 
adopting similar trading rules. In the context of this analysis, the "shortcoming" that Granger- 
Causality might not constitute actual causality is implied throughout the chapter, since it is 
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confirmed that the observed predictability is largely the result of non-synchronous trading 
effects rather than actual causality. 
The inferences obtained by the Granger-Causality model may be affected by the sampling 
process (Renault, Sekkat and Szafarz, 1998). This tends to happen when researchers analyse 
discrete price series, when the underlying theoretical model assumes continuous time. In 
addition, linear Granger-Causality tests may fail to detect non-linear causal relations as 
discussed byBaek and Brock (1992) and Hiemstra and Jones (1994). Non-linearity implies 
that the extent of the dependency between the time series varies during the sample period. 
Engle and Granger (1987) argued that VAR estimates obtained when analysing differenced 
data of cointegrated time series may be flawed, since that the VAR excludes the error 
correction terms which appear in cointegration models. 27 
4.3.3 Impulse Response Functions 
VAR models may be used to generate Impulse Response Functions (IRFs) as shown for 
instance by Sims (1980). IRFs trace the response of each of the variables in the system, to a 
shock in a given variable. Usually, a shock to the variable x, has the largest effect on 
subsequent realisations of that variable itself. Yet if the VAR model predicts that the variable 
x, is affecting other variables in the system, the latter should respond to the initial shock in x, - 
usually the latter responses are lower than the subsequent fluctuations in x, due to the shock. 
The IRF of variable y, to a shock in variable x, which occurs at time t, may be viewed as the 
difference between two time series: 
The realisations of the time series y, after the shock in x, has occurred; and 
9 The realisations of the time series y, which would have been observed in the absence 
of the shock in x,, during the same time period. 
The above may be formulated as follows: 
" Cointegration tests that were performed on the data sets used in this analysis showed that the series were not 
cointegrated, and therefore this limitation is not relevant to this analysis. 
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where y is the time series of interest, 6 is the shock taking place at time t, co, j is the history of 
the time series, c denotes an innovation, and the IRF is generated from time t to t+n. As 
shown in the equation, the intermediate innovations are assumed to be equal to zero, and this 
may be considered as a limitation of orthogonalised versions of IRFs. Another weakness of 
orthogonalised IRFs is that the actual results may vary, depending on the order in which the 
variables are specified in the VAR model. 
In order to overcome the above limitations, - Koop, Pesaran and Potter (1996) introduced the 
Gencralised Impulse Response Function (GIRF), where the. expectations of yt-,,, are only 
conditional on the shock and the history of the series. This can be written as follows: 
GIRFy(n, t5, W, -, 
)=E[y,,, jE, (4.12) 
4.3.4 Trading Break Returns 
The analysis of trading break and post-trading break returns is relevant for inferring whether 
delayed price adjustments in the data, mainly emanate from traders' delays in updating their 
expectations or whether they are more attributable to non-synchronous trading. Here, the term 
"trading break" refers to the ceasing of trading activity at the end of the day till the subsequent 
morning (and at times till after the weekend). It is assumed that during a trading break, market 
participants have enough time to adjust theirjudgements regarding the fundamental value of 
the firms, and that any outdated limit orders are cancelled. This appears to be a reasonable 
assumption for overnight and weekend breaks. 
Given this, one may assume that any trades which occur immediately after a trading break will 
reflect the underlying market value of the particular firms and one may rule out any delayed 
price adjustments on part of the traders. This implies that if lead-lag effects as between the 
indices persist immediately after the trading break, they must be mainly due to non- 
synchronous trading effects rather than mispriced trades. Non-synchronous trading effects can 
still coexist with trading breaks given that an infrequently traded stock, might still take longer 
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to trade immediately following the trading break. This results in a delayed adjustment of 
market price data - yet it is reasonable to assume that traders' expectations would have 
already been adjusted by the time that trading was resumed. This test is discussed further in 
Section 4.8, in the context of the empirical setting. 
4.3.5 Formulating the Expected Results for this Study 
The novel approach in this study is that the effects of non-synchronous trading are 
investigated in terms of leads and lags between two market indices which feature differing 
degrees of liquidity. The more liquid index may be expected to lead the less liquid one. Any 
lead-lag effects might be consistent with market participants taking longer to adjust their 
judgement regarding the fundamental value of the firms which trade less frequently. Yet, such 
lead-lag effects may simply be the result of non-synchronous trading effects in the data. In 
line with prior literature, one may expect both of the former factors to be contributing to lead- 
lag effects. 
Another novel contribution in this analysis emanates from the use of a high-frequency data 
set, in addition to a daily data set. One may expect non-synchronous trading effects to be 
more prominent in a high-frequency data set and this rests on the fact that trading activity 
typically varies throughout the trading day. Non-trading periods for less liquid stocks might 
be more likely to occur during particular periods of the day, and such effects require a high- 
frequency data set to detect. Empirical studies point at a rise in trading activity at the end of 
the day. In our empirical setting of NSE, trading activity peaks at the end of the day, as 
discussed by Shah and Sivakumar (2000). This implies that non-synchronous trading effects 
become less significant at the end of the day, and thus more difficult to detect when using a 
data set which is based on closing prices. 
Summing up, the main expectations are that the more liquid index leads the less liquid one and 
that such an effect becomes more pronounced when analysing the high frequency data set. 
Based on the inferences of previous studies, such predictability elements should be partly 
attributable to actual delays in price adjustments as well as due to non-synchronous trading. 
At the end of the Chapter, I investigate which of the latter causes is more relevant in 
explaining the observed lead-lag effects. 
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4.4 Data Set Characteristics 
The daily data consist of the closing observations of the NSE Nifty and Midcap indices - the 
main index and the smaller capitalisation index respectively. Each index comprises 50 stocks 
and no security may be included in both indices. The reader is referred to Chapter 3 for a 
more detailed background of the main indices and NSE setup. The daily data period ranges 
from I" January 1999 to 3 1" December 2003 -a total of 1257 observations. 
Figure 4.1: Logarithmic Series for Nifty (LN) and Mldcap (LM) (Daily 
Frequency) 
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The high frequency data set consists of the values of both indices, sampled at one minute 
intervals, over the period ranging from 15'h June 1999 to 25"' June 1999. This period includes 
nine continuous trading sessions starting at 10 a. m. and ending at 3.30 p. m., yielding a total of 
2970 observations. 
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Each high frequency data file showed tick-by-tick changes in the value of the Nifty and 
Midcap indices. In some instances there were seven (different) observations for each second, 
totalling to approximately 420 observations for the particular minute. In sampling the data, 
the first observation for the particular minute was taken. The observations typically started at 
10: 00 and ended at 15: 29 yielding a total of 330 one-minute observations for each trading day. 
Figure 4.2: Log Return Series for Nifty (LRN) and Mldcap (LRM) (Daily 
Frequency) 
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Figures 4.1 and 4.2 show the logarithmic series and log return plots for both indices, sampled 
at daily intervals. Figures 4.3 and 4.4 show logarithmic series and log return plots for both 
indices, sampled at one minute intervals. Summary statistics and ADF tests of different orders 
are shown in Table 4.1 (daily data) and Table 4.2 (intra-day data). 
Both in the case of the daily and one minute frequency data. sets, the Augmented Dickey 
Fuller tests do not reject the null hypothesis of a unit root when considering the logs of the 
series. The null hypothesis of a unit root is rejected when considering the logarithmic returns. 
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This implies that the logarithmic prices may be classified as l(l) since they are stationary in 
the first differences. 
Table 4.1: Daily Interval Data Set 
Properties of Nifty and Midcap Logarithmic Series (LN and LM) and Nifty and 
Midcap Log Returns (LRN and LRM) 
_Variable 
LN LM LRN LRM 
Maximum Value 7.539 8.534 0.075 0.074 
Minimum Value 6.750 6.953 -0.077 -0.090 
Mean 7.083 7.565 0.001 0.001 
Std. Deviation 0.167 0.345 0.016 0.020 
Skewness 0.438 0.584 -0.174 -0.547 
Excess Kurtosis -0.743 -0.321 2.614 1.972 
Jarque-Bera Test (a) 69.2 *** 76.9 363.8 266.1 
ADF Test Statistics (Excluding Trend) (b) 
ADF (1) -1.11 -0.71 -25.12 -23.59 
ADF (5) -1.18 -0.76 -14.15 -13.68 
ADF (10) -1.30 -1.07 -10.15 -8.75 
95% Ctitical Value -2.86 -2.86 -2.86 -2.86 
ADF Test Statistics (including Trend) (b) : 
ADF (1) -1.00 -0.40 -25.13 -23.60 
ADF (5) -1.08 -0.47 -14.16 -13.71 
ADF (10) -1.20 -0.86 -10.17 -8.79 
95% Critical Value -3.42 . -3.42 -3.42 -3.42 
The above statistics are based on a time series of 1257 (price level) observations. 
Statistical significance at the 99%, 95% and 90% level of confidence is denoted by 
and * respectively. 
(a) The Jarque-Bera test for normality, is X2 (2) distributed. The critical values are 
9.21,5.99 and 4.61, for the 99%, 95% and 90% confidence levels respectively, 
rejecting the null hypothesis of a normal distribution. 
(b) The Augmented Dickey-Fuller statistics, test the null hypothesis of a unit root. 
The ADF(n) statistic is the t-ratio of p in the model 
yjAXý-, + E,, t=l,..., z. The 95% critical values of the Axý = Cr + P& - PX'-J + 
test are shown in MacKinnon (1991). The ADF tests do not reject the null hypothesis 
of a unit root for the logarithmic series. The null hypothesis of a unit root is rejected 
when considering the logarithmic returns. 
An informal procedure which may be used to cross-check this test is to look at the 
autocorrelation of the series at different lags. High autocorrelation coefficients which decline 
slowly may be taken as an indication of a unit root. The autocorrelation coefficients shown in 
Appendix 4.1 indicate that the logarithmic series are l(l). 
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Figure 4.3: Logarithmic Series for Nifty (LN) and Midcap (LM) (One Minute 
Frequency) 
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Figure 4.4: Log Return Series for Nifty (LRN) and Midcap (LRM) (One Minute 
Frequency) 
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Given that non-synchronous trading effects depend on the level of liquidity, it is important to 
assess the relative liquidity of the respective indices. One may expect the main index (Nifty) 
to be more liquid than the smaller capitalisation index (Midcap), since larger capitalisation 
companies are likely to be more popular amongst traders. Yet, an empirical investigation 
about the trading frequencies of the shares included in the indices was undertaken to confirm 
this notion. 
Table 4.3 shows the average trading frequencies for the individual shares in the Nifty and the 
Mideap index. Given that the individual shares in the indices change periodically, the index 
composition as at the time of writing (I 8h May 2003) was chosen, largely due to the 
unavailability of index composition historical data. The sampled trading days are included in 
both the daily and the high frequency data sets, and this restricted the potential sample to 9 
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trading days (since the latter data set consists of 9 trading days). Alternate trading days from 
the high-frequency data set were chosen. Given this, such preliminary investigation suffers 
from various limitations. In particular, it is assumed that the index compositions and the 
respective liquidity levels do not change materially over the sample period. 
Table 4.2: One-Minute Interval Data Set 
Properties of Nifty and Midcap Logarithmic Series (LN and LM) and Nifty 
and Midcap Log Returns (LRN and LRM) 
Variable LN LM LRN LRM 
Maximum Value 7.113 7.592 0.010 0.004 
Minimum Value 7.012 7.522 -0.006 -0.003 
Mean 7.070 7.560 0.0000 0.0000 
Std. Deviation 0.024 0.015 0.0006 0.0005 
Skewness -0.804 -0.167 2.624' 0.579 
Excess Kurtosis -0.319 -0.344 39.803 7.278 
Jarque-Bera Test 332.5 28.4 199,395 *** 6,719 
ADF Test Statistics (Excluding Trend) (b) : 
ADF (1) -1.63 -1.06 -31.93 -32.29 
ADF (5) -1.65 -1.26 -20.80 -18.29 
ADF (10) -1.63 -1.28 -15.72 -15.13 
95% Critical Value -2.86 -2.86 -2.86 -2.86 
ADF Test Statistics (including Trend) (b) 
ADF (1) -0.91 -1.63 -31.96 -32.29 
ADF (5) -1.01 -1.91 -20.84 -18.28 
ADF (10) -0.93 -1.94 -15.78 -15.13 
95% Critical Value -3.41 -3.41 -3.41 -3.41 
The above statistics are based on a time series of 2970 (price level) 
observations. Statistical significance at the 99%, 95% and 90% level of 
confidence is denoted by ***, ** and * respectively. 
(a) The Jarque-Bera test for normality, is X2(2) distributed. The critical values are 
9.21,5.99 and 4.61, for the 99%, 95% and 90% confidence levels respectively, 
rejecting the null hypothesis of a normal distribution. 
(b) The Augmented Dickey-Fuller statistics, test the null hypothesis of a unit root. 
The ADF(n) statistic is the t-ratio of p in the model 
?I 
AX, =a+ P&-px, -, +T' 
t=l,..., z. The 95% critical values of YiAxý_i + 
the test are shown in MacKinnon (1991). The ADF tests do not reject the null 
hypothesis of a unit root for the logarithmic series. The null hypothesis of a unit 
root is rejected when considering the logarithmic returns. 
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Table 4.3: Average Trading Frequencies for Nifty and Midcap Shares 
Nifty Shares Midcap Shares 
Av. # Trades Av. Waiting Av. # Trades Av. Waiting 
per S are Time (seconds) per Share Time (seconds) 
15 June '99 3181 6.2 956 20.7 
17 June '99 3798 5.2 858 23.1 
21 June'99 3081 6.4 1034 19.1 
23 June '99 3568 5'5 989 20.0 
25 June '99 3180 6.2 965 20.5 
The table shows the average number of transactions for the shares included in the Nifty 
and Midcap indices for five different trading days. Assuming that these transactions 
occur evenly throughout a trading day of five and a half hours, one can estimate the 
average waiting time - i. e. the average interval between trades. 
Table 4.3 shows that the Nifty index is more liquid than the Mideap, in line with our 
expectations. On average, there is a waiting time of around 6 seconds in between trades for 
the shares included in the Nifty index, while the waiting time for the shares in the Midcap 
index is around 20 seconds. This implies that each of the index observations is "outdated" by 
around 6 seconds and 20 seconds respectively. In estimating the average waiting time, it was 
assumed that trades occur evenly throughout the day. This is not usually a realistic 
assumption - according to Shah and Sivakumar (2000) NSE trading tends to peak at the end of 
the day. This implies that during some periods, the average waiting time will decrease or 
increase; and in the latter case the non-synchronous trading effects become more pronounced. 
Given that non-synchronous trading effects are mainly caused by the less liquid stocks, it also 
makes sense to look at the waiting time statistics of the less liquid shares in the respective 
indices. The waiting time statistics of the ten least frequently traded shares in each index are 
shown in Table 4.4. The table shows that one quintile of the infon-nation which is used in 
estimating Nifty observations is at least five minutes old. Similarly, Midcap observations are 
based on a data set, a quintile of which is around ten minutes old. 
Thus, we may now re-formulate our expectations more specifically. Firstly, one may expect 
that the Midcap index should appear "less efficient" than the Nifty index, in the sense that we 
should obtain an indication that Midcap returns may be predicted to some degree from Nifty 
returns. This "inefficiency" is partly the result of non-synchronous trading, and the study aims 
to infer whether the predictability is more attributable to non-synchronous trading effects or 
actual delayed adjustments of traders' expectations. Secondly, one may also expect non- 
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synchronous trading effects to be more pronounced in the high-frequency data set, following 
the notion that trading peaks at the end of the day, implying that closing prices should be 
based on reasonably current information. 
Table 4.4: Average Trading Frequencies for Nifty and Midcap Least Frequently 
Traded Shares 
Nifty (Least Traded ) Shares Midcap (Least Traded ) Shares 
Av. # Trades Av. Waiting Av. # Trades Av. Waiting 
per Shar Time (minutes) per Share Time (minutes) 
15 June '99 73 5 42 8 
17 June'99 66 5 26 13 
21 June'99 73 5 . 31 11 
23 June'99 86 4 51 7 
25 June'99 71 5 32 10 
The table shows the average number of transactions for the ten least frequently traded 
shares included in the indices. Statistics for five different trading days are shown. 
Assuming that these transactions occur evenly throughout a trading day of five and a 
half hours, one can estimate the average waiting time - i. e. the average interval 
between trades. 
4.5 Pesaran-Timmermann Tests 
We now turn to the first predictability investigation through Pesaran-Timmemiann (1992) 
tests, Given that this procedure is essentially a test on the signs, rather than the magnitude of a 
time series, it does not matter whether it is applied to simple returns or log returns. Pesaran- 
Timmermann tests were conducted not only on the contemporaneous relationship between the 
indices, but also on the relationship between the change of an index at time t with the lagged 
changes of the other index. 
Table 4.5 shows Pesaran-Timmermann statistics for both the daily and intra-day data series. 
At both frequencies, the Nifty and Midcap indices tend to contemporaneously move in the 
same direction, as witnessed by the highly significant. statistics of 20.28 for the daily data and 
18.83 for the intra-day data. Assuming that the difference between these statistics is not due 
to the different sample periods, the lower test statistic for the high frequency data set, may 
indicate that non-synchronous trading effects are more evident in high frequency data. 
Despite this, one should note that the difference in test statistics is not so important at this 
level of significance. 
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Inspecting the Pesaran-Timmennan statistics for the daily data set in more detail, both the 
contemporaneous and the first lag are significant in predicting the change direction of the 
other index. The significant contemporaneous relationship 
' 
implies that the indices tend to 
move in the same direction, as may be reasonably expected. Ignoring the other significant 
lags for the time being, we may note that the Nifty and Midcap indices are more or less 
equally relevant for predicting the direction change of the other index. This implies that the 
difference in liquidity in between the daily data sets is not resulting in differing degrees of 
predictability. We may thus assume that this predictability effect is not the result of non- 
synchronous trading or differing degrees of liquidity. One possible explanation might be 
6cruns" in the data, whereby each of the indices changes successively in the same direction 
over a period of days. Data runs do not necessarily contradict the efficient market hypothesis 
given that longer runs may be considered as a normal feature when analysing a series that may 
be classified as a random walk with drift. 
The other significant lagged observations in the daily data set are the third Midcap lag, and the 
fourteenth Nifty lag. As regards the latter, there might be no economic reason why the current 
direction change of the Midcap is affected by the Nifty direction change of 14 days ago, and 
thus we may treat it as a rogue observation. The third Midcap lag direction change is 
significant in predicting the current Nifty direction change. One might again think of this as a 
rogue observation, yet there might be an economic reason why the lagged change direction of 
the smaller capitalisation index affects the current change direction of the index of larger 
companies. Whilst causality is usually assumed to run from larger stocks to smaller ones, 
there might be a case for arguing that smaller companies may affect larger ones as well. Some 
events may impact to a higher degree on smaller companies, These may include concessions 
which aim to reduce the regulatory burden on smaller companies, or a sudden reduction in 
local consumer demand, when smaller companies rely to a larger extent on domestic trade. In 
such cases, one might argue that these events are immediately reflected in the prices of smaller 
company st ocks. Yet, one may still expect that the fluctuations eventually spill over to larger 
company stocks. For instance, a positive news item might make smaller companies more 
optimistic and therefore they would increase their trading with larger companies, say those 
who supply them with raw materials. Therefore it might be plausible that Midcap shocks 
eventually spill over to Nifty prices. Yet, Table 4.5 indicates that it takes about 3 days for 
market participants to price in these effects, and it may be debatable whether this is a short 
enough period to be consistent with such an adjustment. 
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Table 4.5: Pesaran-Timmermann Statistics 
Dail Data Intra-D y Data 
Lag (a) S(Mt, Nt, ) S(Nt, Mt-, ) S(Mt, Nt-, ) S(Nt, Mt-a) 
0 20.28 20.28 18.83 18.83 
1 3.99 3.65 13.41 11.61 
2 -0.31 0.60 8.18 3.37 
3 1.60 2.97 5.96 0.34 
4 1.58 1.69 4.47 0.87 
5 0.19 0.30 5.19 0.52 
6 -1.72 -1.49 3.92 -1.08 
7 -0.55 -0.44 1.95 0.48 
8 -0.35 1.07 0.35 -1.74 
9 1.16 1.21 -0.36 -2.42 
10 1.36 -0.01 0.90 -1.56 
11 0.99 0.13 0.67 -2.49 
12 0.91 0.73 -0.31 -0.89 
13 0.31 0.82 0.23 -1.10 
14 2.06 -0.75 -0.71 -0.79 
15 0.37 -0.56 -0.95 -0.51 
16 0.58 0.45 -1.82 -1.63 
17 0.15 0.82 -0.11 -0.99 
18 -0.17 0.85' -1.52 -1.56 
19 -1.06 -0.04 -0.14 -1.25 
20 -0.91 0.22 -0.71 -1.75 
21 -1.28 -0.15 0.82 0.11 
22 -0.56 -0.47 1.06 -0.68 
23 0.50 0.37 0.27 -0.66 
24 -0.50 1.43 1.32 0.72 
25 0.50 0.60 1.00 1.59 
26 0.02 -1.15 1.61 2.01 
27 1.03 0.49 1.12 3.51 
28 -0.44 0.52 1.87 0.42 
29 -0.01 -0.32 0.27 -1.33 
30 -0.44 -0.06 0.84 -0.87 
The table shows Pesaran-Timmermann Test Statistics (S) for the 
relationship between the Nifty Index (N) and the Midcap Index (M). Both 
contemporaneous and lagged relationships are investigated. Being 
normally distributed, the critical values for the test are: 2.58,1.96 and 1.65 
for the 99%, 95% and 90% level of confidence respectively. Significance at 
these levels of confidence is denoted by *** (99%), ** (95%) and * (90%). 
When considering the lagged relationships in the high-frequency data, we note that both 
indices tend to move in synchronicity with the other index and a number of lags. Given that 
the first two lagged change directions are significant in both cases, we may again attribute this 
to data runs. At such high frequencies it may not be realistic to expect abrupt price changes 
given that as new information becomes available it is plausible that "old" limit orders do not 
get cancelled immediately and are "picked off'; i. e. they trade against an order that was 
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submitted by a trader with more updated information. In this way the stock would still trade at 
the "old" price, despite the availability of new information. 
Yet, the Nifty change directions remain significant for a further five lags and this suggests that 
the Nifty leads the Midcap as may be expected. This might be due to non-synchronous 
trading effects where the less liquid stocks appear to take longer to adjust to news, given that 
they trade less frequently. The remaining significant lags in the high frequency data set, may 
either be considered as rogue observations, or they may also be consistent with feedback 
effects running from the Midcap to the Nifty index. 
Overall, these statistics indicate that the Nifty index leads the Midcap at high frequency data, 
while the indices tend to move almost contemporaneously at daily frequency. This may imply 
that the Midcap index appears to adjust more slowly - but not slowly enough to obtain clear 
predictability at daily frequency. This seems in line with our prior expectations: "causality" 
mainly runs from the Nifty to Midcap, and (at least) part of. this predictability is the result of 
non-synchronous trading effects, which become more pronounced in the high frequency data 
set. 
4.6 Granger-Causality Tests 
4.6.1 Daily Interval Data 
A preliminary 24 order VAR was estimated (using the log returns series) in order to select the 
optimal order of the VAR. As shown in Appendix 4.2, both the Akaike Information Criterion 
and the Schwarz Bayesian Criterion selected a VAR(l) model, yet the log-likelihood ratio 
statistics rejected all orders less than 16. In view of this, two VAR models were estimated: a 
VAR(l) and a VAR(16). The former model was deemed superior on the basis of a higher 
System Log Likelihood Ratio, higher Log Likelihood Ratios for the individual equations, 
higher F-statistics, and higher Akaike Information Criteria and Schwarz Bayesian Criteria, as 
shown in Appendix 4.3. Besides, it is not clear on practical grounds why an index shock 
taking place on day t, should still affect the price series on day t+16. 
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When inspecting the largest error terms of the VAR(l) regressions, it was not apparent that 
errors tended to occur on any particular day of the week. If we hypothesise that more volatile 
returns are realised on Mondays, this would imply that the VAR(l) regressions would perform 
badly in forecasting the Monday return, as well as the Tuesday returns (given that the Monday 
information is then used to forecast the Tuesday return). Therefore, one may expect that the 
Monday effect would result in larger forecast errors for Mondays and Tuesdays. The largest 
40 error terms for each of the VAR regressions were inspected, but the Monday and Tuesday 
errors did not particularly outnumber those of other trading days. 28 This is in line with the 
empirical results of Choudhry (2000) who found that the ch ange in volatility on Mondays was 
not significant on the Indian market. 
The individual regressions of the estimated VAR(l) model and diagnostic statistics, are shown 
in Table 4.6 Panels A and B together with error plots and histograms. The LM statistics 
indicate that error terms are heteroskedastic. This may be attributed to exogenous factors 
which are not being captured by the model. Given that our main interest is the relationship 
between the indices, this might not be particularly problematic as long as the omitted variables 
do not lead to spurious results. 
In both equations, the coefficients through which one can infer any Icad-lag relationship 
between the indices are insignificant, as shown in Table 4.6. The most "significant" 
coefficient in the respective regressions is the lag of the dependent variable. Despite this, the 
F-tests reject the null hypothesis that the joint coefficients are equal to zero in case of both 
regressions; yet this may be probably attributed to the lagged dependent variable, rather than 
the lag of the other index. 
In order to investigate further, Granger non-causality tests were conducted on the Nifty and 
Mideap Log Return series in the system of equations, as detailed in Table 4.6 Panel B. This 
methodology tests the null hypothesis of no causality, and the tests did not permit the rejection 
of the null hypothesis of no-causality for both variables. 
A Log Likelihood Ratio (LR) Statistic was computed as detailed in Table 4.6 Panel B, and this 
permitted the rejection of the null hypothesis that the contemporaneous covariance between 
the fluctuations in the log returns series is equal to zero. 
23 A histogram is tabulated in Appendix 4.4. 
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Table 4.6 Panel A: OLS Regression Coefficients and Error Plots for Nifty Equation in the 
VAR (daily data). 
Regressor Intercept Lagged Nifty Lagged Midcap 
Coefficient 0.0005 0.0575 0.0136 
T-Ratio (1.21) (1.24) (0.37) 
Number of Observations 1255 R-Bar-Squared 0.004 
S. E * of Regression 0.016 F-statistiC 
a 3.257 
Residual Sum of Squares 0.318 Equation Log-likelihood 3416.0 
Residual HeteroskedaStiCity b 56.83 System Log-likelihood 7168.3 
a) The F-statistic is F-distributed with 2 and 1252 degrees of freedom. The 95% Critical value is 
3.00, rejecting the null hypothesis that all the regressors (except the intercept) are zero. 
b) The residual heteroskedasticity test is based on the regression of squared residuals on 
squared fitted values (Godfrey, 1978). it is X2(1 ) distributed with a critical value of 6.635 for a 
one tailed test at the 99% confidence level. The statistic rejects the null hypothesis that error 
terms are serially uncorrelated. 
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Overall, these results are in line with the inferences obtained through the above Pesaran- 
Timmermann tests, that there is only a weak lead-lag relationship (if at all) between the Nifty 
and Midcap indices, when sampled at daily intervals. It might be more accurate to postulate a 
contemporaneous relationship between the indices at this frequency, as inferred through the 
LR test and the Pesaran-Timmermann test. Again, this suggests that the differing liquidity 
levels in between indices do not lead to pronounced non-synchronous trading effects which 
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may be gauged through lead-lag effects in daily data. This might be caused by the typical 
trading peak at the end of the day, which implies that the closing index observations are based 
on reasonably current information. 
Table 4.6 Panel B: OLS Regression Coefficients, and Error Plots for Mideap Equation in 
the VAR (daily data) and Tests on the VAR System. 
Regressor Intercept Lagged Nifty Lagged Mldcap 
Coefficient 0.0005 -0.0244 0.1682 
T-Ratio (0.9410) (0.4173) (3.6694) 
Number of Observations 1255 R-Bar-Squared 0.022 
S. E. of Regression 0.020 F-statistic a 15.103 
Residual Sum of Squares 0.506 Equation Log-likelihood 3124.4 
Residual HeteroskedaStiCity b 145.7 System Log-likelihood 7168.3 
a) The F-statistic is F-distributed with 2 and 1252 degrees of freedom. The 99% critical value is 4.61, 
rejecting the null hypothesis that all the regressors (except the intercept) are zero. 
b) The residual heteroskedasticity test is based on the regression of squared residuals on squared fitted 
values (Godfrey, 1978). It is )? (I) distributed with a critical value of 6.635 for a one tailed test at the 99% 
confidence level. The statistic rejects the null hypothesis that error terms are serially uncorrelated. 
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Granger Non-Causality Tests: When testing the null hypothesis that the coefficient of lagged Nifty in the 
Midcap equation is zero, a statistic of 0.17453 is obtained. When testing the null hypothesis that the 
coefficient of lagged Midcap in the Nifty equation is zero a statistic of 0.13989 is obtained. Being )? (1) 
distributed, with a critical value of 3.841 (one-tailed; 95% confidence level), the former tests do not permit 
the rejection of the null hypothesis of no-causality for both variables. 
Log Likelihood Ratio (LR) Statistic: The LR Statistic tests the null hypothesis that contemporaneous 
covariance between fluctuations in the series is equal to zero. Log-Likelihood statistics for the VAR 
system, Nifty and Midcap Equations (estimated independently through OLS) are shown in Panels A and B 
of this table. LR (Ho: Hi) ratio is computed as [2 (7168.3 - 3416.0 - 3124.4)] and is equal to 1255.8. The 
test is X2(2) distributed, with a 99% critical value of 9.21. We thus reject the null hypothesis that shocks are 
contemporaneously uncorrelated. 
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6.2 High Frequency Data 
The above procedure was repeated using the high frequency data set. 
A preliminary 24 order VAR was estimated (using the log returns series) in order to select the 
optimal order of the VAR. As shown in Appendix 4.5, the Akaikc Information Criterion 
selected a VAR(9) model, whilst the Schwarz Bayesian Criterion selected a VAR(3) model. 
Yet, the log-likelihood ratio statistics rejected all orders which were less than 7, and therefore 
an order 9 VAR was selected. 
The diagnostics for this initial VAR(9) model showed problems in terms of non-nality and 
heteroskedasticity. A histogram of the error terms showed that the deviations from normality 
are not particularly problematic - the histograms were peak-shaped and therefore most of the 
error terms were close to zero. 
When plotting the error terms, it became apparent that large errors tended to occur at 
approximately equally-spaced intervals and this partly explains the heteroskedasticity of the 
error terms. The larger error terms tend to occur on the opening of the trading day - 
particularly at the first two observations. This is not surprising since a higher amount of news 
is priced during the first observation following the overnight interval. The lagged initial 
return of the trading day is then used to explain the second return during the trading day in the 
VAR system, and the first "unusual observation" leads to a particularly weak forecast for the 
return realised during the second minute. 
Thus a dummy variable was created taking a value of I during the first two observations of 
each trading day. A log-likelihood ratio test on the deletion of the dummy yielded a statistic 
of 408.35; being ý? (2) distributed the test indicates that the dummy is highly significant. The 
"dummy version! 'of the VAR resulted in regression equations with a higher W and Adjusted 
W, yet the error term remained non-normal and heteroskedastic. As regards the latter, the plot 
of the error terms still showed regularly-spaced errors. This may be attributed to the fact that 
in some cases, the large error at the opening occurred at the third, fourth, ... sometimes tenth 
observation for the day. The dummy variable does not account for these observations. 
However, modifying the dummy variable to include the first ten observations of each day 
would "dilute" the dummy with smaller error terms, and this might reduce the effectiveness of 
the dummy. 
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Table 4.7 Panel A: Nifty and Mldcap VAR Coefficients and Tests on the 
VAR system (one-minute frequency data). 
Nifty Regression Midcap Regression 
Regressor Coefficient T-Ratio Coefficient T-Ratio 
LRN(-l) 0.203 (10.51) 0.241 (16.26) 
LRN(-2) 0.012 (0.61) 0.077 (4.96) 
LRN(-3) 0.010 (0.50) 0.075 (4.84) 
LRN(-4) -0.010 (0.49) 0.019 
(1.21) 
LRN(-5) 0.013 (0.64) 0.023 (1.47) 
LRN(-6) -0.030 (1.50) 0.034 
(2.18) 
LRN(-7) 0.048 (2.37) 0.011 (0.72) 
LRN(-8) 0.000 (0.01) -0.045 (2.90) 
LRN(-9) 0.015 (0.77) 0.039 (2.59) 
LRM(-l) 0.162 (6.06) 0.027 (1.31) 
LRM(-2) -0.036 (1.35) -0.080 
(3.92) 
LRM(-3) 0.041 (1.53) 0.031 (1.52) 
LRM(-4) -0.028 (1.06) -0.011 
(0.53) 
LRM(-5) 0.033 (1.26) -0.010 (0.50) 
LRM(-6) -0.028 (1.06) 0.031 
(1.51) 
LRM(-7) -0.078 (2.97) -0.042 
(2.07) 
LRM(-8) -0.002 (0.06) 0.036 
(1.78) 
LRM(-9) -0.032 (1.28) 0.011 
(0.55) 
Intercept 0.000 (0.45) 0.000 (0.69) 
0 (dummy) 0.003 (19.18) 
1 
0.000 (1.29) 
The first column shows the regressor, where LRN and LRM stand for Nifty and 
Midcap Log Return, whilst 0 is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 
for the first 2 observations of the trading day and zero otherwise. Lags are 
denoted as (A), (-2), etc. For both the Nifty and Midcap equations, the table 
shows the regression coefficients and T-ratios in brackets. ***, ** and * denote 
statistical significance at the 99%, 95% and 90% levels of confidence 
respectively. 
Granger Non-Causality Tests: When testing the null hypothesis that the 
coefficients of lagged Nifty in the Midcap equation are zero, a statistic of 51.6 
is obtained. When testing the null hypothesis that the coefficients of lagged 
Midcap in the Nifty equation are zero a statistic of 328.1 is obtained. Being 
x2 (9) distributed, with a critical value of 21.67 (one-tailed; 99% confidence 
level), the former tests permit the rejection of the null hypothesis of no- 
causality for both variables. 
Log Likelihood Ratio (LR) Statistic: The LR Statistic tests the null 
hypothesis that contemporaneous covariance between fluctuations in the 
series is equal to zero. Log-Likelihood statistics for the VAR system, Nifty and 
Midcap Equations (estimated independently through OLS) are shown in Panel 
B of this table. LR (1-10: 1-11) ratio is computed as [2 (36954 - 17915 - 18705)] 
and is equal to 666. The test is X2(19) distributed, with a 99% critical value of 
36.19. We thus reject the null hypothesis that shocks are contemporaneously 
uncorrelated. 
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Table 4.7 Panel B: Diagnostic Statistics and Error Plots for the VAR System 
(one-minute frequency data) 
Nifty Midcap Nifty Midtap 
equation equation equatJon equation 
Number of Observations 2960 2960 R-Bar-Squared 0.185 0.162 
S. E. of Regression 0.0006 0.0004 F-statistiC a 36.34 31.02 
Residual Sum of Squares 0.0010 0.0006 Equation Log-likelihood 17915 18705 
Residual Heteroskedasticity b 975.1 65.61 1 System Log-likelihood 36954 36954 
a) The F-statistic is F-distributed with 19 and 2940 degrees of freedom. The 99% critical 
value is 1.96, rejecting the null hypothesis that all the regressors (except the intercept) are 
zero for both equations. 
b) The residual heteroskedasticity test is based on the regression of squared residuals on 
squared fitted values (Godfrey, 1978). It is X2(1) distributed with a critical value of 6.635 for 
a one tailed test at the 99% confidence level. The statistics for both equations reject the 
null hypothesis that error terms are serially uncorrelated. 
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Granger non-causality tests were conducted on the Nifty and Midcap Log Return series in the 
system of equations, as detailed in Table 4.7 Panel A. The tests permitted the rejection of the 
null hypothesis of no-causality for both series at the 99% confidence level. A Log Likelihood 
Ratio (LR) Statistic was computed as detailed in Table 4.7 Panel A. The statistic strongly 
rejects the null hypothesis that the contemporaneous covariance between the fluctuations in 
the log retums series is equal to zero. 
Thus we may assume the presence of Granger-Causality and contemporaneous effects 
between the indices as smpled at one-minute intervals and propose a system of equations as 
shown in Table 4.7 Panel A. Diagnostic statistics and error plots are shown in Table 4.7 Panel 
B. 
The VARs fitted in this section, for the data sets at daily and one-minute frequency confirm 
the inferences from the Pesaran-Timmen-nann tests of the previous section. The strongest 
relationship is that at one-minute frequency, the Nifty index leads the Midcap and there is a 
tendency for a feedback effect from Midcap to Nifty. The indices tend to move more or less 
contemporaneously at daily frequency - and this is in line with the conclusions of Chiao, 
Hung and Lee (2004). The insignificance of any causality at daily intervals'may be partly 
attributed to the surge in trading activity at the end of the day which reduces the degree of 
non-synchronicity. Yet, we should note that this result is in contrast to the finding of 
Poshakwale and Theobald (2004) who reported that there are lead-lag effects from larger to 
smaller Indian stocks when using daily data. The contrasting evidence may be partly 
reconciled by the use of more recent data in this study - possibly smaller stocks reacted more 
promptly to news in later years. 
One possible explanation for the evidence gleaned so far, might be that market-wide 
information is first reflected in the Nifty index, which includes the most liquid stocks. Some 
minutes after this, the information is priced in the Midcap index, and we obtain a lead-lag 
relationship at high frequency intervals. This may be consistent with the fact that market 
participants tend to monitor the major stocks (the Nifty stocks) more closely, and therefore 
they first price in the new information in these stocks. Whether this conjecture is true or 
otherwise, the "extra waiting time" which is required for the Midcap stocks to trade (Tables 
4.3 and 4.4), invariably results in non-synchronous trading effects in the high-frequency data 
set. 
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Yet, by the end of the day most of the new market-wide information would have been priced 
in both of the indices, and therefore only a contemporaneous relationship is detected when 
investigating relationships at daily frequency. 
The Granger-Causality from Midcap to Nifty in the high-frequency data, may be consistent 
with the spillover effects from smaller to larger stocks (Section 4.5). The feedback effect from 
Midcap to Nifty is unlikely to be the result of non-synchronous trading, since the companies 
constituting the main index are more liquid than the smaller capitalisation companies. Thus, 
the evidence obtained so far is in line with our prior expectations that non-synchronous trading 
effects result in predictability, yet not all of the predictability is the result of non-synchronous 
trading. 
4.7 Impulse Response Functions 
We next generate Impulse Response Functions (IRFs) for respective shocks in the Nifty and 
Midcap indices, using the VAR system obtained for each data frequency. IRFs detect the 
response of particular variables to a shock in a given variable, and therefore they may be used 
to assess whether the "shocked variable" might be relevant in predicting the movements in the 
other variables. Section 4.7.1 deals with the responses to Nifty shocks, whilst Section 4.7.2 
discusses the responses to Mideap shocks. 
4.7.1 Responses to Nifty Shocks 
IRFs showed that a given shock in the Nifty log return series affects the Midcap log return in 
the same direction. Being the first variable in the VAR, the Orthogonalised and Generalised 
IRFs for Nifty are identical (Pesaran and Shin; 1997). IRF plots for daily and one-minutc 
frequencies respectively are shown in Figure 4.5, whilst Appendix 4.6 reports the actual IRF 
statistics. 
In case of the daily data sets, the shocks practically die out within one day. This is in line with 
the notions that no high degree of causality may be expected when using this sampling 
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ftequency. In case of the high-frequency data sets, the shocks die out approximately within 10 
minutes, since they are based on a VAR system of order 9. 
For both data sets, when considering the latter part of the effect (i. e. just before the shocks die 
out) the effect on the Midcap is larger than that on the Nifty. In case of the high-frequency 
data set this may be attributed to the "lead-lag" relationship which partly emanates from non- 
synchronous trading effects. In case of the daily sets, the larger effect on the Midcap seems 
visible right from the initial part of the IRF. 
Figure 4.5: Generallsed and Orthogonalised IRFs following a Nifty Shock 
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The Generalised and Orthogonalised IRFs for a Nifty Shock are identical, since Nifty is the 
first variable in the VAR (Pesaran and Shin, 1997). LRN denotes the response of the Nifty 
Index, whilst LRM denotes the response of the Midcap Index. 
The observation that a shock in variable x has a greater impact on variable y rather than on 
itself is rather unusual in empirical exercises involving IRFs. This may suggest that any actual 
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causality effects which run from Nifty to Mideap are further amplified by non-synchronous 
trading effects. Yet, there might also be an additional explanation as to why a Nifty shock 
might lead to a higher Midcap shock, and this relates to therisks of the stocks. If we assume 
that the smaller companies are more risky, they should have higher betas and therefore should 
fluctuate more widely as compared to the larger company stocks. Thus, a given news item 
may have a higher impact on the Midcap rather than on the Nifty index. Given that this 
research does not account for news releases the results present an "illusion" that a Nifty shock 
results in a larger shock in the Midcap; yet the latter movement might be a response to news 
rather than a response to the Nifty shock itself. 
4.7.2 Responses to Midcap Shocks 
We now turn to the responses following a shock in the Midcap index. This time, the 
Orthogonalised and Generalised versions of the IRFs yielded differing results. Figure 4.6 
shows the Orthogonalised IRFs whilst Figure 4.7 shows the Generalised IRFs. Actual 
statistics are shown in Appendix 4.7: Panel A (daily data set) and Panel B (high frequency 
data set). 
The Orthogonalised IRFs show that the Nifty index is practically unresponsive to Midcap 
shocks, especially when considering the daily data set. 
The Generalised IRFs seem to indicate that the Nifty index responds to Midcap shocks. A 
shock in the Midcap leads to a Nifty fluctuation in the same direction which dies out after one 
day in case of the daily data set, and before 10 minutes in case of the high-frequency data set. 
Given that Midcap stocks trade less frequently than Nifty stocks, we cannot attribute any 
predictability that runs from Mideap to Nifty to non-synchronous trading effects. Overall, the 
IRFs suggest the presence of a feedback effect from Midcap to Nifty, although this does not 
seem particularly pronounced. 29 
29 Possible reasons why a small capitalization index may affect the main index were discussed in Section 4.5. 
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Figure 4.6: Orthogonallsed IRFs following a Midcap Shock 
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LRN denotes the response of the Nifty Index, whilst LRM denotes the response of the Midcap 
Index. 
Overall, the IRFs (together with the previous tests) suggest that the lead-lag effects which are 
present in the data are a combination of actual "causality" or delayed adjustments to news, and 
non-synchronous trading effects. 
t. 
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Figure 4.7: Generallsed IRFs following a Midcap Shock 
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LRN denotes the response of the Nifty Index, whilst LRM denotes the response of the Midcap 
Index. 
4.8 Inefficiency or Non-Synchronous Trading Effects? 
Considering the above three predictability investigations, one observation which was 
consistently confirmed is that at high frequency intervals the Nifty index unambiguously leads 
the Midcap index. The "causality" from Nifty to the Midcap may be explained both by non- 
synchronous trading arguments and by the possibility that market participants do not adjust 
their expectations immediately since they do not follow lower-capitalisation companies as 
closely. A further elaboration on this argument may be inferred from the research of Niarchos 
and Alexakis (1998) in relation to the Greek Stock market. The authors argued that foreign 
investors tend to restrict their holdings in a particular category of shares. Since foreign 
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investors are typically more sophisticated, the latter share category is more efficient. 30 
Therefore, if in the case of NSE overseas investors restrict their holdings to the shares in the 
main index (which is quite plausible), one would expect Nifty to be more efficient than 
Mideap. Yet, from the trading frequency statistics of Tables 4.3 and 4.4, we may also deduce 
that part of this "predictability" is related to non-synchronous trading. The next step is thus to 
investigate which of the former effects is the main cause of the predictability. The proposed 
methodology is described below. 
The VAR model shown in Section 4.6.2 indicates that the first three and the sixth (one- - 
minute) Nifty lags are significant in determining the value of the Mideap, in case of the high 
frequency data set. Therefore we look at the Midcap initial returns during the first six minutes 
of the trading day (denoted IR(M, +, ], the Nifty overnight returns [denoted OR(N)1_, +1], and 
the Midcap overnight returns [denoted OR(M, -, +, ]. If the observed six-minute lead-lag effect 
consists of non-synchronous trading, we may expect this predictability to persist following the 
overnight (or weekend) break. This rests on the notion that it takes around six minutes for 
sufficient transactions to take place in the less liquid stocks, to achieve the required 
adjustment in respect of overnight news. In this way, if OR(N),., +, is correlated with 
IR(M, +,, this may be taken as an indication of non-synchronous trading. 
Conversely, if the observed predictability consists of inherent inefficiency in terms of traders 
not following smaller capitalisation stocks as closely, we may expect the lead-lag effect to 
disappear following the overnight break. Assuming that traders have enough time to process 
news during such break, the overnight price adjustment in the Midcap index should show up 
contemporaneously with that of the Nifty. Thus, if OR(7V)i., +, is correlated with OR(AV, _, +I 
(as opposed to IR(A91+1), this may be taken as an indication that the predictability observed 
during the day consists of inherent inefficiency. 
Two approaches are taken in order to test for the correlation as between indices around the 
overnight breaks. The first test consists of estimating the simple correlation as between the 
respective series. The sample period consisted of III observations ranging ftom II th June 
1999 to 16"' November 1999. These dates were deliberately chosen to obtain a sample period 
where no initial call auctions were held. The data set featured one missing observation in 
IR(API, -, given that the intra-day file for the 22 
nd September 1999 was unavailable. The latter 
date was omitted when estimating the correlation cocfficients. Results shown in Table 4.8 
30 Similar conclusions that foreign investors contribute more actively to market efficiency were empirically 
discovered by Tian and Wan (2004) in an investigation of the Chinese and Hong Kong share market. 
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Panel A, reveal that OR(N),.,,, is correlated to a higher degree with IR(01+1, indicating that 
the observed predictability constitutes non-synchronous trading effects since the overnight 
news is still reflected in the Midcap with a six-minute delay. 
The second related test involves estimating two OLS regressions, to infer whether OR(N), t+l 
is more correlated with OR(M, -, +, or with IR(M, +,: 
XR(N),,, 
+, + (4.13) 
+, 60R(N),,, +, + (4.14) 
where a and P are estimated coefficients, and E is an error term. 
Given the missing intra-day observation in the time series, the sample period was split up, and 
two separate estimations for each model were undertaken. The results shown in Table 4.8 
Panel B, are qualitatively the same across the sub-sample periods. The explanatory statistics 
and t-ratios again show that the OR(N), -,,, is correlated to a higher degree with the IR(A, 1)1+1. 
Overall, both of the above tests point that the predictability as between indices persists around 
the overnight breaks. This lead-lag relationship may not be reasonably attributed to traders 
delaying the adjustment of their expectations, since during the overnight period one may 
assume that participants have ample time to do so. 
Thus, the lead-lag relationship from Nifty to Midcap at high-frequency data is more 
attributable to non-synchronous trading effects. Yet,. the lead-lag effect which runs from 
Midcap to Nifty (which cannot be attributed to non-synchronous trading) implies that part of 
this predictability effect constitutes an actual lead-lag relationship. Possible economic 
explanations for such a relationship might be spillover effects amongst stocks, though one 
cannot rule out the possibility that such an effect is a mere coincidence. These results are in 
line with the discussion by Atchison, Butler and Simonds (1987) and Lo and MacKinlay 
(1990) that index or portfolio data tend to exhibit higher autocorrelation than that which may 
be exclusively expected from non-synchronous trading effects. 
The latter investigation thus yields an important contribution as regards the interpretation of 
predictability. Predictability and Granger-Causality effects do not necessarily imply actual 
causality. This does not simply reflect the possibility that the analysed time series may be 
responding to an exogenous variable. Absence of actual causality may also be due to non- 
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synchronous trading which results in less liquid stocks (apparently) taking longer to adjust to 
new information. 
Table 4.8: Correlation as between Indices around Overnight Trading Breaks 
Panel A: Correlation Estimations 
Correlation between OR(N)t-t., and OR(M)t-t,,,: 0.2916 
Correlation bet. ween, OR(N)t_t. 1 and IR(M)t,,, 0.5153 
Sample period: 1 1th June 1999 to 16'h November 1999 (112 observations) 
Panel B: Regression Estimations 
First Model: Dependent Variable is OR(M)t_t., 
Sample Period: 11 -Jun-1 999 to 21 wSep-1 999 23-Sep-1 999 to 16-Nov-1 999 
# Observations 72 39 
Coefficient T-Ratio Coefficient T-Ratio 
a 0.00012 (0.96) 0.00003 (0.18) 
OR(N)t-t., 0.75604 (3.33) 0.28411 (1.35) 
R-bar-squared 0.1246 0.0213 
Second Model: Dependent Variable Is IR(M)t+l 
Sample Period: 11-Jun-1999 to 21-Sep-1999 23-Sep-1 999 to 16-Nov-1 999 
# Observations 72 39 
Coefficient T-Ratio Coefficient T-Ratio 
a 0.00257 (3.39) 0.00213 (0.95) 
OR(N)t-t+l 7.5782 (5.69) 9.5373 (3.42) 
R-bar-squared 0.3065 0.21964 
The table summarises the results of two different approaches to infer the correlation as 
between the Nifty and Midcap indices. Statistical significance at the 99% level of 
confidence is denoted by ***. Panel A shows the results obtained when estimating the 
simple correlation between series, which indicate that the Overnight Nifty Return [OR(N) 
t-t,., ] is more correlated with the Initial Midcap Return [IR(M)1,11, rather than with the 
Overnight Midcap Return [OR(M)t-t. 1]. 
Panel B shows regression estimations which confirm that OR(N) t-t., performs better in 
explaining IR(M)t., rather than OR(M) t_t+1 (both in terms of t-ratios, and in terms of R2). In 
estimating the models in Panel B, the sample period was split into two due to a missing 
intra-day observation. 
Given that the tests in both panels indicate that OR(N) t_t+1 is more correlated with IR(M) 
1. i, the lead-lag relationship between the Nifty and the Midcap is more attributable to non- 
synchronous trading, rather than to a delayed adjustment of traders' expectations. 
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The findings also relatc to the issue of market efficiency - in particular, predictability effects 
in the data do not necessarily imply market inefficiency. Whilst one may attempt to partly 
predict the Midcap value from the lagged Nifty particularly when using high frequency data, 
this does not necessarily translate into profitable opportunities. Although the Midcap value 
might be temporarily mispriced being calculated through stock prices prevailing in past trades, 
it does not mean that traders are still prepared to transact at such "outdated" prices. In 
addition, there is also a possibility of observing some transitory transactions at "outdated" 
prices in an efficient market. This rests on the scenario that following the release of news, 
some limit orders submitted prior to the release are not cancelled immediately and efficient 
traders "pick off'these orders. This would result in mispriped transactions - yet it does not 
mean that the market is inefficient. 
4.9 Conclusion 
One of the main branches of research in market microstructure relates to the area of market 
efficiency. Non-synchronous trading effects can give the impression that market participants 
are adjusting their expected values of stocks following a delay. In this way non-synchronous 
trading effects may lead to flawed inferences as regards market efficiency. This investigation 
shows that predictability in stock prices does not necessarily contradict market efficiency. 
Factors such as non-synchronous trading and market participants "picking off' mispriced 
orders following the arrival of new information, may give the impression that the traders are 
not adjusting their expectations immediately. This confirms that the main criterion for an 
inefficient market is the existence of profitable trading opportunities and not predictability -a 
notion formerly discussed in various studies including Buckle, Clare and Thomas (1999) and 
Day and Wang (2002). 
This research has investigated the lead-lag effects in NSE stock price data using different 
methodologies. The main empirical observation is that the Nifty index leads the Midcap index 
- particularly when considering high frequency data. When analysing trading break returns it 
was noted that such lead-lag effects persist. In such cases, the predictability cannot be 
attributed to traders' delayed expectation adjustments, since during an overnight period market 
participants have sufficient time to adjust their expected values of stocks. Thus we may 
conclude that lead-lag effects are mainly caused by non-synchronous trading, and that this 
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predictability is not likely to result in abnormal profit opportunities. Yet, in line with previous 
studies, we may also note that non-synchronous trading is not the exclusive cause of observed 
predictability. In particular, the feedback effect from Midcap to Nifty may not be attributed to 
non-synchronous trading given that the former index is composed of less liquid stocks as 
compared to the latter. Finally, we cannot rule out the possibility that part of the predictability 
emanates from stock price limits, in the sense that these might delay prices from adjusting to 
news. Yet, any effects emanating from price limits should not be highly prominent since these 
are not expected to induce causality in any particular direction, and their magnitude should be 
small as compared to that of non-synchronous trading. 
The main contributions of this investigation to the literature are three-fold. Firstly, it was 
confirmed that non-synchronous trading effects may be detected through lead-lag effects in 
stock prices. Previous studies tended to focus on the serial correlation structure or else lead- 
lag effects were tested for at lower sampling frequencies. Secondly, the investigation 
proposed a simple methodology constituting of the analysis of trading break and post-trading 
break returns in order to infer whether predictability is more attributable to non-synchronous 
trading as opposed to actual delayed price adjustments. 
Thirdly, through analysing data sampled at different frequencies, it was formally shown that 
non-synchronous trading effects tend to become more pronounced in high-frequency data. 
This explains why previous studies conducted through lower frequency data such as Chiao, 
Hung and Lee (2004) did not detect any significant causality, and this may be attributed to the 
tendency for trading intensity to vary throughout the day. The results are also in line with the 
empirical evidence of Papachristou (1999), who compared daily frequency serial correlation to 
weekly frequency serial correlation and found that non-synchronous trading effects are more 
evident in higher frequency data. This implies that researchers aiming to study non- 
synchronous trading effects stand a better chance of obtaining significant empirical evidence if 
they use high-frequency data. Conversely, researchers who use high-frequency data in 
investigating unrelated issues should consider the possibility that their findings may be biased 
due to non-synchronicity. For instance, non-synchronous trading effects should be taken into 
consideration when evaluating the adequacy of a given market setup in terms of efficiency. 
Another feature of this analysis which is worthy of note, is the application of non-synchronous 
trading concepts in the context of an emerging market. Non-synchronous trading might be 
even more relevant to emerging markets, given that such markets are often found to be less 
liquid. 
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This investigation also suggests ftirther research issues. Firstly, one potential avenue might lie 
in the re-interpretation of previous studies. Most of the latter studies were based on daily data. 
In this way, the likely increases in trading activity at the end of the day probably diminished 
non-synchronous trading effects, and this might amount to an under-estimation of the effects 
of non-synchronous trading on stock price data. Another potential research issue lies in the 
specific investigation of individual stock price high-frequency data. In addition, following the 
notion that trading activity varies throughout the trading day, one may also inquire how non- 
synchronous trading effects become more pronounced during the middle of the day when 
trading activity tends to abate. 
Finally, whilst this topic is of significance on its own merits, non-synchronous trading effects 
are also important in interpreting features relating to NSE volatility - which is the issue 
tackled in the next empirical chapter. 
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APPENDIX 4.1 
Serial Correlation Statistics For The First Five Lags of Log Nifty, Log Midcap, Log 
Return Nifty and Log Return Alidcap. 
Daily Frequency Data 
Order Autocorrelation T-Ratio Box-Pierce Ljung-Box 
Coefficient Statistic Statistic 
Log Nifty 
1 0.991 (35.39) 1235.2 1238.2 
2 0.982 (20.04) 2447.4 2454.3 
3 0.973 (15.69) 3637.8 3649.4 
4 0.965 (13.22) 4807.6 4824.7 
5 0.956 (11.52) 5956.9 5980.5 
Log MIdcap 
1 0.997 (35.61) 1249.5 1252.5 
2 0.994 (20.29) 2490.2 2497.2 
3 0.990 (15.71) 3722.3 3734.2 
4 0.987 (13.34) 4945.7 4963.4 
5 0.983 (11.70) 6160.4 6184.9 
Log Return Nifty 
1 0.071 (2.54) 6.361 6.376 
2 -0.033 (1.18) 7.727 7.747 
3 0.003 (0.11) 7.741 7.761 
4 0.045 (1.61) 10.258 10.289 
5 0.018 (0.64) 10.674 10.708 
Log Return Midcap 
1 0.153 (5.46) 29.404 29.475 
2 -0.003 (0.10) 29.418 29.488 
3 0.035 (1.21) 31.000 31.077 
4 0.015 (0.52) 31.266 31.344 
5 0.016 (0.55) 31.570 31.649 
.. continued overleaf 
93 
4. AN ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACTS OF NON-SYNCHRONOUS TRADING ON PREDICTABILITY 
Appendix 4.1 (continued) 
One-Minute Frequency Data 
Order Autocorrelation T-Ratio Box-Pierce Ljung-Box 
Coefficient Statistic Statistic 
Log Nifty 
1 0.999 (55.50) 2964.8 2967.8 
2 0.998 (31.19) 5924.1 5931.1 
3 0.997 (24.32) 8877.6 8889.6 
4 0.996 (20.75) 11825.1 11843.1 
5 0.995 (18.09) 14766.7 14791.6 
Log Mldcap 
1 0.999 (55.50) 2967 2970 
2 0.999 (31.22) 5929.7 5936.7 
3 0.998 (24.34) 8887.7 8899.7 
4 0.997 (20.77) 11840.2 11858.2 
5 0.996 (18.11) 14786.8 14811.7 
Log Return Nifty 
1 0.272 (15.11) 219.470 219.692 
2 0.097 (4.85) 247.344 247.603 
3 0.052 (2.60) 255.419 255.692 
4 0.016 (0.80) 256.179 256.453 
5 0.015 (0.75) 256.876 257.152 
Log Return Midcap 
1 0.222 (12.33) 145.853 146.000 
2 0.093 (4.89) 171.496 171.678 
3 0.126 (6.63) 218.941 219.203 
4 0.065 (3.25) 231.639 231.926 
5 0.039 (1.95) 236.157 236.455 
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APPENDIX 4.2 
Selecting the Order of the VAR for Daily Data 
The table below shows the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), the Schwarz Bayesian 
Criterion (SBC), the maximised values of the Log-Likelihood Function (LL) and Log- 
Likelihood Ratio Test Statistics (LR) for a preliminary 24 order VAR which was estimated on 
the log returns series of Nifty and Midcap. Tests were based on 1232 observations. 
Both the Akaike Information Criterion and the Schwarz Bayesian Criterion select a VAR(l) 
model, yet the log-likelihood ratio statistics reject all orders less than 16. Therefore, both a 
VAR(l) and a VAR(l 6) model were estimated, and their diagnostics were compared as shown 
in Appendix 4.3. 
Order AIC SBC ILL LR Test 
24 7011.9 6761.2 7109.9 - 
23 7015.1 6774.7 7109.1 X2 (4)= 1.5566 [. 8171 
22 7014.0 6783.8 7104.0 X2 (8)= 2 11.8435 [. 1581 21 7016.4 6796.4 7102.4 X (12)= 15.1076 [. 236] 
20 7020.1 6810.4 7102.1 X 
2( 
16)= 15.5466 [. 485] 
19 7022.1 6822.5 7100.1 X2 (20)= 19.6788 [. 478] 
18 7025.1 6835.8 7099.1 X2 (24)= 21.6473 [. 600] 
17 7021.1 6842.1 7091.1 X2 (28)= 37.5427 [. 107] 
16 7021.9 6853.0 7087.9 X2 (32)= 44.0813 [. 076] 
15 7021.4 6862.8 7083.4 X2 (36)= 53.0531 [. 033] 
14 7023.6 6875.2 7081.6 X2 (40)= 56.7236 [. 042] 
13 7021.2 6883.0 7075.2 X2 (44)= 69.5188 [. 0081 
12 7018.3 6890.4 7068.3 X2 (48)= 83.3006 [. 001] 
11 7020.9 6903.2 7066.9 X2 (52)= 86.1284 [. 0021 
10 7023.5 6916.1 7065.5 X2 (56)= 88.8453 [. 003] 
9 7020.9 6923.7 7058.9 k2(60)= 102.078 [. 001] 
8 7021.6 6934.6 7055.6 X2 (64)= 108.616 [. 0001 
7 7023.6 6946.9 7053.6 X2(68)= 112.551 [. 001] 
6 7026.7 6960.2 7052.7 X2 (72)= 114.421 [. 001] 
5 7029.0 6972.7 7051.0 X2 (76)= 117.797 [. 0021 
4 7032.1 6986.0 7050.1 X2 (80)= 119.683 [. 003] 
3 7032.6 6996.8 7046.6 X2 (84)= 126.572 1.002] 
2 7031.7 7006.1 7041.7 X2 (88)= 136.375 [. 001] 
1 7033.0 7017.7 7039.0 X2 (92)= 141.744 [. 0011 
0 7012.5 7007.4 7014.5 X2(96)= 190.817 [. 0001 
The Log-Likelihood Ratio Sta tistic (LR), tests the null hypothesis that the order of the VAR is p, 
against the alternative that it i s q, where q is the maximum order of the VAR (in this case, q is 
equal to 24 as permitted by the software programme). The test is X2 distributed with M2 (q-p) 
degrees of freed om, where m denotes the number of variables in the VAR. The probability of 
falsely rejecting the null hypothesis is shown in square brackets. 
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APPENDIX 4.3 
Selecting the Order of the VAR for Daily Data 
The table shows various explanatory power statistics for the VAR(l) and the VAR(I 6) 
models. The VAR(l) model was selected on the basis of higher System Log Likelihood 
Ratio, higher Log Likelihood Ratios for the individual equations, higher F-statistics, and 
higher Akaike Information Criterion and Schwarz Bayesian Criterion. Besides, it is not clear 
on practical grounds why an index shock taking place on day 1, should still affect the price 
series on day t+16. 
VAR (1) Nifty Mldcap 
Regression Regression 
Equation Log-likelihood 3416 3124.4 
F-Statistic F(2,1252) 3.2571 15.1028 
R-Bar-Squared 0.0036 0.0220 
Akaike Info. Criterion 3413 3121.4 
Schwarz Bayesian Criterion 3405.3 3113.7 
System Log-likelihood 7168.3 
VAR (16) Nifty Midcap 
Regression Regression 
Equation Log-likelihood 3399.8 3111.7 
F-Statistic F(32,1207) 1.3277 2.5443 
R-Bar-Squared 0.0084 0.0384 
Akaike Info. Criterion 3366.8 3078.7 
Schwarz Bayesian Criterion 3282.3 2994.2 
System Log-likelihood 7135.8 
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APPENDIX 4.4 
An Analysis of the Occurrences of Forecast Error Terms for the VAR(l) regressions. 
The largest 40 error terms of the VAR(l) regressions were tabulated to inquire whether such 
errors may be attributed to a particular day of the week. The table shows that the error terms 
are distributed across the week. (A lower number of Saturday occurrences may be explained 
by the fact that the exchange is not usually open for trading on this day). If we hypothesise 
that more volatile returns are realised on Mondays, this would imply that the VAR(l) 
regressions would perform badly in forecasting the Monday return, as well as the Tuesday 
returns (given that the Monday information is then used to forecast the Tuesday return). A 
higher number of Monday and Tuesday return forecast errors is not clearly evident from the 
table. This is in line with the empirical results of Choudhry (2000) who found that the change 
in volatility on Mondays was not significant on the Indian market. 
Log Return Nifty Regression Log Return Midcap Regression 
Monday 11 9 
Tuesday 6 6 
Wednesday 5 8 
Thursday 7 5 
Fdday 9 11 
Saturday 2 1 
TOTAL 40 40 
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APPENDIX 4.5 
Selecting the Order of the VAR for One-Minute Frequency Data 
The table below shows the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), the Schwarz Bayesian 
Criterion (SBC), the maximised valuqs of the Log-Likelihood Function (LL) and Log- 
Likelihood Ratio Test Statistics (LR) for a preliminary 24 order VAR which was estimated on 
the log returns series of Nifty and Midcap. Tests were based on 2945 observations. 
The Akaike Infonuation Criterion selects an order 9 VAR, whilst the Schwarz Bayesian 
Criterion selects an order 3 VAR. The log-likelihood ratio statistics rejects all orders less than 
7, and therefore an order 9 VAR was selected. 
Order AIC SBC LL LR Test 
24 36499.6 36206.2 36597.6 
23 36502.7 36221.3 36596.7 X2 (4)= 1.8854 [. 757] 
22 36505.2 36235.8 36595.2 X2 (8)= 4.8352 [. 775] 
21 36508.3 36250.8 36594.3 X 2(12)= 6.6465 [. 880] 
20 36507.2 36261.7 36589.2 X 
2( 16)= 16.7996 1.399] 
19 36510.6 36277.0 36588.6 20)= X 18.1479 [. 578] 
18 36514.3 36292.8 36588.3 
2 
X (24)= 18.6322 [. 771] 
17 36516.6 36307.1 36586.6 2 (28)= X 22.0035 [. 781] 
16 36518.9 36321.3 36584.9 
2 (32)= X 25.5161 [. 785] 
15 36521.5 36335.9 36583.5 
2 (36)= X 28.2575 [. 818] 
14 36524.9 36351.3 36582.9 
2 (40)= X 29.4061 [. 891] 
13 36524.7 36363.0 36578.7 
2 
X (44)= 37.9461 [. 728] 
12 36527.0 36377.3 36577.0 X (48)= 41.2341 [. 744] 
11 36528.0 36390.3 36574.0 X (52)= 47.3077 [. 659] 
10 36527.9 36402.2 36569.9 X2 (56)= 55.4008 [. 497] 
9 36528.2 36414.5 36566.2 X2 (60)= 62.8028 [. 377] 
8 36525.6 36423.8 36559.6 X2 (64)= 76.1749 [. 142] 
7 36523.8 36434.0 36553.8 X2 (68)= 87.6988 [. 054] 
6 36521.6 36443.8 36547.6 X2 (72)= - 100.013 [. 016] 5 36511.2 36445.3 36533.2 X2 (76)= 128.874 [. 000] 
4 36512.1 36458.2 36530.1 X2 (80)= 135.176 [. 000] 
3 36512.9 36471.0 36526.9 X2 (84)= 141.469 [. 000] 
2 36489.0 36459.1 36499.0 X2 (88)= 197.198 [. 000] 
1 36474.0 36456.1 36480.0 X2 (92)= 235.207 [. 000] 
0 36242.7 36236.7 36244.7 k2(96)= 705.919 [. 000] 
The Log-Likelihoo d Ratio Statisti c (LR), tests the null hypothesis that the order of the VAR is p, 
against the alternative that it is q , where q is the maximum order of the VAR 
(in this case, q is 
equal to 24 as permitted by the software programme). The test is X2 distributed with M2(q_p) 
degrees of freedo m, where m denotes the number of variables in the VAR. The probability of 
false ly rejecting the null hypothesis is shown in square brackets. 
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APPENDIX 4.6 
Orthogonalised and Gencralised Impulse Response Functions for Nifty Shocks 
Dail y Frequency One-Minute Frequency 
Horizon LRN LRM LRN LRM 
0 0.0159280000 0.0159800000 0.000571000 0.000196300 
1 0.0011321000 0.0022997000 0.000147700 0.000142600 
2 0.0000962600 0.0003592000 0.000052970 0.000067450 
3 0.0000104100 0.0000580700 0.000032140 0.000063490 
4 0.0000013860 0.0000095130 0.000011170 0.000032250 
5 0.0000002087 0.0000015660 0.000017350 0.000019250 
6 0.0000000333 0.0000002583 -0.000010080 0.000034890 
7 0.0000000054 0.0000000426 O. OOdOO8881 0.000008155 
8 0.0000000009 0.0000000070 -0.000003777 -0.000018410 
9 0.0000000001 0.0000000012 -0.000005474 0.000022950 
10 0.0000000000 0.0000000002 -0.000003544 0.000007513 
11 0.0000000000 0.0000000000 -0.000005020 -0.000000671 
12 0.0000000000 0.0000000000 -0.000002600 0.000001181 
13 - - -0.000005990 -0.000001526 
14 - - -0.000001089 -0.000001025 
15 - - -0.000000632 0.000000088 
16 - - -0.000002573 -0.000001776 
17 - - -0.000000853 -0.000000826 
18 - - -0.000001350 -0.000000078 
19 - - -0.000000700 -0.000000788 
20 - 
1 
- -0.000000418 -0.000000539 
The IRFs show the effect of a shock of one standard error in Nifty Log Return, on the 
variables included in the VAR i. e. LRN (Nifty Log Return) and LRM (M idcap Log Return). 
The Gen eralised and Ort hogonalised IRFs for a Nifty shock are identical, since Nifty is the 
first variable in the VAR ( Pesaran and Shin; 199 7). The IRF estimated using daily data is 
shown for a 12 day horizon, whilst the IRF estim ated through one-minute data is shown 
for a 20 minute horizon. 
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APPENDIX 4.7 
Orthogonalised and Generalised Impulse Response Functions for Mideap Shocks 
Panel A: IRFs estimated at daily frequency 
Ort ogonalised Generalised 
Horizon LRN LRM LRN LRM 
0 0.0000000000 0.0121840000 0.0126660000 0.0200950000 
1 0.0001654000 0.0020492000 0.0010005000 0.0030712000 
2 0.0000373100 0.0003406000 0.0000991700 0.0004922000 
3 0.0000067670 0.0000563800 0.0000123800 0.0000803600 
4 0.0000011540 0.0000093170 0.0000018020 0.0000132100 
5 0.0000001928 0.0000015390 0.0000002829 0.0000021790 
6 0.0000000320 0.0000002541 0.0000000458 0.0000003595 
7 0.0000000053 0.0000000420 0.0000000075 0.0000000594 
8 0.0000000009 0.0000000069 0.0000000012 0.0000000098 
9 0.0000000001 0.0000000011 0.0000000002 0.0000000016 
10 0.0000000000 0.0000000002 0.0000000000 0.0000000003 
11 0.0000000000 0.0000000000 0.0000000000 0.0000000000 
12 0.0000000000 0.0000000000 0.0000000000 0.0000000000 
The iRFs show the effect of a shock of one standard error in Midcap Log Return, on the 
variables included in the VAR i. e. LRN (Nifty Log Return) and LRM (Midcap Log Return). 
Both the Generalised and Orthogonalised IRF versions, for a 12 day horizon are shown. 
continued overleaf 
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Appendix 4.7 (continued) 
Orthogonalised and Generalised Impulse Response Functions for Alideap Shocks 
Panel B: IRFs estimated at one-minute frequencies 
Ort ogonalised Generatised 
Horizon LRN LRM LRN LRM 
0 0.000000000 0.000390700 0.000256300 0.000437300 
1 0.000063200 0.000010430 0.000122800 0.000073350 
2 0.000000448 -0.000015820 0.000024180 0.000016150 
3 0.000013900 0.000015880 0.000026850 0.000042690 
4 -0.000003950 0.000005917 0.000001487 0.000019770 
5 0.000011270 -0.000004384 0.00017860 0.000004724 
6 -0.000007349 0.000016920 -0.000011090 0.000030780 
7 -0.000032240 -0.000013800 -0.000024820 -0.000008669 
8 -0.000006968 0.000004473 -0.000007922 -0.000004266 
9 -0.000012130 0.000000515 -0.000013300 0.000010760 
10 -0.000003888 -0.000005109 -0.000005065 -0.000001192 
11 -0,000000872 -0.000003480 -0.000003033 -0.000003411 
12 -0.000001323 -0.000000169 -0.000002349 0.000000379 
13 -0.000000823 -0.000004060 -0.000003425 -0.000004313 
14 -0,000001035 0.000000584 -0.000001414 0.000000061 
15 -0.000001083 0.000000095 -0.000001251 0.000000125 
16 -0,000000937 -0.000001974 -0.000001992 -0.000002561 
17 -0.000000326 -0.000000059 -0.000000674 -0.000000424 
18 -0.000000094 -0.000000471 -0.000000690 -0.000000456 
19 0.000000029 -0.000000693 -0.000000289 -0.000000973 
20 0.000000352 
1 
0.000000095 0.000000126 
1 
-0.000000157 
The IRFs show the effect of a shock of one standard error in Midcap Log Return, on the 
variables included in the VAR i. e. LRN (Nifty Log Return) and LRM (Midcap Log 
Return). Both the Orthogonalised and Generallsed versions of the Functions are 
shown, for a 20-minute horizon. 
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CHAPTER 5: 
THE SEASONALITY OF STOCK PRICE VOLATILITY AND 
ITS CONNECTION WITH EXCESSIVE PRICE 
MOVEMENTS 
5.1 Introduction 
Empirical analyses of the volatility of financial assets have exposed various "stylised facts", 
such as weekly and monthly seasonality and volatility clustering. Volatility is directly related 
to returns and to risks, and one important research question is whether markets are excessively 
volatile. The latter issue is central to the market microstructure field, since it translates into 
whether asset prices exclusively reflect the underlying infon-nation, or whether they are 
additionally subject to other factors which are likely to emanate from the market setup and 
traders' behaviour. 
The main aim of this chapter is to model NSE volatility and to inquire whether the observed 
volatility is justified or excessive. A whole body of literature and tests have tackled this issue. 
Studies such as Shiller (198 1) inferred whether volatility is excessive or otherwise by 
comparing stock price changes to information about expected dividends, since theoretically 
prices should be equal to the present value of expected future dividends. This approach 
cannot be adapted to index data in a straightforward way for a variety of reasons. Firstly stock 
indices do not directly yield dividends. Secondly, when tackling the topic from a market 
microstructure point of view, there are potential advantages to be reaped from using high 
frequency data - yet dividend data are inherently low frequency. Therefore alternative 
methodologies are used in this study. 
The main research question of whether NSE volatility is justified or excessive is split up into 
two subsidiary questions. The first one is whether the degree of volatility is related to 
information flow. Previous studies on Monday effects and monthly seasonality as described 
in Section 5.2, are used to infer expected information flow patterns on NSE, and it is then 
inquired whether volatility rises during those periods when new information becomes 
available. Increased volatility during the latter periods is likely to be the response to new 
information, and therefore it is more likely to be justified. 
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The second related question concerns the relationship between volatility and returns. In 
particular, if we consider volatility as a measure of risk, then finance theory would suggest 
that this should be positively related to returns. This question is investigated through 
GARCH-in-Mean models. 
Thus, this -empirical analysis is not merely aimed at estimating econometric models, but the 
latter serve as a basis for discussing whether NSE volatility may be deemed justified, or 
whether it appears excessive as often witnessed in emerging financial markets. The detection 
(and possibly the reduction) of unjustified volatility is a central objective of market 
microstructure researchers and practitioners. This analysis is therefore relevant to both of the 
latter, since it pinpoints excessive volatility features on NSE. 
The scope of this chapter is not limited to any one particular type of volatility; indeed different 
technical definitions of the term "volatility" are adopted, including realised volatility, process 
volatility, conditional and unconditional volatility. An additional strength of the analysis is 
that models are estimated by using data of different frequencies depending on the issue being 
investigated; indeed one-minute frequency data, daily data and monthly data are all used in the 
analysis. Whilst the study does not propose new econometric methodology, one main 
innovation lies in the interpretation of different models. In particular, the possible inter- 
relationships between these models might not have been sufficiently cmphasised in previous 
literature. In addition the study explores how different empirical tests may be used to make 
inferences on whether volatility is justified or excessive, in the absence of data about dividend 
expectations. 
The analysis starts with a research background in Section 5.2, whilst an overview of the main 
methodologies and a note on possible findings of the study are shown in Section 5.3. After a 
descriptive note on the data in Section 5.4, the empirical models relating to volatility are 
estimated. Section 5.5 considers the differences in opening volatility across different days of 
the week, Section 5.6 focuses on the monthly seasonality of volatility and Section 5.7 
investigates the relationship between volatility and returns. Results are jointly discussed in 
Section 5.8 where an answer to the main research question about the justification of volatility 
is proposed. Section 5.9 concludes. 
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5.2 Review of Relevant Literature 
Finance literature has proposed different measures of volatility. According to Dacorogna et. 
aL (200 1) we may broadly classify such measures into three categories as follows. Realised 
volatility is calculated from past data and includes measures such as the standard deviation of 
a price series over a particular time period. Other econometric models consider volatility as a 
process, as in the case of a GARCH model. Implied volatility is inferred through the 
theoretical relationship between options prices and the prices of the underlying instruments. 
In addition, we may also distinguish between conditional and unconditional volatility. Whilst 
unconditional volatility statistics such as the variance are calculated through a whole sample 
of data, conditional volatility only depends onpast data, rather than the whole data set. For 
instance, in a GARCH model, the conditional volatility of day t depends on shocks and the 
conditional volatility of previous days. 
One important inference to be gained from this study is whether NSE Index volatility may be 
deemed justified or excessive. This is inferred by comparing NSE volatility patterns to the 
"stylized facts" of volatility prevailing on other markets. As found in the existing literature, 
such volatility patterns may be information-related. Thus, if NSE volatility escalates during 
periods where new information is expected to be higher, volatility is (partly) justified. In this 
way this literature survey includes a description of the main volatility patterns found in 
previous research, and their possible connections with information flow. Section 5.2.1 relates 
to intra-day volatility whilst Section 5.2.2 discusses inter-day volatility. 
5.2.1 Intra-Day Volatility 
Empirical research tends to converge towards the same conclusions regarding volatility 
variations during the trading day, but the explanation for such findings is not fully resolved. 
Wood, Mclnish and Ord (1985) examined one minute interval returns for transaction data 
spanning over six months and found several well-defined patterns. During the opening and 
the closing of the market, returns and standard deviations tend to be higher. The authors 
argued that there are different distributions for overnight returns, opening returns, end-of day 
4 
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returns and intraday returns, where only the latter is a normal one. Higher returns were 
realised during the first thirty minutes of trading and at the market close. These differences 
tend to become less pronounced when one excludes overnight returns. The standard 
deviations of returns tend to be U-shaped across the day, being thicker in the initial period. 
This indicates higher levels of activity within these periods. Such patterns cast doubts on the 
models of stock prices showing i. i. d. increments. Similar findings on U-shaped (or reverse-J- 
shaped) volatility pattems were presented by Harris (1986), Foster and Viswanathan (1993), 
Stoll and VAialey (1990) and Abhyankar, et. al. (1997). 
A W-shaped volatility pattern, which may be explained by a midday trading break, was 
reported by Andersen, Bollerslev and Cai (2000) who examined 5-minute interval returns for 
the Nikkei-225 index. Similarly, Bildik (2001) who examined intra-day data for the Istanbul 
Stock Exchange-100 Index found that returns tend to follow a W-shaped pattern (due to a 
trading break) whilst volatility tends to follow an L-shaped pattern in both the morning and 
afternoon trading sessions. The author also noted that higher closing returns may be the result 
of fund managers "window dressing" their portfolios, in that they bid high prices and accept 
high ask prices at the end of the day to raise the value of their portfolios. 
Shastri, Shastri and Sirodorn (1995) analysed opening and closing prices for shares trading on 
the Stock Exchange of Thailand and found that opening return volatility is around 37% higher 
than the closing return volatility. Mutjaba Mian and Adam (2001) attributed the initial high 
volatility on the Australian Stock Exchange to the way in which the opening call auction is 
structured, whereby it takes around ten minutes for all stocks to trade in the auction. In this 
way, the initial overnight "news" are not priced in immediately with the first index 
observation, but rather after the first ten minutes. 
Authors such as Clark (1973) and Epps and Epps (1976) argued that heteroskedastic price 
changes (and trading volumes) are related to differences in information arrival rates. This 
concept is known as the Mixture of Distribution Hypothesis. Similarly Kalev, et. aL (2004) 
attributed the heteroskedasticity of intra-day returns on the Australian Stock Exchange to 
time-dependence in the news-arrival process and they noted a reduction in volatility 
persistence as obtained through a GARCH (1, I) model when they accounted for a news 
variable such as public company announcements. 
Contradictory evidence was obtained by Andersen, Bollerslev and Cai (2000) who used 
flexible Fourier form regression and found that macroeconomic news announcements were 
41 
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statistically insignificant in explaining intra-day volatility on the Tokyo Stock Exchange. 
Stoll and Whaley (1990) did not attribute the high initial volatility on NYSE to the release of 
public information, but to informed trades or non-synchronous trading. 
Related conclusions by Miller (1989) and Brock and Kleidon (1992) attributed the higher 
returns at the NYSE opening and at the closing to the specialists' behaviour of maintaining 
continuous prices whilst maximising profits. Given that a large number of orders are 
submitted at the closing and prior to the opening, it may be in the specialist's interests to 
increase profit margins (spreads) during these periods. Gerety and Mulherin (1992) used 
NYSE data for the period 1933-1938 and suggested that the high volumes and resulting 
volatility at the end of the day may be attributed to traders who need to transact prior to the 
closing. Thus, the former studies do not attribute intra-day volatility patterns to information 
flow. 
Various theoretical models were proposed to explain the differences in intra-day volatility. 
According to Admati and Pfleidercr (1988) daily volume patterns may be partly explained by 
traders choosing to transact in the "lowcst-cost period" during the day. The resulting 
variations in liquidity affect the expected returns and therefore volatility as outlined in the 
empirical study of Coppejans, Dornowitz and Madhavan (2001). Yet, while the theoretical 
model of Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) explains the volume clustering patterns, it does not 
account for the fact that clustering tends to occur at the beginning and closing of trading days. 
Madhavan, Richardson and Roomans (1997) investigated intra-day volatility variations 
through information patterns and market microstructure features. The authors developed a 
theoretical model to explain stock price changes and tested it through data for NYSE stocks. 
They attributed intraday volatility of stock prices both to market microstructure effects and to 
information. Microstructure effects include trading frictions and price discreteness. 
Infon-nation-related factors include information asymmetry and information flows which 
consist of public announcements and information garnered from order flow. Whilst new 
public announcements may cause revisions in traders' beliefs even in the absence of trading 
activity, the information which may be gained from order flow (by definition) requires trading 
activity to-affect traders' expectations. 
In the model of Madhavan, Richardson and Roomans (1997), both public announcements and 
information gathered from order flow are important causes of volatility, yet the importance of 
public announcements abates during the day, maybe because companies tend to announce 
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news in the mornings. The reduction in information asymmetry and uncertainty as to the 
ftindamental value of the security during the day, contributes towards a reduction in volatility 
and spreads. Overall, information-related patterns tend to reduce volatility during the trading 
day. 
The authors also considered various market microstructure effects and found that factors such 
as rounding of prices tend to be insignificant sources of volatility. A higher portion of 
volatility is accounted for by the bid-ask bounce and this effect becomes more pronounced 
during the trading day. Trading costs (as measured through the possibility of executing orders 
within the bid-ask spread) tend to increase during the day and this eventually leads to 
pronounced volatility. One possible factor that contributes to increased trading costs is that 
intermediaries face the risk of accumulating unwanted inventory, which increases their 
overnight exposure. The interaction between the microstructure effects is also important in 
explaining volatility. 
Thus, according to Madhavan, Richardson and Roomans (1997), information-related volatility 
tends to decrease during the day, whilst the volatility relating to market microstructure factors 
gets more pronounced. These effects result in the typical volatility U-shape. 
5.2.2 Daily and Monthly Volatility 
Various empirical studies concluded that volatility tends to differ across days of the week. 
Such evidence extends to emerging markets as well. For instance, Bildik (2001) noted that the 
opening volatility on the Istanbul Stock Exchange on Mondays and Thursdays was higher than 
the opening volatility on the other days. Whilst he attributed the Monday effect to a higher 
amount of accumulated information during the non-tr ading days, he attributed the Thursday 
effect to the settlement system. In particular, given the presence of a T+2 settlement system, 
"Thursday buyers" do not have to settle their transactions until after the weekend, gaining two 
days free interest. Similar notions on the relevance of the settlement system to inter-day 
effects were presented by Clare, Ibrahim and Thomas (1998) in the context of the Kuala 
Lampur Stock Exchange. 
Researchers have pursued various avenues in explaining inter-day seasonality. French (1980) 
noted that US stock market Monday returns tended to be predominantly negative, and he 
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outlined the possibility that firms postpone the release of adverse information till after the 
closing of the exchange on Friday. Yet, the empirical evidence of negative Monday returns 
tends to be mixed and authors such as Connolly (1989) and Keef and Roush (2005) provided 
contrasting results. In addition, according to Janssen (2004) who studied US general 
economic news release patterns during the period 1994-1998, found a lower tendency for the 
release of economic news during the weekend. Thus, the release pattern of economic news 
may "dampeW' the volatility pattern emanating from any tendencies of companies to release 
(negative) news during the weekend. Despite this, Janssen (2004) still reported higher 
Monday volatility for US-related stocks, bonds, treasury bills and the foreign currency market. 
Empirical evidence on day-of-the-week effects in volatility has also been documented in the 
context of the Indian market. Choudhry (2000) studied returns data for seven Asian markets 
and found that the Indian market was the only one where the change in volatility on Mondays 
was not significant. The Indian index which was used in this study was the BSE 100, and 
therefore we cannot rule out the possibility of obtaining different results in this study since a 
different index is being used. Bhattacharya, Sarkar and Mukhopadhyay (2003) found that 
day-of-the-week effects for the BSE 100 Index also occurred on a fortnightly basis. They 
attributed this both to stock exchange regulations, and to the fact that Indian banks report their 
cash positions to the Reserve Bank of India every other week. 
Various authors have proposed explanations for inter-day volatility patterns. Foster and 
Viswanathan (1990) constructed a theoretical model which explained day-of-the-week effects 
through informed trading and the release of public information. This model allows for trading 
volume, variance and trading costs to differ across the week, yet the degree to which these 
differences are pronounced is dependent on the quality of public infon-nation. In particular, 
those firms with high reporting standards are more likely to witness higher volatility on 
Mondays. The main cause of inter-day variations in this model is that informed traders' level 
of private information varies during the week, and it tends to be higher following non-trading 
periods such as the market opening, particularly on Mondays. During these periods, liquidity 
traders do not have access to trading prices which are an important source of information and 
this places informed traders at a privileged position. 
In the theoretical model of Admati and Pfleiderer (1989) informed and liquidity traders 
transact through market makers. The latter have an incentive to create "trading patterns" in 
that this may. restrict informed traders from transacting immediately. If the informed traders 
transact at a later stage, their private information would have depreciated and this limits the 
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losses of the market makers to informed trades. This process results in patterns in Volume, 
liquidity and volatility and may explain both inter-day and intra-day patterns. Despite this, 
Lee, Fok, and Liu (2001) suggested that since such trading patterns feature in a cross-section 
of markets, it is unlikely that the underlying cause is the trading mechanism given that the 
latter differs across markets. 
Other authors have attributed inter-day patterns on financial markets to psychological factors. 
For instance, authors such as Wilson and Jones (1993) studied various US stock indices and 
found evidence that post trading-holiday returns are usually higher. Fabozzi, Ma and Briley 
(1994) associated higher post trading-holiday returns on US futures markets with the notion 
that people usually feel better after a holiday. 
Madureira and Leal (200 1) studied Brazilian stock market data, and found that whilst the 
Monday effect is present in the index, it does not show up when considering the individual 
stocks. They suggested that Monday effects in index data may be the result of unsuitable 
index construction, such as the inclusion of less liquid stocks. The authors thus suggested that 
Monday effects should be confirmed by analysing individual stock data. 
Researchers have also focused on monthly effects in stock market data. One issue attracting 
much attention is the January effect, where it is often observed that higher returns may be 
earned during this month. Researchers suggested diverse explanations for this effect. For 
instance Ogden (1990) and Booth, Kallunki, and Martikainen (200 1) argued that the January 
effect may be explained by seasonal liquidity and cash flow factors. Kramer (1994) attributed 
the effect to risk seasonality, yet Clare, Psaradakis and Thomas (1995) presented contrasting 
evidence when analysing UK stock market data. Tax-related reasons were considered by 
Branch (1977) and Dyl (1977) who suggested that investors sell stocks on which they can 
realise losses at the end of the fiscal year. This depresses stock prices in December, which 
then recuperate in January. The study of Nassir and Mohammad (1987) in the context of the 
Malaysian stock market suggests that tax-loss selling cannot on its own explain the January 
seasonal, since the authors still found a January effect in the absence of a capital gains tax 
setup. 
The Portfolio rebalancing actions of fund managers at the end of the year have also been 
proposed as explanations for the January effect in the studies of Haugcn and Lakonishok 
(1988) and Clare, Psaradakis and Thomas (1995). Yet, according to Sias and Starks (1997) 
who analysed NYSE-listed stocks, the tax-loss selling hypothesis is a better explanatory factor 
4 
109 
5. THE SEASONALITY OF STOCK PRICE VOLATILITY AND ITS CONNECTION WITH EXCESSIVE PRICE MOVEMENTS 
of the January effect, as compared to window-dressing actions of fund managers. Authors 
such as Chien, Lee and Wang (2002) suggested that higher January volatility may be due to 
the fact that the fiscal years of most companies end in December, and earnings are announced 
in January. 
As outlined by Tang (1998), whilst empirical studies on monthly seasonality of returns are 
numerous, investigations of the monthly seasonality of higher moments of returns are not as 
common. Tang (1998) found mixed evidence regarding monthly seasonality in higher 
moments of the Hong Kong Index and other sectoral indices. 
One notable feature of financial return data (especially lower frequency data) is asymmetric 
volatility, in that high volatility is more likely to follow negative returns rather than positive 
ones. This characteristic has been documented by various researchers including Black (1976). 
Black's explanation for the asymmetric volatility witnessed in inter-day returns was that a 
negative return, leads to a decrease in the value of the firm and therefore an increase in the 
leverage ratio. A higher leverage ratio typically leads to higher volatility of the return on 
equity ratio. An alternative explanation, as outlined for instance by Siourounis (2002), might 
be that smaller investors tend to be more risk-averse, and therefore they sell their holdings 
following price drops in order to stop their losses. 
The empirical evidence regarding asymmetric volatility seems to be sensitive to the data 
frequency. For instance, Mutjaba Mian and Adam (2001) in an empirical study of the 
Australian Stock Exchange Index found that at higher frequencies such as two hour intervals, 
the asymmetric response of volatility tends to disappear. The authors argued that one possible 
reason is that in high frequency data, the asymmetric shocks become disguised amongst a 
higher level of noise. Lin and Yang (2003) used high frequency data for 12 stocks trading on 
the Australian Stock Exchange and found that when accounting for buy or sell imbalances, the 
asymmetric effects in intraday returns may be better predicted. 
5.3 Methodology and Possible Results 
In addressing the question of whether NSE volatility is justified or otherwise, this empirical 
study employs different volatility definitions and rigorous measures of volatility, including 
models estimated through high frequency data. For instance, measures such as return standard 
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deviations, squared returns, scaled intra-day price difference, and the modulus of returns 
address the notions of "realised volatility" and "unconditional volatility". Conversely, the 
estimations of EGARCH and EGARCH-M Models focus on "process volatility" and 
"conditional volatility". The study does not tackle the notion of "implied volatility" mainly 
since NSE derivatives activity was still in its infancy during the period of interest, which 
means that historical derivatives data was largely non-existent. 
Despite this, one should note that the above distinctions between different volatility measures 
may be considered of secondary importance, since the main aim is to distinguish between 
justified and excessive volatility. The adoption of a variety of volatility measures is therefore 
resorted to with this latter aim in mind. The econometric approaches adopted in this study are 
outlined in Sections 5.3.1 and 5.3.2, whilst possible results are discussed in Section 5.3.3. 
5.3.1 Modelling Seasonality through Dummy Variables 
Daily and monthly seasonality of stock prices has often been modelled through dummy 
variables; for instance four dummy variables may be used to model day-of-the-Nveek effects, 
whilst eleven dummy variables may be used to model monthly seasonality. 
This approach to modelling seasonality - particularly monthly seasonality - was called into 
question by various authors. For instance Chien, Lee and Wang (2002) noted that one main 
shortcoming is that OLS regressions assume the absence of heteroskedasticity of returns, 
which goes against the empirically observed "stylised facts'! of stock market data. This may 
lead to flawed test statistics that are biased towards rejecting the null hypothesis of no 
seasonality in returns. Nonetheless, this limitation should not be of concern for our purposes 
due to a number of reasons. Firstly, this research also employs the Kruskal-Wallis test as an 
alternative non-parametric methodology in order to avoid relying on one criterion. In 
addition, authors such as Kunkel, Compton and Beyer (2003), noted that this limitation may 
be addressed by using a large data sample (such as the one at hand). 
4 
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5.3.2 GARCH Modelling 
The ARCH (1) model was developed by Engle (1982). In such a setup, the conditional 
variance of the error term of the return generating process is regressed on a constant and a lag 
of the squared error term. One limitation of this approach is that simple ARCH models may 
require a large number of lags to capture the inherent features of financial data. The GARCH 
(1,1) model was developed by Bollerslev (1986) and Taylor (1986) and overcomes some of 
the limitations of the ARCH (1) process. In particular, a GARCH (1, I) process regresses the 
conditional variance on a constant, a lag of the squared error term and a lag of the conditional 
variance itself. For instance, returns (r, ) are modelled as an AR(I) process as follows: 
r, = ýo + pr, -, 
+ Ei (5.1) 
The conditional variance of the error temi (h, ) is defined as: 
var(e, IQ) (5.2) 
where CI is the information set consisting of current and past observations of r,. The 
conditional variance is modelled as follows: 
o) a, -P, 
' 
I+ 61 h, -1 
(5.3) 
where c, 2 is the squared unexpected return observed during period 1. 
The required conditions to ensure a non-negative conditional variance are 1,8,1 < 1, and (a, 
fli) < 1. It is commonly assumed that the intercept is greater than zero as well. The 
coefficients a, and, 81 represent how volatility is affected by past unexpected returns and the 
lagged conditional variance. 
According to Franses and Van Dijk (2000; pp. 138) ARCH models are able to replicate the 
typical characteristics of financial data including peak-shaped distributions and 
heteroskedasticity. Numerous studies have employed a GARCH (1, I) approach in modelling 
stock returns. These include Bollerslev (1987), Poon and Taylor (1992), and Chelley-Stecley 
4 
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and Steeley (1995). GARCH modelling is also relevant to high-frequency data. As the 
sampling interval gets shorter, it is expected that the coefficients al+, 81 converge to 1. 
When estimating GARCH models, a researcher has to decide whether to assume that the 
standardized errors follow a normal distribution or a Student-t distribution as suggested by 
Bollerslev (1987). One practical solution to this problem is to estimate a separate model under 
both assumptions and deciding on the "best fit" model through a relevant criterion such as the 
Akaike Information Criterion or the Schwarz Bayesian Criterion. 
Various extensions and modifications of the GARCH proce ' ss 
have been proposed. This is 
due to the fact that financial time series are often characterised by non-linearity, and this 
makes the traditional linear GARCH processes sub-optimal for modelling such series. In this 
way, GARCH literature has been supplemented by more elaborate models which allow for - 
asymmetric volatility characteristics and regime switching. One particular example is the GJR 
model proposed by Glosten, Jagannathan, and Runkle (1993). In the GJR model, both the 
sign and the size of the lagged residuals determine the conditional variance. 
Exponential GARCH (EGARCH) processes as proposed by Nelson (199 1), model the log of 
the conditional variance and the asymmetric volatility effect partly emerges from the 
asymmetric shape of the exponential curve. GARCH-in Mean (GARCH-M) models 
investigate the relationship between stock market volatility and the returns generated by the 
market, following the notion that risk:. averse investors expect higher returns to compensate for 
a higher volatility risk. The latter two models are discussed in more detail in Section 5.6. 
Finally, reference should be made to the limitations of GARCH methodology. Various 
authors such as Hansen (1994) presented evidence that higher order moments of the error term 
do not follow a Markov process, i. e. they depend on past values. The fon-ner GARCH models 
do not account for such dependence. 
In addition, volatility is likely to be influenced by other factors which might be unaccounted 
for in the GARCH process. For instance, the volatility of options prices is likely to be 
influenced by the volatility of the underlying instruments and therefore it might be desirable to 
account for both factors in a single model. Such a limitation may be addressed by specifying 
Multivariate GARCH models and GARCHX models (Hwang and Satchell; 2005). 
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Similarly, the standard GARCH process does not model a direct relationship between 
volatility and expected returns, as postulated by the Capital Asset Pricing Model. This 
relationship is directly addressed through GARCH-M processes. 
5.3.3 A Note on Possible Findings of this Study 
In this Chapter, I seek to describe volatility patterns on NSE and to draw inferences on 
whether the observed volatility is justified or excessive. Given that the standard methodology 
for answering the latter question requires data about expected dividends, such approach cannot 
be readily applied in the context of a stock index since indices do not directly yield dividends. 
In addition dividend data are inherently low frequency, and therefore of limited relevance 
when analysing intra-day effects. In this way the research question is split into two subsidiary 
ones. The first question is whether the observed volatility is related to information flow and 
the second one is whether volatility is related to returns. If the empirical findings disclose that 
volatility is connected with information patterns and with returns, then this would imply that 
NSE volatility is (at least partly) justified. These research questions are addressed through the 
econometric modelling of data sampled at different frequencies. The empirical research of 
this Chapter consists of three main investigations as detailed hereunder. 
The first investigation considers the opening volatility during different days of the week. A 
higher opening volatility on Monday would provide evidence that markets are adjusting to 
news accumulated over the weekend, suggesting a connection between volatility and 
information flows. 
The second analysis considers monthly volatility. One main problem with most of the 
existing research on monthly volatility and the January effect is that the underlying cause of 
these effects has not been resolved with certainty. Various possible causes for this effect have 
been proposed and these include the end of financial years for listed companies or investors' 
personal decisions regarding tax-loss selling during the month of December. NSE provides an 
ideal research setting for investigating this issue given that the Indian fiscal year ends in 
March and in case of most NSE listed companies the financial year ends in March as well. 
Therefore, higher volatility around the month of March would again provide evidence that 
volatility is related to information flow. If on the other hand a January effect is noted on NSE, 
this would be an indication that this effect observed on other markets is not mainly caused by 
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the end of fiscal year or the end of financial year of companies. One cannot rule out the 
possibility of detecting both a January effect as well as seasonality around the end of the fiscal 
year - in line with Clare, Psaradakis and Thomas (1995) in the context of the UK equity 
markets where the fiscal year ends in April. 
The third investigation is whether volatility is related to returns. The connection between 
volatility and returns may be interpreted as a risk-retum relationship. A positive relationship 
between volatility and returns may be expected, follow ing the notion that investors are risk- 
averse. Such relationship might not necessarily imply that volatility is justified, but at least 
we may conclude that volatility is being compensated for by a higher return. Absence of a 
positive volatility-retums relationship indicates that risk on NSE is not related to returns - and 
therefore this would hint at excessive volatility. The relationship between volatility and 
returns is analysed through EGARCH-M models. However, such a relationship may only 
hold over a relatively long period of time. This is due to the fact that over the short-term, 
stock prices may deviate from their fundamental values. In addition, if higher volatility 
unfailing yields higher short-term returns, then it would always be advantageous to hold high 
volatility stocks! Given that a longer data range may be required to capture the volatility- 
returns relationship, a five year daily time-series is used to estimate EGARCH-M models. 
Whilst the above methodologies (particularly the first two) were not meant as investigations to 
assess whether volatility is justified or otherwise, one may still glean inferences, especially if 
the results point in the same direction. For instance if it is noted that volatility escalates as 
more news are released and that it is connected to longer-term returns, then we may infer that 
volatility is partly justified. If the results disclose that volatility is not related to the typical 
information flow and to longer-terin returns, then this would indicate that part of the volatility 
is excessive. 
5.4 Data and Notation 
5.4.1 Intra-Day Data 
The original set included high frequency Nifty Index observations for thirty-two trading days, 
starting at 18'h May 1999 and ending on 30th June 1999. In order to avoid any market 
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microstructure bias, the trading days were selected from two different NSE systems. In the 
first regime the trading day opened and closed through a call auction system with continuous 
trading held in between. The second regime simply consisted of one continuous trading 
session. 
This empirical study does not focus on the differences between these regimes - these are 
investigated in Chapters 6 and 7. The trading days were labelled as the "Before" call auction 
suspension period and the "After" call auction suspension period. This distinction is 
unnecessary at this stage, but it becomes relevant in subsequent studies and therefore I 
distinguish between regimes when labelling the trading days for the sake of unifon-nity. 
Two trading days were discarded due to trading halts. 31 The final sample thus consisted of 
fifteen trading days in each regime as shown in Appendix 5.1. The sample includes a 
comprehensive cross-section of different days of the week. This minimizes the potential for 
bias arising from day-of-the-week effects, and is also essential for investigating volatility 
differences on particular days (Section 5.5). 
In sampling the data, the first observation for each particular minute was taken. The 
observations typically started at 10: 00 and ended at 15: 29 yielding a total of 330 observations 
at one minute intervals. This was the case with most of the sessions in the "After" period. In 
case of the "Before" period, more observations were available owing to the additional call 
auction trading. During the call auction regime, the observations started at around 09: 55 and 
ended at 15: 29. Following this, a closing call auction was held yielding (around) five further 
observations from 15: 50 to 15: 55. This resulted in a gap where no observations were 
available. Given that the returns following this trading gap were typically in the range of the 
other one-minute interval returns, this period is treated as a regular one-minute interval for 
modelling purposes. The largest intra-day sample employed in this study consisted of 343 
observations at one minute intervals. 
In most cases the first observation for the particular minute took place exactly at the start of 
that particular minute. Yet occasionally the first observation for the minute occurred after 
one, two or three seconds. WhiIst this was not typically coupled with any outliers, one still 
cannot claim that the sample was taken at uniform intervals. In a sense, this problem is related 
to the non-synchronous trading of individual stocks as analysed in Chapter 4. 
31 The discarded intra-day data sets were 21st May 1999 and 28th June 1999. 
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The distributions of logarithmic returns are typically characterised by fat tails, and this implies 
that extreme observations occur relatively frequently. While eliminating the occasional large 
return might be desirable for the purpose of fitting a statistical model to the data, it does not 
always make sense on economic grounds. Indeed, Cont (1999) argued that such large 
fluctuations may account for a substantial part of the return generated over a particular period, 
and therefore they deserve attention on part of analysts. No extreme observations were 
eliminated in this study. 
Finally, one should note that the selection of 30 particular trading days leaves the possibility 
that the conclusions inferred from this study may have been peculiar to the chosen period, and 
this is an inherent limitation in the research. 
5.4.2 Inter-Day Data 
The daily data set shows the Nifly Closing observations from I" January 1999 till 3 1" 
December 2003 and includes 1257 observations. A note about the use of index data is 
warranted. Such methodology has the inherent advantage that the observations are not biased 
by any peculiar effects taking place within individual stocks. Yet, when keeping in mind that 
the index value is an average of the prices of the underlying stocks, one may intuitively 
assume that if the underlying stocks feature non-synchronous trading effects, then these might 
be present in the index observations as well. Further details about the data set and the Nifty 
index were included in Chapter 3. 
5.5 Intra-Day Volatility and Day-of-the-Week Effects 
We now turn to the modelling of intra-day volatility - particularly the opening volatility. The 
main aim of the analysis is to infer whether volatility is affected by the information flow 
pattern, following the notion that more news is expected to accumulate during weekend non- 
trading days, resulting in higher Monday volatility. 
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5.5.1 Analysing the Intra-Day Data Sets 
The analysis started by aggregating the intra-day log return moduli at one-minute intervals, 
across the sample of 30 trading days. The return plot is shown in Figure 5.1 and is broadly in 
line with the empirical evidence cited in Section 5.2.1, regarding higher volatility at the 
opening and at the closing of the trading day. 
Figure 5.1: Modulus of Intra-Day Returns 
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Descriptive statistics for the intra-day distributions are shown in Table 5.1. The absolute 
value of one-minute log returns ranges from 0.001 to 0.019, whilst the standard deviation of 
the distributions ranges from 0.0004 to 0.0013. Whilst there is no clear-cut tendency towards 
skewness in any one direction, positive skewness is more evident than negative skewness. 
The average of the skewness modulus is 2.02. All the distributions are leptokurtic; the 
average excess kurtosis is 21.96, which comprises a range of excess kurtosis values from 0.37 
to 136.43. Jarque-Bera tests rejected the null hypothesis of a normal distribution at the 99% 
confidence level for all trading days except A13, where the null hypothesis of normality could 
not be rejected. The former features are in line with prior research such as Oldfield and 
Rogalski (1980) who found that as the data frequency increases, the departures from normality 
become more pronounced. This feature may be due to the fact that returns measured at lower 
frequencies are a summation of various other shorter-term returns, and therefore they are 
expected to converge more closely towards the normal distribution following the central limit 
theorem. 
In order to ascertain that the log-returns series are not integrated processes, unit-root tests were 
conducted (Table 5.2). The null hypothesis of a unit root was rejected for all data sets. 
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Table 5.1: Descriptive Statistics for One-Minute Interval Log Returns during the 
Sampled Trading Days 
Day Mean Std. Maximum Minimum Coeff-Of Skewness Kurtosis- Jarque- 
Devn. Variation 3 Bera 
Before Call Auction Suspension 
B1 0.0000 0.0007 0.0038 -0.0023 34.0100 0.4344 2.1556 76.5 
B2 0.0001 0.0007 0.0055 -0.0019 13.5017 1.5046 11.1520 1,884.6 
B3 0.0000 0.0007 0.0026 -0.0022 22.3177 0.0769 0.9608 13.4 
B4 0.0000 0.0007 0.0031 -0.0028 53.5323 -0.1062 1.8199 47.3 
B5 0.0000 0.0005 0.0013 -0.0025 22.7986 -0.3048 1.6518 43.9 
B6 -0.0001 0.0009 0.0030 -0.0028 14.2107 -0.1832 1.0175 16.4 
B7 -0.0001 0.0008 0.0015 -0.0059 7.2531 -2.8826 14.3103 3,372.0 
B8 0.0000 0.0010 0.0033 -0.0040 36.6011 -0.2491 1.1410 21.8 
B9 0.0001 0.0010 0.0122 -0.0051 7.5165 4.4930 59.0561 50,403.2 
B10 0.0000 0.0008 0.0022 -0.0039 35.8040 -0.7191 2.9998 156.3 
B11 0.0000 0.0005 0.0015 -0.0031 134.8700 -0.6735 5.0356 382.7 
B12 0.0000 0.0005 0.0025 -0.0015 16.7890 0.6833 3.2779 177.6 
B13 0.0000 0.0007 0.0083 -0.0017 13.7759 . 6.3281 74.7374 80,920.8 B14 0.0000 0.0006 0.0035 -0.0018 110.7876 1.2391 7.3945 854.0 
B15 0.0001 0.0007 0.0033 -0.0078 13.8242 -3.0624 43.5118 27,513.8 
After Call Auction Suspension 
Al 0.0000 0.0008 0.0100 -0.0051 18.10`15 4.4240 66.8113 62,263.8 
A2 0.0000 0.0005 0.0052 -0.0017 149.1296 3.2508 31.5223 14,200.8 
A3 -0.0001 0.0005 0.0018 -0.0021 8.6844 -0.2167 1.6656 40.6 
A4 0.0000 0.0013 0.0021 -0.0185 44.1214 -10.6914 136.4282 261,416.2 
A5 0.0000 0.0006 0.0054 -0.0017 18.8038 2.5959 27.3576 10,661.7 
A6 0.0001 0.0010 0.0098 -0.0061 12.3625 -2.4213 37.3395 19,434.2 
A7 0.0001 0.0007 0.0081 -0.0014 9.9972 4.1789 42.8090 26,079.6 
A8 0.0000 0.0005 0.0033 -0.0014 . 
82.4192 1.2665 6.3058 633.0 
A9 0.0001 0.0005 0.0045 -0.0010 6.7947 2.7956 22.8939. 7,636.6 
A10 0.0000 0.0006 0.0048 -0.0019 15.2415 1.5164 15.4323 3,401.1 
All -0.0001 0.0007 0.0073 -0.0028 11.4112 2.8776 31.3412 13,919.3 
A12 0.0000 0.0006 0.0016 -0.0032 18.3023 -0.7738 2.6078 126.1 
A13 0.0000 0.0004 0.0015 -0.0013 68.5241 0.1722 0.3716 3.5 
A14 0.0000 0.0004 0.0015 -0.0012 360.6461 0.3948 1.6999 48.3 
A15 0.0000 0.0004 0.0016 -0.0020 23.6199 -0.2304 3.8433 205.4 
The fifteen trading days prior to the suspension of the call auction are superseded with a 
B (Before) whilst the oth er trading days are denoted with an A (After). Descriptive 
statis tics for each trading day are based on around 340 observations for the call auction 
perio d, and 330 observations for the (post-auction suspension period) . The Jarque-Bera test for norma lity, is X2 (2 ) distributed. The criti cal values are 9.21,5.99 and 4.61 , for the 99%, 95% and 90% con fidence levels respectively. The null hypothesis of a normal 
distribution is rejected at the 99% level of confidence for all return series, except for Al 3 
where the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. 
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Table 5.2: Unit Root Tests for Intra-Day Data Sets (One-Minute Frequency) 
Day ADF(I) 95% CV # Obs. Day ADF(I) 95% CV # Obs. 
BOI -10.250 -2.8703 338 A01 -13.020 -2.8706 327 
B 02 -13.140 -2.8703 337 A02 -14.050 -2.8706 327 
B 03 -9.570 -2.8703 337 A03 -10.240 -2.8706 327 
B 04 -11.150 -2.8703 336 A 04 -23.680 -2.8706 327 
B 05 -11.590 -2.8703 338 A 05 -9.620 -2.8705 328 
B 06 -10.220 -2.8703 335 A06 -9.030 -2.8706 327 
B 07 -8.300 -2.8703 338 A 07 --11.070 -2.8706 327 
B 08 -10.230 -2.8703 336 A08 -12.140 -2.8706 327 
B 09 -13.980 -2.8703 337 A09 -13.590 -2.8705 328 
B10 -11.850 -2.8703 337 A10 -9.670 -2.8705 328 
Bll -10.830 -2.8703 336 All -13.750 -2.8706 327 
B 12 -10.720 -2.8703 336 A 12 -10.400 -2.8706 327 
B 13 -13.700 -2.8703 336 A 13 -10.120 -2.8705 328 
B 14 -9.670 -2.8703 335 A 14 -11.050 -2.8705 328 
B 15 -8.280 -2.8702 339 A 15 -9.950 -2.8706 327 
The table shows Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statist ics, on the null hypothesis of a unit 
root in the intra-day log returns series. A first order Augmented Dickey-Fuller test without 
a trend was selected. The ADF(l) statistic is the t-rat io of a, in the model AXf = ao + aIXt- 
I+, 61,6Xt. I + E. The 95% critical values of the test are shown in MacKinnon (1991). The 
null hypothesis of a unit root in the data is rejected ac ross all sets. The column s denote 
the following: Trading Day, ADF Test Stati stic, 95% Critical Value, and the Number of 
Observations used in the test. 
5.5.2 Day-of-The-Week Effects in Opening Volatility 
This study considers day-of-the-week effects since a look at the opening volatility on 
Mondays may give valuable insights as to whether NSE volatility is news-related or 
otherwise. We start by inquiring whether the opening standard deviation of Nifty price level 
series varies across trading days. The opening standard deviation was computed through the 
initial 40 observations sampled at one-minute intervals for the particular day. Given that t- 
tests may cause problems when applied to non-normal distributions such as the ones under 
review, a non-parametric test is used. This is the Kruskal-Wallis test which is defined by: 
k 
H 
12 (TRi)2 
-3(n+l) X2 (k (5.4) 
n(n + 1) i=l ni 
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where n is the number of observations (in our case 30 trading days), k is the number of groups 
(in our case Monday - Friday), TRj is the sum of rankings obtained for each group, and ni is 
the number of observations within the particular group. 
The standard deviations were ranked, assigning a value of I to the lowest standard deviation, 
and a value of 30 to the highest one. The ranks were then grouped according to the days of the 
week. For each of the five groups, the sum and the count of ranks was calculated. This 
yielded an H-statistic of 2.602. Comparing this to the )? (4) critical value (95%) does not 
allow us to reject the null hypothesis that the opening standard deviations are the same across 
trading days. 
As an alternative methodology, a regression was run over the opening standard deviations of 
Nifty level series: 
(7NFT, OP=vf+ADTu + 182 
Dw +A DTH +A DF +ý (5.5) 
where qNFTOp is the opening standard deviation of the Nifty observations, DTu, D; y, DTH, and 
DF are dummy variables for Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday and Friday, V1, '61, 
fl2, P3, and fl4 
32' are estimated coefficients, whilst ý is an error term . 
When considering that this regression was estimated using only 30 observations and that it 
includes four dummy variables, one cannot expect highly significant results. The results 
reported in Table 5.3 Panel A show that all dummy variables are negative, indicating that the 
opening volatility is somewhat higher on Mondays, but the coefficients are not significant at 
the 95% confidence level. 
A second regression was run, this time using the Nifty (levels) percentage squared returns, 
which were sampled at one-minute intervals. The opening returns were calculated using the 
initial forty Nifty price observations for the particular day. The estimated regression was: 
R2 NFT, OP +ADTu +, 82Dw + J83D; rH +, 
84DF +ý (5.6) 
32 This model is a variation of the one estimated by French (1980), who analysed stock returns (rather than 
standard deviations). 
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where R2 NFTop denotes the opening squared (percentage) one-minute returns of the Nifty 
observations; Dru, Div, Drij, and DF are dummy variables for Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday 
and Friday respectively; 7r, Pj,, 82,, 83, and, 84 are estimated coefficients, whilst ý is an error 
term. 
Table 5.3: Regressions of Day-of-The-Week Effects of Opening Volatility 
Panel A: (Openinq tandard Deviations Sampled at Dailv F equencv) 
W DTu Dw DTH DF 
5.44940 -2.54181 -1.03257 -2.55010 -1.89576 
(5.01) (1.78) (0.72) (1.3) (1.23) 
Number of Observations: 30 W: 0.1543 R-bar-squared: 0.0190 
Panel B: (Opening Returns Sampled at One-Minute Freque CV) 
IT Dru Dw DTH DF 
0.0000044 -0.0000032 -0.0000022 -0.0000032 -0.0000031 
(4.70) (2.64) (1.84) (2.58) (2.34) 
Number of Observations: 1170 R2: 0.0079 
- 
R-bar-squared: 0.0045 
Panel A shows the results for the regression where the dependent variable was the Standard 
Deviation of the first 40 observations of the Nifty Index. Panel B shows the results for the regression 
where the dependent variable consisted of the initial 39 Nifty (levels) squared % returns sampled at 
one-minute intervals, across 30 trading days. 
The first column shows the intercept, whilst columns 2-5 show the dummy variables for Tuesday, 
Wednesday, Thursday and Friday. The coefficients are shown on top, with t-ratios in bracket$ 
underneath. Significance at the 99%, 95% and 90% levels is denoted by ***, ** and * respectively. 
The results are shown in Table 5.3 Panel B. Again the dummy variables are all negative 
indicating that opening squared returns (and therefore volatility) are higher on Mondays. The 
dummy variables are all significant at the 95% - 99% level of confidence except for the Div 
which is significant at the 90% level of confidence. 33 
Overall the latter results confirm that the opening volatility tends to be higher on Mondays, 
albeit not clearly significant through the cross-section of tests. 34 
33 This indicates that the Wednesday (opening) volatility is the second highest during the weekdays, after the 
Monday (opening) volatility. This result may be related to the NSE settlement system during the particular 
period, whereby most of the trades occurring during the week were settled on Tuesdays. Following the arguments 
of Bildik (2001), buyers have an incentive to trade on Wednesdays given that they would not be required to settle 
their trades prior to six days. 
34 The evidence shown in Table 5.3 somewhat contradicts the observations of Choudhry (2000) who did not find 
significant evidence of higher Monday volatility on the Indian market. These different results may be reconciled 
when considering that the latter study featured a different index and it did not specifically look at the opening 
volatility. A further possible explanation for the conflicting results is that Choudhry's study used a data set 
ranging from 1990-1995, whereas this study used 1999 data. As outlined by Fox el. aL (1999), India's capital 
markets have undergone substantial change during the 1990's, including more rigorous reporting requirements for 
companies. Higher reporting standards may induce higher volatility on Mondays as outlined by Fostcr and 
Viswanathan (1990). 
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Following French's (1980) assertion that Monday opening returns tend to be predominantly 
negative since firms delay the release of unfavourable information till after the closing of the 
exchange on Friday, a further regression was estimated. The dependent variable consisted of 
the Nifly (levels) percentage initial returns (sampled at one minute intervals) as a function of 
dummy variables for Tuesday - Friday. If the information accumulated on Monday mornings 
tends to be unfavourable, we should note that Monday initial returns are lower than those of 
the rest of the days. The results shown in Table 5.4 indicate that Monday returns do not tend 
to be predominantly negative, since the intercept is positive and none of the dummy variables 
denoting the rest of the trading days are significant. 
Table SA: Regressions of Day-of-The-Week Effects of Opening Returns Sampled at One- 
Minute Intervals 
Tr DTu Dw DTH DF 
0.000074 -0.000012 -0.000126 0.000007 -0.000030 
(0.74) (0.09) (0.96) (0.06) (0.21) 
Number of Observations: 1170 R 2: 0.0014 R-bar-squared: -0.0021 
The dependent variable consisted of the initial 39 Nifty (levels) percentage returns sampled at 
one-minute intervals, across 30 trading days. The first column shows the intercept, whilst 
columns 2-5 show the Dummy variables for Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday and Hday. The 
coefficients are shown on top, with t-ratios in brackets underneath. None of the coefficients are 
significant. Results show that Monday opening returns are not significantly different from the 
opening returns of the rest of the week. 
Considering the possibility that Monday opening returns are not predominantly negative due 
to noise induced by high-frequency sampling, the cumulative opening return for the index 
(during the first 40 minutes) was estimated for each trading day in the sample. An average 
return for day of the week was then worked out, as shown in Table 5.5. The table confirms 
that Monday opening returns do not tend to be "more negative" than the opening returns for 
the other days of the week. 
The tests undertaken so far indicate that the opening volatility on Monday tends to be 
somewhat higher than that of the rest of the days, although the difference is not clearly 
significant. In addition, Monday opening returns are not predominantly negative. 
In view of the findings of Madureim and Leal (2001), that a Monday effect may be present in 
index data, but not in individual stock prices, additional tests were carried out on individual 
stock data. The aim is to establish whether the higher Monday volatility is confirmed when 
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analysing individual stocks. A sample of nineteen out of fifty stocks included in the NSE 
Nifty Index was selected. The latter stocks were selected in a way to capture a variety of 
industries, but otherwise the sample selection process was random. The sample period for 
individual stock data ranged from the I" January 1999 to 3 1" December 2003 -a total of 1257 
observations. Volatility was assessed in terms of the Scaled Intra-Day Price Difference, which 
was defined as follows: 
Di, t = (Phigh it - Plow it) / Popen ij (5.7) 
where Phigh j,, , P, .. j,, and Pp, j,, are the highest, lowest and opening prices for stock i on day I 
respectively. Therefore this test considers the volatility throughout the whole trading day, 
rather than the opening volatility. 
Table 5.5: Average Opening Returns for Different Days of the Week 
Day of the Week No. of Trading Days Sampled Average Opening Return 
Monday 5 days 0.16% 
Tuesday 7 days 0.25% 
Wednesday 7 days -0.22% 
Thursday 6 days 0.58% 
Friday 5 days 0.12% 
The opening return for a particular trading day was defined as the Nifty Index % return for 
the first 40 minutes of the day. The average for the particular opening return for each day 
of the week was then estimated. Monday returns do not tend to be predominantly negative 
as compared to other trading days. 
The following regression was estimated: 
Di =iri +AD, ýfoN, j + 
ýj (5.8) 
where Di, is the Scaled Intra-Day Price Difference for stock i, 7r and P are estimated 
coefficients, DAfoyj is a dummy variable which takes the value of I on a Monday and zero 
otherwise, whilst ýj is an error term. Higher Monday volatility should result in a significantly 
positive coefficient for the dummy variable. The results reported in Table 5.6 show that 
volatility for the sampled stocks is not significantly higher on Mondays; indeed Dj%foNj is 
negative in case of eight stocks. 
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Thus, Monday volatility seems somewhat higher as compared to other weekdays when 
considering Nifty Index data, whilst it is not significantly higher when measured in relation to 
individual stocks. Whilst this "inconsistency" might be partly due to the fact that the tests on 
the Nifty Index data considered the opening Monday volatility, whilst the tests on the 
individual stocks considered the volatility throughout the whole day, the results still allow us 
to conclude that the Monday effect in the index data is not related to information. If the 
Monday effect was indeed related to information, it should still have shown up in the 
individual stock data, given that one may expect information-related fluctuations to be of a 
longer tenn nature and thus showing up when considering volatility estimates in respect of the 
whole trading day. 
Table 5.6: Individual Stock Volatility Regressions on a Monday Dummy Variable 
(estimated through daily-frequency data) 
Sampled Stock Intercept Monday Dummy Variable R-Squared 
Coefficient t-Ratio 
Bajajauto 0.03746 0.0014 (0.82) 0.00054 
Bhel 0.04702 -0.0026 '(1.42) 0.00160 
Bpcl 0.04921 -0.0017 (0.82) 0.00054 
Bses 0.04120 0.0007 (0.36) 0.00010 
Colgate 0.03074 0.0021 (1.49) 0.00176 
Digitaleqp 0.06041 -0.0014 (0.55) 0.00024 
Gujambcem 0.04236 -0.0018 (1.03) 0.00084 
Herohonda 0.04371 -0.0001 (0.08) 0.00001 
Hindlever 0.03262 0.0003 (0.24) 0.00005 
Icicibank 0.04957 -0.0004 (0.19) 0.00003 
IpcI 0.04679 0.0003 -(0.16) 0.00002 
L&T 0.04136 0.0003 (0.16) 0.00002 
M&M 0.04734 -0.0001 (0.05) 0.00000 
Niit 0.06052 0.0003 (0.12) 0.00001 
Orientbank 0.04275 0.0021 (1.11) 0.00098 
Reliance 0.03552 0.0012 (0.73) 0.00042 
Sbin 0.03694 0.0006 (0.42) 0.00014 
Sunpharma 0.04643 -0.0025 (1.15) 0.00106 
Tatatea 0.04148 0.0013 (0.70) 0.00039 
The table shows results for volatility regressions for a sample of 19 stocks. Volatility 
measured as the Scaled Intra-Day Price Difference, was regressed on an intercept, a 
dummy variable taking the value of I on a Monday, and a value of zero otherwise, as 
well as an error term. Each regression for the individual stocks was estimated using a 
sample of 1257 observations. The table reports the Intercept Value, and the 
Coefficient and t-ratio for the Dummy Variable. R-squared statistics are shown in the 
last column. The dummy variable does not indicate that volatility is significantly higher 
on Mondays. 
0 
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Thus overall the explanation proposed by Madureira and Leal (2001), seems applicable in the 
context of the Nifty Index. The Monday effect transpires in the index data but disappears 
when considering individual stocks. This is probably due to index construction features and 
market factors such as non-synchronous trading. Overall, it is unlikely that the higher index 
volatility on Mondays is related to information flows. 
5.6 Monthly Volatility 
The study now turns to the analysis of monthly volatility through daily log returns. Higher 
volatility during the month of March and in the subsequent period might be justified on the 
grounds that the financial year for a large number of Indian companies terminates in March. 
5.6.1 Analysing the Data Set 
The plots of the daily Nifty (levels) series and log returns for the period I" January 1999-3 1" 
December 2003 are shown in Figure 5.2. The latter plot visually confirms that high volatility 
seems to cluster around specific periods. Nifty Log Returns feature an excess kurtosis of 
2.6138 and a negative skewness of -0.17354. A Jarque-Bera Test Statistic of 363.84 permits 
the rejection of the null hypothesis of non-nality at the 99% level of confidence when 
compared to the respective Chi-Squared critical value. 
The first order autocorrelation coefficient of the log returns is highly significant, whilst the 
majority of the subsequent lags are insignificant. The autocorrelation function is shown in 
Figure 5.3. The Augmented Dickey-Fuller test-statistics yielded similar statistics when 
specifying tests with and without a trend. ADF tests yielded statistics of -25.05 (Order 1), - 
14.4 (Order 5), and - 10.1 (Order 10). Order 5 and order 10 tests were specified due to 
possible weekly or fortnightly effects in the data. Comparing the former statistics to the 95% 
critical value of -2.86 allows us to reject the Null Hypothesis of a Unit Root in log returns. 
The time series spans around 5 years and should enhance the robustness of the fitted 
regressions; yet as outlined in Chapter 2 there are limitations inherent in working with such a 
long time period. In particular the data set includes changes in market microstructure, which 
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are not accounted for. Some of these microstructure changes (for instance changes in price 
limits) may well affect the underlying volatility process. 
Figure 5.2: Time Series Plots for (a) Nifty Index and (b) Nifty Log Returns 
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5.6.2 Monthly Seasonality on NSE 
The test on monthly seasonality is related to the previous one on day-of-the-week effects, in 
that the main scope is not the simple detection of seasonality, but rather to serve as an 
indication of whether volatility is related to news (and therefore is partly justified) or whether 
it constitutes excessive market movements, This follows the notion that the Indian fiscal year 
and the accounting year for a large number of NSE-quoted companies end in March, and 
annual reports are released between March and June. In this- way, higher volatility during 
these months indicates that market movements may constitute a response to new information. 
If no significant differences in volatility or returns are found around these months, it would 
imply that the market tends to be excessively volatile for most of the year (since the volatility 
of the "no news months" is equal to the volatility of the "news months"). 
The test consists of two simple OLS regressions, where two different proxies for volatility 
were specified as dependent variables, whilst the explanatory variables in each regression 
were eleven dummy variables for the months of February, March.... December. The 
dependent variable in the first regression was the Modulus of the Daily Log Returns as a 
volatility proxy, whilst the dependent variable in the second regression was the Intra-Day 
Scaled Difference (Equation 5.7). 
Regression results are shown in Table 5.7. The R2 statistics indicate that the models have low 
explanatory power, but this may be expected when explaining volatility in ternis of an 
intercept and a rudimentary pattern of information flow - one should really account for a more 
detailed pattern of infori-nation to obtain comprehensive explanatory power. 
Prior to discussing the volatility around the month of March, we note that the dummy variable 
denoting the month of August shows a reduction in volatility during this period, and this is 
significant at the 95% level of confidence. We may attribute this to a holiday effect; for 
instance Janssen (2004) who analysed news release patterns for US economic indicators found 
a tendency for less news releases during August. Bournan and Jacobsen (2002) presented 
similar evidence of lower holiday-period volatility in respect of a number of emerging and 
developed markets. The authors stated that differences across the holiday months of May to 
October do not emanate from differences in trading volume, but possibly from changes in 
trading behaviour such as the degree of risk aversion or increased liquidity requirements. 
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Table 5.7: Mont ly Seasonality of Volatility Regressions (estimated throug h daily data) 
Regression I Regression 2 
Volatility Proxy Modulus of Log Returns Intra-Day Scaled Difference 
Coefficient T-ratio Coefficient T-ratio 
Intercept 0.0116 (11.25) 0.0207 (17.52) 
Dummy 
Variables: 
February 0.0001 (0.09) 0.0007 (0.43) 
March 0.0027 (1.85) 0.0076 (4.50) 
April 0.0052 (3.49) 0.0086 (5.02) 
May 0.0013 (0.91) 0.0026 (1.53) 
June -0.0013 (0.91) -0.0016 (0.94) 
July -0.0017 (1.18) -0.0016 (0.99) 
August -0.0029 (1.99) -0.0.039 (2.31) 
September 0.0018 (1.22) 0.0023 (1.36) 
October 0.0002 (0.11) 0.0014 (0.83) 
November -0.0014 (0.95) -0.0020 (1.16) 
December -0.0020 (1.35) -0.0015 (0.88) 
R2 0.0405 R2 0.0802 
Regression R-bar 2 0.0320 R-bar 2 0.0720 
Statistics F-statistic 4.7728 F-statistic 9.8644 
#. Observations 1256 #. Observations 1257 
In the above models, volatility is measured in terms of the Modulus of Log Returns in the first 
regression, whilst it is measured in terms of the Intra-Day Scaled Difference in the second 
regression. The explanatory variables are dummies for the months of February to December. 
Statistical significance is denoted by and * for the 99%, 95% and 90% levels of 
confidence respe ctively. 
As expected, significant increases in volatility are evident during the months of March and 
April, and we may attribute these to an end-of-accounting-year effect and an end-of-fiscal year 
effect. The increased volatility during April is significant at the 99% level of confidence in 
both models. Yet, the increased volatility for the month of March is significant at the 99% 
level when modelled in terms of the Intra-Day Scaled Difference, but it is only significant at 
the 90% level when modelled in terms of the modulus of log returns. 
This might be disclosing an interesting feature, in that the increased volatility during the 
month of March might include a comprehensive amount of unjustified movements. Whilst 
March volatility increases sharply in terms of the intra-day scaled difference (which may be 
interpreted as movements around the fundamental value of the stock price), the increase is not 9 
as sharp in terms of daily returns. This implies that the increased price movements during the 
day might not have sufficient economic justification; these fluctuations are short-lived and do 
not materialise in a similarjump in returns of the same statistical significance. Thus, the 
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increased volatility during this month may be interpreted as the response to conjectures of 
traders about the performance of companies at year-end, when preliminary results and audited 
accounts have not yet been published. Part of these responses are "unfounded guesses" and 
therefore they do not necessarily result in a long-lived change in the magnitude of returns. 
Volatility increases during the month of April at the 99% level of confidence both when 
modelled in terms of log return modulus, and when modelled in terms of the Intra-Day Scaled 
Difference. This may imply that the market movements during this month are long-lived 
since they materialise in longer-term returns of comparable statistical significance and 
therefore have a higher degree of economic justification. Thus, we may interpret the April 
volatility as responses to "real news" following clustering of earnings reports. 
In summary, NSE witnesses increased volatility during the months of March and April, which 
coincides with the end of the accounting year for a large number of quoted companies. The 
increased volatility during March may be the response to "guesses" about company 
performance, since the increased price dispersion does not materialise in a change in returns of 
similar statistical significance. The increased volatility during April is more likely to consist 
of responses to real news about company performance, since the increased price dispersion 
results in a change of similar significance in returns. Volatility abates during the month of 
August (in line with other markets) when traders are likely to be on holiday. 
In order to present the above notions through more parsimonious models, two further 
regressions were estimated as follows: 
y :- lr + 
ADAMR, 
APR 
+ ß2DAUG +ý (5.9) 
where DMARAPR is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 during March and April and 
zero otherwise, DAUG is a dummy variable which takes the value of I during August and zero 
otherwise, 7c,, 81 and, 82 are estimated coefficients, whilst ý is an error ten-n. In the first 
regression, the dependent variable was the modulus of the daily log retums, whilst in the 
second regression the dependent variable was the Scaled Intra-Day Price Difference. Results 
shown in Table 5.8 confirm the above intuitions that volatility is significantly higher during 
March and April, whilst it is significantly lower during August. 
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Given the limitations of the dummy variable methodology when assessing monthly 
seasonality as described in Section 5.3.1, the Kruskal-Wallis test was used as a non-parametric 
alternative. This is defined by Equation 5.4 reproduced bereunder: 
H=[- 12 
k (TR, )2 
-3(n+j) V2 
Y, 
-, (k-1) (5.4) 
n(n + 1) i=l ni 
where n is the number of observations (in our case 1257 for the Scaled Intra-Day Price 
Difference and 1256 for the Modulus of Daily Log Returns), k refers to the three different 
groups (i. e. the March-April period, August, and Rcsý of The Year), TRj is the sum of rankings 
obtained for each group, and ni is the number of observations within the particular group. 
Table 5.8: Monthly Seasonality of Volatility Regressions 
(Parsimonious Models estimated through daily da a) 
Regression I Regression 2 
Volatility Proxy Modulus of Log Retums Intra-Day Scaled Difference 
Coefficient T-ratio Coefficient T-ratio 
Intercept 0.0113 (32.58) 0.0207 (52.05) 
Dummy 
Variables: 
March-April 0.0043 (5.16). 0.0080 (8.45) 
August -0.0026 (2.35) -0.0039 (3.10) 
R20.0279 R20.0667 
Explanatory R-bar 2 0.0264 R-bar 2 0.0652 
Statistics F-Statistic 18.011 F-Statistic 44.800 
#. Observations 1256 #. Observations 1257 
In the above models, volatility is measured in terms of the Modulus of Log Returns in the 
first regression, whilst it is measured in terms of the Intra-Day Scaled Difference in the 
second regression. The first explanatory variable is a dummy taking a value of 1 during 
March & April and zero otherwise, and the second explanatory variable is a dummy taking 
a value of 1 during August and zero otherwise. Statistical significance is denoted by *** for 
the 99% level of confidence. 
The modulus of log returns and intra-day scaled differences were respectively ranked, 
assigning a value of I to the lowest value. The ranks were then grouped into three, and the 
sum and the count of ranks was calculated for each group. this yielded an H-statistic of 20.00 
for the Modulus of Log Returns, and an H-statistic 55.39 for the Scaled Intra-Day Price 
Difference. When comparing the H-statistics to the A2) critical value, we may reject the null 
hypothesis that the volatility is the same across the three periods at the 99% level of 
confidence. 
41 
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Overall, the above tests indicate that volatility is significantly higher during the months of 
March and April, and significantly lower during August. These findings are of noteworthy 
importance, since they hint that the infamous January effect - absent in the Indian context but 
present in most other markets - may in fact be related to the end-of-financial-year of quoted 
companies and possibly the end of fiscal year, since a similar "January" effect is witnessed 
during the months of March and April on the Indian markets. 's 
5.7 The Connection Between NSE Volatility and Returns 
The third empirical investigation concerns the relationship between volatility risk and return, 
as inferred through EGARCH-in Mean (EGARCH-M) models. Section 5.7.1 considers the 
basic features of the data, consisting of Nifty daily log returns for the period I" January 1999 
to 31" December 2003. A preliminary EGARCH model is fitted in the subsequent section, 
whilst Section 5.7.3 investigates the relationship be"veen volatility and returns through 
EGARCH-M models. 
5.7.1 Preliminaries for Specifying the GARCH Model 
Two important elements in estimating GARCH models relate to the definition of the return- 
generation process (say, an AR model), and whether the conditional variance equatio n should 
account for any asymmetric effects in the data. 
In selecting the return-generation process, six AR(p) models were estimated with p ranging 
from 0 to 5 in order to infer the model which best captures the return generating process. The 
Schwarz Bayesian Criterion selected the AR(l) process as the best model, whilst the Akaike 
Information Criterion selected the AR(2) process. Yet according to the latter criterion, the 
35 One side-issue relating to these changes in volatility is whether a January effect might show up, after omitting 
the data of the months showing significant volatility changes (i. e. March, April and August). Elin-dnating these 
months from the data set, the January effect still does not transpire in terms of significant dummy variables when 
volatility is modelled in terms of the Modulus of Log Returns and the Intra-Day Scaled Difference. This indicates 
that the main cause of the January effect observed on other markets is likely to be the end-of-financial-year of 
listed companies and end of fiscal years. This evidence potentially contrasts with the results of Clare, Psaradakis 
and Thomas (1995) who noted both a January effect and seasonality around fiscal year end in April, in the context 
of the UK equity markets. 
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difference between the statistic for the AR(l) and AR(2) process was minimal and therefore 
the log return series was moddled as an AR(l) process for the sake of parsimony. 
The presence of ARCH effects in the residuals of the AR(l) process was tested for through 
LM heteroskedasticity tests as proposed by Engle (1982). 36 Order I and order 5 tests yielded 
LM statistics of 89.7 and 108.6 respectively. The tests pen-nit the rejection of the Null 
Hypothesis of no ARCH effects at the 95% level of confidence, when comparing the LM 
statistics to the Chi-Squared statistics at the respective degrees of freedom. 
In order to infer the level of asymmetry in the conditional volatility, the methodology 
proposed by Engle and Ng (1993) was used. The squared error term of the AR(l) process is 
regressed over a constant, a dummy variable of the lagged sign and an error term: 
6" 2= 00 + OID, -, + ý, (5.10) 
When Ft-I is negative 1)7ý-, takes a value of 1, whilst it takes a value of zero otherwise. 
Significance of Dý-t-j is an indication of asymmetric volatility. The coefficient of D-t-I was 
0.000073 with a t-ratio of 2.36 and this is significant at the 95% level of confidence. This 
means that negative returns tend to be followed by higher volatility, and therefore it is 
desirable to use models which account for this feature. This is in line with the result discussed 
in Chapter 3 that high volatility tends to follow negative returns. 
The selected asymmetric volatility model was Exponential GARCH (EGARCH) as proposed 
by Nelson (199 1). EGARCH processes model the log of conditional variance as follows: 
ln(h, ) = o)+criz, -, +rjýz, -, 
j-Eýz, 
-, 
j))+ A ln(h, 
-, 
) (5.11) 
where h, is the conditional variance, and z1_1 is the lagged error ten-n. Given that Equation 
(5.11) is modelling the logarithm of the conditional variance, and that the inverse log ftinction 
(the exponential) of any number is always positive, no restrictions need to be imposed on the 
estimated coefficients to ensure a positive conditional variance. However, 1,81 1 has to be less 
than one in order to ensure process stability. 
36 This test was described in Section 3.4.3. 
133 
5. THE SEASONALITY OF STOCK PRICE VOLATILITY AND ITS CONNECTION WITH EXCESSIVE PRICE MOVEMENTS 
Positive errors have an impact of al+yj on ln(h, ), whilst negative errors have an impact of al- 
yl. A further asymmetric effect of positive and negative errors on volatility also results from 
the asymmetric shape of the exponential curve. 
5.7.2 Estimating an EGARCH Process 
A preliminary EGARCH model Nvas fitted to the daily data, assuming that the conditional 
distribution of the errors was normal. The results are shown in Table 5.9 Panel A. The AR(l) 
coefficient of the Log Return Equation is highly significant - this indicates that past returns 
may be used to (partly) predict current returns and tliprefore following Fama (1970), we may 
argue that the market is not even weak-form. efficient. 37 All the coefficients of the 
heteroskedasticity equation are highly significant. The latter coefficients imply that a positive 
shock (say +1) in period t-I has an impact of around 0.17 on the log of the conditional 
variance in period t. A negative shock (say -1) in period t-I has an impact of around 0.38 in 
period t. These shocks then drag on to period t+1 through the P coefficient. The P coefficient 
is highly significant and shows that around 93% of current period conditional volatility is 
transmitted to the next period. This implies that the change in conditional variance prevailing 
in period t due to the shock z, -,, 
has a significant impact on the conditional variance of period 
1+1, and thus we may state that there is a substantial degree of persistence. This AR process 
in the conditional variance then continues in the subsequent periods. Authors such as Janssen 
(2004) interpreted significant P coefficients as the markets' response to news, given that some 
types of news follow an autoregressive pattern. The combined effects of shocks and 
persistence on the conditional variance are summarised in Table 5.9 Panel B. 
Despite the significance of the coefficients, one should note that the explanatory power of the 
regression in tenns of the R2 statistics is low. In addition, the low F-statistic for the log return 
equation does not permit the rejection of the null hypothesis that the estimated coefficients are 
equal to zero. Yet this may be expected when specifying a regression which explains returns 
through an AR process. Returns are likely to depend mainly on the underlying news - which 
arc not accounted for in this setup. Despite this, the overall model captures (at least part oo 
9 
37 Fama (1970) described three forms of market-efficiency. A market is "weak-forrW' efficient if past information 
is not relevant in predicting returns, it is "semi-strong form" efficient if public information is not relevant in 
predicting returns, and it is "strong-form" efficient if neither public nor private information are relevant in 
predicting returns. 
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the heteroskedasticity of returns, in view of the significance of the coefficients of the 
conditional variance equation as well as the Wald-Statistic (Table 5.9 Panel A). 
Table 5.9: EGARCH Model fitted to Nifty Daily Log Return Data 
Panel A: Regression Results 
Log Return AR(1) Process: 
Intercept Lag R (bar) 2 F-Statistic: F (4,1250) 
0.00056 0.12372 0.0023 0.71927 
(1.45) (4.13) (-0.0009) 
Conditional Variance Equation: 
Intercept: w Coeff: cr, Coeff: y, Coeff: 131 
-0.5683 -0.1054 *** 0.2753 *** 0.9321 *** 
(3.94) (4,73) (7.26) (54.83) 
Wald Test Statistic for the Null Hypothesis that a, + y, +, 6 1=0: 
697.4 as compared to a Chi Squared (1) Critical Value of 6.635 at the 99% level of confidence. 
Model estimation based on 1255 observations. 
Panel B: Impacts of Shocks and Persistence on Conditional Variance 
Direct Impact of a ±1 unit shock in zt., on 
log htassumlng that (zt., )=O 
Indirect Impact of change in log ht (due to 
±1 unit shock in zt. 1) on log hi.,, 
Positive Shocks Negative Shocks Positive Shocks Negative Shocks 
zt. 1(a, + yi) zt., (al - yf) fit(A log ht) A loght) _P, 
L 
0.1699 0.3807 0.1584 0.3549 
Panel A shows the results for the estimated EGARCH process. The t-ratios are shown in brackets 
underneath the respective coefficients. Significance at the 99% level of confidence is denoted by ***. 
The Adjusted R2 is shown in braces underneath the R2 Statistic. Panel B shows comparative statistics 
by tracing the effects of a shock in zt., on subsequent conditional volatility. 
Finally, the "goodness of fiV' of the estimated model may also be judged visually, as shown in 
Figures 5.4 to 5.6. The plot of the actual versus fitted values (Figure 5.4) confirms that the 
fitted model only explains a minor portion of the variation in Nifty Log Returns. Figure 5.5 
shows that only a few of the residuals are statistically significant, yet it discloses potential 
serial correlation in the error terms. The presence of residual serial correlation was confirmed 
by statistically significant autocorrelation coefficients. When considering the residual series, 
the correlation coefficient was statistically significant at the first lag (90% confidence level), 
If 
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the tenth lag (90% confidence level) and lag 23 (99% confidence level). 38 This suggests that 
the EGARCH model does not capture all the dependencies in the mean and variance of the 
Nifty Index. The histogram of the scaled residuals (Figure 5.6) indicates that the error terms 
approximate a normal distribution (unlike the leptokurtic distribution of the underlying data 
set). 
Figure 5.4:. Plot of Actual and Fitted Values 
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Figure 5.5: Plot of Transformed Residuals and Two Standard Error Bands 
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3' The significant serial correlation of the tenth lag is in line with the finding of Bhattacharya, Sarkar and 
Mukhopadhyay (2003) of fortnightly seasonality in the Indian stock markets, as outlined in Section 5.2.2. The 
significance of the 23 d lag may denote monthly seasonality, such as a tum-of-the-month cffect. 
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5.7.3 Estimating EGARCH-M Processes 
EGARCH-M processes model asymmetric volatility as per the EGARCH model, but also seek 
to explain the return generating process of the mean equation through the conditional variance 
of returns, postulating a fisk-return relationship. The conditional variance equation is the 
same as shown in Equation (5.11). 
Two EGARCH-M models were fitted to the data set, 'assuming in both cases that the 
conditional distribution of the errors was normal. The first model specified the mean equation 
of log returns as an AR(l) process plus an additional variable accounting for the conditional 
variance as follows: 
r, = (P pr, -, + '91, + e, 
(5.12) 
The mean equation of the second model simply specified the log retums as a function of an 
intercept, the conditional variance and an error terin as shown in Equation (5.13): 
r, = ip + (%, + -C, (5.13) 
The results are summarised in Table 5.10, Panels A and B. The mean equation regressions 
have low explanatory power as shown by the R2 and the F-statistics; although the first 
regression has better explanatory power than the second one. The coefficients for the 
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conditional variance equation are all highly significant and the Wald tests reject the null 
hypothesis that these coefficients are equal to zero at the 99% confidence level. 
Table 5.10: EGARCH-M Models fitted to Nifty Daily Log Return Data 
PANEL A (Regression 1): 
Log Return Process: 
Intercept: (p Coeff: p Coeff: ht R (bar) 2 F-Statistic: F (5,1249) 
0.00003 0.1253 *** 2.7764 0.0038 0.9418 
(0.04) (4.15) (0.74) {-0.00021 
Conditional Variance Equation: 
Intercept: w Coeff: a, Coeff: y, Coeff: 
-0.6045 *** -0.1054 *** 0.2762 *** 0.9279 
(3.82) (4.66) (7.25) (49.62) 
Wald Test Statistic for the Null Hypothesis that ai + yi +, p 0: 
653.6 as compared to a Chi Squared (1) Critical Value of 6.635 at the 99% level of confidence. 
PANEL B (Regression 2): 
Log Return Process: 
Intercept: 0 Coeff: ht R (bar) 2 F-Statistic: F (4,1250) 
0.00056 0.2594 0.00007 0.0234 
(0.84) (0.08) (-0.0031) 
Conditional Variance Equation: 
Intercept: w Coeff. a, Coeff: yi Coeff: P, 
-0.5504 *** -0.0960 *** 0.2726 *** 0.9341 *** 
(3.81) (4.59) (7.23) (54.63) 
Wald Test Statistic for the Null Hypothesis that at + y, +iG I=0: 
766.6 as compared to a Chi Squared (1) Critical Value of 6.635 at the 99% level of confidence. 
Panel C: Impacts of Shocks and Persistence on Conditional Variance 
Direct Impact of a ±1 unit shock in zt., on Indirect Impact of change in log ht (due to 
log h, assuming th E (zt-, )=O ±1 unit shock in zt-, on log ht.,, 
Positive Shocks Negative Shocks Positive Shocks Negative Shocks 
zt-, (al + yi) zt-, (a, - YI) 01(d log hý A log ht) 
Regressi on 1 
0.1708 0.3816 1 0.1585 0.3541 
Regress ion 2 
0.1766 0.3686 1 0.1650 0.3443 
Panels A and B show the results for two alternative EGARCH-M specifications. Both estimations 
were based on 1255 observations. T-ratios are shown in brackets underneath the respective 
coefficients. Significance at the 99% level of confidence is denoted by ***. The Adjusted R2 is 
shown in braces underneath the R2 Statistic. Panel C shows comparative statistics by tracing the 
effects of a shock in zt., on subsequent conditional volatility. 
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The regressions yield the same qualitative results as regards the relationship between volatility 
and returns. The AR(l) lag in the first regression is highly significant and again this indicates 
that the market is not weak-fon-n efficient. The other coefficients of the mean equation are 
insignificant, and this implies that volatility is not a significant factor in explaining Nifty 
returns - although the coefficient of h, in the mean equation is positive (and therefore in the 
expected direction). This may suggest that the returns on underlying securities do not directly 
compensate for risk as measured by conditional volatility. In this way, risk-averse investors 
are better off holding stocks of lower volatility and this also suggests that at least a portion of 
the underlying stocks may be excessively volatile. Despite this, the fact that the coefficient of 
h, is not significant does not imply that the volatility risk of holding the market portfolio is 
being unrewarded, given the presence of other variables in the mean equation (which generate 
additional returns). 
The combined effects of shocks and persistence on the conditional variance are summarised in 
Table 5.10 Panel C. Results are similar to those of the EGARCH model estimated in the 
previous section. The coefficient of, 81 in both equations, as well as the comparative statistics 
shown in Table 5.10 Panel C point at a relatively high persistence of volatility - again hinting 
that volatility might be excessive. 
The plots of the error terms were qualitatively the same for both regressions, and therefore 
only the plots relating to the first regression (with an AR lag) are reproduced in Figures 5.7 to 
5.9. In line with the outcomes of the previous sub-section, the plot of the actual versus fitted 
values confirms that the fitted model only explains a minor portion of the variation in Nifty 
log returns. Despite this, few of the residuals are statistically significant and the scaled 
residuals approximate a non-nal distribution. 
Checks on the serial correlation of the error terms were also undertaken. In case of Regression 
I the serial correlation coefficient of the residual series was significant at the fourth, tenth, and 
twenty-third lag (95%, 95%, 99% confidence levels respectively). In case of Regression 2, 
only the serial correlation coefficient for the first lag was significant at the 95% level of 
confidence. Thus, the latter regression seems to perform better in capturing the volatility 
dependencies, even if it has a lower overall explanatory power. 
139 
5. THE SEASONALITY OF STOCK PRICE VOLATILITY AND ITS CONNECTION WITH EXCESSIVE PRICE MOVEMENTS 
Figure 5.7: Plot of Actual and Fitted Values (Regression 1) 
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Figure 5.8: Plot of Transformed Residuals and Two Standard Error Bands 
(Regression 1) 
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Figure 5.9: Histogram of Scaled Residuals and the Normal Density (Regression 1) 
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One possible reason for the absence of the risk-return relationship might be that a longer time 
series is required for the risk-retum. relationship to emerge more clearly, as discussed in 
t 
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Section 5.3.3. Additionally, one cannot exclude the possibility that volatility is compensated 
for over longer term-periods - rather than on a daily basis. This makes it more difficult to 
detect the connection between volatility and returns using daily data since any relationship 
becomes "buried" in noise. This issue was investigated further by estimating an EGARCH-M 
model using monthly data. The first monthly closing observation for each of the months 
January 1999 till December 2003 was sampled, yielding a total of sixty (level) observations. 
Serial correlation coefficients for the monthly data were insignificant, except for the sixth lag 
which showed a coefficient of 0.42 and a t-ratio of 3.05. Checks for unit roots consisted of a 
series of ADF tests of different orders. Specifications with and without a trend yielded the 
same qualitative results. ADF(I) and ADF(3) tests rejected the null hypothesis of a unit root. 
The test-statistics for specifications without a trend were -4.57 and -3.60 as compared to a 
95% critical value of -2.93. Despite this, ADF(6) and ADF(12) tests did not reject the null 
hypothesis of a unit root, where the test-statistics for specifications without a trend were -1.73 
and -1.47 as compared to a 95% critical value of -2.93.39 
LM heteroskedasticity tests as proposed by Engle (1982), together with the respective F- 
versions failed to reject the Null Hypothesis of no ARCH effects at the 95% level of 
confidence. Nonetheless the model estimationwas proceeded with. The EGARCH-M model 
was specified in log returns as shown in Equation 5.13. The results as shown in Table 5.11, 
still confirin that the coefficient of h, is not significant, re-affinning the absence of any 
relationship between returns and volatility. 
Overall, the models estimated in this section unanimously suggest that Nifty volatility is not 
linked to returns, and therefore volatility may be excessive. 
D In trying to avoid the use of data featuring a possible unit root, the log returns were differenced again. The null 
of a unit root was still not rejected for an order 12 test on the second difference of returns. When the series was 
differenced for a third time, GARCH models would not converge. The EGARCH-M model was thus estimated 
using the original log return series, given that this enables a more straightforward interpretation of results. Whilst 
the presence of a unit root may lead to spurious results, the bias usually materialises in high explanatory powers 
and highly significant coefficients. The results obtained when estimating the monthly data EGARCH-M model 
(Table 5.1 1)'do not disclose such features, and thus any possible bias does not affect the main conclusion of the 
absence of a relationship between volatility and returns. 
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Table 5.11: EGARCH-M Model fitted to Nifty Monthly Log Return Data 
Log Return Process: 
Intercept: 9 Coeff: ht R (bar) 
2 F-Statistic: IF (4,53) 
0.0820 -12.0173 
(0.94) (0.81) 
0.0409 
(-0.03151) 
0.5647 
Conditional Variance Equation: 
Intercept: w Coeff: a, Coeff: y, Coeff: P, 
-4.6262 0.1067 
(2.09) (0.59) 
-0.3179 
(1.10) 
0.0926 
(0.21) 
The EGARCH-M was estimated through 58 monthly observations. T-ratios are shown in brackets 
underneath the res ? ective coefficients. Significance at the 95% level of confidence is denoted by 
**. The Adjusted R is shown in braces underneath the R2 statistic. 
5.8 Discussion 
The former three empirical investigations may be used to comment on whether the Nifty Index 
volatility is justified or otherwise. This is an important question from a market microstructure 
point of view, since it relates to whether asset prices are subject to factors emanating from the 
market setup or traders' behaviour, as opposed to solely reflecting the underlying information. 
The standard methodology for making inferences on whether volatility may be deemed 
excessive is to analyse individual stocks and consider dividend expectations. Yet, this 
methodology cannot be readily applied to index data, given that indices do not directly yield 
dividends. In addition dividend data are inherently low frequency and thus not usually 
appropriate for market microstructure studies, where additional benefits may be reaped by 
using higher frequency observations. Therefore inferences are to be made by answering the 
questions of whether volatility is related to information flow patterns and whether it is related 
to retums. 
Two types of tests were undertaken to inquire whether index volatility is related to the 
information flow. The first test considered day-of-the-week effects. It was found that index 
volatility varies (albeit not clearly significantly) during different days of the week -a Monday 
f 
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effect was detected in the index data. Whilst one may be tempted to attribute this to 
information accumulated over the weekend, this Monday effect was not present in individual 
stock data. This implies that the higher Monday volatility of the Nifty index is not 
information-related - and overall this test hints at traces of excessive volatility. 
A second test considered monthly seasonality of volatility. It was found that volatility 
increases significantly during March and April and this may be attributed to the end-of- 
financial-year for a large number of Indian companies coinciding with the end of the Indian 
fiscal year. Despite this, whilst the April volatility was accompanied by equally significant 
increases in return magnitudes, the March volatility was not accompanied by comparatively 
significant increases in return magnitudes. This indicates that volatility during March might 
be more related to traders' conjectures about company perfon-nances, rather than official 
company news. It was also shown that volatility abates during the month of August - which 
may be attributed to a holiday effect. Whilst this may be due to a lower amount of news 
releases during August, it also casts doubts on whether the higher volatility observed during 
the other months may be excessive. 
The issue of whether volatility is related to returns was investigated by EGARCH-M models 
which were fitted to index data sampled at daily and monthly ftequencies. The models 
unanimously show that there is no significant relationship between volatility and returns - 
again hinting at excessive volatility. 
What overall inference do these tests yield on Nifty volatility? Whilst the March-April jump 
in volatility may be partly justified by the end-of-financial year of quoted companies, we may 
still speak of excessive volatility components in the data. These include higher Monday 
volatility which cannot be explained by returns (and therefore information) in the underlying 
stocks, volatility during the month of March which is likely to be the response to guesses 
about company performance rather than official news, as well as the absence of a clear 
relation between volatility and returns. Thus one may assert that there is evidence of 
excessive volatility in the Nifty Index, which is likely to emanate from traders' behaviour or 
the market setup. 
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5.9 Conclusion 
This study applied various empirical tests to identify volatility patterns on NSE, with a 
particular reference to how volatility may be related to infon-nation flow and returns. The 
latter aspects were emphasised in order to make inferences on whether the index volatility is 
justified or excessive - and this is an important issue in the field of market microstructure, 
since market designers often aim at curtailing unjustified volatility. This study used different 
volatility definitions and sampling frequencies, depending on the issue of interest. In line with 
numerous empirical papers including those cited in Section 5.2, typical volatility patterns were 
identified in the index data. These include volatility peaking during the opening of the day 
and then rising again at the end, as well as the presence of a Monday effect in Index data. 
Tests revealed that Monday effects transpiring to some degree in index data, are more 
attributable to market microstructure factors such as index construction features or non- 
synchronous trading, since the Monday effect is not significant in the underlying stocks. NSE 
volatility tends to increase during the months of March and April, and this may be explained 
through an end-of-financial-year effect coinciding with the end of the Indian fiscal year. The 
increased NSE volatility during the month of March seems unjustified, since it is. not 
accompanied by higher return magnitudes of similar statisti cal significance. The higher 
volatility during April is accompanied by a jump in returns of similar significance, and thus 
the pronounced April volatility seems related to information since the increased price 
dispersion during the trading day materialises in longer term returns. NSE volatility abates 
during August and this may be attributed to a holiday effect. Finally, EGARCH-M models 
show that longer-term volatility seems unrelated to the returns on NSE and this indicates that 
volatility may be excessive. Overall, these tests seem to point at unjustified volatility, perhaps 
with the exception of the higher volatility during April. 
The findings were also rich in ternis of providing important evidence regarding issues which 
have attracted considerable attention in the finance discipline, such as day-of-the-week effects. 
The investigation confirmed the finding of Madureira and Leal (2001), in that the Monday 
effect may appear in a stock index, but not in the underlying stocks. This shows the Ir 
importance that researchers confirm the Monday effect through individual stock data rather 
than relying on index data. The finding is also relevant from the point of view of market 
designers, since the Monday effect in index data might be due to index construction features 
or non-synchronous trading. For instance, according to Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay (1997; 
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pp. 129) non-synchronous trading induces spurious serial correlation in index data, and this 
may also prevail when the index is comprehensively diversified. Given this, improving the 
index construction might not constitute a simple matter of further diversification of underlying 
stocks. Equal-weighted indices may also be liable to spurious serial correlation, and thus the 
weekly dependence in an index may not be immediately attributable to index weights 
emphasising less liquid stocks. The authors also noted thatindex serial correlation may arise 
when the underlying stock betas are of the same sign, or if the returns on individual stocks 
have small means. This may present a possible trade-off on part of market designers; whilst 
they may opt to minimise serial dependence by avoiding the former features, the selection of 
stocks to be included in an index should primarily be influenced by the objective of achieving 
a comprehensive yardstick relating to the particular market or economy. The task of selecting 
the underlying stocks might prove even more challenging when constructing an index to 
represent a particular economic sub-sector - where the betas and the returns of the selected 
stocks are likely to be similar. Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay (1997; pp. 99) also stated that it 
is unlikely that the weekly serial correlation prevailin g on actual markets may be exclusively 
attributable to non-synchronous trading. This implies that minimising such dependencies 
might require a completely different track than the possibilities outlined above. 
This investigation also provided important evidence as regards the January effect often 
observed on other markets. A monthly effect on NSE was observed during the months of 
March and April rather than January, and this implies that it is likely that this effect is related 
to the end-of-financial-year of listed companies and/or the end of the fiscal year. There is no 
evidence of significant excess returns on NSE during the month of January. This contrasts 
with the empirical evidence presented by Clare, Psaradakis and Thomas (1995), who noted 
both a January effect and April seasonality around the fiscal year end, in the context of the UK 
equity markets. 
One main innovation of this analysis relates to the interpretation of different models - in 
particular the relevance of commonly-used methodologies to the assessment of whether 
volatility is justified or excessive. Given the profound relevance of this issue for market 
microstructure, the latter discipline would benefit from additional methodologies which may 
be applied in answering such questions, in the absence of data about dividend expectations. 
The empirical results also show that further research is required as to why index data tend to 
feature a Monday effect and why this might not always be confirmed when analysing the 
underlying stocks. The main explanation for Monday effects so far has been the accumulation 
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of news during the weekend; but if this is indeed the case the Monday effect should show up 
in individual stock data as well. Similarly, other empirical studies of securities markets where 
the quoted companies do not end their financial years in December, would be useful in 
assessing whether January effects are mainly caused by end-of-financial-year company results 
and/or the end of the fiscal year. 
Finally, the discovered volatility seasonality patterns are of relevance to the analysis of 
changes in volatility following a call auction suspension on NSE. This topic is investigated in 
the subsequent two chapters. 
9 
146 
5. THE SEASONALITY OF STOCK PRICE VOLATILITY AND ITS CONNECTION VOTH EXCESSIVE PRICE MOVEMENTS 
APPENDIX 5.1 
A Summary of the Intra-Day Data Sets 
Before Call Auction 
Suspension 
After Call Auction 
Suspension 
Tuesday 18 May'99 1 Wednesday 9 June '99 
Wednesday 19 May'99 2 Thursday 10 June '99 
Thursday 20 May'99 3 Friday 11 June'99 
Monday 24 May'99 4 Monday 14 June '99 
Tuesday 25 May'99 5 Tuesday 15 June '99 
Wednesday 26 May'99 6 Wednesday 16 June'99 
Thursday 27 May'99 7 Thursday 17 June '99 
Friday 28 May'99 8 Friday 18 June'99 
Monday 31 May'99 9 Monday 21 June'99 
Tuesday I June'99 10 Tuesday 22 June '99 
Wednesday 2 June'99 11 Wednesday 23 June '99 
Thursday 3 June'99 12 Thursday 24 June '99 
Friday 4 June'99 13 Friday 25 June'99 
Monday 7 June '99 14 Tuesday 29 June'99 
Tuesday 8 June '99 15 Wednesday 30 June'99 
The sets include 15 days where a call auction was used to open and close 
the trading session, and a further 15 trading days following the call 
auctions suspension. The Nifty In dex returns for each trading day were 
sampled at one-minute intervals. 
147 
6. THE IMPACT OF THE SUSPENSION OF OPENING AND CLOSING CALL AUCTIONS ON NSE 
CHAPTER 6: 
THE IMPACT OF THE SUSPENSION OF OPENING AND 
CLOSING CALL AUCTIONS ON NSE 
6.1 Introduction 
The design of trading protocols and the evaluation of their effectiveness are two of the most 
important topics in market microstructure. As outlined by Madhavan (2000), trading 
protocols provide the framework within which markets operate and thus play a central role in 
price formation. This implies that evaluating the effectiveness of different protocols is a main 
concern of market authorities, regulators and market participants. 
One issue which has attracted much attention in this area relates to the effectiveness of call 
auctions as compared to continuous trading systems or hybrid structures featuring both 
processes. Given that call auctions batch a number of trades in a given security at a particular 
point in time, they should theoretically provide an efficient mechanism for aggregating diverse 
information because trading does not take place until price discovery has occurred 
(Economides and Schwartz; 1995). This contrasts with a continuous trading setup where price 
discovery and trading take place simultaneously implying that trades may occur at "false" 
prices, as noted by Schwartz (2000). However, continuous trading usually involves greater 
immediacy and therefore less price risk than an auction. In particular, given that there is a 
delay in establishing the trading price during an auction, the "true" price may change between 
the submission and execution of an order, as noted by Madhavan (1992). Economides and 
Schwartz (1995) thus argued that a hybrid system is best: an opening call auction to efficiently 
aggregate overnight information, followed by continuous trading during the day. This view 
has prompted many of the major exchanges to introduce an auction to open and in some cases 
to close the day's trading, as outlined by Ellul, Shin and Tonks (2004). 
The balance of empirical evidence on call auctions is inconclusive, with some studies 
identifying gains from the auction process but others finding that continuous trading is 
superior. These inconsistencies may be due to the fact that call auctions vary in structure, and 
that they are typically applied in the context of different trading protocols. As noted by 
Madhavan (2000), empirical comparisons between call auctions and continuous trading are 
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often hindered by the fact that the two systems being compared rarely share a common set of 
trading protocols. Similarly, in looking at the impact of replacing call auctions by continuous 
trading, researchers often have to deal with the fact that such changes are typically 
accompanied by other reforms which make it difficult to conclude if costs or benefits are due 
to the switch to continuous trading or to other factors. 
A further limitation of the existing empirical literature on call auctions is that it is mostly 
concerned with the stock markets of the major industrial countries. Exceptionally, Shastri, 
Shastri and Sirodorn (1995) investigated the impact of the opening call auction on the 
Bangkok Stock Exchange, and found that prices at the opening call were more volatile than 
during the rest of the day, although this could be because uncertainty and volatility tend to 
peak at the start of the trading day following the overnight closing. In general there has been 
little research on stock exchanges in emerging markets. This is an important omission given 
that emerging stock markets tend to be less liquid than those of developed countries, and it has 
been argued that call auctions are particularly suited for trading less liquid stocks (Madhavan, 
1992). This suggests that in emerging markets call auctions may have advantages over 
continuous trading systems in fostering the efficient trading of relatively illiquid securities. 
However, this argument also underlines a further difficulty in comparing call auctions and 
continuous trading: if the effectiveness of an auction depends on the liquidity of the market, a 
proper comparison must control for variations in market liquidity and other factors. 
This investigation adopts a novel approach in analysi! ig the effectiveness of call auctions, in 
that it considers the impact of the suspension of opening and closing call auctions by NSE on 
the 9"' June 1999.40 This change in trading procedures related to one of a series of 
"experiments" whereby NSE was endeavouring to introduce call auctions to an otherwise 
continuous trading setting. This is probably the first study of the impacts of such a 
suspension, and an inherent strength of this empirical setting is that other market protocols and 
arrangements remained unchanged. Furthermore, since the continuous trading session took 
place both before and after the suspension, it is unlikely that the auctions would have limited 
the degree of immediacy in the market. 41 Thus, this is not a comparison between two systems 
with several different trading protocols. This enhances the robustness of the conclusions, in 
that any changes following the suspension are more likely to be the result of the change 
concerning the call auction. Being an emerging market exchange, NSE features a significant 
40 The NSE circular announcing this change was issued on the same day. 
" Upon the suspension of the call auction on NSE, the time devoted to continuous trading was unchanged. 
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proportion of less liquid securities, and this enables the investigation of any differences in the 
impacts concerning more and less liquid securities in the market. 42 
This chapter has two main objectives. The first one is to estimate the impact of the suspension 
of call auctions at the NSE, using the standard procedure of comparing the volatility, 
efficiency and liquidity (VEL) of traded securities in the market before and after suspension 
(Amihud, et. aL, 1997). The second aim is to infer the value of the call auctions to traders 
using an event study to calculate the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for the sampled 
securities. If the auctions improved the price discovery process, one may expect a 
deterioration in VEL following suspension and negative CARs. If on the other hand, the 
auctions led to reduced immediacy and increased price risk then one may expect 
improvements in VEL following suspension, together with positive CARs. 
The tests undertaken in the analysis suggest that VEL broadly improved after the suspension 
of the auctions, but the mean CARs were generally negative. Thus, further tests are conducted 
to examine the relationships between the responses to the auction suspension and the 
composition of the sampled securities, particularly in respect of their liquidity. It turns out 
that stock liquidity is an important factor in explaining the former results, a finding which is 
also consistent with the arguments of Ellul, Shin and Tonks (2004). 
The objectives of this investigation should be qualified in that it seeks to infer the 
effectiveness of call auctions from the point of view of the market in general; yet one should 
note that a feature which is desirable from the point of view of most market participants might 
not prove as desirable to specific players, and vice versa. In this setting, the auctions might 
have presented particular advantages or disadvantages to specific market participants, however 
this analysis abstracts from these issues and focuses on the reaction to suspension on part of 
the general market; the desirability of call auctions to specific trader categories may be 
explored in future research. 
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows: 
A review of the existing literature relating to call auctions is shown in Section 6.2. Section 6.3 
discusses the possible findings and the data set. The subsequent sections focus on VEL 
42 Ellul, Shin and Tanks (2004) identify a similarly clear-cut comparison between the opening and closing calls 
on the London Stock Exchange and the parallel off-exchange dealer market. However, results for developed 
markets may not be applicable in an emerging market. 
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changes. In particular Section 6.4 investigates the impacts of the suspension of call auctions 
on volatility, Section 6.5 tackles the impacts of suspension on efficiency and Section 6.6 deals 
with liquidity changes. Each section offers a description of the adopted methodologies given 
that different tests are undertaken for assessing the changes for each of these factors. 
Section 6.7 traces the traders' reactions to the call auctions suspension through an event study. 
The Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) pattern which is obtained, although robust and 
significant, seems inconclusive at first sight. In Section 6.8, further tests are undertaken in 
order to infer whether the latter ambiguity may be explained by accounting for the initial betas 
or the liquidity of the sampled stocks. Section 6.9 offers various possible explanations for the 
observed empirical results, whilst Section 6.10 concludes. - 
6.2 Review of Relevant Literature 
Trading systems may either rely exclusively on call auctions or continuous trading, or else the 
protocol may provide for a hybrid system. For instance the trading sessions of NYSE 
commence and close with a call auction, whilst a continuous trading session is held in 
between. Exchanges which (at the time of writing) match orders exclusively through call 
auctions include Bursa Malaysia (the former Kuala Lampur Stock Exchange) which holds 
periodic call auctions for each of the traded securities. In the latter exchange, the interval 
between call auctions may differ across stocks and it ranges between one second and 99 
secondS. 43 
Call auctions vary in structure as outlined by Economides and Schwartz (1995) and different 
call auction structures may have different effects on trading activitY. 44 This may partly 
explain the mixed evidence on call auction efficacy as outlined below. Furthermore, different 
markets have different trading protocols and it may be that 'Similarly-structured auctions have 
different implications across markets. 
The central issue in the debate between call auctions and continuous trading is the trade-off 
between information efficiency and immediacy. A sequence of call auctions aggregates 
43 http: //Nv%vw. bursamalaysia. com/wcbsite/tmding/matching. htm (accessed 7th May 2004). 
4' For instance Roth and Ockenfels (2002) presented evidence that subtle differences in internet auctions used for 
trading non-financial assets can cause pronounced differences in bidding behaviour. 
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information more efficiently, especially where asymmetric information is a problem and 
dealers are reluctant to take the opposite side of trades. However, periodic auctions lack 
continuity and therefore reduce the immediacy of trading. They may also result in higher 
information costs given that current prices are available less frequently as outlined by 
Madhavan (1992). However, the latter arguments are less relevant where call auctions are 
used at the opening or closing, since trading still occurs continuously for the rest of the day. 
Moreover, lack of immediacy is an issue in any setting in which trades are clustered in a short 
period, and this may occur independently of an auction. For instance, Admati and Pfeliderer 
(1988) gave a theoretical account in which the transactions of uninformed traders are bunched 
in the lowest cost period. Similarly, traders who submit orders prior to the market opening 
have to wait for execution until the opening, irrespective of the protocols used at opening. 
Thus, it can be argued that an opening call auction, such as we analyse for the NSE, is 
unlikely to have much effect on immediacy. 
The literature background now proceeds with an account of theoretical, empirical and 
exPerimental studies in Sections 6.2.1 to 6.2.5. 
6.2.1 Theoretical Literature 
Various authors such as Economides and Schwartz (1995) argued that call auctions aggregate 
different expectations of market participants thereby increasing price discovery and pricing 
efficiency. Schwartz (2000) contrasted this notion to a continuous market setting where prices 
are discovered whilst trading occurs, whereas a call market executes trades after the price 
discovery occurs. In the theoretical model of Hillion and Suominen (2004), closing call 
auctions are successftil in reducing the potential for market participants to manipulate closing 
prices. 
Madhavan (1992) theoretically investigated the performance of different market structures and 
concluded that auctions aggregate information more efficiently, especially when the level of 
asymmetric information on the market is high, and dealers become reluctant to take the 
opposite sides of trades. On the other hand, the lack of continuity of a periodic auction may 
result in higher infortnation costs given that current prices are available less frequently. Yet, 
the latter argument might not be applicable to those market settings where auctions are solely 
used at the opening and at the closing, since trading still occurs continuously for the rest of the 
152 
6ý THE IMPACT OF THE SUSPENSION OF OPENING AND CLOSING CALL AUCTIONS ON NSE 
day. In addition if call auctions are successively held at close enough intervals (e. g. Bursa 
Malaysia) the loss of continuous price indications may not ýe as pronounced. 
A second disadvantage of call auctions is that some market participants may use the setup to 
conceal information from other traders, For instance, in the model of Caillaud and Mezzetti 
(2004) some participants give up profitable trading opportunities in an initial auction, in the 
hope that the resulting price movements materialise in higher subsequent profits. 
The learning process on call auction markets was investigated by Pouget (2004 a), through a 
comparison with a Walrasian setup. In the latter system, tentative prices are announced and 
adjusted, until a price is set where demand equals supply and the trades occur at the latter 
price. If traders learn through a belief-based model (where previously not chosen actions are 
more likely to be chosen) equilibrium is discovered in both setups. Yet, when traders learn 
through a reinforcement-based model (where previously chosen actions are more likely to be 
chosen) equilibrium is discovered in the Walrasian setup, but not necessarily in the call 
auction. In the latter case, if informed traders do not disclose the equilibrium price at the 
outset, the uninformed traders do not choose the equilibrium price either since they follow 
reinforcement-based learning. The Walrasian setup is better since it does not induce price 
uncertainty, as is the case in a call auction. The author suggests that organising a pre-opening 
period prior to the auction, may help in making the process resemble more closely a Walrasian 
setup. 
Another disadvantage of call auctions as outlined by Madhavan (1992) is that the underlying 
stock price may change during the time from which the trader submits his order till when the 
order is executed. Yet, these drawbacks are common to those situations when trades cluster to 
one specific point or short period and such outcome may occur independently of an auction. 
For instance, in the theoretical model of Admati and Pfeliderer (1988), uninformed traders 
choose to transact in the lowest cost period. In addition this disadvantage is "immaterial" in 
opening call auctions, since traders who submit orders prior to the opening of a continuous 
market still have to wait till execution, facing the same underlying risk of a change in the 
fundamental value of the stock. 
Finally, one may argue that call auctions undermine prompt access to the market, given that 
orders cannot typically trade instantly, but have to wait till the next auction. Yet, one should 
also consider that most traders might not demand instantaneous liquidity and are at times 
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prepared - or willing - to postpone their trading to a specific point. The theoretical findings 
of Admati and Pfeliderer (1988) and Vayanos (1999) corroborate this argument. 
6.2.2 Empirical Comparisons Between Call Auctions and Continuous 
Trading 
Various studies have empirically investigated the inherent pricing efficiency of call auctions 
as postulated by the former theoretical arguments. An investigation of the learning process of 
traders during the pre-open call auction of the (former) Paris Bourse is found in Biais, Hillion 
and Spatt (1999). The authors noted that the price discovery process reaches its peak at the 
last minutes of the call, whereas orders posted during the in itial minutes may be classified as 
"noise". The latter may be consistent with traders not being aware of the ftindamental value of 
the security, or with buyers (sellers) submitting orders at artificially low (high) prices in an 
attempt to drive the price in a favourable direction. 45 
Amihud and Mendelson (1987) empirically compared the opening call auction and the 
continuous trading session on NYSE, in terms of the stock return distributions, the 
convergence of prices to fundamental values and serial correlation patterns. The authors used 
a time series model, to distinguish between the fundamental values of securities as opposed to 
the actual prices. They concluded that opening returns exhibit greater dispersion and show 
higher negative autocorrelation patterns than closing returns. The authors also noted that the 
error term of their model, was greater. for the opening prices, as compared to the closing ones. 
Similarly, Shastri, Shastri and Sirodom (1995) found that opening prices on the Thailand 
Stock Exchange, which are determined through a call auction, tend to be more volatile than 
those of the rest of the day. While this may be taken as an indicatio n against the pricing 
efficiency of call auctions, one should not overlook the fact that uncertainty is typically at its 
peak during the opening of a trading session, following the overnight market closure. Thus, 
these empirical results may emanate from the initial uncertainty, rather than any inherent 
inefficiency of auctions. According to Biais, Glosten and Spatt (2002), the latter argument 
was confin-ned by the studies of Amihud, Mendelson and Murgia (1990) and Amihud and 
Mendelson (199 1), who empirically analysed call auctions which were not held at the start of 
45 This contrasts with the findings of Davies (2003) and Dia and Pouget (2004a), that most of the orders at the 
pre-opening period of the Toronto Stock Exchange and the West-African Bourse are submitted with the intention 
of trading. 
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the trading day. The latter studies found that auction markets are not inherently less efficient 
than continuous trading. 
Ellul, Shin and Tonks (2004), found that price discovery tends to be higher during the London 
Stock Exchange call auctions as compared to the contemporaneous dealership market 
transactions taking place off the exchange. Contradictory results were obtained by Angel and 
Wu (2001) who evaluated the possible introduction of an opening call auction on Nasdaq by 
simulating an auction using existing Nasdaq data. The authors found that the introduction of 
an opening call auction might lead to lower price discovery. 
As regards volatility of call auction pricing, Angel and NVu (2001) noted that dealers may be 
better equipped to handle the random nature of order imbalances, as compared to call auctions. 
Yet, the main arguments of this study rely on a comparison between dealers and auctions - 
rather than an assessment of call auctions on their own. Indeed, the authors did not rule out 
the presence of a call auction in improving the opening procedures on Nasdaq. 46 Thus, in 
applying this reasoning to NSE, one should note that given the absence of market makers, call 
auctions may still be a positive feature on this exchange. 
Call auctions increase liquidity by batching a number of transactions which might have 
otherwise been executed sequentially, as discussed by Economides and Schwartz (1995). This 
implies that auctions should reduce trading costs. Kchr, Kralmen and Theissen (2001) 
empirically examined the difference in trading costs between call auction and continuous 
trading sessions on the Frankftirt Stock Exchange. They found that the call auction provides 
transaction cost savings for small transactions, but not for large transactions, which are 
cheaper to execute in the continuous session. Similarly, Ellul, Shin and Tonks (2004) when 
comparing call auction trading to dealership trading on the London Stock Exchange, found 
that small orders tend to be cheaper to execute in the call auction, whereas larger orders tend 
to be cheaper to execute in the dealership market. Yet, according to the empirical evidence 
found by the latter authors, the system which results in lower overall costs tends to vary with 
the trading volume. 
Comerton-Forde (1999) investigated stock return data from the Australian Stock Exchange 
and the Jakarta Stock Exchange. The former exchange commences with a call auction, while 
16 The authors concluded that "What is needed is a hybrid mechanism tlýat incorporates the best features of a call 
market with the advantages of the existing market" (i. e. dealers). Schwartz (2000) advocated the introduction of a 
call auction on Nasdaq, as well as on other US markets. 
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the latter one commences with continuous trading. The author concluded that the call auction 
increases liquidity and reduces volatility, at the initial phases of the trading sessions. Such 
benefits are more pronounced for less liquid stocks. Despite this, one should note that such 
studies where comparisons are undertaken across different exchanges tend to be hindered by 
the fact that the two systems being compared rarely share a common set of trading protocols, 
as discussed by Madhavan (2000). 
The issue of whether call auctions constitute a better trading method for less liquid stocks has 
also been debated. Various authors such as Barry and Brown (1984) have associated a higher 
level of asymmetric information with smaller stocks. This implies that call auctions are 
especially suitable for trading smaller stocks, given that according to Madhavan (1992) call 
auctions perform particularly wellwhen the level of asymmetric information is high. Despite 
this, Ellul, Shin and Tonks (2004) found that on the London Stock Exchange, where trading at 
the opening and at the closing may take place both through call auctions and through the 
dealership system, less liquid stocks tend to trade in the latter market more frequently, even if 
the call auctions offer cost savings and higher pricing efficiency. One possible explanation for 
this behaviour is that dealers' services add a value to the market structure given that they 
guarantee the availability of a counterparty during most of the time, whereas call auctions may 
depend to a higher degree on public orders. This creates a "thick market externality": traders 
will only enter an auction if they believe sufficient traders will be present so as to establish an 
informationally-efficient price. Despite this, the latter argument might not be directly 
applicable to the investigation at hand, given the absence of dealers on NSE. 
6.2.3 Empirical Studies of Conversions between Systems 
The efficacy of call auctions and continuous trading has also been compared, by considering 
those cases where exchanges switched in between systems. Again, one should interpret these 
studies with care, since as noted by Amihud, Mendelson and Lauterbach (1997), such changes 
typically involve other reforms to the trading system making it difficult to conclude if costs or 
benefits are due to changes in the call auction trading or to other factors. 
Muscarella and Piwowar (200 1) using event study methodology found that on the former Paris 
Bourse the stocks which were transferred to continuous trading experienced positive abnormal 
returns, whilst those transferred to call trading showed negative abnon-nal returns. Similar 
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results in favour of continuous trading methods were found by Amihud, Mendelson and 
Lauterbach (1997) and Lauterbach and Ungar (1997), both studies focusing on the Tel Aviv 
Stock Exch ange. Henke and Lauterbach (2005), presented analogous results in respect of 
stocks traded on the Warsaw Stock Exchange. Yet, one should note these types of results do 
not necessarily imply that call auctions are inherently inferior trading systems since they may 
reflect investors' preferences for stocks that trade continuously. This was confirmed by 
Kalay, Wei and Wohl (2002) who observed increased trading volumes for Tel Aviv Stock 
Exchange securities which moved to continuous trading, and reduced volumes for those stocks 
which remained trading through the call auctions. 
Aitken, Comerton-Forde and Frino (2002) analysed the introduction of a closing call auction 
on the Australian Stock Exchange, and noted that on high-volatility days, there is a 
pronounced tendency for traders to delay their trading till the auction. They suggested that 
call auctions are more highly valued by traders on high-volatility days. Despite this, one may 
question whether this effect might constitute a general tendency to postpone trading on high 
volatility days (in the hope that volatility reverts back to normal levels), irrespective of 
whether the session closes off with an auction or otherwise. 
The changes in VEL factors of stocks when the latter switch from call auctions to continuous 
trading might also depend on the initial liquidity levels of the stocks. For instance, Kairys, 
Kruza, and Kumpins (2000a) found that when the Riga Stock Exchange shifted from a call 
auction to a continuous trading system the overall liquidity impact was positive, yet the 
benefits accrued to stocks which were already liquid whilst the volumes of smaller company 
stocks declined. 
6.2.4 Other Empirical Studies 
Ronen (1998) studied the impact of trading mechanisms on volatility by considering a change 
in the trading procedures on the Tel-Aviv Stock Exchange. The exchange used a call auction 
to end thetrading day; yet in 1988 the mechanisms were reversed whereby the call auction 
was held prior to the continuous trading session. The author reported no significant 
differences in opening volatility following the change, concluding that the trading mechanism 
does not affect the opening volatility. 
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Comerton-Forde and Rydge (2006 a) considered two empirical cases of manipulative orders: 
the first one for a liquid stock and the second one for an illiquid stock. They studied how 
auctions featuring different matching algorithms perform in dealing with market manipulation. 
The authors showed that manipulative orders can impact on the prices established in the 
auction and manipulation is less costly in illiquid stocks. In the case of the illiquid stock, a 
price was established in the presence of a manipulative order - yet the auction did not 
establish a price when the manipulative order was eliminated. This casts doubts on the notion 
that auctions are particularly suited to trade less liquid stocks. This idea corroborates with the 
empirical findings of Madhavan and Panchapagesan (2000) who analysed the opening auction 
on NYSE. The authors found that call auctions might not be the ideal trading setup for less 
liquid stocks, given that the latter are considerably sensitive to order imbalances which might 
result in mispricings. 
With reference to the possible differences in auction algorithms, Comerton-Forde and Rydge 
(2006 a) noted that when only the first criterion in the algorithm is used to set the price, 
different algorithms tend to establish the same price (since most algorithms start with the basic 
rule of maximising trading volume). Yet, when the subsequent criteria have to be considered 
in establishing the auction price, algorithms tend to establish different prices - since the 
subsequent criteria may differ across algorithms. The authors argued that the auction 
algorithm on its own might be unable to restrain the effects of manipulative orders and 
complementary features may thus be required. The latter may include order restrictions, 
market surveillance and implementing a random call auction tennination time, since 
manipulators typically submit orders just before termination, so that other traders might not 
have sufficient chance to respond. Volatility extensions may potentially curb market 
manipulation; the pre-open time is extended when the stock price deviates considerably from a 
reference price, since this might indicate the presence of a manipulative order. In this way, 
balancing liquidity may be attracted on the opposite side of the book. 
Comerton-Forde and Rydge (2006 b) studied the changes on the Australian Stock Exchange 
following increased auction transparency measures and modifications to the call auction 
algorithm. The measures intended to enhance transparency included restrictions on 
undisclosed orders and an extension of the pre-close period (where orders are displayed to the 
market without any trading taking place). The change in the auction algorithm involved the 
introduction of the basic principle that the established price maximises the trading volume 
(thus making the algorithm similar to the one adopted by NSE). The authors reported 
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increased efficiency and trading volumes following these changes, and they noted that these 
benefits extended to the less liquid stocks trading on the exchange. 
6.2.5 Experimental Studies 
In an experimental investigation, Theissen (2000) concluded that call auctions present benefits 
in terrns of higher pricing efficiency and lower trading costs. A previous experimental study 
was conducted by Schnitzlein (1996) who found that whilst prices converge to their true levels 
in both call auction and continuous trading settings, uninfon-ned traders incur lower adverse 
selection costs when they trade in a call market. 
Biais and Pouget (2000) considered market settings involving call auctions to different 
degrees. Their findings suggest that call auctions on their own might not be the ideal price 
discovery tool. A better alternative might be to organise a pre-opening period prior to the 
auction, where a volume maximising price is based on the incoming orders. The latter price is 
disseminated, yet no trades are executed. According to the authors, the prc-opening 
information augments price discovery in the subsequent call auction period and the continuous 
trading session. 47 
Pouget (2004 b) considered the convergence towards equilibrium prices in a call auction 
market as compared to a Walrasian setup. The author concluded that the Walrasian setup 
features less frequent deviations from equilibrium and it can generate higher volumes, since 
uninformed traders may refrain from participating in the auction. 
6.3 Expected Results and Data 
6.3.1 Expected Results 
Overall, the theoretical and empirical research on call auctions has not yet materialised in 
clear-cut conclusions, and this may be partly attributable to the fact that call auctions vary in 
47 A theoretical model of the role of pre-opening periods in securities markets is found in Dia and Pouget (2004b). 
The authors found that pre-opening periods have a positive role in enhancing liquidity and information 
dissemination. 
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structure and they may have different impacts across markets. For instance Kairys, Kruza and 
Kumpins (2000b) suggested that the actual effects of changes in trading systems may vary, 
given that different exchanges adopt different listing requirements, price limits, and minimum 
tick sizes. Heterogeneous results may also be due to the differing thickness of the markets. 
This complicates the formulation of the hypotheses to be tested by researchers. 
This analysis has two main objectives. The first one is the assessment of the impact of the 
auction suspension on the volatility, efficiency and liquidity (VEL) of traded securities on 
NSE. As described in the previous section, existing literature suggests that the presence or 
otherwise of call auctions may impact on VEL. Call auctions may affect volatility if their 
information dissemination process impacts on the proportion of uninformed investors or 
changes the potential for market manipulation. Auctions may affect pricing efficiency due to 
potentially enhanced infon-nation aggregation, whereby trading only occurs after observing a 
set of submitted orders. The liquidity impact of call auctions may result from changes in 
traders' willingness to transact due to changes in the fairness of the matching system and the 
speed of execution. 
Whilst volatility, liquidity and efficiency may be thought of as distinct items, one should not 
sideline the likely interconnections between them. For instance, if the presence of a call 
auction leads to increased (decreased) pricing efficiency, then it should also lead to decreased 
(increased) volatility due to lower (higher) deviations from the fundamental values of 
securities. Similarly, changes in efficiency should lead to changes in the fairness of 
transactions; this would impact on the willingness to trade, resulting in liquidity changes. 
Liquidity changes may also lead to changes in volatility, for instance if the higher number of 
transactions leads to enhanced price discovery. In addition, one may also speak of liquidity 
externalities in the sense that liquidity changes for a particular security may impact on the 
liquidity of other securities (Amihud, Mendelson and Lauterbach; 1997). This chapter does 
not address the former interrelationships across the separate VEL factors, since the VEL 
analysis is intended to gauge the net changes in volatility, efficiency and liquidity. These 
changes might not emerge if the researcher were simply to focus on traders' immediate 
reactions to the auction suspension. Overall, the reader should keep in mind that VEL 
encompasses three separate (interrelated) variables, even if occasionally it might be referred to 
as a single factor in the text for the sake of brevity. 
The second aim of the chapter is to infer the value of the call auctions to market participants 
through an event study. If the auctions assisted in price discovery, one may expect 
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deteriorations in VEL following suspension. In addition, the suspension of the auctions 
should be value-decreasing, resulting in negative CARs. Such a result would be in line with 
the findings of Pagano and Schwartz (2003) that the introduction of a closing call auction at 
the Paris Bourse created improvements in the price discovery process, without any negative 
effects during the continuous trading session. If on the other hand, the auctions led to reduced 
immediacy and increased price risk then one may expect an improvement in VEL following 
suspension, together with positive CARs. This would corroborate the arguments of Ellul, Shin 
and Tonks (2004) that the value of call auctions may be limited by "thick market externalities" 
by which traders only enter the auction if they believe that a sufficient number of other traders 
will be present so as to establish informationally-efficient prices. 
In considering which of the former two outcomes may be more likely, it is essential to 
hypothesise an argument which (attempts to) explain the above mixed evidence. One 
consideration which might solve the "puzzle" is that ceterisparibus, traders tend to prefer 
stocks that trade continuously rather than through sequential call auctions since the former 
setup permits instant access to the markets. Yet, when call auctions are used in conjunction 
with continuous trading, say at the start and at the end of a continuous session, they do not 
limit the immediate access to the market given that the stocks still trade continuously for most 
of the time. In such cases, auctions might be considered as "positive" by market participants, 
given that they help in the price discovery process without prohibiting the security from 
continuous trading. One study which supports this argument was conducted by Pagano and 
Schwartz (2003). The authors used the market model W statistic to investigate the impact of 
the introduction of a closing call auction at the (former) Paris Bourse. They found that the 
closing call led to improvements in the price discovery process, without any negative liquidity 
effects during the continuous trading session. 
As regards this empirical study, NSE followed a system where the continuous trading session 
was preceded and followed by a call auction. These auctions were discontinued on 9 th June 
1999. Following the above reasoning, one may expect stock prices to show negative CARs, 
on the grounds that these auctions were previously serving to integrate different market 
expectations and thus establishing more efficient prices, without hindering immediate access 
to the market during the day. If these expectations are correct, one may also expect 
deteriorations in VEL, Despite this, in view of the mixed evidence presented in the former 
section, one cannot exclude the possibility of obtaining diverse results. 
161 
6, THE IMPACT OF THE SUSPENSION OF OPENING AND CLOSING CALL AUCTIONS ON NSE 
6.3.2 Data and Notation 
NSE began with continuous, screen-based, nationwide electronic trading and subsequently 
introduced a pre-opening and post-closing call auction on an experimental basis. For the rest 
of the trading day the system functioned as a continuous pure limit order book market, with 
time and price priorities applied to incoming orders. A note about the actual procedures 
governing the auction is warranted. This description is based on information obtained from 
NSE circulars and intra-day data files. Whilst further details about the auction would have 
been desirable, no responses were forthcoming to requests for information from NSE. 
The transaction data files did not explicitly distinguish between trades which were executed 
during the call auctions from the trades executed during the continuous session. However, 
when the opening and closing call auctions were held, the initial and closing part of the 
trading was characterised by trades occurring in successive stocks in an alphabetical order. 
For instance, trading typically began with the stock designated with a code ABB or ACC and 
a number of trades in the particular stock were executed at a single price. The alphabetical 
sequence typically went on up to the stock designated by ZEETELE. Trading during the rest 
of the day seemed to occur randomly across stocks in no particular order. This suggests that 
the system executed an auction for each stock in an alphabetical sequence (and the auction 
process was not subsequently repeated). Following the opening auction for each stock, the 
system switched to continuous trading. Similarly, following the closing auction for each 
stock, trading stopped for the rest of the day. 
One further feature which permitted the distinction between the auction and the continuous 
session was the typical break in between the regimes. Whilst technically there was no trading 
break intended between the opening auction and the continuous session, a typical 10 second 
break was noted when inspecting the data files. Such break was not typically observable 
during the rest of the trading day, where it is reasonable to expect at least three transactions 
during any particular second. The termination of the continuous trading session and the start 
of the closing auction is clearly distinguishable by an intended trading halt of around 20 
minutes. Brokers could submit and cancel orders during thi s break and it is reasonable to 
assume that brokers had access to a limited range of orders on both sides of the book during 
this interval. 
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Not all stocks trade during the opening and closing auctions, presumably due to insufficient 
demand or supply at price schedules which permit trading. When a stock does not trade 
during the auction, this is not specifically indicated in the data files, and therefore in order to 
obtain an idea of stocks wbicb did not trade during the auction, one would have to start with 
the whole list of stocks and eliminate the stocks which trade during the auction. 
One should note that whilst the exchange specified formal timings during which trading 
occurred, this was not followed unfailingly during the trading days. For instance, the trading 
process at times started at 9: 55, when the designated starting time was 9: 45. Similarly, whilst 
there was a designated time for the switch from the call auction to continuous trading, the 
switch mainly occurred upon termination of the alphabetical auction process described above. 
The continuous trading session's fon-nal halt was intended to occur at 15: 30, and this yardstick 
was usually upheld, take or leave around two seconds either way. The closing auction was 
subsequently held, following a trading break of around 20 minutes. The trading day stopped 
upon the ten-nination of the closing auction across stocks; this usually lasted around three 
minutes as shown in Table 6.1. 
Following the auction suspension on 9"' June 1999, a circular issued by NSE on the 15th June 
1999 speaks of the implementation of a proposed pre-open procedure. This terminology 
requires some clarification. A pre-open period does not imply a call auction; for instance 
authors such as Dia and Pouget (2004 b) use this term to describe a process where traders may 
submit orders and tentative prices are disseminated - yet no transactions actually take place. 
The main idea behind this process would be to glean information about traders' expectations 
following the overnight break. Yet, the former NSE circular mentions that this pre-open 
period, establishes prices in such a way to match the largest number of traded quantity of 
securities. For instance the circular specified: "To the extent possible the opening price is 
determined at one of the observed price points in the market and is a single price at which all 
opening trades take place". In this way, one may assume that the term pre-open period on 
NSE is referring to a process where the first trading price for a security is established. Yet, a 
took at the data files discloses that this pre-open period functioned in a different way ftom an 
auction. This is inferred by looking at successive trades in the same stock, taking place during 
the same second. One notes that such trades in the same stock were executed at different 
prices - whereas in a call auction these trades should occur at the same price. This confin-ns 
that when NSE suspended the auction on 9th June 1999, the exchange only re-adopted it on 
the 17th November 190 to suspend it again on the following day. 
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No material details were available as regards the algorithm of the auction setup considered in 
these chapters. However, the above-mentioned circular described a new pre-open algorithm 
and compared it to the previous one; this may offer indirect information about the auction 
setup of interest, since the circular specifies the differences as between the algorithms. it 
seems that in both setups the NSE pre-open algorithm followed the basic rule that the opening 
price maximises the total traded quantity. Presumably, this procedure also applied during the 
auction system which is studied here. This seems in line with the practices adopted by other 
exchanges; for instance Comerton-Forde and Rydge (2006 a) described different auction 
algorithms and they reported that the call auction algorithins of nine out of twelve major 
exchanges follow this basic principle. Orders which included bargain conditions. such as "All- 
Or-None" were not considered in the pre-open. Orders could also be modified and cancelled 
during the pre-open. 
The NSE circular specifies that one advantage of the proposed pre-open system over the 
previous one was that it considers market orders in establishing the opening prices. This 
suggests that market orders were not considered in the call auction system which is studied 
here; although this could not be established with certainty. The main advantage of 
considering market orders in the pre-open session is that a price may still be calculated in 
cases when limit orders specify prices that preclude any matching. Market buy (sell) orders 
are considered as orders which are prepared to trade at the highest (lowest) available price. 
Thus, market orders obtain the best price priority and are listed at the top of the order book. 
Now, Comerton-Forde and Rydge (2006 a) describe further criteria in auction algorithms 
which are considered in those cases where there is more than one possible price which results 
in the highest traded quantity. Whilst no direct information about subsequent criteria 
applicable on NSE was found, it might be the case that when more than one opening price was 
possible, the initial price was determined with reference to the previous prices of the security. 
In fact the above-mentioned circular specifies that: "The proposed algorithm therefore 
eliminates the need to refer to the Base Price of the security as the opening price if there are 
limit price orders available in the market". 
With reference to transparency, one may reasonably assume that the brokers' information set 
during the auction was largely the same as that prevailing during the continuous session - 
although this could not be ascertained with certainty. As described in Section 2.2.2, brokers 
have access to the best five prices prevailing for each stock and the respective quantities on 
offer at each price, in real time. Perhaps the only material difference between the auction 
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information set and the continuous trading one relates to the availability of indicative prices 
prior to the commencement of trade matching. For instance, traders start by submitting orders 
prior to the commencement of transactions in the opening auction. Similarly, brokers are 
likely to have access to unfilled orders during the 20 minute break in between the continuous 
session and the closing auction. This is an important difference - at least on theoretical 
grounds - given that one characteristic of auctions which potentially makes them more 
efficient trading mechanisms, is that traders can assimilate existing order information prior to 
the execution of trades. 
Another point which is worthy of comment relates to the measurement of volatility during the 
call auction. Given that the auction executes a batch of transactions for any particular stock at 
one single price, it does not make sense to speak of stock-specific volatility during the call 
auction. Thus, when researchers require an inference on stock-specific volatility during the 
auction, they would have to measure the price movement for the particular stock from the 
auction time to the previous or subsequent observations. Despite this, one may still measure 
the volatility during the auction in terms of a stock index movement. As shares trade 
successively in the auction, the index value changes continuously. However, when measuring 
index volatility during the auction, one should keep in mind that this is based on shares trading 
in a designated alphabetical order, rather than a continuous matching process across all stocks. 
The opening and closing auctions were suspended without Prior notice on 9 th June 1999, and it 
subsequently emerged that the suspension was due to software-related problems, although 
these had not apparently had a direct effect on the pricing process. Indeed, if the auctions 
were resulting in asset mispricing, one may expect that they would have been suspended at an 
earlier stage in view of the discrepancies prevailing between the call auction prices as 
compared to those of the continuous session. 
One may deduce that the software glitch mainly occurred in the closing auction held on 8 th 
June 1999 - which would explain the sudden suspension on the subsequent day. Looking at 
the intra-day data files, the closing call auction held on 801 June may be compared with the 
closing calls of the preceding five trading days. Statistics reported in Table 6.1 show that the 
former auction seems ambiguous as compared to the preceding five: its duration is at least 
double that of the other days, and the interval in between observations is much longer. In 
addition, the percentage change in the Nifty value is much larger than that registered in the 
other auctions. During the closing call auction held on the 8 th June, the Nifty Index value 
increased from around 1162 to 1178; yet this movement was reversed during the subsequent 
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day, when the Nifty closed at around 1162 again. This indicates that the increase in Nifty 
value registered during the 8h June closing auction, may have been unjustified, since it was 
reversed on the subsequent day. Figure 6.1 shows how the price movements in the latter 
auction were much higher as compared to those registered on the preceding five trading days. 
Table 6.11: Closing Call Auction Summary Statistics 
Date 8 Jun 99 7 Jun 99 4 Jun 99 3 Jun 99 2 Jun 99 1 Jun 99 
Auction Starting Time 15: 50: 15 15: 50: 02 15: 50: 02 15: 50: 01 15: 50: 01 15: 50: 01 
Auction Ending Time 15: 59: 33 15: 52: 58 15: 53: 33 15: 53: 25 15: 53: 15 15: 54: 21 
Duration Of Auction 
(min. 'sec. ") 9,18" 2'56" 3'31" 3'24" 3'14" 4'20" 
% Nifty Change 1.5% 0.3% -0.1% 0.0% -0.1% 0.2% 
# Observations 41 37 37 38 39 37 
Average Interval 14 sec. 
I 
5 sec. 
I 
6 sec. 
I 
5 sec. 
I 
5 sec. 
I 
7 sec. 
I 
The table reports the closing call auction summary statistics for 81n June 1999 as 
compared to the preceding five trading days. The rows show the following 
information: Trading Day, Auction Starting Time, Auction Ending Time, the 
Duration of the Auction, the % change in the Nifty Index during the auction, the 
number of Nifty observations yielded by the auction software programme, and the 
average interval in between the Nifty observations during the call auction. 
Figure 6.1: Closing Call Auctions - Nifty Log Returns 
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The above plots show the price movements registered during the closing call auctions 
as given in the intra-day data files provided by NSE. The observations were not 
sampled at uniform time intervals. 
This preliminary investigation was extended by looking at the opening and closing Nifty 
return distributions for the period 260' May 1999 to 22 nd June 1999. This includes ten trading 
days with opening and closing call auctions, and a ftirther ten days without call auctions. If 
the software problems in the auction system were resulting in unjustified price movements, 
one should note higher price dispersion during the auctions. Yet, comparing the auction prices 
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to the subsequent prices during the day may be biased against the call auctions - since 
volatility is typically higher at the opening and at the closing. The opening movements in the 
call auctions days were thus compared to the opening movements in the continous trading 
days, and the procedure was repeated for the closing movements. The opening distributions 
were defined as the first thirty Nifty observations, sampled at 30-second intervals (covering 
the first 15 minutes of trading). Similarly, the closing distributions were defined as the last 
thirty Nifty observations, sampled at 30-second intervals. (The latter usually comprise the last 
II minutes of continuous trading, a 20-minute trading break which is treated as a 30-second 
48 interval for computation purposes, and the closing call auction). 
A series of Wests were conducted to compare the mean standard deviations for both sets of 
distributions, as shown in Table 6.2. Two t-tests were conducted on the opening distributions. 
The mean standard deviation of the opening distributions increased following the suspension - 
indicating that it was unlikely that any software problems in the auction system were resulting 
in unjustified price movements. A second test was conducted, to check the difference between 
the standard deviation of the opening distribution prevailing on 8 th June 1999, and the mean 
standard deviations for the rest of the sample (before and after auction suspension), following 
the notion that the 8th June opening auction might have driven prices away from fundamentals. 
fi th The former difference between the standard deviations is insigni Icant, suggesting that the 8 
June opening auction functioned adequately. 
A further set of three t-tests, shown in Table 6.2, were conducted on the mean standard 
deviations of the closing distributions. T-test 3, shows that the mean standard deviation of the 
closing distibutions before suspension, was significantly higher than after suspension. Yet, 
this might be solely caused by the high price dispersion of the 8h June closing auction. T-test 
4 investigates this by comparing the mean standard deviation of the closing distributions 
before auction suspension except 8h June, to the mean standard deviation post-suspension. 
The difference is no longer significant. The fifth Mest compared the 8 th June closing 
distribution standard deviation to that of the rest of the sample (before and after suspension). 
The test shows that the standard deviation of the 8h June closing distribution was significantly 
higher than that prevailing over the remaining trading days. 
" in this sample period, the returns realized during the trading break did not materially differ from the 30 second 
returns. 
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Table 6.2: T-Tests on Opening and Closing Distributions 
(data sampled at half-minute Intervals) 
Opening Returns 
Test 11, MSD - Before Suspension [MSD - After Suspension] 0.0010 [ 0.00151 
t-Statistic [95% one-tailed critical value] -1.4894 [ 1.7341 
Test 2: MSD - 8th June [MSD - Rest of Sample) 0.0015 [ 0.0013 
t-Statistic [95% one-tailed critical value] -0.2759 [ 1.7341 
Closing Returns 
Test 3: MSD - Before Suspension [MSD - After Suspension] 0.0005 [ 0.0004 ] 
t-Statistic [95% one-tailed critical value] 1.7506 1.7341 ] 
MSD - Before Suspension except 8th June [MSD - After 
Test 4: Suspension] 0.0005 0.0004 ] 
t-Statistic [95% one-tailed critical value] 1.4241 1.7396 ] 
Test 5: MSD - 8th June [MSD - Rest of Sample] 0.0009 0.0004 ] 
t-Statistic [95% one-tailed critical value] -1.7605 1.7341 
The above Mests compared the Standard Deviations for the log return distributions of 
the Nifty index, sampled at 30-second intervals. The opening distributions comprised 
the first 29 log returns for each trading day, and similarly the closing distributions 
consisted of the last 29 log returns for each trading day. The mean standard deviation 
(MSD) was worked out by taking the average of the standard deviations for each 
distribution included in the particular sample. The opening distributions show no 
significant differences before-suspension and post-suspension - indicating that any 
software problems did not result in unjustified price movements in the opening call 
auctions. The closing distributions point at a significant difference between the MSD of 
8'h June 1999, as compared to the rest of the sampled days. This indicates that the 
software problems might have resulted in unjustified price movements during the 
closing call auction of the latter day - and the auction was thus suspended on 9th June 
1999. 
The above evidence, supports the view that the software problems in the auction system 
mainly occurred on 8"' June 1999 during the closing. The auction software glitches are 
unlikely to have had a direct effect on the pricing process during the rest of the trading days. 
This notion is important to establish that we are not considering a call auction which is 
inherently defective due to software problems (save for one particular day). Studying a 
defective auction would not result in any firm conclusions as to the effectiveness of call 
auctions in general. 
The NSE did not subsequently reintroduce opening and closing auctions on a permanent basis. 
When auctions were in effect, the pre-opening auction was usually held between 09: 30 and 
09: 45, followed by continuous trading until 15: 30, and subsequently by a post-closing auction 
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between 15: 30 and 15: 45. As from the 90'June 1999, continuous trading took place between 
10: 00 and 15: 30. The data period runs from 2d March through 46 September 1999, or for 63 
days either side of 9th of June. 49 The subsequent investigations were conducted on daily data, 
unless otherwise specified. 
In selecting the individual stocks to be included in the sample, only equity securities were 
considered. 50 The aim of the sampling process was to select the most liquid stocks, in order to 
guarantee sufficient observations to enable the conduction of a detailed empirical study. Yet, 
selecting the most liquid stocks, may also lead to results which could be sample specific. For 
example, overall it would be reasonable to expect higher spreads to prevail for a randomly 
selected sample, rather than for the most liquid stocks. In addition, some findings might also 
be specific to the particular period. 
Stocks were chosen in terms of the 170 stocks with highest quantities traded, and the 170 
stocks with the highest Indian Rupee value traded. 107 stocks appeared on both of these lists, 
and this lead to a sample of 233 stocks. Thirty stocks were omitted from the sample due to 
missing observations. Missing observations might lead to a jump in returns when the 
observations resume again, and this might impact on the calculation of returns and volatility. 
Some of the missing observations in the sample may have been due to shares suspended from 
trading for some days, as the company issued additional shares or changed its equity structure. 
Where a change in equity structure was detected (including mergers, new share issues and 
stock splits) the stock was deleted from the sample on the grounds that this is likely to have 
affected the pricing process. This led to a further reduction of 21 shares from the sample. The 
final sample thus consisted of 182 stocks as shown in Appendix 6.1. 
The sample is characterised by a considerable degree of cross-sectional variation. For 
example the (simple) return for GRAMOPHONE was 2856,42% whilst the (simple) return for 
ARVINDMILL was -58.91%. One may also note that during the thirteen months 
included in 
the sample period, the Nifty Index value increased by 50.5%, whilst the Mideap Index realized 
a gain of 99.5%. 
49 Our sample period is characterized by occasional minor changes in trading hours. 
50 In order to eliminate observations which are not related to common equity, the occurrences 
for securities in the 
series N I, N2, N3, N4, N5, N6, N7, N8, N9, NA, NB, NE, NO, NP, (debentures), PI (preference shares) and 
W I, 
W2, W3, NV4 (warrants) and AE, BE and BI were deleted. Only observations in the EQ (equity) series were 
considered. 
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For the purpose of the event study, observations of the BSE-500 Index were used. There were 
five instances when the BSE-500 closing price was unavailable, possibly due to BSE being 
closed for trading. These days were omitted from the sample when conducting the event 
study. 
For the basic comparison analyses and the event study, the sampling interval was 
homogenised by the use of daily data on volumes and prices (the last trade price for each 
stock, unless otherwise specified). Appendix 6.2 shows the data periods used for the VEL 
comparisons and the event study. In calculating returns, dividend payments were abstracted 
from. 
To obtain an idea of the activity in the auctions before suspension, three trading days were 
selected at random from different days of the week and reasonably close to the event date. 
Three sub-samples were taken: Sample A securities had a daily pre-event mean volume less 
than or equal to 40,000 shares, whilst Sample C securities featured a pre-event daily mean 
volume greater than 140,000 shares. The remaining shares were labelled as Sample B 
(medium-liquidity shares). The former volume values were chosen in such a way to obtain 
three approximately equal sub-samples. Summary statistics of trading activity on the chosen 
days for Sample A, B and C shares are shown in Table 6.3. Evidently, trading frequencies 
increase as we move from low to medium and to high liquidity stocks, and the level of activity 
is generally higher for the closing auction than for the opening auction. A possible 
explanation for this is that any unexecuted orders at the end of the continuous session were 
automatically carried forward to the closing call, whereas outstanding orders at the end of the 
previous trading day were not necessarily carried forward to the call auction of the subsequent 
day. 
With reference to notation, the event date (9"' June 1999) is denoted as T=O, and all other days 
are denoted in terms of the number of trading days which separate the respective day from this 
date. For instance, T+5 refers to 5 trading days after the event day. 
The study now proceeds with the assessment of the impact of the discontinuing of call 
auctions on VEL factors. 
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Table 6.3* Summary Statistics for Call Auctions 
Monday Thursday Friday 
3 May 1999 - 27 May 1999 4 June 1999 
Open Close Open Close Open Close 
Total Number of Transactions 
(including unsampled stocks) 1,274 2,995 1,446 13,361 3,392 5,642 
Sample A 
% of shares in Sample A which 7% 46% 13.6% 88% 18.6% 72.9% 
traded in the auction 
Average # of Transactions per 0.4 1.6 0.5 7.8 0.6 10.1 
share (incl. zero observations) 
Average # of Transactions per 5.3 3.4 3.5 8.8 3.3 13.8 
share (excl. zero observations) 
Average # of Units Traded per 49 217 34 1,307 141 830 
share (incl. zero observations) 
Average # of Units Traded per 725 473 254 1,482 755 1,140 
share (excl. zero observations) 
Sample B 
% of shares in Sample B which 45% 80% 41% 95% 39.7% 81.3% 
traded in the auction 
Average # of Transactions per 2.0 5.0 1.3 21.3 3.1 6.2 
share (incl. zero observations) 
Average # of Transactions per 4.5 6.3 3.2 22.7 8.0 7.6 
share (excl. zero observations) 
Average # of Units Traded per 447 891 409 5,118 786 1,095 
share (incl. zero observations) 
Average # of Units Traded per 986 1,118 1,005 5,459 2,012 1,348 
share (excl. zero observations) 
Sample C 
% of shares in Sample C which 80% 95% 95% 100% 86.4% 98.3% 
traded in the auction 
Average # of Transactions per 13.6 28.5 14.7 120.1 42.0 59.9 
share (incl. zero observations) 
Average # of Transactions per 17.1 30.0 15.4 120.1 48.5 60.9 
share (excl. zero observations) 
Average # of Units Traded per 4,290 8,201 4,117 43,515 15,243 19,912 
share (incl. zero observations) 
Average # of Units Traded per 5,385 8,640 4,338 43,515 17,634 20,255 
share (excl. zero observations) 
The table shows summary statistics for the opening and closing call auctions held on 
three different days. The days were randomly selected, yet trading days which were 
more than one and a half months distant from the event were not considered. In 
addition, if the chosen date happened to be a Monday, all other Mondays were no longer 
considered, and so on for all the other days. This was done in order to minimize the 
possibility of bias from day of the week effects. As expected, trading frequencies 
increase as we move from Sample A to Sample B to Sample C. The statistics Indicate 
that the closing call auction is more active than the opening auction. 
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6.4 The Impact of Auction Suspension on Volatility 
The impact of the suspension of the call auctions on market volatility is assessed through a 
comparison of the percentage intra-day price difference and reversals of overnight returns. 
These measures focus on short-term volatility, given that any expected impacts of call 
auctions to price stability are essentially of a short-term nature. 51 
6.4.1 The Scaled Intra-Day Price Difference 
The scaled intra-day price difference (SIDP) is an indicator of intra-day volatility given by: 
SIDPi, t ý (Phigh U- Plow if) 
/ Popen U (6.1) 
where Phigh jj , Pl,,, ij and Pp,, jj are the highest, 
lowest and opening prices for security i on day 
I respectively. This measure may be taken as an indication of the efficacy of opening call 
auctions on the grounds that if auctions aggregate information more efficiently, they should 
lead to lower intra-day volatility around the fundamental value of the security. The pre-event 
SIDPjj was worked out using data from T-63 to T-1, whilst in estimating post event SIDPjj the 
data from T+l to T+63 was used. 
Results are shown in Table 6.4. Contrary to expectations, intra-day volatility decreased in the 
post-event period, and the hypothesis of no difference between the pre-event and post event 
SIDPi,, is clearly rejected through a paired two sample t-test for means. Paired Means t-tests 
were also conducted on the standard deviations of SIDPI,, for each stock, and this may be 
interpreted as the "volatility of intra-day volatility". No significant change in the standard 
deviation of SIDPij is evident and the null hypothesis of no difference between pre-event and 
post-event data is not rejected. 
" The impact of the suspension on longer-term volatility is investigated in Chapter 7. 
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Table 6.4: Tests on Scaled Intra-Day Price Difference (Daily Frequency) 
Pre-Event Post-Event 
Mean SIDPI. t 0.0632 0.0564 
Std. Deviation of SIDPI, t 0.0211 - 0.0226 
t Statistic on the Null Hypothesis of No 
Difference between Pre-and Post Event 7.6443 
(Paired Means Test) 
99% Critical Value (one-tailed test) 2.3471 
99% Critical Value (two-tailed test) 2.6033 
Mean of Standard Deviations of SIDPI. t 0.033166 0.033157 
Std. Deviation of Std. Devn's of SIDPI. t 0.0165 0.0491 
t Stat on the Null Hypothesis of No 
Difference between Pre-and Post Event 0.0027 
(Paired Means Test) 
90% Critical Value (one-tailed test) 1.2862 
90% Critical Value (two-tailed test) 1.6533 
The table shows the results of paired two sample Wests for differences in intra- 
day volatility between the pre-event and post-event period. Tests on the 
Means of the Scaled Intra-Day Price Difference (SIDPit), reject the null 
hypothesis of no change in SIDPi, (, following suspension at the 99% level of 
confidence. When considering the standard deviations of SIDPII, the null 
hypothesis cannot be rejected, denoting no significant change in the standard 
deviation of SIDPIt following suspension. 
6.4.2 Overnight Return Reversal 
Overnight return reversals (ORR) are a measure of inter-day volatility. If the auctions help in 
price discovery, one may expect lower overnight volatility during the period when auctions 
were held. However, a direct comparison between overnight returns in the pre-event and post- 
event periods could be potentially misleading as higher price changes in one period might be 
justified by the news, in that period. Thus it might be more appropriate to concentrate on the 
reversal of price movements. If overnight price movements are reversed during the next day, 
this implies that the overnight movement Nvas excessive. Thus, the day return is regressed as a 
function of the previous overnight return as follows: 
r, =, u, + 7rr"i, t ei, (6.2) 
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where Iii is a constant, rj,, is the day (log) return of security i on day t, roij is the overnight (log) 
return of security i between day 1-1 and t, and cij is an error term. A negative 7ri may be taken 
as an indication of price reversals, and therefore excess overnight volatility. 
The mean overnight return reversal coefficient 7ri was estimated for both the pre-event and 
post-event period of the sampled stocks, as shown in Table 6.5. The mean coefficient of 7r is 
negative both in the pre-event and in the post-event period, which is an indication of excess 
short term volatility in terms of overnight return reversals. The ORR test indicates a highly 
significant increase in the modulus of 7r when the call auctions were suspended, as inferred 
through a paired two sample Mest for means. 
Table 6.5: Overnight Return Reversals (Daily Frequency Data) 
Pre-Event Post-Event 
Mean rT -0.3439 -0.3970 
Standard Deviation of n 0.1726 0.2288 
t Statistic on the Null Hypothesis of No 
Difference between Pre-and Post Event 2.9097 
(Paired Means Test) 
99% Critical Value (one-tailed test) 2.3471 
99% Critical Value (two-tailed test) 2.6033 
The table shows the results of a paired two sample West for differences in 
overnight return reversal coefficients (Tr) between the pre-event and post- 
event period. The test shows that reversals became higher in magnitude 
following suspension. The difference is significant at the 99% confidence 
level and this suggests lower overnight volatility during the auction period. 
Thus, the above tests yield contrasting results as to changes in volatility following the auction 
suspension. In order to cross-check that there were no additional events which might have 
impacted on volatility during this period, NSE circulars for the period in question were 
reviewed. On, 16 th June 1999 the National Securities Clearing Corporation (NSCQ applied 
additional volatility margins in respect of outstanding positions of trading members (brokers) 
in highly volatile stocks. This might have discouraged members from increasing positions in 
volatile stocks and might have resulted in lower volatility in the post-suspension period. It 
might also be the case that brokers charged higher fees for transactions in these stocks, and 
this might have discouraged trading activity in these stocks. Yet, the first instance where any 
NSE circular specified particular stocks on which this margin was applied was on the 4h 
January 2000, which is outside the data range used in this exercise. In addition, when 
analysing the specific stocks on which an additional volatility margin was applied, it was 
noted that only four of these stocks featured in the sample. Overall, this indicates that 
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additional volatility margins were not likely to have been the underlying cause of the changes 
in volatility. 
A more general issue is that most Indian companies have accounting years which end in 
March, and release their annual reports between March and June, in the pre-event window, as 
described in Chapter 5. It could therefore be argued that one might expect higher volatility in 
the pre-. event Ivindow because of the clustering of earnings reports. However, Ball and Brown 
(1968) found that the impact of an earnings surprise on a company's share price typically 
begins several months before the release of the annual report, and is almost fully impounded 
into the price by the time of the formal earnings announcement. Furthermore, the impact of 
the news on share prices and spreads is generally dissipated during the day of the 
announcement itself in as little as 15 to 30 minutes as outlined by Patell and Wolfson (1984) 
and Kim and Verrecchia (1994). This suggests that any effect of such announcements on pre- 
event window volatility would have been at most small, and in any case confined to the SIDP 
measure. 52 
Notwithstanding the above arguments, a data adjustment procedure was carried out to account 
for the volatility patterns during different months of the year on NSE. The latter procedure 
confirmed that the effect of volatility seasonality on the former results is minimal. The 
volatility seasonality regressions presented in Chapter 5 Table 5.8 were used to adjust the 
individual stock figures on which the fon-ner volatility tests were based. The volatility 
seasonality model shows that the SIDP is typically 0.008 higher during the months of March 
and April. This implies that around two-thirds of the pre-event observations of the SIDP for 
each individual stock have to be scaled down by 0.008. As a substitute for this procedure, the 
final SIDP for each individual stock during the pre-event period was adjusted down by two- 
thirds of 0.008. Similarly, given that the volatility seasonality model shows that the SIDP is 
typically 0.0039 lower during August, around one-third of the post-event observations for 
each individual stock have to be adjusted upwards by 0.0039. Again, this procedure was 
approximated by an upward adjustment of the final SIDP of individual stocks by one-third of 
0.0039. Tests on Paired-Two Samples for Means for the adjusted SIDPs shown in Table 6.6 
Panel A, still indicate a drop in SIDP following suspensionWhich is significant at the 99% 
level of confidence. 
52 NSE regulations permit release of earnings news at any time in the trading day, and so there is no overnight 
effect arising from the systematic release of earnings news out of trading hours. 
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Similar adjustments were done in respect of the ORR measure. The ORR was adjusted for the 
seasonality pattern'which is typical in the Modulus of Log Returns for Daily Data, shown in 
Chapter 5 Table 5.8. Given that the Return Modulus is typically 0.0043 higher during the 
months of March and April, around two-thirds of the ORR pre-event observations for each 
individual stock have to be roughly scaled down by 0.0043. In this way, the final ORR 
modulus for each individual stock during the pre-event period was adjusted down by two- 
thirds of 0.0043. Similarly, given that the Return Modulus is typically 0.0026 lower during 
August, around one-third of the post-event observations for the individual stocks have to be 
adjusted upwards by 0.0026. Again, this procedure was approximated by an upward 
adjustment of the final ORR modulus of individual stocks by one-third of 0.0026. Tests on 
Paired-Two Samples for Means for the adjusted data shown in Table 6.6 Panel B, confirm that 
ORRs became more prevalent following suspension, where the change is still significant at the 
99% level of confidence. 
Table 6.6 
Panel A: Scaled Intra-Day Price Difference (Seasonally Adjusted Daily Data) 
Pre-Event Post-Event 
Mean SIDPi, t 0.0628 0.0565 
Std. Deviation of SIDPI, t 0.0210 0.0227 
t Statistic on the Null Hypothesis of No 
Difference between Pre-and Post Event 7.1823 
(Paired Means Test) 
99% Critical Value (one-tailed test) 2.3471 
99% Critical Value LtýLo-talled test) 2.6033 
Panel B: Overnight Return Reversals (Seasonally Adjusted Daily Data) 
Mean TT -0.3429 -0.3973 
Standard Deviation of Tr 0.1721 0.2290 
t Statistic on the Null Hypothesis of No 
Difference between Pre-and Post Event 2.9836 
(Paired Means Test) 
99% Critical Value (one-tailed test) 2.3471 
99% Critical Value (two-tailed test) 2.6033 
The above paired two sample Mests, replicate the tests shown in Tables 6.3 and 6.4, using 
seasonally-adjusted data. These tests do not change the former inferences, in that the they 
indicate a drop in SIDP following suspension (significant at the 99% confidence level) and an 
increase in magnitude of the ORRs following suspension (significant at the 99% level of 
confidence). 
These adjustments confirm the arguments that the typical volatility seasonality pattern on NSE 
does not impact on the former volatility tests. Yet, this still does not solve the puzzle 
regarding the conflicting highly significant inferences whicý were obtained. Overall, the 
volatility tests do not clarify whether the auctions were reducing market volatility. The 
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contradictory findings on intra-day and overnight volatility might be potentially explained by 
the statistics shown in Table 6.3 that the closing call auction was more active than the opening 
one. Following the suspension of the auctions, intra-day volatility decreased - possibly due to 
the fact that the opening auction was not sufficiently effective given the relatively low activity. 
The pronounced overnight volatility following suspension might indicate that the closing call 
auction was more effective due to higher activity. This is corroborated by the findings of 
Hillion and Suominen (2004), who found that closing call auctions may reduce the potential 
for market participants to manipulate closing prices. 
It should also be noted that the fonner tests are not exhaustive. For instance, the tests do not 
address the issue of whether the call auctions' utility is higher on more volatile days, in terms 
of their contribution to enable the market to deal with news shocks. The relationship between 
volatility and news is addressed through GARCH models in Chapter 7, where a more detailed 
investigation of the impacts of the auction suspension on NSE volatility is undertaken. 
This investigation now proceeds with further tests on Efficiency and Liquidity, which are 
carried out using the original data (not adjusted for monthly seasonality). 
6.5 The Impact of Auction Suspension on Pricing Efficiency 
6.5.1 Relative Return Dispersion 
The Relative Return Dispersion (RRD) as described by Amihud, Mendelson and Lauterbach 
(1997), is calculated by averaging the squared residuals of the market model. RRD is defined 
as: 
In2. 
RRD, =-E it n j=1 
(6.3) 
where RRD, is the Relative Return Dispersion across the sampled securities during time t, ei, is 
the market model residual for security i at time t, and n is the number of sampled securities. A 
lower RRD, indicates a lower pricing error and therefore higher efficiency. Results shown in 
Table 6.7 indicate that RRD decreased contrary to expectations, indicating higher pricing 
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efficiency following the auction suspension. The decrease in RRD is significant at the 99% 
level of confidence, as inferred through a paired tNvo sample west for means. 
Table 6.7: Relative Return Dispersion (Estimated through Daily Frequency Data) 
Pre-Event Post-Event 
RRDt 0.1272 0.1017 
Standard Deviation of RRDj. t 0.1196 0.1127 
t Statistic on the Null Hypothesis of No 
Difference between Pre-and Post Event 2.9308 
(Paired Means Test) 
99% Critical Value (one-tailed test) 2.3471 
99% Critical Value (two-tailed test) 2.6033 
The table shows the results of a paired two sample Mest for differences in relative return 
dispersion (RRDt) between the pre-event and post-event period. The test shows a 
decrease in (RRDI) following suspension, which is significant at the 99% confidence. 
This suggests increased efficiency following suspension. 
6.5.2 Serial Correlations of Returns 
Significant serial correlation in (log) returns may be taken as an indication of pricing 
inefficiency since if prices fully adjust to new information, price changes should be 
uncorrelated, assuming that news are uncoffelated as well. The pre-event and post event first 
order autocorrelations for individual stocks are reported in Appendix 6.3, together with Box- 
Pierce (1970) and Ljung-Box (1978) statistics. As may be expected, some stocks showed 
negative first order serial correlation, whilst others showed positive serial correlation. Given 
this, the mean correlation across stocks is expected to converge to zero. Thus it makes sense 
to look at the squared first order correlations. 
One should note that the first order serial correlation for most stocks was insignificant, both in 
the pre-event and in the post-event estimation (Appendix 6.3). Table 6.8 shows that the first 
order serial correlation changes significantly, yet this result can be misleading since the 
significance stems from the fact that a predominantly negative serial correlation changed to a 
predominantly positive serial correlation. Whilst this may suggest that the nature of the price 
discovery process may have changed following the call auction suspension, one should note 
that positive serial correlation is as "inefficienf' as negative serial correlation, and therefore 
this result should not be interpreted as a change in efficiency. Looking at the change in the 
squared correlation coefficients, we note an insignificant increase in pricing efficiency. This 
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exercise thus confirms the improvement in market efficiency following suspension as inferred 
through the previous test, albeit insignificantly. 
Table 6.8: Return Serial Correlations for Daily Frequency Dat 
First Order Squared First Order 
Setial Correlation Serial Correlation 
Pre- Post- Pre- Post- 
Event Event Event Event 
Mean -0.0169 0.0791 0.0304 0.0292 
Standard Deviation 0.1739 0.1519 0.0409 0.0352 
t Statistic on the Null Hypothesis of No 
Difference between Pre-and Post Event -6.3912 0.2748 
(Paired Means Test) 
95% Critical Value (one-tailed test) 1.6533 1.6533 
95% Critical Value (two-tailed test) 1.9732 
1 
1.9732 
1 
The table shows the results of paired two sample Wests for differences in serial 
correlation between the pre-event and post-event period. The first test indicates a highly 
significant change in serial correlation where the latter changed from negative 
dependence to positive dependence. Yet, given that both negative and positive serial 
correlation constitute a sign of inefficiency, one should look at the absolute value of the 
correlation or alternatively at the squared correlation. This is done in the second test, 
which indicates an insignificant decrease in squared correlation coefficients following 
suspension. 
Given that auctions are thought to have particular value at the opening of the trading day, 
when it is necessary to aggregate overnight infonnation, the investigation was extended to 
how the call auctions performed in terms of their role in helping with price discovery on NSE. 
If the call auctions were beneficial for price discovery purposes, then one may expect that 
prices move quickly to their fundamental values and this should lead to lower serial 
correlation of returns in the call auction regime - particularly at the beginning of the day 
following the opening auction. 
This issue was tackled through intra-day data for the NSE Nifty Index by taking the 
logarithmic returns of the index sampled at one minute intervals. 53 The sample started with 
the last 26 trading days of the call auction regime (46 May 1999 - 8ý June 1999) and the first 
26 trading days of the post-auction regime (9th June 1999 - 14th July 1999). Two trading days 
were dropped from this sample due to trading suspensions occurring during the first hour of 
the day which occurred on the 21" May 1999 and on the 28ý'June 1999 respectively. Thus, 
the sample used for the purpose of this exercise included 25 trading days in each regime. 
5' The data for the Nifty Index was used (rather than individual stock data) to avoid the problem of non-trading in 
individual stocks. 
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The first order serial correlation coefficient of the first 60 log returns of the Nifty index 
sampled at one minute intervals was estimated for each trading day. As shown in Table 6.9, in 
case of the auction regime the cross-sectional averag6 of the serial correlation coefficients of 
the sampled trading days was 0.369, whilst in case of the Post-auction regime this statistic was 
0.226. A t-test on the serial correlation coefficients of both regimes enabled the rejection of 
the hypothesis of equal means at the 99% confidence level. 54 
Table 6.9: Nifty Index Serial Correlation During the First Trading Hour 
(Nifty observations were sampled at one-minute frequency) 
Pre-Event Post-Event 
Mean 0.3690 0.2261 
Variance 0.0123 0.0365 
Pooled Variance 0.0244 
T Statistic on the Null Hypothesis of No Difference 3.2352 
between Pre-and Post Event (Paired Means Test) 
99% Critical Value (one-tailed test) 2.4066 
99% Critical Value (two-tailed test) 2.6822 
The table shows the Nifty Index First Order Serial Correlation Coefficients in the Auction and 
Post-Suspension period. The mean correlation is an average of the first order serial correlation 
coefficients estimated through a sample of 25 trading days for each regime. 
This suggests that the call auctions did not help in price discovery, even at the opening. Thus, 
pricing efficiency generally increased after auction suspension, both during the whole trading 
day and in particular within the first hour. 
6.6 The Impact of Auction Suspension on Liquidity 
The measures which were selected for investigating liquidity changes following suspension 
were the number of shares transacted and the volume per unit of return. The results were then 
cross-checked through a time trend regression. 
6.6.1 Number of Shares Transacted 
The number of shares transacted is related to the "volume" aspect of liquidity, in the sense that 
higher amounts of activity are expected in a more liquid market. The results presented in 
54 The same qualitative results are obtained when considering the modulus of the serial correlation cocfficients, 
given that positive serial correlation is as incfficient as negative serial correlation. 
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Table 6.10 Panel A, show increased volumes following auction suspension. This increase is 
significant at the 90% confidence level, as inferred by a paired two sample t-test for means. 
Table 6.10: Liquidity Indicators 
Panel A: Daily Volume of Transactions 
Pre-Event Post-Event 
Mean of Volume 322,391 367,123 
Std. Deviation of Volume 986,908 942,824 
t Stat on the Null Hypothesis of No 
Difference between Pre-and Post Event -1.9422 
(Paired Means Test) 
90% Critical Value (one-tailed test) 1.2862 
95% Critical Value (one-tailed test) 1.6533 
90% Critical Value (two-tailed test) 1.6533 
95% Critical Value (two-tailed test) 1.9732 
Panel B: Daily Volume I Return Ratio 
Pre-Event Post-Event 
Mean of (Volume / Return) Ratio 108,730 141,148 
Std. Deviation of (Volume / Return) Ratio 284,978 338,722 
t Stat on the Null Hypothesis of No 
Difference between Pre-and Post Event -4.4228 
(Paired Means Test) 
99% Critical Value (one-tailed test) 2.3471 
99% Critical Value (two-tailed test) 2.6033 
The table shows the results of paired two sample t-tests for differences in 
liquidity proxies between the pre-event and post-event period. The first test 
(Panel A) shows an increase in the number of shares transacted following 
suspension which is significant at the 90% level of confidence. The second 
test (Panel B) shows an increase in the volume: return ratio following 
suspension which is significant at the 99% confidence. The tests suggest 
increased liquidity following the auction suspension. 
6.6.2 Volume per Unit of Return 
The volume divided by the absolute return, is an estimate of what amount of traded shares 
causes a one unit change in stock price. 55 Therefore, this measure assesses the "resiliency" 
aspect of liquidity. The absolute return is defined as the modulus of the difference between 
the opening and the closing price of the security. As may be expected, the return on some 
days was zero and this was problematic given that in such cases a ratio of infinity is obtained. 
Thus, for computation purposes, the daily Return / Volume ratio for the stocks was estimated 
" The volume measure being used is the number of shares transacted, rather than the monetary value of the 
transacted shares. 
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and the reciprocal of the average of the daily ratios for each stock was taken as the average 
Volume / Return ratio. This method only leads to "infinity occurrences" when the volume is 
equal to zero i. e. when the share does not trade for the whole day. No such instances occurred 
in the sample at hand. 
Results presented in Table 6.10 Panel B, show a statistically significant increase in market 
liquidity in terms of resiliency, given that a higher volume is required to change the price by 
one unit. 
6.6.3 A Time-Trend Model 
Both of the above tests suggest increased liquidity, yet one cannot exclude the possibility that 
the latter improvement in resilience, may have been partly due to a lower degree of intra-day 
volatility, as shown in Section 6.4.1. The liquidity tests should be interpreted with caution, 
given that the number of shares traded on most world exchanges is on the increase - and thus 
the above increase in liquidity might be unrelated to the call auction suspension. This implies 
that one may expect share volumes to trend upwards, irrespective of the call auction 
suspension. This point was addressed by looking at a longer data period from I" January 1995 
to 29"' December 2003 -a total of 2,248 daily observations. The test consisted of an 
estimation of a simple time trend regression for volume traded with shift and trend dummies at 
the suspension date: 
v=c+At+, 6, d+fl3t. d +e (6.4) 
where v is the logarithmic volume data relating to the total number of transactions on NSE, t is 
a time trend starting from I on the first observation and increasing successively to 2,248 at the 
last observation, d is a dummy variable taking a value of zero from the initial observation till 
auction suspension date, and a value of one in the suc cessive period, c, P1,82, and P3 are 
estimated coefficients, whilst c is an error term. Results shown in Table 6.11 provide 
confirming evidence that that there was a significant step increase in volume as shown by the I 
and d coefficients, though a small decrease in trend following the auction suspension as shown 
by the I. d coefficient. 
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Overall, these tests confinn an increase in NSE liquidity following auction suspension, which 
goes beyond a simple longer-terin trend towards higher volumes as witnessed on most world 
exchanges. One may thus rule out any hypothesised deterioration in liquidity levels, 
following the suspension of the call auctions. 
Table 6.11: Time trend regression estimated through daily data 
constant trend ddx trend 
Coefficient 9.4426 *** 0.0033 *** 2.0490 -0.0021 
T-ratio (348.8) (78.5) (27.9) (36.6) 
The table shows the results obtained for a time trend regression for volume traded on NSE 
between January 1995 to December 2003 (2248 observations). The explanatory variables are 
an intercept, a time trend, a dummy variable taking the value of zero before the auction 
suspension and a value of one following the suspension, and the final variable is the dummy 
multiplied by the time trend. The first row shows the coefficients, whilst t-ratios are shown in 
brackets underneath. Statistical significance at the 99% level of confidence is denoted by ***. 
In summary, the evidence on VEL changes is not unambiguous, but a substantial majority of 
the tests suggest that there was an improvement in VEL following the auction suspension. 
6.7 The Value of Auctions to Shareholders: An Event Study 
This section uses event study methodology to assess the value of auction suspension to 
shareholders. A description of event-study methodology is offered in Section 6.7.1, whilst 
Section 6.7.2 discusses the limitations of the methodology. The empirical results are 
presented in Section 6.7.3. 
6.7.1 Event Study Methodology 
Event study methodology analyses "normal" stock returns in order to compare them to the 
returns realized over a period of interest, during which a specific event took place. Therefore, 
this methodology uses the assessment of market participants, in order to infer whether specific 
events change the value of securities. An event may be deemed to affect the value of 
securities if the latter experience significant abnormal returns during the event period. 
According to the theory of market efficiency (Fama et al. 1969), prices adjust quickly to new 
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information and therefore one may expect abnormal returns to occur on the event 
announcement date. Abnormal returns realized immediately prior to the announcement might 
signify insider trading, whilst abnormal returns on the days following the announcement might 
be explained by investors reacting to price movements of previous days, prices failing to fully 
adjust because of daily price limits, and in some cases time zone differences. One important 
factor which the researcher should consider is whether the observed abnormal returns might 
emanate from an unrelated event. In this way, the events included in the sample should 
ideally span over different securities, and have occurred in different periods. The latter might 
not always be possible, such as when assessing the impacts of a one-time event, say, new 
legislation or market-wide changes in the trading process. 
The period during which the abnon-nal returns are expected is called the event window, and 
this usually includes days preceding and following the event date or the event announcement 
date. It is customary for the event window to commence around two days prior to the event. 
When the event day is known with certainty, and there are sufficient grounds to believe that 
markets adjust instantly, a short event window might be appropriate. This study uses an 18 
day event window; from T-2 to T+15. The choice of a fairly long window covers the 
possibility that market microstructure changes of this kind might take longer for the markets to 
evaluate, partly because they might be interpreted differently by different market participants. 
Indeed, a high number of participants may also classify such changes as irrelevant, since they 
are not expected to change the "fundamental value" of securities - in terms of the underlying 
earnings and risks of the firms. Longer event windows might not necessarily be desirable, on 
the grounds that the observed returns pattern may become "diluted" with unrelated factors. In 
addition longer event windows reduce the power of the tests (MacKinlay; 1997) and 
exacerbate the problem that the assumed normal return generating process is usually imprecise 
(Fama; 1998). 
The market model is estimated through data observed during the estimation window in order 
to infer the level of non-nal market returns. The conventional methodology is for the 
estimation window to precede the event window. Yet, this may lead to post-selection bias, if 
the particular event is conditional on the characteristics of the securities. For instance, 
Amihud, Mendelson and Lauterbach (1997), studying an event for stocks selected by the Tel 
Aviv Stock Exchange on the basis of their "marketability", used a post-event estimation 
window. In the current study, a pre-event estimation window is used, on the grounds that the 
event under review was not conditional on stock characteristics, but applied to all NSE 
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securities. According to MacKinlay (1997), event studies may include both pre-event and 
post-event data for the estimation of normal returns. 
Event studies customarily use the market model, estimated through OLS. The market model 
hypothesises a linear relationship between the return on individual securities and the general 
market retum. Thus: 
r,,, : -- ai + Ar., + so (6.5) 
where rij is the (log) return of stock i on day 1, r,,,, is the market (log) return, ai and A are 
estimated coefficients, and cij is a residual term. This approach is advantageous not only due 
to the inherent simplicity, but also due to technical reasons. For instance Brown and Warner 
(1980), MacKinlay (1997), Fama (1998) and Saiful Bahri and Leger (200 1) argued that more 
elaborate models, such as multifactor ones where additional indices / risk factors are included, 
do not usually present significant gains. Similarly, Cable and Holland (1999) empirically 
showed that the market model tends to outperform the other principal retum-generating 
models. 
Following, Green, Manos, Murinde, and Suppakitjarak (2003), the above market model was 
adjusted to account for calendar time effects, on the hypothesis that returns might follow a 
calendar day pattern rather than a trading day pattern. Thus, the estimated regression was: 
rf,,, 
= a,,, +, 8, r +ei,, (6.6) 
where r',,, =-- r,,, / m, ,r=r,,,,, 
/ m, and in is the return interval in calendar days. All of the 
sampled stocks traded every day during the period of interest, and thus no adjustments were 
necessary to allow for thin trading. 
Following the estimation of the calendar day market model, abnormal returns during the event 
window are calculated as follows: 
AR',,, =+ Pir ) (6.7) 
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where AR',,, is the (calendar day) abnormal return for security i on day t. The "trading day" 
abnonnal. return is obtained by multiplying AR',.., by the number of calendar days between the 
trading days as follows: 
ARj,, = AR'j,, m, (6.8) 
The above abnormal returns for each day are then averaged across the stocks as follows: 
n 
AMR, AR, (6.9) 
where MAR, denotes mean abnormal returns during time t, and n is the number of stocks in the 
sample. This procedure should help in eliminating the "noise" emanating from firm specific 
events, which are unrelated to the event under review. Finally, the average abnormal returns 
are summed across trading days as follows: 
T+15 
CAR, = ZMAR, 
i=T-2 
(6.10) 
where CAR, denotes cumulative abnormal returns during time period t. This enables the 
detection of abnormal returns in those cases when the event date is not known with certainty, 
or in those cases where there are reasons to believe that the markets reacted to the information 
on some other day close to the event, say, due to insider trading. Yet, this methodology has its 
drawbacks. Brown and Warner (1980) showed that CARs may deviate substantially from 
zero, even in the absence of any abnormal returns -a feature that may be expected when 
simulating a random walk. 
The use of daily data in event studies warrants a note. Brown and Warner (1985) showed 
through simulations that using daily (as opposed to monthly) data enhances the predictions of 
event studies, largely because this permits the specification of a more specific event window. 
Yet, the authors also discussed problems which are usually encountered when using daily data 
for conducting event studies. These issues may be summarised as follows: 
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Daily stock returns (including excess returns) are not non-nally distributed, yet they 
converge to the normal distribution as the sample size is enlarged, in line with the 
Central Limit Theorem. 
Data sets are usually subject to different trading intervals, due to non-synchronous 
trading. This feature may result in biased and inconsistent, 8 estimates, when using 
OLS technique. In particular, the estimated fi of highly liquid shares will be biased 
upwards, whiist that of less liquid securities would be understated, as discussed in 
Dimson (1979). Yet, Brown and Warner (1985) argued that this does not necessarily 
imply a flawed overall procedure, given that since OLS residuals sum to zero, the bias 
in P is compensated for by a bias in a for each security. In addition, when the sample 
includes securities of differing liquidity levels, and when event dates are not clustered, 
the bias of the estimated betas may be neutralised across securities. Alternative 
procedures for estimating, 8 were specified by Scholes and Williams (1977) and 
Dimson (1979), yet Brown and Warner (1985) showed through simulations that these 
methodologies perform similarly to OLS in terms of specification and power of tests 
for abnormal perfonnance. 
Estimating the variance of excess returns is often required for the purpose of testing 
for statistical significance. This task is hurdled by a number of issues, which include 
serial dependence of excess returns, cross-sectional dependence of excess returns 
(especially when the event for different securities is clustered within a short period), 
and non-stationarity in stock return variance, given that the latter tends to increase 
around specific events. When adjusting for serial correlation, superior test statistics 
may be computed, yet the "improvements are small, and only apply in special cases"56 
In the absence of adjustment for cross-sectional dependence (when this is present) the 
variance is understated and this implies that it would be easier to reject the null 
hypothesis of no excess returns. Yet, adjusting for cross-sectional correlation may 
make it more difficult to reject the null hypothesis of no excess returns. Brown and 
Warner (1985) suggested that such adjustments should only be undertaken when the 
cross-sectional dependence is high, for example when the securities are selected from 
one specific industry. When the return variance increases during the event period, the 
estimated variance (from non-event period data) understates the true variance, and the 
null hypothesis of no abnormal returns is rejected more frequently. One possible 
56 Brown and Wamer (1985). 
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approach to deal with this problem is to estimate the cross-sectional variance of excess 
returns using event-period data. Yet, if this approach is undertaken when there are no 
actual variance changes around the event period, this may lead to sub-optimal variance 
estimates given that the non-event period variance is ignored. 
0 The distribution of the test statistic through which the researcher can infer the 
significance of excess returns is affected by a variety of factors, including those which 
affect the mean and variance of the excess returns discussed above. 
Another decision faced by researchers when conducting an event study concerns the choice of 
the market index. According to MacKinlay (1997) event studies usually use a broad-based 
index as a proxy for the market portfolio such as the S&P 500. Brown and Warner (1980) 
also considered the use of a Value-Weighted Index. While there are no evident gains from 
this methodology, the authors specified that when using a Value-Weighted Index, the statistics 
for individual securities should be similarly weighted for the purpose of aggregation - 
otherwise it might turn out to be "too easy" or "too difficult" to reject the null hypothesis, 
depending on the estimated betas of the stocks in the portfolio. 
The choice of index for this study is the BSE 500, a broad based index quoted by BSE. The 
main reason for this choice of index is that the main indices quoted on NSE at the time - Nifty 
and Midcap comprise 50 stocks each and therefore they might not be sufficiently broad. In 
addition, given that major stocks are quoted both on NSE and BSE, and given that both 
exchanges are subject to the same systemic risk (related to the Indian economy) there are 
sufficient grounds to believe that this choice of index is reasonable. 
In some cases, the researcher may form expectations about whether the event being analysed 
is likely to positively or negatively affect the value of securities. For instance, one usually 
expects positive abnormal returns for companies on which a take-over bid is announced. 
Similarly, one may expect negative abnormal returns for companies which experience a 
downgrade in their credit rating. Yet, in case of some particular events, expectations cannot 
be easily fon-nulated. This is the case with stock market microstructure modifications such as 
changes in trading protocols. In such cases, even if theory posits a relationship between the 
event and returns, market participants might still take long to trade on the new information, 
given that such relationship may not be as clear cut to the former. This might be the case with 
the event studied here. 
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Tests for inferring abnon-nal returns include parametric and non-parametric ones. Brown and 
Warner (1980) found that parametric t-tests are acceptably specified. Whenusingsuch 
parametric tests to assess abnormal performance, the researcher is assuming that the test 
statistic is student-t distributed and security returns are normally distributed. Given that 
violations of these assumptions may lead to false inferences non-parametric tests are at times 
used. These include sign tests and Wilcoxon sign rank tests. The sign test is based on the 
notion that positive returns should constitute around half of total returns, in a sample where 
there are no abnormal returns. The Wilcoxon sign rank test considers the magnitude of 
returns, in addition to the sign. Brown and Warner (1980) noted that such tests may suffer 
from misspecification, and therefore offer no clear-cut advantages over parametric ones. 
Researchers should not place unwarranted reliance when using both types of tests. 
The power of the test is the ability to reject the null hypothesis of no abnormal returns, for a 
given level of Type I or Type 2 error and a given level of abnormal performance. Large 
sample sizes, short event windows and abnormal returns of high magnitude, enhance the 
power of the tests (MacKinlay; 1997). 
6.7.2 Other Limitations of Event Study Methodology 
Various authors have investigated whether the inherent assumptions of event study 
methodology constitute a hindrance to the validity of the empirical results. For instance, when 
testing for the presence of abnormal returns, the researcher has to assume a particular 
sampling distribution under the null hypothesis (usually a Student-t distribution). Type I and 
Type 2 errors may be made, especially if the assumed distribution differs from the actual one. 
In particular, the methodology assumes that asset returns are normally and independently and 
identically distributed across time. This may not always be the case since return distributions 
tend to deviate from normality. Methods of dealing with such factors include robust 
estimation as suggested by Mills, Coutts, and Roberts (1996). Yet according. to Cable and 
Holland (2000) this does not necessarily lead to significant benefits, partly because when the 
abnormal returns are averaged across a large number of stocks, the deviations from normality 
will tend to become less pronounced. According to MacKinlay (1997), the distribution-related 
assumptions do not usually present any major problems. 
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Brown and Warner (1980) noted that the return generating model is subject to measurement 
error. This limitation is relevant even when a simple market model is chosen, given that 
according to Roll (1977) the market portfolio cannot be directly observed. Thisproblem 
becomes more complex when coupled with small sample size. 
Event studies are based on the notion that stock prices respond immediately to news. Now, 
various studies as cited by Fama (1998) suggest that stock returns may at times overreact or 
underreact following an event, and a correction is observed over the longer term. Such 
overreactions may be attributed to psychological factors such as traders overemphasising 
recent information, and infon-ned investors who overestimate the precision of their private 
information. Yet, Fama (1998) argues that whilst the latter factors may explain individual 
anomalies or exceptions, they are largely incapable of explaining the "big picture" i. e. the way 
in which markets usually react to information. Furthermore, the author argues that these 
"anomalies" tend to disappear when abnormal returns are measured through alternative return 
generating models. 
The empirical results obtained in event studies may be vulnerable to excessive influence by 
outliers; again a larger sample should reduce such eventualities. 
Standard OLS regression, assumes that error terms are homoskedastic, normally distributed 
and that they are not serially correlate d. In the absence of this, the estimated coefficients do 
not have BLUE (Best Linear Unbiased Estimator) properties. Thus, when estimating the 
market model, one should check whether the error terms violate these assumptions. Coutts, 
Mills and Roberts (1994) documented that such violations occurred persistently when working 
with different data sets, and they attributed this to an inherent misspecification in the market 
model. 
The results obtained in event studies may be particular to the sampled stocks, and in such 
cases they fail to reflect the behaviour of the whole population. This is particularly relevant in 
those cases where the sample is not randomly selected. Yet, when selecting a random sample, 
differing results can still be obtained across different samples as shown by Coutts, Mills and 
Roberts(1997). In the latter study, whilst different samples usually yielded similar results 
such as negative CARs after a given time from the event, some samples yielded CARs in a 
different direction. 
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When using the estimated market model coefficients to calculate the expected returns during 
the event window, the researcher is assuming that these parameters are stable over the 
estimation period and the event window. Coutts, Mills and Roberts (1994) quoted various 
research papers which demonstrated that the model parameters tend to be unstable. 57 
Similarly, Saiful Bahri and Leger (2001) suggested that stock sensitivity to specific risk 
sources may vary over time. Unstable parameters may imply a flawed estimation of abnormal 
returns. If the parameters vary during the period being analysed, then the error terms would 
be heteroskedastic, and therefore testing for heteroskedasticity in the error ten-ns may be one 
way of inquiring whether the parameters were stable over the period. 
Coutts, Mills and Roberts (1997) noted that when parameters are unstable, the estimation of 
abnormal returns is partly dependent on the number of days included in the estimation period 
(given that different estimation periods yield different parameters). Despite this, the overall 
pattern of cumulative abnormal returns is largely unaffected by these factors, since the main 
effect is simply to drift the pattern downwards or upwards. Given these limitations, the results 
obtained from event study analysis should be interpreted with care. Coutts, Mills and Roberts 
(1997) suggested that any inferences gained from event studies should be based on the pattern 
of CARs, given that these tend to be consistent across different estimation periods and 
sampled firms. 
0.7.3 Empirical Results 
In conducting the event study, the standard procedure of an OLS market model was used. The 
market model specified in Equation 6.6 was estimated using data from T-62 to T-3. Table 
6.12 shows summary statistics based on the estimation of the market models for the 182 
stocks. As may be expected the mean t-ratio for a indicates that most of the estimated 
coefficients are insignificant, whilst the mean t-ratio for, 8 indicates a highly significant 
coefficient across stocks. 
57 Relevant studies include Saunder (1980) and Hays and Upton (1986). 
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Table 6.12: Market Models Estimated through Daily Data - Summary Statistics 
a t-ratio: cr 13 t-ra t1o: GW Adjusted Fe 
Mean 0.0008 (0.18) 1.2030 (4.66) 0.27 0.26 
Median 0.0009 (0.20) 1.2231 (4.71) 0.28 0.26 
Std. Deviation 0.0041 (0.89) 0.4433 (1.70) 0.13 0.13 
Minimum -0.0118 (-2.44) 0.1952 (0.82) 0.012 -0.005 
Maximum 0.0168 (3.37) 2.6905 (9.09) 0.59 0.58 
The summary statistics were compiled on the basis of the 182 market model estimations 
relating to the individual stocks. Columns 2 to 5 show summary statistics for estimated 
alphas and betas, and respective t-ratios. [For instance, the a coefficient across the 
individual market models had a mean of 0.008; on average the t-ratios relating to a were 
0.18; etc. ] Columns 6 and 7 show the R-squared and Adjusted R-squared summary 
statistics of the estimated market models. 
Table 6.13: Diagnostic Checks on Estimated Market Models 
Mean Min. - Max. 95% Cv # % 
F-statistic -F (1,58) 24.6409 0.6785 82.5571 4.0000 169 93% 
Order I Serial Correlation 2.2013 0.0004 23.3566 3.8410 36 20% 
Test - 
k2(l ) 
Order I Serial Correlation 2.3897 0.0004 36.3318 4.0000 36 20% 
Test -F (1,57) 1 
Functional Form Test - Xý'(`I) 1.3581 0.0000 16.2858 3.8410 21 12% 
Functional Form Test -F 1.4317 0.0000 21.2354 4.0000 21 12% 
(1,57) 
Normality Test - X2(2) 76.9884 0.0118 P645.50 5.9910 93 51% 
Heteroscedasticity Test - 1.2330 0.0004 36.3735 3.8410 13 7% 
X 2(1) 1 
Heteroscedasticity Test -F 1.6615 0.0004 89.2925 4.0000 13 7% 
(1,58) 
Predictive Failure (Chow's 20.3890 1.8388 295.5171 28.8690 24 13% 
Second) Test - X2(18) 
Predictive Failure (Chow's 1.0631 0.1022 10.6618 1.8100 23 13% 
Second) Test -F (18,58 
Chow's First Test - X'(2) 1.9924 1 0.0080 13.5089 1 5.9910 13 7% 
Chow's First Test -F (2,74) 0.9962 1 0.0040 6.7545 1 3.1200 13 7% 
The first column lists the diagnostic test undertaken, whilst the second, third and fourth 
columns show the mean, minimum and maximum values of the test statistic across the 
182 estimated regressions. The fifth column shows the 95% critic al value. T he number 
and percentage of stocks where the null hypothesis was rejected at the 95% level of 
confidence are shown in columns 6 and 7. 
The following references relate to the above tests: 
Serial Correlation: Breusch and Pagan (1980), Kiviet (1986). 
Functional Form Tests: Ramsey (1969) 
Normality Test: Jarque and Bera (1980) 
Chow's Tests: Chow (1960) 
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Given that the market model is an integral part of calculating abnormal returns, diagnostic 
checks on the estimated regression were done. A summary of these tests is shown in Table 
6.13. Tests relating to the overall suitability of the estimated regressions, serial correlation, 
normality and heteroskedasticity of error terms were considered. Both LM and F versions of 
the tests were conducted, and in all cases the respective versions yielded the same overall 
inferences. The F-ratio, shows that for the large majority of the estimated market models, the 
regressions have a significant overall fit. This is also confirmed by the Functional Forrn Test. 
The Predictive Failure Test and the Chow (1960) Test show that parameters are stable over the 
sampled period. This is important for the purpose of this study, given that a frequent criticism 
of event studies is that inferences may be flawed because of time-changing betas. These tests 
indicate that, for most stocks, betas were stable over the period which in this case includes the 
event window, given that 18 out-of sample observations were used for the purpose of these 
tests. The serial correlation and heteroscedasticity tests do not reject the null hypothesis for 
the majority of the stocks. The only test where the diagnostics seem problematic is the 
normality test. 
In the test for normality, the null hypothesis of a normal error term distribution is rejected in 
case of 51% of the stocks. The mean test statistic was 76.99 whilst the median test statistic 
across stocks was 6.5. The discrepancy between the mean and the median indicates a few 
abnormally high statistics. In fact, the highest six statistics were as follows: 6645,2751,712, 
451,418 and 196. Thus, the mean, minimum and maximum statistics on their own do not 
provide a clear picture of the test statistic results across stocks, given that the statistics tend to 
decline considerably after the highest five. Still, the issue of normality merits further 
consideration. When inspecting the error terms of those stocks with a high statistic, it was 
noted that the fitted model mimicked the actual market movements reasonably well for most 
of the time, except in some outlier points. Low log return outliers may be explained by ex- 
dividend price patterns, given that our definition of returns abstracts from dividend payments. 
Yet, most of the outliers were high points, and thus the possibility of company announcements 
is more relevant. These trends resulted in histograms where most of the error terms were close 
to zero (and therefore almost a uniform distribution) with minimum observations in the tails. 
The histogram being reproduced in Figure 6.2 shows -such a pattern, and it relates to the stock 
with the highest normality test statistic (CASTROL). These considerations are important, 
given that whilst one of the standard assumptions underlying the OLS regression model is 
being violated, at least they instil confidence that the estimated coefficients of the market 
models are close to their "true values". Therefore, the main objective in dealing with this 
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abnon-nality should be the enhancement of the power of the significance tests of the abnormal 
returns, rather than obtaining better estimates of the regression coefficients. 
Figure 6.2: Error term histogram for CASTROL with a superimposed normal distribution. 
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In order to assess the statistical significance of the abnormal returns, one has to compare the 
error terms in the market model regression throughout the estimation period, to the error terms 
obtained when using the estimated market model to predict the normal returns during the 
event window in the absence of the event. The latter errors are assumed to be abnormal 
returns. In the absence of normally-distributed errors, it is unadvisable to rely on t-ratios or 
asymptotic test statistics. In addition, according to MacKinnon (2002), for asymptotic tests to 
be strictly valid, an infinite sample is required. According to this author, bootstrap tests 
usually perform better than aysmptotic tests for assessing statistical significance and 
establishing confidence intervals. The advantage of bootstr apping in the present context is 
that it relies only on the assumption of random sampling from the data at hand, and does not 
require any distributional assumptions relating to normality or a constant variance. 
Given that for the purpose of assessing significance we are interested in the magnitude rather 
than the direction of the abnormal returns, we may compare the squares of the error terms, in 
the estimation period to those of the event window for each stock. Yet, when comparing the 
simple squared residuals for both periods, the summation for the estimation period is likely to 
be larger, given that we are summing up 60 error terms (emanating from 60 observations) as 
compared to 18 error terms or abnormal returns (emanating from 18 observations) in the event 
window. Therefore, prior to taking the square of the error tenns in the estimation period, each 
error has to be divided by 60 and multiplied by 18; or equivalently each error of the event 
window has to be divided by 18 and multiplied by 60. The latter option was chosen for this 
study; hence: 
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T-3 
S. S. R. Ei,,,, =Z 
t=T-62 
and 
T+15 [60 
- S. S. R. Ei,,,,,,, t =i 
'71,1]2 
I=T-2 18 
where S. S. R. E,,,, and S. S. R. El.,,.,,, are the Sum of Squared Resealed Errors for stock i, in the 
estimation period and in the event window respectively. In inferring whether there are 
differences in the two groups of S. S. R. E. s across stocks, a bootstrap procedure was used. 
Unbiased market model coefficients as noted through the diagnostic checks shown in Table 
6.13, together with the inherent advantages of the bootstrap procedure should enable the 
correct inference of statistical significance. 
The mean S. S. R. E.., t was 0.0787whilst the mean S. S. R. E,,,, was 0.2429; a mean difference of 
0.16419. In inferring whether the latter difference is significant or otherwise, we are asking 
whether this difference could have occurred by pure coincidence. In order to check the 
probability that the 0.16419 mean difference arose by coincidence, the S. S. R. E. s for all stocks 
in the estimation period and in the event period, were shuffled and combined in a single 
sample of 364 S. S. R. E. s. Observations were then randomly drawn without replacement from 
this population, creating two sub-samples, each having 182 observations. The difference 
between means of these two sub-samples was recorded, and the population was re-shuffied. 
This procedure was repeated 5,000 times . 
58 A summary of the mean differences obtained for 
each procedure is shown in Figure 6.3. No mean differences equal to or higher than 0.16419 
ivere noted, and this implies that the p-value related to the rejection of the null hypothesis that 
the mean difference was due to coincidence, is less than 0.0002. Therefore we may reject the 
null hypothesis of equal means (at least) at the 99.98% confidence level. 
Having established that the abnormal returns during the event window are significant, we now 
look at the CARs pattern. For this purpose, the calendar day abnormal returns over the event 
window were converted to trading day returns, as shown in Equation 6.8. A plot of CARs 
59 
over the event window is shown in Figure 6.4. 
5' The software routine used for this process is shown in Appendix 6.4. 
59 One potential limitation of this approach is that the concentration of annual reports of Indian companies in the 
pre-event window may bias the CARs pattern. Given that data on companies' earnings announcements were not 
available, those sampled securities which went cx-dividend during the pre-event period or during the event 
window, were searched for as an approximation. The original CARs pattern was re-estimated, omitting those 
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Figure 6.3: Mean Differences for S. S. M. E. Random Sub-Samples in the Bootstrap 
Proced ure. 
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This his togram shows a summary of the mean differences obtained when the estimation 
period and event window S. S. M. E. s were randomly re-sampled for 5000 successive 
times. Each bin covers all values within 0.005 of its centre. 
As a "robustness check" on the overall shape of the CARs shown in Figure 6.4, each stock 
was randomly assigned to one of five sub-samples, as detailed in Appendix 6.5. Three of the 
latter sub-samples consisted of 36 stocks, whilst the other two, included 37 stocks. For each 
sub-sample, the abnormal returns were averaged across stocks, and then summed across 
trading days. The plots of these five sub-samples shown in Figure 6.5 are acceptably similar: 
CARs start from negative or close to zero, and drift slightly upwards till T+3. The CARs then 
start to decrease till around T+9 and then drift upwards again. This provides an indication that 
the overall behaviour of CARs is following a similar pattern across stocks. 
0 
securities which went ex-dividend during the period of interest. The CARs pattern for the remaining 116 
securities confirmed the original one for the whole sample. 
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Figure 6.5: Cumulative Abnormal Returns for five Sub-Samples 
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Overall this section shows that during the event window, stocks experienced significant 
abnormal returns, in a manner which seems consistent across stocks. Yet, this does not imply 
that the abnormal returns are significant on theoretical grounds. Whilst the initial and later 
increasing CARs might correspond to the broad improvement in VEL, the range of negative 
CARs is harder to reconcile with the VEL changes. Therefore, possible linkages between 
CARs and VEL changes are considered in the subsequent section. 
iý,, 
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6.8 Explaining the Abnormal Returns 
This section integrates the former empirical results, by inferring whether the relative abnormal 
returns reflect the changes in VEL for the cross-section of stocks. This exercise also provides 
an opportunity to "cross check" whether the abnormal returns were the result of the event 
under review, or due to other unrelated factors. In this way, this section inquires whether the 
traders' reaction to the event may be considered as justified. 
One way in which the above objectives may be achieved is through estimating cross-sectional 
regressions, where CARs are regressed as a function of VE!, changes. This section also 
investigates whether there were any differing patterns in the changes in VEL amongst stocks 
with different betas and liquidity. The rationale for including liquidity in the cross-sectional 
regressions explaining CARs rests on the arguments concerning the relationship between 
stock liquidity and the benefits of auctions (Section 6.2). As for the betas of the stocks, one 
may expect high beta stocks to react to a higher degree to general market trends, and therefore 
it might be plausible to expect amplified CARs for such stocks. 
Section 6.8.1 investigates whether the changes in VEL were related to the betas and the 
liquidity of stocks. The subsequent section inquires whether the observed CARs were 
justified given the VEL changes. The section also investigates whether the CAR patterns 
differed amongst stocks having different betas and initial liquidity. 
For the purpose of this investigation, it is necessary to distinguish between stocks by means of 
dummy variables. The first set of dummy variables denoted by, 8D relates to the betas of the 
stocks. The dummy variable PDI has a value of I for stocks with, 8 5 0.8, and zero otherwise. 
Thus it indicates stocks with a relatively low, 8. The dummy variable flD2 has a value of 1 for 
stocks with 1,25, and zero otherwise. Thus it indicates stocks with a relatively high 
These values of beta were chosen in a way to obtain an approximately equal number of stocks 
in the three categories of high, low and average betas. 
The second set of dummy variables serves as an indicator of liquidity and is denoted by LD. 
The mean volume during the pre-event period, i. e. from T-63 to T-1, was used to specify these 
dummy variables. The dummy variable LDI has a value of I for stocks with daily mean 
volume :5 40,000 shares, and zero otherwise. It indicates that the stock is relatively less 
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liquid . 
60 The dummy variable LD2 has a value of I for stocks with a daily mean volume ý: 
140,000 shares, and zero othenvise. LD2 indicates a highly liquid stock. Again, these volume 
values were chosen in such a way to divide the whole samp)e into three, approximately equal 
categories. 61 
6.8.1 The Effect of Betas and Liquidity on VEL Changes 
Eight linear OLS regressions were run, in order to test for relationships between VEL changes 
vis-6-vis the betas and initial liquidity of the stocks. Given that the tests of volatility (Section 
6.4) gave different results, both SIDP and ORR were regressed on, 8D and LD of the stocks. 
As for efficiency and liquidity, since the measures showed the same qualitative effect of the 
auction suspension, only one measure was used as regressand: the percentage change in RRD 
and the percentage change in the Volume per Unit of Return Ratio. 62 
Table 6.14: Regression Results for Changes in Volatility, Efficiency and Liquidity 
Dependent Beta Regressions Liquidity Regressions 
Variable Intercept 61) 1 AD2 R(barf Intercept LDI LD2 R(barf 
%AI ntra-Day -0.1100 0.0165 -0.0067 0.0028 -0.1163 0.0421 -0.0220 0.0260 
Scaled Difference (5.29) (0.48) (0.24) R. 008) (5.73) (1.44) (0.75) (0.01511 
A Rev (n) -0.0162 -0.0721 -0.0490 0.0129 -0.0427 0.0132 -0.0452 0.0102 
(0.52) (1.40) (1.19) (0.0019) (1.39) (0.30) (1.02) {-0.001) 
%ARRD -0.1348 0.0929 0.0405 0.0013 -0.1136 0.1559 -0.1067 0.0138 
(1.16) (0.49) (0.27) R. 010) (1.00) (0.95) (0.65) {0.0028) 
%A Volume 1 0.3737 -0.0715 0.2406 0.0158 0.4854 0.2496 -0.2950 0.0415 
Return Ratio (2.73) (0,32) (1.33) fO. 0048) (3.65) (1.30) (1.54) (0.03081 
Column I specifies the explanatory variable, which was first regressed as a function of an 
intercept and, 8 dummies and then as a function of an intercept and liquidity dummies. T-ratios 
are shown in brackets underneath the coefficient. The R-squared relating to each regressi on is 
shown in columns 5 and 9 respectively, while the Adjusted R-squarqd is shown in braces 
underneath. Each regression was estimated through 182 observations, comprising the ind ividual 
stocks. 
Regression results are summarised in Table 6.14. None of the dummy variables are 
significant at the 95% level of confidence, and the regressions have low explanatory power. 
Therefore, the observed VEL changes seem unrelated to the betas or the initial liquidity levels 
"' Given that the chosen sample consists of the most liquid stocks traded on NSE, the term "less liquid" does not 
necessarily imply "illiquid". 
" These sub-samples map into Samples A, B and C, referred to in Table 6.3. 
62 The measures were selected on the basis of a higher significance level in the VEL comparisons. 
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of stocks. 63 Yet, this test indicates that if we include the PD and LD together with VEL 
changes in a cross section regression to explain CARs (as done below), the regression should 
not be multicollinear since VEL changes seem unrelated to the dummies. 
6.8.2 Explanatory Factors of Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
The aim of this section is to explain (trading time) CARs as a function of changes in VEL. 
Considering the CARs pattern over the event window shown in Figure 6.4, we note that there 
is an increasing segment and a downward sloping portion. Whilst the magnitude of the 
abnormal returns is statistically significant, as established in Section 6.7.3, we note that the 
CARs pattern tends to reverse over time. 64 The final value of CARs across stocks during the 
event window is very close to zero (but slightly negative at around -0.000064). This presents 
a problem, in the sense that if we were to regress the CARs noted on the final day of the event 
window on changes in VEL, the specification may be flawed since it does not make sense to 
regress the overall (slightly) negative reactions of traders as a function of changes, which 
generally point at an improvement in the overall market structure. 
Given this, six OLS regressions were run: 
a) CARs from T+9 till T+ 15 (upward sloping) were regressed on % changes in VEL factors 
which showed an improvement. This regression was then repeated twice but'8D and LD were 
respectively included in the estimations. 
b) A second set of regressions investigates whether the initial negative reaction (T=O till T+8) 
may be explained by the higher volatility as indicated by the overnight return reversal 
coefficient a. PD and LD were subsequently included in separate regressions. 
The results are shown in Table 6.15. As regards the upward sloping CARs regression shown 
in Panel A, the %A in Intra-Day Scaled Difference is significant but in the unexpected 
direction, the %A in RRD is insignificant in the expected direction, whilst the %A in Volume 
Return Ratio is significant in the expected direction. When introducing, 8D and LD in the 
regression, these dummy variables are insignificant, even if they add to the explanatory power 
63 The latter result is thus inconsistent with the findings of Kairys, Kruza, and Kumpins (2000a) cited above, who 
found that increased liquidity largely accrued to the most liquid stocks. 
64 Despite that CARs are statistically significant this does not necessarily imply any overall abnormal change 
during the event period. Brown and Warner (1980) showed that statistically significant CARs may occasionally 
be obtained in the absence of any event. 
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of the first regression. Nonetheless, the fi dummy variables are both in the same direction, 
whereas if the relationship between hetas and CARs is linear, one would expect that the 
dummy variable for low fl stocks would have a coefficient which is of the opposite sign of that 
of high, 8 stocks. 
The regressions explaining the downward sloping CARs are shown in Table 6.15 Panel B. 
The intercept is highly significant. The negative CARs may be explained by the increase in 
Overnight Return Reversals, which is marginally significant at the 90% level of confidence. 
Table 6.15: Regressions with CARs as Dependent Variables 
Panel A: Up ard Slopi g CARs 
Dependent Inter. ASD I ARRD AVIR PD1 PD2 LD1 LD2 F12 
CARsT+9 0.048 "* 0.225 *" -0.001 0.024 - 0.174 
fill T+15 (4.15) (3.80) (0.09) (2.88) (0.160) 
CARsT+9 0.057 0.230 
- 
-0.001 0.023 "* -0,031 -0.003 0.184 
fill T+15_ (0.06) (2.72) 4) (0.17) 0.161 
CARsT+9 0.046 0.216 -0.002 0.021 "* 0.025 -0.018 0. `194 
fill T+15 (2.83) 1 (3.65) (0.16) (3.54) (1.25) (0.89) (0.171) 
_ 
The dependent variable for each regression is shown in the first column, whilst the subsequent 
columns show the coefficients of the independent variables. Regressors are as follows: Intercept 
(Inter. ), %A in Intra Day Scaled Difference (ASD), %A in RRD (ARRD), %A in Volume/Return 
Ratio (AVIR), Beta Dummy Variables (AD I and W2), and Liquidity Dummy Variables (LD1 and 
LD2). T-ratios are shown underneath the respective coefficients in brackets. Statistical significance 
at the 99%, 95% and 90% levels of confidence is denoted by ***, ** and * respectively. The last 
column shows the R-Squared of the regression, whilst the Adjusted R-Squared is included in braces 
underneath. Each regression was estimated through 182 observations, comprising the individual 
stocks. 
Panel 13: Downward SI Ing CARs 
Dependent Inter. AOR PD1 PD2 LD1 LD2 R2 
CARs T+O -0.039' 0.070 * 0.018 
fill T+8 
_ - 
(4.05) (1.83) (0.013) 
CARs T+O -0.036" 0.070 * 0.000 -0.005 0.019 
fill T+8 (2.25) 0.80) 0) (0.25) {0.002) 
CARs T+O -0.068"* 0.063 0.0741' 0.015 0.081 
Ell T+8 
. 
(4.40) 
ý 
(1.69) 
- 
(3.33) (0.67) 
, 
(0.066) 
. _ 
The dependent variable for each regression is shown in the first column, whilst the subsequent 
columns show the coefficients of the independent variables. Regressors are as follows: Intercept 
(Inter. ), A in Overnight Return Reversals (AOR), Beta Dummy Variables (PD1 and PD2), and 
Liquidity Dummy Variables (LD1 and LD2). T-ratios are shown underneath the coefficients in 
brackets. Statistical significance at the 99%, 95% and 90% levels of confidence is denoted by 
and * respectively. The last column includes the R-Squared of the regression, whilst the Adjusted 
R-Squared is shown in braces underneath. Each regression was estimated through 182 
observations, comprising the individual stocks. 
II 
Another significant coefficient in the "downward sloping portion" regression set is LDI, the 
dummy variable for the relatively less liquid stocks, where the sign indicates that less liquid 
stocks experienced higher returns. However, as the dummy for the most liquid stocks is also 
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positive but insignificant, one cannot conclude that there is a well-defined relationship 
between liquidity and the CARs. To check these results, the whole sample of stocks was split 
into high, medium and less liquid stocks, and the mean CARs were recalculated for each 
sample as shown in Figure 6.6. The figure visually confirms the overall difference between 
the CARs of the less liquid stocks (Sample A) and those of medium and high liquidity stocks 
(Samples B and C). The difference between the CARs of average and highly liquid stocks is 
not as striking. The reason for this may be due to the original sampling process, where the 
most liquid stocks traded on NSE were selected. Such a sampling process implies that the 
Sample A stocks which we are labelling as "less liquid", are in fact "moderately liquid" as 
compared to the unsampled stocks, whilst Samples B and C might both be "highly liquid". 
Figure 6.6: Different CAR patterns for stocks with differing liquidity 
levels. 
0.08 - 
0.06 
0.04 -p, 
0.02 ------ SAMPLE A 
0 T_ _T SAMPLE B 
A\ 
-0.01 -*-SAMPLE 
C 
-0.04 
-0.06 - _j 
-0.08 
Sample A includes those 59 sampled stocks featuring lowest liquidity levels in terms of pre- 
event daily mean volume. Sample C includes the 59 stocks showing the highest pre-event 
daily mean volume, whilst the remaining 64 stocks were allocated to Sample B as "average 
liquidity stocks". 
The fact that less liquid stocks experienced higher CARs after suspension, contradicts the 
argument that less liquid stocks tend to benefit more from call auctions as found in the studies 
such as Comerton-Forde (1999) and Kairys, Kruza, and Kumpins (2000 a). One possible 
explanation for this behaviour on part of NSE traders is that the call auction for less liquid 
stocks was not functioning reasonably well on the grounds that these stocks were not actively 
traded during the auctions (Table 6.3). These findings provide some support to the arguments 
of Madhavan and Panchapagesan (2000) and Ellul et. al. (2004) that call auction may not be 
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of benefit to less liquid stocks. The latter authors argued that the value of call auctions may be 
limited by "thick market externalities", in the sense that traders only enter the auction if they 
believe a sufficient number of other traders will be present so as to establish informationally- 
efficient prices, The investigation of Comerton-Forde and Rydge (2006 a) offers another 
notion as to why the auction may have been less suited for less liquid stocks, in the sense that 
auctions may be used to manipulate prices and manipulation is less costly in illiquid stocks. 
6.9 Further Discussion 
Table 6.16 summarizes the main findings on VEL changes following the auction suspension. 
Volatility, efficiency and liquidity broadly improved, although one measure of volatility 
deteriorated. These improvements are not accompanied by unambiguously positive CARs 
after the suspension, as shown in Figure 6.4. After an initial increase in the 2 days preceding 
suspension, the CARs are negative for most companies for most of the post-event window: 
first decreasing then increasing. Five possible explanations for this apparent inconsistency 
and the limitations of each explanation are considered below. 
Table 6.16: Summary of Changes in VEL Factors Following Call Auction Suspension 
Test 1 Scaled Intra-Day Price Difference 
Volatility (Significant (99%) in favour of suspension). 
Test 2 Overnight Return Reversal 
(Significant (99%) in favour of auctions) 
Test 1 Relative Return Dispersion 
(Significant (99%) in favour of suspension) 
Efficiency Test 2 Return Serial Correlation 
(insignificant in favour of suspension) 
Test 3 Opening Sedal Correlation as proxy for Opening Price Discovery 
(Significant (99%) in favour of suspension) 
Test 1 Number of Shares Transacted 
(Significant (90%) In favour of suspension) 
Liquidity Test 2 Volume per Unit of Return 
(Significant (99%) in favour of suspension) 
Test 3 Time Trend Model 
(Auction Dummy is significant (99%) in favour of suspension) 
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Explanation 1 
The contradictory evidence on volatility is interesting, given that the results indicate that intra- 
day volatility decreased whilst overnight volatility increased. One possible explanation for 
this might be that the opening auctions were not successful in reducing intra-day volatility, 
whilst the closing auctions were contributing towards reducing overnight volatility. The latter 
argument is in line with the empirical study of Pagano and Schwartz (2003) who found that 
the closing call auction at the (former) Paris Bourse resulted in improvements in the price 
discovery process. 
The statistics presented in Table 6.3 show that the closing call auction is more active than the 
opening call auction and therefore it might be the case that since around half of the sampled 
securities do not trade in the morning auction, then the potential benefits from such an auction 
may not materialize for a large portion of the shares. In addition, when looking at the average 
number of transactions for the shares in Sample A during the opening auction, one may also 
question whether such a volume is "robust" enough to ensure that the established price is 
efficient. These ideas cast doubts over how much effective the opening call auction was in 
reducing intra-day volatility and increasing pricing efficiency. Yet, it is relevant to point out 
that this evidence does not disclose a limitation in call auction procedures themselves. It 
rather suggests that call auctions have to be sufficiently active in order to reap any expected 
benefits, in line with the observation of Schwartz (2000) that call auctions should attract a 
"critical mass order flow" since otherwise they may fail. 
Existing literature suggests further reasons why the closing auction may have been more 
effective than the opening one. For instance, Hillion and Suominen (2004) found that closing 
call auctions may reduce the potential for market participants to manipulate closing prices, 
whereas the theoretical model of Caillaud and Mezzetti (2004) suggests that some participants 
might use (or refrain from using) the initial auction to conceal information from other traders. 
Explanation 2: 
The results could be related directly to the liquidity differences of the shares. As Figure 6.6 
shows, CARs realized from T=O till T+8, for the relatively iiquid stocks (Samples B and Q 
were negative. Less liquid stocks experienced no material CARs. The rationale behind this 
might be that the less liquid stocks traded much less actively in the call auctions and therefore 
had little to lose from suspension. However, since the liquid stocks traded more actively 
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during the auctions, the traders reacted negatively, possibly given the forgone expected 
benefits relating to auctions. This is consistent with the view that higher liquidity stocks did 
benefit from the call auctions but low liquidity stocks did not. 
After T+8, all of the sampled stocks experienced a positive CAR pattern. One possibility is 
that this may have been related to the overall improvement in VEL factors although Table 
6.15 Panel A shows that these change s have little explanatory power on the CARs pattern. It 
is plausible that the reaction to VEL changes occurred in the late stages of the event window, 
given that the impacts of market microstructure changes might require more time to evaluate. 
Explanation 3: 
Given the general improvement in VEL following the auction suspension, one might expect 
positive CARs over the event window. Yet, this does not seem to be the case with the CARs 
pattern at hand. Section 6.8.2 indicates that the CARs pattern observed during the event 
window cannot be convincingly explained by changes in VEL factors. One explanation which 
may be considered is that the downward sloping part of the CARs in the initial days was an 
overreaction and the abnormal returns subsequently reversed as a correction, maybe in view of 
the general VEL improvements. If this is the case, Figure 6.6 shows that the overreaction was 
confined to the more liquid stocks and this is plausible given that the latter stocks traded more 
actively in the auction. Despite this, if the upward sloping part of the CARs was indeed a 
correction, such correction should not have occurred in case of less liquid stocks, given that 
there was no overreaction in these stocks in the first place. Therefore the possibility of an 
overreaction followed by a correction is not completely supported by the CARs pattern. 
Explanation 4: 
One possible occurrence is that the improvements in VEL were priced in prior to T=O, even 
though the suspension was announced on the day of implementation. In fact the event 
window shows positive CARs in days T-2 and T-1. This may imply insider trading, or that 
the suspension was expected by the market. The latter is possible because NSE went through 
a period whereby it was endeavouring to introduce call auctions, but had to suspend them due 
to software-related problems . 
65 However, changes which affect the structure of trading can be 
difficult to price in fully before the event because these may lead to unexpected changes in 
65 Author's correspondence with Susan Thomas, Assistant Professor at Indira Gandhi Institute of Development 
Research, Bombay, India. 
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volume and composition of trading. In addition, if the auctions were suspended due to 
soffivare glitches on one particular day, the suspension would have been difficult to predict. 
Explanation 5: 
It is also possible that the call auctions had utility for specific types of investors, especially 
domestic or foreign institutions which may be key providers of market liquidity at certain 
times. Thus, the different inferences obtained from the VEL comparisons and the event study 
might be due to differing reactions of particular trader categories. Available data did not 
permit a direct test of this hypothesis, but it seems unlikely that call auctions could have 
benefits for domestic institutions which would not be picked up in the above general tests. 
During the period covered by this analysis, foreign institutional investors (FlIs) were subject 
to fin-n-specific ceilings on the percentage share capital they were permitted to hold in 
individual Indian companies. Once this ceiling was approached, I'lls were required to dispose 
of part of their holdings and a liquid market would b6 essential for this to function smoothly. 
The call auctions may have facilitated this process - in fact soon after the auctions were 
suspended, NSE introduced (in December 1999) a new trading segment specifically to enable 
FIls to dispose. of security holdings in excess of the permitted maxima. 
None of these explanations is entirely satisfactory, but together, they do suggest that the call 
auctions were not as effective as might have been expected, particularly at the opening, and 
for less liquid stocks. 
6.10 Conclusion 
This empirical study investigated the effect of the suspension of call auctions on VEL and 
analysed the stock price reactions to the event. It was noted that the abnormal returns during 
the event period were significant in terms of their magnitude, and their pattern was robust 
across different sub-samples of the stocks. Overall, the empirical results suggest an 
improvement in VEL and no clear-cut market reaction in terms of CARs. In addition, no 
evidence was found to support the notion that call auctions are particularly effective for 
206 
6. THE IMPACT OF THE SUSPENSION OF OPENING AND CLOSING CALL AUCTIONS ON NSE 
trading less liquid stocks, given that when regressing VEL changes over the liquidity dummy 
variables the latter were insignificant. 66 
To the author's knowledge, this is the first study to compare call auctions and continuous 
trading following a suspension, where no other changes in market protocols took place. The 
investigation of such an event in the context of an emerging market is an additional 
noteworthy factor given that low liquidity is more of a potential problem in such markets as 
compared to those in the major industrial countries. The main conclusions from the study are 
summarised undemeath. 
First, the findings confirm the prevailing wisdom that market microstructure changes do have 
measurable and significant effects on stock prices and on market performance measures such 
as volatility, efficiency and liquidity. The results suggest that call auctions do not necessarily 
enhance VEL factors as discussed inter alia by Madhavan (1992). Still, this does not allow us 
to dismiss the theoretical conclusions of authors such as Economides and Schwartz (1995) 
predicting more efficient information aggregation in an auction setup, since the adverse 
impacts of the auctions on VEL found in this study may have been the result of a badly 
structured auction or a set-up which was inadequate for the underlying NSE characteristics. 
As noted by Schwartz (2000), a badly structured call auction is likely to fail. 
Second, no clear-cut market reaction to the suspension was found. The CARs are significant 
but initially they decrease and subsequently increase. In particular, the reaction to the auction 
suspension in case of the most liquid stocks was negative (though this reaction was 
subsequently reversed). This two-phase reaction across stocks is not wholly unexpected given 
that market microstructure changes may take longer to evaluate. The cross-sectional 
relationships between the CARs and the underlying VEL factors are also imprecise. Despite 
this, stocks which experienced the most improvements in efficiency and liquidity also 
experienced higher CARs, although the efficiency effect was not significant (Table 6.15). The 
improvement in intra-day volatility had a positive impact on the cross-section of CARs, while 
the deterioration in inter-day volatility had the expected negative effect. 
Third, one may conjecture that a source of these conflicting findings may lie in the liquidity of 
the sampled securities. Results point at a difference in the response to the suspension as 
" One possible explanation for this result is that given that the sample consists of the most liquid stocks, it does 
not include enough sampling variation in terms of liquidity for the detection of any relationship between liquidity 
and changes in VEL. 
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between less liquid stocks and medium and highly liquid stocks. Less liquid stocks traded less 
in the auctions than other securities, especially at the opening, and they experienced the most 
gains following the suspension. The results suggest that the less liquid stocks did not benefit 
from the auction system, and that the closing auction may have been more effective than the 
opening one. This could be because of a liquidity threshold which stocks have to pass to reap 
the information benefits of an auction, as outlined by Schwartz (2000) and Ellul, Shin and 
Tonks (2004). Indeed, following Comerton-Forde and Rydge (2006 a), auction price 
manipulation is less costly in case of less active securities. A related argument is that the 
negative evidence surrounding call auctions found in other studies may partly emanate from 
low call auction activity, rather. than a flawed overall structure of auctions. In particular it 
may not be justified to expect call auctions to contribute to pricing efficiency of less liquid 
stocks, if the latter fail to trade actively during the auction. 
These results have some important general implications. 67 First, the findings support the 
argument that call auctions are not necessarily a superior method for opening and closing an 
otherwise continuous market. We cannot support the notion that the main disadvantage of call 
auctions is that they prohibit stocks from trading continuously given that indications of further 
disadvantages in terms of VEL were obtained. The initial negative reaction on part of traders 
upon the suspension of the auction confirms the conjecture that when auctions are held at the 
opening and at the closing, the restriction from prompt trading is not so pronounced since 
stocks still trade continuously most of the time. If the auctions were viewed by traders as "a 
restriction from continuous trading", the former would have been relieved upon the 
suspension and responded with positive CARs immediately. The benefits or costs of call 
auctions appear to depend on the composition of the shares being traded. This suggests that 
future research will need to delve more deeply into the nature of the trading process with a 
particular reference as to how this may differ across stocks of varying liquidity. Second, the 
above results show that it cannot be taken for granted that auctions improve share trading in a 
less liquid emerging market. On the NSE, it appears to have been precisely the less liquid 
securities which gained least from the auction system. 
In interpreting the above results, one should keep in mind that the findings focused on auction 
effectiveness from the point of view of the market in general as opposed to specific players. 
Whilst it is reasonable to assume that the design of the trading protocol should reflect the 
requirements of the general market, the auctions might still have presented particular 
67 A limitation of the analysis is that the soffivare issues prior to suspension may have had an impact on the 
effectiveness of the auction. 
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advantages / disadvantages to specific market participants such as large traders. The 
desirability of call auctions to specific trader categories is an additional issue which may be 
explored in future research. 
Finally, further research is required on the linkages between call auctions and other elements 
of the trading setup such as price limits, transparency and the role of call auctions in a 
dealership market. In the absence of such knowledge it remains difficult to assess the 
desirability of call auctions on particular trading venues - save for experimenting with actual 
changes in the trading protocol, which might not be an optimal policy. 
In view of the contrasting evidence on the impact of the auction suspension on NSE volatility, 
the subsequent chapter constitutes a more detailed analysis on the volatility changes following 
the suspension. 
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APPENDIX 6.1 
Final Sample of Individual Stocks 
1. Abb 47. Escorts 93. Jpind 138. Ramanewspr 
2. Adaniexpo 48. Essarship 94. Kecintl 139. Raslarnipak 
3. Amarajabat 49. Esselpack 95. Kesoramind 140. Raymond 
4. Andhrapet 50. Finpipe 96. Kopran 141. Reckcolman 
5. Apollohosp 51. Fujitsicim 97. Krebsbio 142. Relcapital 
6. Apollotyre 52. Germanrem 98. Kronecomm 143. Reliance 
7. Aptech 53. Glaxo 99. L&T 144. Rhonepouln 
8. Arvindmill 54. Gnfc 100. Lakme 145. Rolta 
9. Ashokley 55. Godrejsop 101.1-aneseda 146. Sail 
10. Bajajauto 56. Gramophone 102. Leadedsys 147. Saloraintl 
11. Bankbaroda 57. Grasim 103. Lichsgfin 148. Samtel 
12. Bankindia 58. Gujambcem 104. Lml 149. Sanghipoly 
13. Bankpunjab 59. Gujratgas 105. M&M 150. Sbin 
14. Bataindia 60. Gujsidhcem 106. Madrasrefn 151. Shasunchern 
15. Bauschlomb 61. Hcl-Hp 107. Mahaintl 152. Shyamtele 
16. Bel 62. Hdfcbank 108. Mastershar 153. SlIverline 
17. Bharatforg 63. Herohonda 109. Mastgain92 154. Smithklpha 
18. Bhel 64. Himachlfut I 10. Mastplus9l 155. Smitk(bech 
19. Bilt 65. HindalcO 111. Max 156. Softsolint 
20. Bindalagro 66. Hindevelop 112. Mcdowell 157. Spic 
21. Birlaeric 67. Hindlevchm 113. Mircelectr 158. Spicelec 
22. Bomdyeing 68. Hindlever 114. Mos6rbaer 159. Spicfine 
23. Bongairefn 69. Hindmotor 115. Mrf 160. Sqrdsfware 
24. BpcI 70. Hindpetro 116. MtnI 161. Srf 
25. BpI 71. Hindzinc 117. Nagarfert 162. Sterlite 
26. Britannia 72. Hocl 118. Nelco 163. Sunpharma 
27. Bses 73. Hoteleela 119. Nepcmicon 164. Suppetro 
28. Cadbury 74. Icici 120. Nestle 165. Surajdjamn 
29. Carrierair 75 * Icicibank 121. 
Niit 166. Tatachem 
30, Castrol 76. Idbi 122. Nilkampist 167. Tataelxsi 
31. Ceat 77. Indal 123. Nirma 168. Tatafin 
32. Centurytex 78. Indhotel 124. Nocil 169. Tatapower 
33. Cmc 79. Indiacern 125. Novartis 170. Tatatea 
34. Coatviyela 80. Indogulf 126. Orientbank 171. Tatavashis 
35. Cochinrefn 81.1ndrayon 127. P&G 172. Telco 
36. Colgate 82. Infotecent 128. Padminpoly 173. Thomascook 
37. Corpbank 83. Ingerrand 129. Parkedavis 174. Tisco 
38. Crestcomm 84. Insilco 130. Peerleship 175. Tvselec 
39. Crompgreav 85.1oc 131. Pennaralum 176. Unitedphos 
40. Dabur 86. lpcalab 132. Pentfrprod 177. Ushabeltro 
41. Dclpoly 87. IpcI 133. Pfizer 178. Utibank 
42. Dcmdaewoo 88. Itc 134. Philips 179. Vdoconintl 
43. Digitaleqp 89. Iti 135. Psidatasys 180. Vikaswsp 
44. Dlfcement 90. Itil 136. Punjabtrac 181. Voltas 
45. Drreddy 91. Jct 137. Raincalcin. 182. Wartdeisel 
46. Emerck 92. Jindvijstl 
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APPENDIX 6.2 
A Summary of the Data Periods Used for the Comparison Analysis and Event Study. 
Pre-Event and post-Event periods used for the comparison analysis 
Firs day Las day Number of days in period 
Event Date Event Date Open' Closed Week- Total 
Time Time days days* days days 
3rd 8th 
Pre-Event March June 
period" 
1 
T-62 1999 T-1 1999 
1 
62 8 70 98 
1 
Post- 1 Oth 3rd 
Event T+1 June T+62 Sept. 62 0 62 86 
period" 1999 1999 
Estimationperio and event window used for the event study 
Period First day Las day Number of days in per od 
Event Date Event Date Open Closed Week- Total 
Time Time days days* days days 
3rd 4th 
Estimation March June 
Period T-62 1999 T-3 1999 60 8 68 94 
7th 30th 
Event T-2 June T+15 June 18 0 18 24 
Window 1999 1999 
* Excluding Weekends 
** When working with intra-day prices, rather than returns, one further observation was 
available and therefore data from T-63 till T-1 were used for the pre-event period and data 
from T+1 till T+63 were used for the post event period. 
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APPENDIX 6.3 
First Order Serial Correlations 
The name of the stock is shown in Column A; Columns B I, CI and DI show pre-event data, 
whilst post-cvent data are shown in Columns B2, C2, and D2. The first order serial 
correlation is shown in Columns BI and B2. Significance at the 95% level of confidence is 
denotedby**. In all cases, the standard error is equal to 0.127. TheBox-Pierce(1970) 
statistics are reported in Columns Cl and C2, whilst the Ljung-Box (1978) statistics are shown 
in Columns DI and D2. The probability of falsely rejecting the null hypothesis of no serial 
correlation is shown in square brackets. 
A BI Cl Dl B2 C2 D2 
STOCK COEFF. BOX-PIERCE LJUNG-BOX COEFF. BOX-PIERCE LJUNG-BOX 
(pre) (pre) (pre) (post) (post) (post) 
ABB 0.103 0.663 [. 4151 0.696 [. 404] 0.094 0.549 [. 4591 0.576 [. 448] 
ADANIEXPO -0.085 0.449 [. 503] 0.4711.493] -0.215 2.874 (. 0901 3.015 [. 082] 
AMARAJABAT -0.155 1.496 [. 221) 1.569 [. 210) 0.202 2.539 [. 111] 2.664 [. 103] 
ANDHRAPET -0.358** 7.957 [. 0051 8.348 [. 004] -0.139 1.198 [. 2741 1.257 [. 2621 
APOLLOHOSP 0.352** 7.670 [. 006J 8.047 1.005] 0.161 1.600 [. 206] 1.679 (. 195] 
APOLLOTYRE 0.076 0.354 (. 552] 0.372 [. 542] 0.279** 4.825 [. 0281 5.063 [. 024] 
APTECH -0.083 0.4231.516] 0.444 [. 505] -0.084 0.436 [. 509] 0.458 [. 499] 
ARVINDMILL 0.087 0.474 [. 491] 0.497 1.481) 0.163 1.653 [. 199] 1.734 [. 188] 
ASHOKLEY 0.17 1.800 (. 1801 1.889 [. 169] 0.138 1.186 [. 276] 1.245 [. 265) 
BAJAJAUTO -0.108 0.717 [. 397] 0.752 (. 3861 -0.285** 5.022 [. 0251 5.269 [. 022] 
BANKBARODA 0.294** 5.342 [. 021] 5.604 [. 018] 0.183. 2.066 [. 151] 2.168 [. 141) 
BANKINDIA 0.139 1.198 [. 274] 1.257 (. 262] -0.032 0.062 J. 8041 0.065 [. 799) 
BANKPUNJAB -0.07 0.304 [. 581) 0.319 [. 572] -0.036 0.079 [. 7781 0.083 [. 773) 
BATAfNDIA -0.04 0.101 [. 750] 0.106 [. 745] 0,141 1.231 [. 267] 1.291 [. 2561 
BAUSCHLOMB 0.141 1,240 (. 265] 1.301 [. 254] 0.155 1.490 [. 2221 1.564 [. 2111 
BEL -0.111 0.767 [. 3811 0.805 [. 370] 0.232 3.329 (. 0681 3.493 [. 0621 
BHARATFORG -0.096 0.573 [. 4491 0.601 [. 4381 -0.113 0.794 [. 373] 0.833 [. 362] 
BHEL 0.122 0,917 [. 3381 0.962 (. 327] 0.118 0.858 [. 3541 0.900 [. 343] 
BILT 0.015 0.014 [. 907] 0.014 [. 905] 0.232 3.327 [. 068] 3.491 (. 0621 
BINDALAGRO -0.178 1.962 [. 161] 2.059 [. 151] -0.061 0.231 [. 631] 0.242 [. 623) 
BIRLAERIC 0.112 0.772 [. 380] 0.810 (. 368] 0.033' 0.069 (. 7931 0.072 [. 788] 
BOMDYEING 0.054 0.183 [. 669] 0.192 1.661) 0.073 0.3291.5661 0.345 [. 5571 
BONGAIREFN -0.246 3.738 (. 0531 3.922 [. 048] 0.016 0.016 [. 8991 0.017 [. 897] 
BPCL 0.21 2.734 [. 0981 2.869 (. 090] -0.02 0.026 [. 873] 0.027 [. 870] 
BPL 0.168 1.743 [. 187] 1.829 1.176J -0.098 0.593 [. 4411 0.622 (. 430] 
BRITANNIA 0.104 0.668 (. 4141 0.701 [. 402] 0.209 2.703 [. 1001 2.836 [. 092] 
BSES 0.105 0.680 1.410] 0.713 [. 398] 0.089 0.492 (. 4831 0.517 [. 4721 
CADBURY -0.108 0.724 [. 395] 0.759 1.384] -0.189 2.220 1.1361 2.329 [. 1271 
CARRIERAIR -0.127 0.992 (. 319] 1.041 (. 308] -0.176 1.931 [. 165) 2.026 [. 155) 
CASTROL 0.003 0.001 [. 979] 0.001 (. 978] -0.049 0.150 (. 699] 0.157 [. 6921 
CEAT -0.227 3.189 [. 074] 3.346 [. 0671 0.125 0.974 1.324] 1.022 [. 312] 
CENTURYTEX 0.327** 6.637 (. 010] 6.964 [. 0081 0.123 0.939 [. 3321 0.985 [. 3211 
CIVIC 0.341** 7.223 [. 007] 7.5781.006) -0.089 0.489 [. 4841 0.513 (. 474] 
COATVIYELA -0.004 0.001 [. 9721 0.001 [. 971) 0.256** 4.0601.044] 4.259 [. 039] 
COCHINREFN -0.083 0.430 (. 5121 0.451 [. 5021 -0.066 0.271 [. 6031 0.284 [. 5941 
.. continued overleaf 
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A Bi Cl DI B2 C2 D2 
STOCK COEFF. BOX-PIERCE LJUNG-BOX COEFF. BOX-PIERCE LJUNG-BOX 
(pre) (pre) (pre) (post) (post) (post) 
COLGATE -0.208 2.671 (. 102] 2.803 [. 0941 0.2 2.482 [. 1151 2.604 [. 107] 
CORPBANK 0.218 2.959 [. 085] 3.105 [. 078] 0.116 0.8281.3631 0.869 [. 351] 
CRESTCOMM 0.041 0.105 (. 7451 0.111 (. 7391 0.275** 4.704 [. 0301 4.935 [. 026] 
CROMPGREAV 0.018 0.020 [. 8881 0.021 [. 885] 0.189 2.225 [. 136] 2.334 [. 127] 
DABUR -0.18 2.007 [. 1571 2.106 [. 1471 0.086 0.461 [. 497] 0.484 [. 4871 
DCLPOLY -0.199 2.447 [. 1181 . 2.568 (. 109] 0.11 0.746 [. 388] 0.783 [. 376] 
DCMDAEWOO -0.096 0.568 [. 451] 0.596 [. 440] 0.231 3.3131.0691 3.476 [. 062] 
DIGITALEOP 0.123 0.934 [. 3341 0.980 [. 322] 0.046 0.134 (. 715] 0.140 [. 7081 
DLFCEMENT 0.131 1.065 [. 302] 1.118 [. 2901 -0.081 0.403 [. 526] 0.423 [. 516] 
DRREDDY -0.115 0.819 (. 366] 0.859 [. 3541 0.241 3.599 [. 058] 3.776 (. 052] 
EMERCK -0.2 2.487 [. 115] 2.609 [. 106] 0.024 0.036 [. 8491 0.038 (. 8451 
ESCORTS -0.068 0.287 [. 5921 0.301 [. 5831 -0.03 0.056 [. 8131 0.059 [. 8091 
ESSARSHIP -0.414** 10.62 [. 0011 11.14 [. 0011 0.023 0.034 [. 8531 0.036 [. 8501 
ESSELPACK -0.285** 5.046 [. 025] 5.294 [. 021] 0.223 3.088 [. 079] 3.240 [. 072] 
FINPIPE 0.015 0.014 [. 905] 0.015 [. 9031 0.061 0.228 [. 633] 0.239 [. 625] 
FUJITSICIM 0.075 0.347 (. 556] 0.364 [. 5461 0.023 0.032 [. 8581 0.033 [. 8551 
GERMANREM -0.287** 5.118 [. 024] 5.370 [. 0201 0.015 0.0141.906] 0.015 [. 9041 
GLAXO -0.195 2.353 [. 1251 2.469 [. 116] -0.088 0.482 [. 4881 0.505 [. 477] 
GNFC -0.107 0.715 [. 3981 0.750 [. 386] 0,272** 4.573 [. 0321 4.798 [. 028] 
GODREJSOP 0.158 1.543 [. 2141 1.619 [. 203] 0.171 1.807 [. 1791 1.896 [. 1691 
GRAMOPHONE 0.271** 4.561 (. 0331 4.786 [. 029] 0.337** 7.032 [. 008] 7.378 [. 007] 
GRASIM 0.037 0.085 [. 771] 0.089 [. 765) 0.417** 10.80 [. 0011 11.32 [. 0011 
GUJAMBCEM -0.343** 7.291 [. 007] 7.650 [. 006] 0.139 1.203 [. 273] 1.262 [. 2611 
GUJRATGAS -0.003 0.001 (. 9811 0.001 (. 9801 0.343** 7.276 (. 0071 7.634 [. 006] 
GUJSlDHCEM -0.205 2.618 [. 106] 2.747 [. 097] -0.105 0.684 [. 408) 0.717 [. 397] 
HCL-HP -0.03 0.057 [. 8121 0.060 [. 8071 0.169 1.780 [. 1821 1.868 [. 172] 
HDFCBANK 0.008 0.004 [. 947] 0.005 [. 946] -0.038 0.089 [. 7651 0.094 (. 7591 
HEROHONDA -0.236 3.443 [. 064] 3.613 (. 057] 0.125 0.968 [. 3251 1.015 [. 314] 
HIMACHLFUT 0.184 2.098 [. 148] 2.201 [. 1381 0.171 1.809 [. 1791 1.898 (. 1681 
HINDALCO 0.134 1.106 [. 293) 1.160 [. 281] 0.142 1.248 [. 2641 1.310 [. 2521 
HINDEVELOP -0.215 2.862 [. 091] 3.003 1.0831 0.262** 4.259 [. 039] 4.468 [. 035] 
HINDLEVCHM -0.083 0.431 [. 5121 0.452 [. 501] 0.193 2.300 (. 129] 2.413 [. 120] 
HINDLEVER -0.049 0.149 [. 700] 0.156 [. 693) 0.301** 5.6291.018) 5.905 [. 015] 
HINDMOTOR -0.282** 4.930 [. 026] 5.173 [. 0231 0.001 0.000 [. 993] 0.000 [. 9931 
HINDPETRO 0.194 2.335 [. 1271 2.450 [. 1181 0.305** 5.766 [. 016] 6.050 [. 0141 
HINDZINC -0.113 0.795 [. 373] 0.834 [. 3611 0.330** 6.744 [. 009] 7.0751.0081 
HOCL -0.028 0.050 [. 8241 0.052 [. 819] -0.069 0.296 t. 586] 0.311 [. 577] 
HOTELEELA -0.001 0.000 (. 9971 0.000 (. 9971 -0.025 0.038 [. 845] 0.040 [. 842) 
ICICI 0.097 0.579 [. 447] 0.608 [. 436] 0.185 2.129 [. 145] 2.234 [. 135] 
ICICIBANK -0.014 0.012 [. 914] 0.012 [. 9121 -0.208 2.681 [. 1021 2.813 (. 094] 
IDBI 0.079 0.386 [. 5341 0.405 (. 525] 0.042 0.112 [. 7381 0.117 [. 7321 
INDAL -0.045 0.126 [. 7231 0.132 [. 7161 0.462** 13.21 [. 000] 13.86 [. 000) 
INDHOTEL 0.016 0.015 [. 902] 0.016 [. 9001 0.24 3.562 (. 0591 3.737 (. 0531 
INDIACEM 0.077 0.364 [. 5471 0.381 [. 537] 0.196 2.376 [. 123] 2.493 [. 114] 
INDOGULF 0.211 2.754 [. 0971 2.889 [. 089] 0.113 0.795 [. 3731 0.834 [. 3611 
INDRAYON 0.233 3.353 [. 067] 3.518 [. 061] 0.177 1.943 [. 1631 2.039 (. 153] 
INFOTECENT -0.011 0.008 [. 929] 0.008 [. 928] 0.152 1.429 [. 2321 1.499 [. 221] 
INGERRAND -0.208 2.684 [. 101] 2.816 [. 0931 -0.014 0.012 [. 914] 0.012 (. 912] 
INSILCO 0.054 0.179 [. 673] 0.187 [. 6651 0.158 1.548 [. 2131 1.625 [. 2021 
10C 0.001 0.000 [. 9911 0.000 [. 990] 0.167 1.738 [. 187] 1.824 [. 177] 
continued overleaf 
f 
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A B1 Ci D1 B2 C2 D2 
STOCK COEFF. BOX-PIERCE LJUNG-BOX COEFF. BOX-PIERCE LJUNG-BOX 
(pre) (pre) (pre) (post) (post) (post) 
IPCALAB -0,003 0.001 (. 981] 0.001 [. 980] 0.309** 5.923 [. 015] 6.215 (. 0131 
IPCL -0,054 0.180 (. 6711 0.189 [. 664] 0.056 0.195 [. 659] 0.204 [. 651] 
ITC -0.262** 4.248 [. 039] 4.457 [. 035] -0.147 1.337 [. 2481 1.403 [. 236] 
ITI -0.255** 4.026 [. 045] 4.224 [. 040] 0.161 1.6021.206] 1.681 [. 195] 
ITIL 0.198 2.439 [. 118] 2.559 [. 110] -0.155 1.496 [. 2211 1.570 [. 210] 
JCT -0.037 0.083 [. 774] 0.087 [. 768] -0.114 0.812 1.367] 0.852 [. 356] 
JINDVIJSTL -0.222 3.051 [. 081] 3.201 [. 0741 0.243 3.652 (. 0561 3.832 [. 0501 
JPIND -0.192 2.283 [. 131) 2.396 f. 1221 0.277** 4.759 [. 029] 4.993 [. 025] 
KECINTL 0.067 0.276 [. 600] 0.289 [. 591] 0.239 3.554 [. 059] 3.729 (. 053] 
KESORAMIND -0.061 0.227 (. 6331 0.239 [. 6251 0.346** 7.418 [. 0061 7.783 [. 005] 
KOPRAN 0.062 0.237 [. 6261 0.249 (. 618] 0.083 0.424 (. 515] 0.445 (. 505] 
KREBSBIO 0.02 0.0251.875] 0.026 f. 872] 0.211 2.762 [. 097] 2.897 [. 0891 
KRONECOMM 0.229 3.237 [. 072] 3.396 [. 065] 0.086 0.461 [. 497] 0.484 [AB7] 
UT -0.01 0.006 [. 9391 0.006 [. 9371 -0.105 0.684 [. 4081 0.718 [. 397) 
LAKME 0.178 1.963 [. 161] 2.060 [. 151] 0.145 1.295 [. 255] 1.359 [. 244] 
LANESEDA -0.345** 7.398 [. 007] 7.762 [. 005] -0.239 3.544 [. 060] 3.718 [. 054] 
LEADEDSYS 0.05 0.157 [. 692] 0.165 [. 685] 0.17 1.788 [. 181] 1.876 [. 171] 
LICHSGFIN 0.013 0.011 [. 9181 0,011 [. 9161 0.146 1.316 [. 251) 1.380 [. 240] 
LML -0.159 1.574 [. 210] 1.651 [. 199] -0.055 0.189 [. 664] 0.198 [. 656] 
M&M -0.102 0.642 [. 423] 0.673 (. 412] 0.179 1.976 [. 1601 2.073 [. 1501 
MADRASREFN -0.12 0.898 [. 3431 0.942 [. 332] 0.045 0.125 1.7241 0.131 [. 717] 
MAHAINTL 0.039 0.095 [. 7571 0.100 [. 7521 0.045 0,124 [. 7241 0.130 [. 718] 
MASTERSHAR -0.198 2.441 [. 1181 2.561 [. 110] -0.142 1.253 [. 2631 1.314 [. 252] 
MASTGAIN92 -0.263** 4.289 (. 038] 4.499 (. 034] 0.055 0.187 [. 6661 0.196 [. 658] 
MASTPLUS91 -0.042 0.109 [. 741] 0.115 [. 735] 0.105 0.686 [. 408] 0.719 [. 396] 
MAX 0.075 0.347 [. 556] 0.364 [. 546] 0.018 0,020 [. 8871 0.021 [. 884) 
MCDOWELL, 0,503** 15.70 [. 000] 16.47 [. 000] 0.142 1.244 [. 265] 1.305 [. 253] 
MIRCELECTR 0.045 0.125 (. 724] 0.131 [. 7171 0.383** 9.077 [. 0031 9.523 (. 0021 
MOSERBAER 0.15 1.399 [. 237] 1.468 [. 226] 0.055 0.190 [. 663] 0.199 [. 656] 
MRF 0,023 0.033 [. 855] 0.035 [. 851] 0.187 2.168 [. 1411 2.274 (. 1321 
MTNL -0.046 0.131 [. 717] 0.138 [. 7111 0.112 0.781 [. 377] 0.820 (. 365] 
NAGARFERT -0.199 2.463 [. 1171 2.584 [. 1081 0.088 0.481 [. 4881 0.504 [. 478] 
NELCO 0.324** 6.522 [. 011] 6.843 [. 009] 0.179 1.985 [. 159] 2.082 [. 149] 
NEPCMICON -0.315** 6.151 [. 0131 6.454 [. 011] -0.283** 4.972 [. 026] 5.217 [. 022) 
NESTLE -0.275** 4.678 [. 0311 4.908 [. 0271 -0.15 1.393 [. 2381 1.462 [. 2271 
NIIT 0.012 0.009 [. 9241 0.010 [. 9221 -0.079 0.384 [. 5361 0.403 [. 526] 
NILKAMPLST -0.045 0.123 [. 726] 0.129 [. 719] 0.280** 4.854 [. 028] 5.092 [. 024] 
NIRMA -0.036 0.081 [. 776] 0.085 [. 771] -0.037 0.083 [. 773] 0.087 [. 7681 
NOCIL 0.039 0.096 [. 757] 0.101 [. 7511 0.034 0.074 [. 786] 0.077 [. 7811 
NOVARTIS -0.078 0.376 [. 5401 0.395 [. 530] 0.224 3.106 [. 078] 3.259 [. 0711 
ORIENTBANK 0.2 2.487 [. 1151 2.609 [. 106] 0.063 0.243 [. 622] 0.255 [. 614] 
P&G -0.109 0.738 [. 3901 0.774 [. 379] -0.01 0.006 [. 9361 0.007 [. 9341 
PADMINPOLY -0.072 0.319 [. 572] 0.3351.563] 0.177 1.953 [. 162) 2.0491.152] 
PARKEDAVIS -0.214 2.835 [. 0921 2.975 [. 085] 0.068' 0.286 [. 593] 0.300 [. 584] 
PEERLESHIP -0.251 3.918 (. 0481 4.111 (. 0431 0.003 0.001 [. 9821 0.001 (. 9811 
PENNARALUM -0.226 3.164 [. 0751 3.319 [. 068] -0.243 3.648 [. 0561 3.827 [. 050] 
PENTFIRPROD -0.02 0.024 [. 8771 0.0251.874] -0.041 0.1051.746] 0.110 [. 740) 
PFIZER 0.171 1.803 [. 1791 1.892 [. 169] 0.21 2.733 1.0981 2.868 [. 090] 
PHILIPS -0.057 0.203 (. 6531 0.213 (. 6451 0.062 0,237 [. 6261 0.248 [. 618] 
PSIDATASYS 0.086 0.457 [. 499] 0.479 [. 489] -0.043 0.113 [. 7371 0.118 [. 731] 
continued overleaf 
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A BI 
STOCK COEFF. 
(pre) 
PUNJABTRAC 0.212 
RAINCALCIN -0.188 
RAMANEWSPR -0.139 
RASLAMIPAK -0.2 
RAYMOND 0.129 
RECKCOLMAN -0.057 
RELCAPITAL -0.277** 
RELIANCE -0.004 
RHONEPOULN -0.452** 
ROLTA 0.21 
SAIL -0.166 
SALORAINTL 0.103 
SAMTEL -0.147 
SANGHIPOLY -0.205 
SBIN 0.212 
SHASUNCHEM 0.264** 
SHYAMTELE -0.189 
SILVERLINE 0.152 
SMITHKLPHA -0.008 
SMITKLBECH -0.177 
SOFTSOLINT 0.132 
SPIC -0.08 
SPICELEC 0.034 
SPICHNE 0.139 
SQRDSFWARE 0.212 
SRF -0.321** 
STERLITE -0.041 
SUNPHARMA 0.205 
SUPPETRO -0.144 
SURAJOIAMN -0.239 
TATACHEM 0.039 
TATAELXSI 0.124 
TATAFIN -0.097 
TATAPOWER 0.077 
TATATEA -0.036 
TATAVASHIS 0.211 
TELCO -0.073 
THOMASCOOK 0.029 
TISCO 0.06 
TVSELEC 0.485** 
UNITEDPHOS -0.039 
USHABELTRO 0.105 
UTIBANK -0.198 
VDOCONINTL 0.260** 
VIKASWSP 0.075 
VOLTAS -0.197 
WARTDEISEL -0.082 
Cl Dl 
BOX-PIERCE LJUNG-BOX 
(pre) (pre) 
2.787 [. 0951 2.924 [. 0871 
2.193 [. 139] 2.3011.129] 
1.192 [. 275] 1.250 [. 2631 
2.476 [. 116] 2.598 [. 107] 
1.024 [. 312] 1.075 [. 300] 
0.199 [. 6551 0.209 [. 648] 
4.768 [. 029] 5.003 [. 025] 
0.001 [. 977] 0.001 [. 977] 
12.66 [. 000] 13.28 [. 000] 
2.725 [. 099] 2.859 [. 091] 
1.704 [. 1921 1.788 [. 1811 
0.660 [. 4161 0.693 [. 4051 
1.342 [. 2471 1.408 [. 2351 
2.607 [. 1061 2.736 [. 0981 
2.797 [. 0941 2.934 [. 0871 
4.313 [. 0381 4.526 [. 0331 
2.219 [. 1361 2.328 [. 127] 
1.433 [. 2311 1.504 [. 220] 
0.004 (. 9491 0.004 (. 9471 
1.948 [. 1631 2.044 [. 1531 
1.083 [. 2981 1.136 [. 2861 
0.394 [. 5301 0.414 [. 5201 
0.073 [. 7871 0.076 [. 7821 
1.204 [. 273] 1.263 [. 2611 
2.784 [. 0951 2.921 [. 087] 
6.405 [. 0111 6.720 [. 0101 
0.106 [. 7451 0.111 [. 7391 
2.596 [. 1071 2.724 [. 0991 
1.283 [. 2571 1.346 [. 2461 
3.542 [. 0601 3.716 [. 054] 
0.096 [. 7571 0.100 [. 7521 
0.946 [. 3311 0.993 (. 3191 
0.582 [. 4461 0.610 [. 4351 
0.371 [. 543) 0.389 [. 5331 
0.078 [. 7801 0.082 [. 7741 
2.750 [. 0971 2.885 [. 0891 
0.334 [. 5631 0.3511.5541 
0.053 [. 8181 0.056 [. 814] 
0.221 [. 6381 0.232 [. 6301 
14.61 [. 000) 15.33 [. 0001 
0.097 [. 7561 0.101 [. 7501 
0.677 [. 4101 0.711 [. 3991 
2.419 [. 1201 2.538 [. 1111 
4.178 [. 041] 4.383 [. 0361 
0.352 [. 553) 0.369 [. 5431 
2.400 [. 1211 2.518 [. 1131 
0.415 [. 5191 0.436 [. 5091 
B2 C2 D2 
COEFF. BOX-PIERCE LJUNG-BOX 
(post) (post) (post) 
-0.121 0,907 [. 3411 0.952 [. 329] 
0.015 0.0131.9081 0.014 [. 906] 
-0.033 0,067 [. 7961 0.070 [. 7911 
0.097 0.586 1.4441 0.615 [. 433] 
0.191 2.260 [. 1331 2.371 [. 1241 
-0.092 0.523 [. 4691 0.549 [. 459] 
0.142 1.254 [. 2631 1.315 [. 251] 
0.069 0.292 [. 5891 0.307 [. 580] 
-0.142 1.252 [. 2631 1.314 [. 2521 
0.1 0.621 [. 4311 0.651 [. 420] 
0.132 1.079 [. 2991 1.133 [. 287] 
-0.169 1.776 [. 1831 1.863 [. 172] 
0.088 0.482 [. 4871 0.506 [. 4771 
-0.227 3.181 [. 0751 3.337 [. 068) 
-0.037 0.083 [. 7731 0.087 [. 768] 
0.178 1.969 (. 1611 2.065 (. 1511 
-0.004 0.0011.9721 0.001 [. 9711 
0.004 0.001 [. 9771 0.001 [. 9761 
-0.091 0.516 [. 4731 0.541 [. 462] 
0.07 0.306 [. 580] 0.321 [. 571] 
0.032 0.063 [. 8021 0.066 [. 797) 
0.273** 4.631 [. 031] 4.858 [. 028] 
0.151 1.405 [. 2361 1.474 [. 225] 
0.197 2.406 [. 121] 2.524 [. 112] 
0.255** 4.030 [. 0451 4.228 [. 040] 
0.018 0.020 1.8871 0.021 [. 885] 
0.278** 4.806 [. 0281 5.042 (. 025] 
0.139 1.204 1.2731 1.263 [. 261] 
-0.04 0.098 [. 7541 0.103 [. 749] 
-0.01 0.006 [. 9371 0.007 [. 9351 
0.201 2.495 [. 114] 2.618 [. 106] 
-0.04i 0.106 [. 7451 0.111 [. 739] 
0.407** 10.29 [. 0011 10.80 [. 0011 
0.243 3.671 [. 0551 3.852 [. 050] 
0.1 0.625 [. 4291 0.656 [. 4181 
0.098 0.601 [. 4381 0.630 [. 4271 
0.114 0.8031.3701 0.842 [. 359) 
0.001 0.000 [. 9941 0.000 [. 994] 
-0.049 0.152 [. 6971 0.159 [. 690] 
0.21 2.7311.0981 2.865 [. 091) 
0.22 - 3.004 [. 083] 3.152 [. 0761 
-0.224 3.110 [. 0781 3.263 [. 0711 
-0.286** 5.077 [. 024] 5.327 [. 0211 
0.051 0.164 [. 6861 0.172 [. 679] 
0.217 2.909 [. 0881 3.052 [. 0811 
0.067 0.276 [. 6001 0.289 [. 5911 
0.117 0.843 [. 3581 0.885 [. 347] 
r 
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APPENDIX 6.4 
Bootstrap Routine 
The routine specified below was estimated using Resampling Stats software 68. The 
programme reads the S. S. ME. data in the file path c: \data. Column I in this file contained 
estimation period S. S. ME. s whilst Column 2 contained event window S. S. ME. s. The 
programme places Column I Data in a vector entitled "estim" and Column 2 Data in a vector 
entitled "event". These vectors are then combined in a single population, entitled "all". The 
repetitive routine then begins 69 . The population is shuffled; reordering the "all" data. The 
programme then picks 182 observations placing them in A$, and the remaining observations 
are allocated to Z$. The difference in means of the sub-samples is recorded and allocated in 
the vector "scrboard". After the repetition loop ends, the programme counts the number of 
instances where a mean difference of 0.164193 or higher was obtained. The p-value relating 
to the latter mean difference, is simply the number of instances where such mean difference 
(or higher) occurred, divided by 1000 (or 5000 when the routine is repeated 5000 times). 
Therefore, if we note 40 instances with such a mean difference (or higher), this would imply 
that there is a 4% chance that this mean difference occurs by pure coincidence. The p-value 
would therefore be 0.04. In such a case, the hypothesis of equal means of the original samples 
(i. e. estimation and event S. S. ME. s), may be rejected at the customary 95% level of 
confidence. 
READ file "C: \DATA"estim event 
CONCAT estim event all 
REPEAT1000 
SHUFFLE all all 
TAKE all 1,182 A$ 
TAKE all 183,364 Z$ 
MEAN A$ mA$ 
MEAN Z$ mZ$ 
SUBTRACT mA$ mZ$ diff$ 
SCORE diff$ scrboard 
END 
COUNT scrboard >=. 164193 more 
DIVIDE more 1000 prob 
PRINT more prob 
HISTOGRAM scrboard 
63 Information about this soft-%vare is found on the intemet web page 
http: //xv-, vw. resample. com/content/about. shtml (accessed I st March 2004). The routine presented here is a 
modified version of another routine which is found on the same website. 
6' The routine in this programme covers 1000 re-sampling processes, due to software restrictions. Yet the actual 
programme was run for 5 successive times, resulting in 5000 different re-sampling processes. The results were 
then aggregated. 
216 
6. THE IMPACT OF THE SUSPENSION OF OPENING AND CLOSING CALL AUCTIONS ON NSE 
APPENDIX 6.5 
Random Sub-Sampling for checking the consistency of the Cumulative Abnormal 
Returns Pattern. 
Individual stocks were randomly assigned to one of the five sub-samples shown below. The 
computer generated a random number for each stock, by means of a spreadsheet. The stocks 
were then ordered starting from the smallest random number to the largest one. The first 36 
stocks were assigned to Sub-Sample 1, the second and third 36 stocks were assigned to Sub- 
Sample 2 and Sub-Sample 3 respectively, and the next 37 stocks and the remaining ones were 
assigned to Sub-Sample 4 and Sub-Sample 5 respectively. For each sub-sample, the abnormal 
returns were averaged across stocks, and then summed across trading days. The cumulative 
abnormal return plot for each of the sub-samples is shown in Figure 6.5. 
SUB-SAMPLE 1 (36 Stocks) 
Amarajabat, Arvindii-H, Bataindia, Bauschlomb, Bomdyeing, Dongaireffi, Cmc, Coatviyela, Corpbank 
Dabur, Esselpack, Germanrem, Gujratgas, Hdfcbank, Herohonda, Indrayon, Ioc, Jet, Kronecomm, Mahaint], 
Max, Mcdowell, P&G, Pcimaralum, Pfizer, Punjabtrac, Raincalcin, Ramanewspr, Raymond, Samtel, 
Silverline, Tatachem, Tatapower, Tatavashis, Telco, Tvselec 
SUB-SAMPLE 2 (36 Stocks) 
Adaniexpo, Aptech, Bajajauto, Bankpunjab, Bet, Bilt, Bindalagro, Birlaeric, Castrol, Ceat, Cochinreffi, 
Dcmdaewoo, Emerck, Essarship, HimachIfut, Hindevelop, Hindlever, Hindpetro, Indiacem, Insilco, fpcalab, 
Lichsgfin, Lml, Mtnl, Nelco, Niit, Nocil, Padn-tinpoly, Raslarnipak, Relcapital, Reliance, Rhonepouln, Sbin, 
Suppetro, Tatafin, Tatatea 
SUB-SAMPLE 3 (36 Stocks) 
Apollohosp, Apollotyre, Bankbaroda, Bankindia, Bpcl, Bpi, Bses, Cadbury, Crompgreav, Dclpoly, Glaxo, 
Gujsidhcem, Hindzinc, Hocl, Idbi, Indal, Indhotel, Infotecent, Iti, Itil, Jindvijstl, Kesoramind, Mastplus9l, 
Nepcmicon, NilkampIst, Orientbank, Pentfrprod, Psidatasys, Rolta, Saloraind, Shyamtele, Smithkipha, Spic, 
Spicelec, Sunpharma, Thomascook 
SUB-SAMPLE 4 (37 Stocks) 
Abb, Andhrapet, Ashokley, Britannia, Dlfccment, Drreddy, Escorts, Gnfc, Godrejsop, Grasim, Hindlevchm, 
Hindmotor, Hoteleela, Indogulf, Jpind, L&T, Leadedsys, Mastershar, Mastgain92, Moserbaer, Mrf, 
Nagarfert, Nestle, Novartis, Sail, Sanghipoly, Softsolint, Sqrdsf,. vare, Srf, Sterlite, Surajdiamn, Tataelxsi, 
Unitedphos, Ushabeltro, Vdoconintl, Vikaswsp, Voltas 
SUB-SAMPLE 5 (37 Stocks) 
Bharatforg, Bhel, Carrierair, Centurytex, Colgate, Crcstcomm, Digitaleqp, Finpipe, Fujitsicim, Gramophone, 
Gujambcem, Hcl-Hp, HindalcO, Icici, Icicibank, Ingerrand, Ipcl, Itc, Kecintl, Kopran, Krebsbio, Lakme, 
Laneseda, M&M, Madrasrefn, Mircelectr, Nirma, Parkedavis-I Peerleship, Philips, Reckcolman, 
Shasunchem, Smitklbech, Spicfine, Tisco, Utibank, Wartdeisel 
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CHAPTER 7: 
A MORE DETAILED INVESTIGATION OF VOLATILITY 
CHANGES FOLLOWING AUCTION SUSPENSION 
7.1 Introduction 
The evidence on changes in volatility following the suspension which was gleaned in the 
previous chapter did not yield clear inferences in any particular direction. The two different 
tests which were undertaken were both highly significant, but yielding contrasting indications. 
This chapter thus investigates the impact of the call auction suspension on NSE volatility in 
further detail, and thus it may be considered as an extension of the previous empirical 
investigation. 
In the previous chapter, intra-day volatility was measured as the difference between the 
highest and lowest trading price of the day, scaled down by the opening price. Intra-day 
volatility decreased following the suspension, and the change was significant at the 99% level 
of confidence. Overnight volatility was assessed in terms of the Overnight Return Reversals, 
and reversals were more prominent following the auction suspension where the difference was 
significant at the 99% level of confidence. Thus, the first test indicated lower volatility 
following suspension, whilst the second one pointed at higher volatility following the 
suspension of the call auction. 
This Chapter employs more rigorous measures of volatility. The main aim of this analysis is 
to model volatility around the auction suspension, with the intention of assessing whether the 
suspension resulted in overall higher or lower volatility. Various tests are thus applied, 
ranging from GARCH models to the scrutiny of return distributions and price movements 
during the day. Tests are conducted on monthly and daily data as well as observations 
sampled at higher frequencies. 
The use of data sets sampled at different frequencies and the application of alternative tests to 
investigate the issue from multiple points of view is one of the inherent strengths of the 
analysis. In particular, the study investigates the impact of the call auction suspension on 
longer term inter-day volatility. This notion was sidelined in the previous chapter, on the 
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grounds that market microstructure changes may only affect stock prices in the short-term, 
whereas over longer periods it is expected that prices become more influenced by the 
fundamental value of the firm. As outlined in the previous chapter, the analysis of the call 
auction suspension on NSE enables a relatively clear comparison in between systems. 
The main objective of this analysis is to assess the volatility impact of the suspension of call 
auctions at the NSE, in terms of inter-day and intra-day volatility. If the auctions improved 
the price discovery process, one would expect to observe increased volatility following 
suspension - confinning the empirical results of Comerton-Forde (1999) who concluded that 
an exchange which commences the trading day with a call auction, rather than with continuous 
trading, may curtail volatility at the initial phases of the trading sessions. If on the other hand 
the call auctions did not contribute towards price formation, one may expect no material 
changes in volatility - or even a reduction in volatility following suspension. This would 
corroborate findings by Angel and Wu (2001) and Pouget (2004 b) who compared auctions to 
alternative settings, in terms of handling order imbalances and controlling deviations from 
equilibrium, respectively. Given that the evidence on call auctions and short-term volatility 
obtained so far was mixed, and that the link between market microstructure and longer-term 
volatility may be weak, it is difficult to infer a priori which of the above outcomes is more 
likely to be witnessed. 
One major factor which poses challenges to the investigation of longer term volatility is the 
monthly seasonality pattern on NSE as discovered in Chapter 5. NSE volatility tends to 
increase during the months of March and April given that the accounting years of many 
companies end in March, coinciding with the end of the Indian fiscal year. Volatility tends to 
abate during August, perhaps due to a holiday effect. This pattern makes the original daily 
data biased in favour of the call auction suspension given that the higher volatility months 
coincide with the call auction period, whilst August coincides with the post-suspension period. 
In this way, the daily data set is adjusted for seasonality, given that the latter is unrelated to 
call auctions. The intra-day data set spans over a period of one and a half "normal volatility" 
months and therefore it should be less prone to seasonality. 
With reference to the layout of this chapter, there is no designated literature survey, since the 
relevant literature regarding volatility concepts and GARCH Models was reviewed in Chapter 
5, whilst possible relationships between auctions and volatility were discussed in Chapter 6. 
The reader is thus referred to the relevant Sections of these Chapters for a background of prior 
literature. 
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This analysis starts with a research background in terms of a description of the data set in 
Section 7.2. Following this, empirical models relating to volatility are estimated. Section 7.3 
considers intra-day volatility, whilst Section 7.4 focuses on inter-day Volatility. Results are 
jointly discussed in Section 7.5 where the empirical evidence is summarised and evaluated in 
the context of different indications at hand. Section 7.6 concludes. 
7.2 Data and Notation 
7.2.1 Intra-Day Data 
The analysis uses intra-day observations of the NSE Nifty Index sampled at one-minute 
frequency. A description of the intra-day data sets and the sampling process was shown in 
Section 5.4. L The data set includes fifteen trading days immediately preceding the auction 
suspension and a further fifteen days immediately following suspension. These trading days 
are labelled as BI... B 15 (where B stands for "Before Suspension Period") and Al ... A15 
respectively (where A stands for "After Suspension Period"). Sampling at one minute 
frequency, yielded around 330 observations for each trading day. 
Descriptive statistics for the distributions of observations of each trading day are shown in 
Chapter 5 Table 5.1. In particular, the null hypothesis of a normal distribution was rejected 
for most data sets and the null hypothesis of a unit root for the intra-day log returns was 
rejected across all data sets. 
7.2.2 Inter-Day Data 
The daily data set shows the Nifty Closing observations from I" February 1999 till 16'h 
November 1999 and includes 204 observations. Whilst a longer series was available, the 
following models were estimated using only those days for which it could be established 
whether the trading sessions were commencing and closing through a call auction (therefore 
the remaining observations were not considered). 
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The plots of the Nifty (levels) series as well as log returns for the relative period are shown in 
Figure 7.1. The latter plot visually confirms that high volatility seems to cluster around 
specific periods as empirically found in Section 5.6. In particular volatility tends to be higher 
during the months of March and April and it tends to abate during the month of August. 
Figure 7.1: Time Series Plots for (a) Nifty Index and (b) Nifty Log Returns 
(a) 
I 
1 
I 
1 
(b) 
The Nifty Log Return data set features an excess kurtosis of 2.35 and a skewness of -0.0087. 
A Jarque-Bera Test Statistic of 46.88 permits the rejection of the null hypothesis of normality 
at the 99% level of confidence when compared to the respective )? (2) critical value. 
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None of the autocorrelation coefficients of the log returns is significant. The autocorrelation 
function is shown in Figure 7.2. Augmented Dickey-Fuller test specifications with and 
without a trend yielded similar test-statistics as follows: -10.8 (Order 1), -5.5 (Order 5) and - 
4.4 (Order 10). Comparing the former statistics to the 95% critical values of -2.88 (test 
specification without a trend) and -3.43 (test specification with a trend) allows us to reject the 
Null Hypothesis of a Unit Root in log returns. GARCH models were thus estimated using 
Log Return Data. 
Figure 7.2: Autocorrelation Function for Nifty Log Returns 
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7.3 Intra-Day Volatility 
This section assesses whether the suspension of the call auctions led to any changes in intra- 
day volatility. For comparison purposes, it is essential to flt* a uniform model across all intra- 
day data sets. The imposition of a uniform model on different data sets implies that a 
researcher cannot tailor-make models in order to maximise the overall statistical fit for each 
particular trading day. Therefore a thorough analysis of the data is essential in order to ensure 
that the functional forin of the imposed model does not deviate largely from the main 
characteristics of the different data sets. This task is undertaken in the next sub-section. 
GARCH models are then fitted to the intra-day data sets in Section 7.3.2. Section 7.3.3 
investigates the typical variations in volatility throughout the trading day and inquires whether 
the initial volatility constitutes price discovery or noise. 
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7.3.1 Analysing the Intra-Day Data Sets 
The analysis started by aggregating the intra-day log returns at one-minute intervals, across 
the 15 trading days for the "Before Period" and the 15 trading days comprising the "After 
Period". The return plots shown in Figures 7.3 and 7.4 and-are broadly in line with the 
empirical evidence cited in Section 5.2.1, regarding the higher volatility at the opening and at 
the closing of the trading day. Dummy variables were included in GARCH models to account 
for this factor, yet these estimations tended not to converge. 
It would also have been desirable to model the actual opening and closing call auctions by a 
separate process, yet this was not possible given that in most cases, the auction time did not 
exceed five minutes, yielding five observations at one minute intervals (and in some cases 
even less). 
Descriptive statistics and Augmented Dickey Fuller Tests for each of the trading days are 
shown in Chapter 5 Tables 5.1 and 5.2 respectively. 
It is assumed that intra-day log returns follow an AR(O) process. AR(p) models with different 
values of p ranging from 0 to 5 were fitted to each intra-day data set, in order to infer the 
preferred model through the Akaike Information Criterion and the Schwarz Bayesian 
Criterion. Results shown in Table 7.1 indicate that both criteria select an AR(I) model for 
over half of the data sets and therefore this model is adopted as the standard return generating 
process. 
t 
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Having selected an AR(l) specification for the intra-day log returns, we now test for the 
presence and nature of ARCH effects in the residuals of these processes. Table 7.2 
summarises the results of LM heteroskedasticity tests as proposed by Engle (1982), together 
with the F-version of the test. 70 Actual test statistics are shown in Appendix 7.1. Order I and 
order 5 tests were conducted. The tests rejected the Null Hypothesis of no ARCH effects at 
the 95% level of confidence for around 50% of the data sets. This "low" rejection rate may be 
explained by various theoretical studies such as Drost and Nijman (1993). These authors 
specified that if daily returns follow a GARCH (1, I) process, intraday returns should follow a 
weak GARCH (1,1) process and the coefficients of a, and, 81 should tend to 1. The failure to 
reject the null hypothesis of no ARCH effects in about 50% of the cases, may also explain the 
non-convergence of some of the GARCH estimations - the actual return process might not 
have been following a GARCH pattern in these cases-. 
In order to choose the model which best describes the nature of the ARCH effects in the data, 
the level of asymmetry in the conditional volatility is now investigated. This should enable us 
to discriminate between linear and non-linear GARCH models. Engle and Ng (1993) outlined 
the following methodology for testing for asymmetric volatility: 
E', 2= 00 + OID, - ,+ý, (7.1) 
9 
Equation 7.1 regresses the squared error term from the AR(l) model over a constant, an error 
term and a dummy variable of the lagged error sign. When Et-I is negative D-ý-j takes a value 
70 This test was described in Section 3.4.3. 
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of 1, whilst it takes a value of zero othenvise. Significance of D_, _1 
is an indication of 
asymmetric volatility. Test results are shown in Table 7.3 and indicate that Dý_, _Ijs only 
significant in case of four trading days, and therefore it is not advisable to use non-linear 
ARCH models, such as EGARCH or the GJR model for modelling intra-day data. This 
somewhat contradicts the earlier result discussed in Section 3.4 that high volatility tends to 
follow negative returns; yet the results in that Particular instance were derived using 
observations at daily intervals. As outlined by Mutjaba Mian and Adam (2001) asymmetric 
volatility tends to decline in higher frequency data. 
Table 7.1: Chosen AR(p) models for Intra-Day Log Returns (One-Minute Intervals) 
Day Maximum AIC Chosen Model Maximum SBC Chosen Model 
Bol 2003 AR(4) 1997 AR(l) 
B02 2030 AR(3) 2024 AR(2) 
B03 2007 AR(l) 2003 AR(l) 
B04 2018 AR(2) 20i2 AR(2) 
B05 2109 AR(2) 2103 AR(2) 
B06 1911 AR(l) 1907 AR(l) 
B07 1988 AR(l) 1985 AR(l) 
B08 1878 AR(l) 1874 AR(l) 
B09 1982 AR(2) 1976 AR(2) 
B10 1973 AR(2) 1968 AR(2) 
Bil 2133 AR(2) 2127 AR(2) 
B12 2120 AR(2) 2114 AR(2) 
B13 2139 AR(l) 2135 AR(l) 
B14 2076 AR(l) 2073 AR(l) 
B15 2107 AR(5) 2096 AR(5) 
A01 2022 AR(4) 2013 AR(3) 
A02 2102 AR(l) 2098 AR(l) 
A03 2062 AR(l) 2058 AR(l) 
A04 2058 AR(2) 2053 AR(2) 
A05 2079 AR(l) 2076 AR(l) 
A06 1933 AR(2) 1927 AR(2) 
A07 1991 AR(l) 1987 AR(l) 
A08 2069 AR(l) 2065 AR(l) 
A09 2129 AR(l) 2125 AR(l) 
A10 2057 AR(l) 2053 AR(l) 
All 2000 AR(3) 1992 AR(3) 
A12 2014 AR(2) 2009 AR(2) 
A13 2101 AR(l) 2097 AR(l) 
A14 2154 AR(l) 2150 AR(l) 
A15 2152 AR(l) 2149 AR(l) 
The table shows the following data for each daily log return price series: Columns 2 and 
3 show the highest Akaike Information Criterion Value obtained when fitting AR(l) - 
AR(5) models and the chosen model following AIC. Columns 4 and 5 show the highest 
Schwarz Bayesian Criterion Value obtained when fitting AR(l) - AR(5) models and the 
chosen model following the SBC. Using both criteria, an AR(l) model is preferred for 
over half of the data sets. 
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Table 7.2: Rejection Rates of the Null Hypothesis of No ARCH Effects for different 
test specifications on One-Minute Frequency Data. 
LM Tests Order I Order 5 
% of Days where the Null Hypothesis of No ARCH 50% 57% 
effects is rejected at the 95% confidence level 
F-Tests Order 1 Order 5 
% of Days where 1he Null Hypothesis of No ARCH 50% 57% 
effects is rejected at the 95% confidence level 
The table shows the percentage occurrences where the Null Hypothesis of No ARCH 
effects in the error term was rejected, for different test specifications. 
Table 7.3: Asymmetric Volatilit y Tests ( D-t., ) for One-Minute Frequency Data 
Day Before Call Suspension After Call Suspension 
Coefficient T-ratio - Observations Coefficient T-ratio Observations 
1 -0.8 X10, (0.75) 339 2.7 X1 
0-7 (1.51) 328 
2 -1.0 XIO-7 (0.74) 338 
0.1 X10-7 (0.33) 328 
3 -0.4 X10-7 (0.60) 338 
0.1 X10-7 (0.27) 328 
4 0.5 X10-7 (0.70) 337 -1.7 X1 
0-7 * (1.92) 328 
5 -0.1 X10-7 (0.30) 339 0.5 XjO, 
7 (1.37) 329 
6 -0.3 X1 
0-7 (0.20) 336 1.6 X10-7 (0.65) 328 
7 3.4 XIO-7 ** (2.30) q39 -0.7 X1 
0-7 (1.09) 328 
8 -0.3 X10,7 (0.18) 337 -0.7 XIO, 
7 * (1.73) 328 
9 -7.2 X, 
0-7 (0.90) 338 -0.1 X10-7 (0.38) 329 
10 1.0 Xl()-7 (0.85) 338 0.5 X, 0-7 (1.03) 329 
11 0.3 X10-7 (0.43) 337 J., X, ()-7 (1.09) 328 
12 -0.3 X10,7 (0.65) 337 0.7 XjO, 
7 (1.18) 328 
13 -0.1 X10-7 (0.38) 337 0.1 X10-7 (0.29) 329 
14 -0.4 XIO-7 (0.51) 336 -0.3 XIO-7 (1.01) 329 
15 -1.3 X1 
0-7 (1.67) 340 0.2 XIO-7 (0.53) 328 
The table shows the coefficient of D7t., which accounts for asymmetric volatility as per 
the methodology proposed by Engle and Ng (1993). T-ratios are shown next to the 
coeffi cients. Significance at the 95% and the 90% confidence levels is denoted by ** 
and * respectively. T he number of observations available for regression estimation is 
shown in italics. 
7.3.2 Intra-Day GARCH Processes 
This section shows the estimation of the actual GARCH models and it investigates the 
differences between the "Before Period" and the "After Period". Since it is desirable to fit a 
uniform model to all data sets for comparison purposes, the chosen specification is GARCH 
(1, I). This follows the observation of Andersen and Bollerslev (1997) that this model usually 
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provides an acceptable estimate. Therefore returns are modelled as an AR(l) process, whilst 
heteroskedasticity is modelled as shown in Equation 7.2 hereunder: 
C 1) +a 62 + filh, I1 1-1 -1 (7.2) 
where h, is the conditional variance which depends on past information, and E, 2 is the 
unexpected return observed during period 1. 
Two different GARCH models were attempted for each trading day: the first model assumed 
that the conditional distribution of the errors was normal whilst the second model assumed 
that it followed a student-t distribution. In the former case, three out of thirty estimations 
failed to converge, whilst in the latter case, ten estimations failed to converge. 
A number of estimated models were omitted for any one of the following three reasons. 
Models were omitted when a Wald Test failed to reject the Null Hypothesis that (a + P) was 
equal to one. This violates the required stationarity condition of GARCH models and 
indicates a unit root in the return variance. Other models were omitted given that the 
estimated coefficient for the lagged conditional variance in the GARCH equation was negative 
and highly significant. Such a coefficient does not make sense as outlined by Engle (2001). 
The third criterion for model omission was negative Rý statistics indicating very poor 
explanatory power. In these cases, the sofhvare did not provide an F-statistic for the models, 
probably due to the same reason. 
The Akaike Information Criterion and the Schwarz Bayesian Criterion were used to select the 
preferred model for each trading day - whether to use the normal distribution model or the t- 
distribution one. In those cases where these criteria selected different models, the choice was 
done according to the Akaike Information Criterion. For those trading days where no choice 
of model was possible (due to estimation failures or omitted models), the only available model 
was retained. This process resulted in 23 estimations available for analysis; 13 for the "Before 
Period" and 10 for the "After Period" as shown in Tables 7.4 and 7.5. 
The GARCH (l, l) model estimations presented in Tables 7.4 and 7.5 show that the AR(l) 
coefficient of the return equation is significant. According to Fama (1970) this indicates that 
the market is not even weak-form efficient since past returns may be used to (partly) predict 
current returns. Yet, we should also state that some degree of serial correlation may be 
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expected in high-frequency data, where returns tend to be affected by market factors such as 
the splitting of large orders into smaller ones. Despite the high significance of the AR(l) 
coefficient, the regressions have modest explanatory power as inferred from the R2 statistic. 
As regards the conditional variance equation, most of the alphas and betas are significant, and 
Wald tests reject the null hypothesis that a, + fil =0 for all the estimations. We thus infer that 
lagged errors and shocks have a significant effect on conditional volatility. 
Table 7.4: GARCH Models for one minute-frequency data - "Before Period" 
AR 
Day Intercept 
AR Lag 
R' Coeff: (b Coeff:. Coeff: 
A 
Wald 
V P 
B1 -0.000008 0.4095*** 0.1613 0.0000003 0.1226 0.1992 * 14.8 
t (0.25) (7.75) (0.07) (1.25) (1.84) (65.9) 
B2 0.000018 0.2757*** 0.1102 0.0000000 0.0185 0.9506 *** 63589.7 
n (0.58) (5.47) (0.00) (1.34) (63.33) (62.3) 
B3 -0,000027 0.4386 *** 0.1916 0.0000000 0.0457 0.8967 *** 10545.7 
t (0.80) (8.90) (0.00) (1.31) (26.17) 8.0 
B4 0.000022 0.3881 *** 0.1121 0.0000000 0.0346 0.8593 *** 6574.7 
n (0.67) (7.65) (0.01) (1.51) (34.82) (92.4) 
B5 0.000026 0.2838 *** - 0.0925 0.0000000 0.0626 0.8780 *** 9889.6 
n (1.04) (5.45) (0.00) (2.36) (32.67) (38.8) 
B6 -0.000027 0.3747 *** 
- 0.1680 0.0000000 0.1505 *** 0.7985 *** 3962.3 
n (0.70) (6.56) 1 (0.01) (2.71) (17.25) (7.41 
B8 -0.000038 0.4000 *** 0.1129 0.0000000 0.0835 0.8655 *** 8665.2 
n (0.82) (7.83) (0.01) (2.29) (25.90) (21.2) 
B9 0.000043 0.3750 *** 0.1789 0.0000000 0.2257 *** 0.6496 *** 1211.5 
n (1.59) (7.11) 
- 
(0.01) (3.37) (12.06) (17.41 
B 10 0.000021 0.3500 *** 0.1327 0.0000000 0.0939 0.8756 *** 7225.3 
t (0.65) (6.67) 
- 
(0.00) (2.21) (24.75) 
_ 
(4.5) 
B 11 0.000010 0.3923 *** 0.1339 0.0000000 0.0344 0.9260 *** 28603.8 
n (0.44) (7.74) 
- 
(0.00) (1.70) (44.94) (48.3) 
B 13 -0,000001 0.2195 *** 0.1927 0.0000000 0.0773 0.8578 *** 5168.3 
t (0.05) (4.34) (0.00) (2.15) (26.05) 121.4) 
B 14 -0.000009 0.3283 *** 0.0840 0.0000000 0.0664 0.8334 *** 1902.2 
t (U.; Jts) (6.24) (0.01) (1.37) (20.17) (17.8) 
B 15 0.000028 0.4129 *** 0.2092 0.0000001 0.2977 *** 0.3661 *** 154.4 
r (1.23) (8.74) (0.00) (3.49) (5.43) (34.1) 
- 
The first column shows the trading day, whilst the letter underneath Indicates whether the - 
conditional distribution for the error. terms was assumed to be normal (n) or student-t (t). Log 
returns were modelled as an AR(1) process, where 9 refers to the intercept and p is the 
estimated coefficient of the lagged return. T-ratios are shown in brackets underneath the 
coefficients and significance at the 99%, 95% and 90% confidence levels is denoted by ***, ** 
and * respectively. R2 shows the explanatory power of the regression. The coefficients of the 
GARCH process are w (the intercept), a, (lagged error term) and 01 (lagged conditional 
variance). The final column shows the results for the Wald Tests on the GARCH process. The 
null hypothesis of the first test is that a=O and P=O. The test is X2(2) distributed with a 95% 
critical value of 5.991. The result for the second Wald test is shown in braces underneath. The 
null hypothesis is that a, +P1=1 and the test is X2(1) distributed with a 95% critical value of 3,841. 
When the null hypothesis was not rejected, the particular model was discarded and therefore it 
is not shown in the table. The observations available for each model estimation ranged from 
336 to 340. (The actual number of observations in respect of each trading day is shown in 
Table 7.3). 
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Table 7.5: GARCH Models for one minute-frequency data - "After Period" 
AR 
Day Intercept 
AR Lag 
R2 Coeff: 6) Coeff: Coeff- A Wald 0 
16 
A2 -0.000016 0.2634 *** 0.1563 0.0000000 0.0426 0.9358 *** 37260.4 
n (0.76) (5.20) (0.00) (2.04) (47.82) 16.0 
A3 -0.000018 0.3003 *** 0.0771 0.0000000 0.0420 0.9448 *** 39661.2 
t (0.79) (5.59) 
- 
(0.00) (1.61) (40.67) 4.8 
A4 0.000034 0.3343 *** 0.5643 0.0000000 0.0475 ** 0.8857 *** 12464.2 
n (1.56) (7.63) (0.00) (2.18) (38.45) 63.9 
A7 0.000019 0.3382 *** - 0.0728 0.0000000 0.0618 0.8567 *** 4496.6 
t (0.65 (6.45) (0.00) (1.11) (15.96) 33.4 
A 9 0.000032 0.000032 0.2957 *** 0.1558 0.0000000 0.0448 0.8647 *** 5377.8 
t 1 53 
] 
1.53 ) (5.52) (0.0 (0.88) (16.89) 53.0 
All 
] 
_0 . 0; 0040 -0.000040 0.3704 *** 
- 0.1453 0.0000000 0.0227 0.9370 *** 15808.4 
t 1.46 (1.46) (7.41) 1 (0.00) (1.18) (49.33) 26.5 
A 12 -0.000007 0.3961 *** 0.1859 0.0000000 0.0732 0.7430 *** 1625.9 
n (0.26) (7.50) (0.01) (1.84) (17.67) 81.7 
A 13 -0.000008 0.3721 *** 0.1356 0.0000000 0.0372 0.9017 *** 14297.6 
n (0.34) (7.14) (0.00) (0.95) (23.56) 57.9 
A 14 -0.000015 0.2332 0.0203 0.0000000 0.1548 ** 0.5373 156.2 
t (0.82) 3.90 (0.01) (2.17) (7.71) 28.7 
A 15 -0.000007 0.31i29 29 0.0845 0 0 
t 
0.0000000 0.0579 0.7502 688.5 
t (0.39) (F ). 75) (5.75) (0.01) (0.96) (12.67) 36.2 
The first column shows the trading day, whilst the letter underneath indicates whether the 
conditional distribution for the error terms was assumed to be normal (n) or student-t (t). Log 
returns were modelled as an AR(l) process, where (p refers to the intercept and p is the 
estimated coefficient of the lagged return. T-ratios are shown in brackets underneath the 
coefficients and significance at the 99%, 95% and 90% confidence levels is denoted by ***, ** 
and * respectively. R2 shows the explanatory power of the regression. The coefficients of the 
GARCH process are w (the intercept), a, (lagged error term) and P, (lagged conditional 
variance). The final column shows the results for the Wald Tests on the GARCH process. The 
null hypothesis of the first test is that a=O and P=O. The test is X2 (2) distributed with a 95% 
critical value of 5.991. The result for the second Wald test is shown in braces underneath. The 
null hypothesis is that al+oi=l and the test is )? (l) distributed with a 95% critical value of 3.841. 
When the null hypothesis was not rejected, the particular model was discarded and therefore it 
is not shown in the table. The observations available for each model estimation were 328 or 
329. (The actual number of observations in respect of each trading day is shown in Table 7.3). 
According to Franses and Van Dijk (2000), the unconditional mean of c, 2 or the unconditional 
variance of E, is equal to: 
CT 
2 (7.3) 
Volatility is expected to converge to this value over the long-term. a, and, 61 are the ARMA 
components of the conditional variance i. e. the unexpected lagged return and the lagged 
conditional variance. One may interpret these as temporary deviations around the 
unconditional variance which depend on past information. Most of these coefficients, 
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especially those relating to, 81, are significant and we may conclude that there is a substantial 
degree of persistence in the NSE Nifty index, when sampled at one-minute frequency. 
T-tests were conducted on the coefficients obtained for the returns and conditional variance 
equations in order to infer any significant differences in between the "Before Period" and the 
"After Period". The results are shown in Table 7.6. The reduction in a, was significant at the 
90% level of confidence, when considering the critical value for a one-tailed test. The 
reduction in a, did not lead to any significant difference in the combined GARCH coefficients 
as shown by the t-test on a, +, 81. Yet, the results indicate an overall highly significant drop in 
the unconditional variance of &t as shown in the last column. This is in line with the evidence 
of a reduction in intra-day volatility (Section 6.4.1), where this was modelled by the Intra-Day 
Scaled Price Difference for individual stocks. Despite this, one should also note that the latter 
result from the previous Chapter was also coupled by a significant increase in Overnight 
Return Reversals and thus the relationship between the call. auctions and the overall volatility 
is still unclear. 
Table 7.6: T-Tests for Return and GARCH Model Coefficients (estimated through one-minute 
frequency data) 
Cb &. A e,, +A eolo-&, -A) Mean (Before) 0.0000044 0.358 0.000000047 0.101 - 0.766 0.867 0.00000036 Mean (After) -0.000003 0.322 0.000000017 0.058 0.836 0.894 0.00000018 
Variance (Before) 0.0000000 0.004 0.000000000 0.007 0.052 0.033 0.00000 
Variance (After) 0.0000000 0.003 0.000000000 0.001 0.016 0.009 0.00000 
Pooled Variance 0.0000000 0.003 0.000000000 _ 0.004 1 
_ 0.037 0.023 0.00000 
t-Statistic 0.686 1.455 1.242 1.534 -0.865 -0.429 2.833 
95% Critical 
Value (one-tail) 1.721 1.721 1.721 1.721 1.721 1.721 1.721 
95% Critical 
Value (two-tail) 2.080 2.080 2.080 2.080 2.080 2.080 2.080 
The table shows the results for t-tests to infer any significant differences in the coefficients between 
the "Before Period" and "After Period". Statistics were based on 13 observations for the "Before 
Period" and 10 observations for the "After Period". Significance at the 99%, 95% and 90% confidence 
levels is denoted by and * respectively. 
While the reduction in a is only significant at the 90% level of confidence when considering a one- 
tailed test, and the increase in, 6 is insignificant, there is an overall highly significant drop in the 
unconditional variance of et as measured by the expression [W / (1-cr-)3)]. 
The reported t-tests assumed equal variances between the 'Before Period" and the "After Period" in 
respect of each coefficient. T-tests assuming unequal variances were also conducted. The latter tests 
led to the same inferences, except that the reduction in w becomes significant at the 90% level of 
confidence, when considering a one-tailed test. 
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7.3.3 Intra-Day Return Distributions 
The second test on changes in intra-day volatility following the call auction suspension 
considers the intra-day return distributions. Particular emphasis is laid on the opening 
observations, given that any expected effects of opening auctions should be noted at the initial 
observations of the particular day (and similarly, most effects of closing call auctions can only 
be assessed in view of the initial observations of the following day). 
Figures 7.3 and 7.4 confirm that volatility tends to reach its peak during the initial half hour of 
trading, and then rises again towards the end of the trading day - although it does not typically 
reach the opening levels. This section investigates the differences between the opening, 
middle-of the-day, and closing volatility and aims to highlight any changes in these factors 
following the call auction suspension. A test is also undertaken in order to assess whether the 
initial volatility constitutes price discovery or noise. 
A note on the approach of analysing the return distributions is warranted prior to presenting 
the empirical results. Different methodological approaches were attempted to model changes 
in volatility throughout the trading day. The inclusion of dummy variables did not result in 
successful outcomes. Therefore, this rather "rudimentary" approach was adopted, involving 
the analysis of the basic characteristics of the returns at each of the particular trading day 
sections. This approach is not necessarily an inferior one. According to Dacorogna, el. aL 
(200 1; pp. 44) in case of high-frequency data, realized volatility may prove to be a superior 
measure than modelled volatility such as the estimates obtained through GARCH estimations. 
The first 40 (one-minute) observations for each trading day were considered in compiling 
statistics for the opening period. Similarly, the last 40 observations were used for compiling 
statistics relating to the closing. The rest of the observations were labelled as "middle of the 
day". 
The summary statistics are shown in Table 7.7. When considering the average statistics for 
the 30-day period, it is evident that volatility is highest at the opening, whilst closing volatility 
is higher than that of the middle of the day. This may be inferred both through the standard 
deviations of returns, as well as the maximum and the mean of squared returns. In addition, 
the largest return during the day tends to occur at the opening as shown in Figures 7.3 and 7.4. 
It is also evident that the opening return distributions are the ones which deviate most from the 
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normal distribution, in terms of skewness and excess kurtosis. As may be expected, the 
skewness is closer to zero for the middle of the day distributions and this may be attributed to 
the fact that these distributions include roughly five times as many observations as the other 
ones. A higher amount of observations makes it less likely that the distribution skews to any 
particular direction. 
Table 7.7: Summary Statistics For Return Distributions Sampled at One-Minute Intervals 
LOG RETURNS . SQUARED LOG RETURNS 
St. Dev Skew. K-3 Mean St. Dev Max Min 
Op. Avg: 30 Days 0.0012 0.835 6.710 0.00000193 0.0000068 0.0000403 0 
Mid. Avg: 30 Days 0.0005 -0.048 1.312 0.00000027 0.0000005 0.0000041 0 
Cl. Avg: 30 Days 0.0007 0.155 0.428 0.00000055 0.0000009 0.0000041 0 
OP. Avg: Before 0.0012 0.339 4.313 0.00000164 0.0000047 0.0000278 0 
OP- Avg: After 0.0012 1.330 9.106 0.00000222 0.0000088 0.0000528 0 
Mid. Avg: Before 0.0006 -0.131 1.740 0.00000034 0.0000006 0.0000054 0 
Mid. Avg: After 0.0004 0.035 0.884 0.00000020 0.0000003 0.0000028 0 
Cl. Avg: Before 0.0008 0.156 0.692 0.00000079 0.0000014 0.0000062 0 
Cl. Avg: After 0.0005 0.153 0.165 0.00000031 0.0000004 0.0000020 0. 
The Columns indicate the following: (1) Period of the Day (Opening / Middle / Closing); (2) Average 
for the particular period (Whole Sample / Before Period / After Period); (3) Standard Deviation of 
Returns; (4) Skewness of Returns; (5) Excess Kurtosis of Returns; (6) Mean of Squared Returns; (7) 
Standard Deviation of Squared Returns; (8) Maximum Squared Return; and (9) Minimum Squared 
Return. The opening and closing distributions consisted of 40 observations. The observations for the 
middle-of-the-day ranged from 248 to 260. 
In testing for the differences in volatility during the Opening, Middle of the Day and the 
Closing, two volatility proxies were used. These were the Mean Squared Returns and the 
Return Standard Deviations for the particular period of the day - these were first estimated for 
each section of the thirty trading days, and then an average was computed for the Opening, 
Middle Of the Day and the Closing. 
The differences between the Mean Squared Returns at the Opening, Middle-of-the-Day and 
Closing were tested through two-tailed Paired Sample Mests. Results shown in Table 7.8 
Panel A reject the hypotheses of no difference between the mean squared returns across the 
trading day. Similarly, two-tailed Paired Sample Mests were conducted on the return standard 
deviations during different periods of the trading day. Table 7.8 Panel B shows that the results 
are qualitatively analogous. Overall, this confinns the pattern of a reverse-J-shape in volatility 
(and retums). 
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Table 7.8: T-tests on Differences in Volatility During the Trading Day. 
PANEL A: Two-Tailed Paired Sample T-Tests Tests on Mean Squared Retums 
Null Hypothesis Outcome T-Statistic Two-Tailed 
Confidence Level Critical Value 
No Diff. Between Open. & Mid. Rejected - 99% 3.60 2.76 (99%) 
No Diff. Between Open. & Clos. Rejected - 99% 2.83 2.76 (99%) 
No Diff. Between Mid. & Clos. Rejected - 95% 2.22 2.05 (95%) 
PANEL B: Two-Tailed Paired Sample T-Tests Tests on Retum Std. Deviations 
Null Hypothesis Outcome T. -Statistic 
- Confidence Level Critical Value 
No Diff. Between Open. & Mid. Rejected - 99% 6.21 2.76 (99%) 
No Diff. Between Open. & Clos. Rejected - 99% 4.45 2.76 (99%) 
No Diff. Between Mid. & Clos. Rejected - 99% 3.62 1 
2.76 (99%) 
The Wests are based on the statistics of the 30 sampled trading days; and thus 30 
observations were available for each of the opening, closing and middle-of-the-day 
periods. All Wests reject the null hypothesis of no difference between the respective 
volatility proxies during the different periods of the day. 
The Mean Squared Returns and the Return Standard Deviations Statistics were estimated 
through one-minute frequency data. 
The differences between the "Before Period" and the "After Period" across these different 
sections of the trading day are now analysed. The statistics for the Opening Distributions as 
shown in Table 7.7 indicate that following the suspension of the call auction, the initial 
volatility increased (in terms of the mean of squared returns, standard deviation of squared 
returns, and maximum squared returns). This is in contrast to the Middle-of-the-Day and the 
Closing distributions which overall indicate lower vo latility. 
One may also note differences in terms of deviations of the return distributions from non-nality 
- although this does not necessarily serve as an indication with respect to volatility. The 
opening return distributions for the "After Period" deviate more from normality in terms of 
skewness and excess kurtosis. Conversely, the Middle-of-the-Day and the Closing 
distributions indicate convergence towards normality following the auction suspension. 
As regards the kurtosis for the whole 30 days, the opening returns tend to be the most "peak 
- shaped". This also indicates that whilst the opening is typically more volatile, it is also 
characterised by a number of returns which are very close to zero. The plots of the log returns 
across trading days confirm that the opening is characterised by a large return which takes 
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place within the first minutes, which is then followed by smaller returns. This pattern 
suggests that prices seem to fluctuate, initially in response to overnight news and subsequently 
depending on temporary liquidity features such as remaining order imbalances. This point is 
investigated ftirther underneath. Provided that the large return is not subsequently reversed, 
this suggests that most of the initial price discovery occurs within the interval of one or two 
minutes. Yet, if the large return is subsequently reversed, this implies that the initial volatility 
might comprise noise. 
Prior to presenting the empirical results, one should note that a limitation of this methodology 
is that the underlying news pattern (which is not observed) may in fact mean that in some 
Reversal instances, the initial volatility may still have been justified, and similarly a 
Reinforcement does not necessarily imply that the opening return was justified. Yet, it may be 
expected that over a 30 trading-day sample this methodology yields reasonable indications. In 
addition no material differences in news arrivals are expected to prevail between the "Before" 
and "After" periods. 
A further limitation of the methodology is that it may be biased in favour of reinforcements. 
As outlined by Madhavan, Richardson and Roomans; (1997), reinforcements may be more 
likely than reversals given that larger orders are typically executed in smaller components and 
due to other market factors such as price continuity rules. 71 
Table 7.9 shows the statistics relating to the Reversal-Reinforcement Test. The opening 
returns were defined as the percentage (nominal) return from the opening till 10: 15.72 The 
return plots confirmed that in most cases, the large return at the opening occurred during the 
initial 15 minutes, and it is therefore captured in this period. The subsequent returns were then 
measured as the return from 10: 15 till 12: 30 and the return from 10: 15 till the closing. When 
the direction of the opening return did not subsequently change, it suggests that the opening 
return was justified and it is labelled as a Reinforcement. Those cases where the return 
changed sign are labelled as Reversals, and indicate that the opening return may have been 
noise. 
71 The typical bid-ask bounce may potentially lead to an opposite effect (a relatively high amount of reversals) 
when analysing individual stock or derivative data at short enough intervals, as discussed by Buckle, Gwilym, 
Thomas and Woodhams (1998). Whilst the concept of bid-ask spreads is less relevant in those settings where 
transactions are not intermediated via market-makers (such as NSE), such effect might still transpire given that 
trades may usually be classified as "buyer-initiated" or "seller-initiated", depending on wbom of the parties has a 
higher incentive or urgency to transact. 
72 In case of the post-suspension period, this constitutes the return during the first 15minutes of trading, whilst it 
represents a longer trading time in case of the pre-suspension period, owing to the additional call auction trading. 
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The results shown in Table 7.9 indicate that Reversals are more prominent than 
Reinforcements, and overall they do not provide evidence that the initial opening returns are 
justified. This suggests that the opening stages are prone to unjustified price fluctuations, and 
it explains %vhy market designers have typically implemented features to assist price discovery 
during this period (such as pre-opening periods and call auctions). 
Table 7.9: Intra-Day Return Patterns 
Day Op - 10: 15 10: 15-12: 30 10: 15-Cl RF REV - 12: 30 RF REV - Cl. 
B1 0.56% 1.44% 0.16% RF RF 
B2 1.30% 0.61% 0.45% RF RF 
B3 0.85% -1.01% -1.90% REV REV 
B4 -0.66% 1.07% 1.09% REV REV 
B5 -0.13% 0.62% 0.89% REV REV 
B6 0.61% -1.99% -2.72% REV REV 
B7 -0.49% 1.53% -3.41% REV RF 
B8 0.09% -2.50% -1.01% REV REV 
B9 3.53% -0.09% 1.14% REV RF 
BIO -1.01% 1.47% 0.29% REV REV 
Bll -0.28% -0.90% 0.41% RF REV 
B 12 0.73% -0.35% 0.26% REV RF 
B 13 1.90% -0.40% -0.26% REV REV 
B 14 0.68% 0.08% -0.51% RF REV 
B 15 -1.42% 1.85% 3.26% REV REV 
A1 -0.05% 0.01% -1.45% REV. RF 
A2 1.00% -0.21% -1.11% REV REV 
A3 -0.08% -1.40% -1.67% RF RF 
A4 -3.02% 0.47% 2.10% REV REV 
A5 0.48% 0.08% -1.44% RF REV 
A6 -0.24% -0.41% 2.80% RF REV 
A7 0.95% 1.09% 1.48% RF RF 
A8 0.27% 0.08% -0.47% RF REV 
A9 0.87% 0.63% 1.44% RF RF 
A10 0.62% 0.44% 0.59% RF RF 
All 0.41% -1.79% -2.49% REV REV 
A 12 -0.48% -0.64% -0.58% RF RF 
A 13 0.53% 0.42% -0.74% RF REV 
A 14 0.48% -0.73% -0.51% REV REV 
A 15 -0.19% -0.56% -0.31% RF RF 
TOTAL DAYS: REV: 16 REV: 18 
RF: 14 RF: 12 
BEFORE SUSPENSION PERIOD: REV: 11 REV: 10 
RF: 4 RF: 5 
AFTER SUSPENSION PERIOD: REV: 5 REV: 8 
RF: 10 RF: 7 
The returns columns show the % changes in nominal prices from the opening to 10: 15, from 
10: 15 till 12: 30, and from 10: 15 till the end of the day. When the direction of the opening 
return is the same as that of the subsequent return, the "pattern" is classified as a 
Reinforcement (RF). When the opening return changes direction during the rest of the day, 
the "pattern" is classified as a Reversal (RV). 
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Yet, the statistics reported in Table 7.9 do not provide overall evidence that the auction setup 
on NSE was assisting in price discovery. When considering the differences between the call 
auction regime and the trading days without auctions, the reversals are more prominent in the 
call auction period. Therefore, the higher initial volatility following the auction suspension 
(Table 7.9) should be interpreted with caution, since it might be the case that although there 
were higher price movements, the latter were in fact justified. 
The Reinforcement / Reversal ratios provide further evidence that the expected theoretical 
benefits of auctions were not being realised on NSE, and they support the evidence presented 
in the previous chapter that the suspension of the call auctions led to higher efficiency and 
lower intra-day volatility. The latter evidence was gathered over a 120-trading day period, 
and therefore provides confidence that the former intra-day results are not a "peculiar 
observation". 
Thus, although at face value one may argue that the call auctions were contributing towards 
reduced opening volatility, doubts are cast about this statement when considering whether the 
initial price movements were reversed later on during the ddy or otherwise. Yet, one should 
also be cautious before attributing such price movements to the call auctions themselves. 
While it might be the case that the call auctions were not contributing to price discovery, it 
might still be unreasonable to state that the auctions were pushing prices in the "wrong" 
direction. This goes against the fundamental features of auction principles and it might be 
more sensible to attribute such inconsistencies to traders' actions. In particular, it might be the 
case that some traders were submitting "Mispriced" orders to misguide other traders, and 
cancelling such orders before they are executed, as suggested for instance by Biais, Hillion 
and Spatt (1999) in respect of the (former) Paris Bourse. Such participants then trade 
profitably as the price movements are reversed. 
If traders indeed use opening call auctions to misguide other participants, then one natural 
question woul d be why they donot use the closing call auctions in a similar manner. Firstly, 
there is no evidence that mispriced orders are not submitted at the closing call auction as well. 
Indeed, prior literature suggests that there are participants who may be interested in 
manipulating closing prices. The latter may include brokers who might try to influence 
closing prices in order to give the impression of smart order execution capability to their 
clients (Hillion and Suominen; 2004). Despite this, there are also reasons why traders may 
prefer to submit mispriced orders earlier during the day, rather than at the closing auctions. 
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Comerton-Forde and Rydge (2006 a) showed that manipulation is less costly in a situation 
when there are relatively few orders on the book. Thus, one may infer that opening auctions 
could have been more suited for manipulation since these were less active than the closing 
ones. Another reason why traders might have preferred to use opening auctions for 
manipulation is that they might not have been interested in misguiding participants during the 
overnight period, given that no organised trading takes place overnight, and therefore it might 
be difficult to take advantage of the information asymmetry. A related aspect is that inferring 
the real value of a stock during the overnight period may be more difficult due to the absence 
of trade reporting. In addition, if the mispriced order is executed in the closing auction, 
traders may have to withstand undesired overnight positions. This would present the risk that 
adverse overnight news may swamp any expected profits from anticipated price reversals. 
These risks might become even more pronounced when holding exposures during the 
weekend closure, as per the empirical evidence of Brailsford (1995) in respect of Australian 
equity market volatility. The submission of mispriced orders towards the closing may also be 
hindered by increased trading costs towards the end of the day. One possible reason for such 
increased costs may be that fund managers postpone their trades towards the closing, and this 
creates increased demand for immediacy (Cushing and Madhavan; 2001). 
The statistics for the middle-of-the-day and the closing hint at a lower volatility following the 
call auction suspension. This is in line with the decline in the unconditional variance 
following suspension (Section 7.3.2). 
7.4 Inter-Day Volatility 
Given that the daily data feature seasonality effects (Section 5.6) it is biased towards 
indicating higher volatility during the call auction period, since the higher volatility months 
(March and April) coincide with the call auction system, whilst the lower volatility month 
(August) forms part of the post-suspension period. This monthly seasonality was detected 
over a five year period, and thus it is not related to the call auctions themselves. 
To exclude these seasonal effects, the data were adjusted as follows. Log returns during the 
months of March and April as compared to the rest-of-the-year are in the ratio of 1.0043 :I 
(Chapter 5 Table 8). Conversely, the ratio of the rest-of-year log returns to August log returns 
is I: 0.9974. As a simple adjustment for this seasonality, the March and April log returns 
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were divided by 1.0043, whilst the August log returns were divided by 0.9974 . The plot of 
the Nifty Log Returns adjusted for seasonality is shown in Figure 7.5. 
Figure 7.5: Nifty Log Returns adjusted for Monthly Seasonality 
As a preliminary test, the Modulus of Seasonally-Adjusted Nifty Log Returns series was 
regressed as follows: 
Y= ir +, flDA +ý (7.4) 
where Y is the Seasonally-Adjusted Log Modulus Return series, 7r and P are estimated 
coefficients and c is an error term. DA is a dummy variable which takes the value of I during 
the call auction period (I" February 1999 till 8h June 1999) and zero otherwise. The results 
shown in Table 7.10 Panel A indicate that volatility was higher during the call auction period, 
and the dummy variable is significant at the 95% confidence level. Yet a closer look at Figure 
7.5 shows "spikes" in the Seasonally-Adjusted Log Return series that coincide with the month 
of April. Considering the possibility that these large returns were due to new information, 
rather than the call auction itself, the four largest observations during the month of April were 
eliminated. These observations ranked as the first, second, fourth and fifth largest in the 
whole data set. When the regression shown in Equation 7.4 was re-estimated in the absence of 
these "outliers", DA was not even significant at the 90% confidence level, as shown in Table I 
7.10 Panel B. 
" The tests undertaken on the adjusted log returns data were also replicated on the unadjusted log returns. No 
material differences were noted in the empirical results. 
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Table 7.10: Regressing Seasonal ly-Adjusted Daily Log Returns Modulus on A Call 
Auction Dummy 
PANEL A: Data comprised the whole sample of Seasonally-Adjusted Log Returns 
Intercept (-rr) Auction Dummy (DA) Explanatory Statistics 
0.0 122 *** 0.0040 ** R-Squared 0.0238 
(10.24) (2.21) (R-bar-Squared 0.0189) 
PANEL B: Data did not include the 4 largest April observations 
Intercept (-rr) Auction Dummy (DA) Explanatory Statistics 
0.0122 *** 0.0017 R-Squared 0.0066 
(12.20) (1.14) (R-bar-Squared 0.0015) 
The table shows the results obtained when regressing the Seasonally-Adjusted Nifty Log 
Return Modulus series, over an intercept, and a dummy variable which took the value of 
1 during the. call auction period and zero otherwise. Panel A shows the first estimation . 
using all 203 sampled observations, whilst Panel B shows the second estimation, where 
the four largest April observations were eliminated (199 observations). Regression 
coefficients are shown on top, whilst t-ratios are reported in brackets underneath. 
Explanatory statistics are shown in the third column. Significance is denoted by 
and * for the 99%, 95%, and 90% confidence level respectively. 
Thus, this preliminary test yields an indication against the call auction setup, albeit not clearly 
significant. We now progress with the estimation of GARCH models using the seasonally- 
adjusted daily data. 
7.4.1 Preliminaries for fitting GARCH models 
In order to infer the model which best captures the return generating process, six AR(p) 
models were estimated with p ranging from 0 to 5. Both the Schwarz Bayesian Criterion and 
the Akaike Infonnation Criterion selected an AR(O) process. 
Having selected an AR(O) specification for the daily log returns, we now test for the presence 
and nature of ARCH effects in the residuals of this process through LM heteroskedasticity 
tests as proposed by Engle (1982). 74 Order I and order 5 tests yielded LM statistics of 20.1 
and 21.5 respectively. The tests permit the rejection of the Null Hypothesis of no ARCH 
74 This test was described in Section 3.4.3. 
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effects at the 99% level of confidence, when comparing the LM statistics to the Chi-Squared 
statistics at the respective degrees of freedom. 
The test of Engle and Ng (1993) was used to infer whether a GARCH process which accounts 
for asymmetric volatility is required (Equation 7.1). In this case, the coefficient of the lagged 
dummy Dý-t-j was 0.00008 with a standard error of 0.0001 and this is indicates that any 
asymmetric responses are insignificant. Thus it is unnecessary to use models which account 
for asymmetric volatility. 
In attempting to fit GARCH models to the data, the majority of estimations failed to converge. 
Therefore, Absolute Value GARCH (AGARCH) models were estimated as alternatives. An 
AGARCH model assumes that the conditional volatility is affected by the current and past 
conditional volatility, and by the current and past absolute Value of the shocks. Thus the 
conditional volatility equation of an AGARCH model is specified as follows: 
J, = o) ++ ßilliý-, (7.5) 
'where h, is the conditional variance which depends on past information, and E12 is the 
unexpected return observed during period t. Empirical results are shown in the next Section. 
7.4.2 The Impact of Call Auction Suspension on Inter-Day Volatility 
Two different approaches were selected for inferring the impact of the call auction suspension 
on volatility. The first approach involved further use of the dummy variable D. 4 which takes 
the value of I during the call auction period, and the value of zero for the rest of the 
observations. This dummy variable was included in the conditional variance equation of the 
AGARCH model. Estimation results are shown in Table 7.11. The second approach involved 
the estimation of two separate AGARCH models for the "B. efore Period" and the "After 
Period". The results are shown in Table 7.12 Panels A and B. 
The results of the dummy variable approach, suffer from low explanatory power in terms of 
W. The intercept of the log return process is significant at the 90% level. As regards the 
conditional variance equation, the Wald-Tests do not permit the rejection that the coefficients 
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are equal to zero. The dummy variable DA is positive, indicating a higher conditional variance 
in the call auction regime. The dummy variable is nearly significant at the 90% level of 
confidence, both through a Wald-Test and a comparison of the coefficient with the standard 
error 
Table 7.11: AGARCH Model for dally Nifty log returns with Auction Dummy 
Log Return AR(O) Process: 
Intercept R (ba r) 2 
0.0020 -0.0001 
(1.61) f-0.0151) 
Conditional Variance Equation: 
Coeff: w Coeff: a, Coeff: 181 Coeff: DA 
0.0 184 *** 0.1887 -0.2747 0.0055 
(2.79) (2.35) (0.66) (1.57) 
Wald Test Statistic for the Null Hypothesis that a, +, 6 1 +DA= 0: 
0.0386 as compared to a Chi Squared (1) Critical Value of 2.71 at the 90% level of confidence. 
Wald Test Statistic for the Null Hypothesis that af +, 6 ,=0: 
0.04349 as compared to a Chi Squared (1) Critical Value of 2.71 at the 90% level of confidence. 
Wald Test Statistic for the Null Hypothesis that DA= 0: 
2.4978 as compared to a Chi Squared (1) Critical Value of 2.71 at the 90% level of confidence. 
The conditional volatility equation includes a dummy variable DA, which takes the value of I for the 
call auction regime, and a value of zero when no call auctions were held. 204 observations were 
available for model estimation. T-ratios are shown in brackets underneath the respective 
coefficients. Significance at the 99%, 95% and 90% levels of confidence is denoted by and 
respectively. The Adjusted R2 is shown in braces underneath the R2 statistic. 
The low significance of the dummy variable is not surprising. The previous evidence 
presented in Chapter 6 regarding the impact of the auction suspension on volatility was mixed. 
In addition, it may also be justified to expect call auctions to impact more heavily on intra-day 
volatility rather than inter-day volatility, given that the long-term value of stocks is more 
dependent on the fundamental value of the firms, rather than on the setup in which they trade. 
These considerations, coupled with the low explanatory power of the mean equation limit the 
potential for meaningfid inferences. The results of this test are thus consistent with the 
previous ones, in that we only obtain weak evidence against the call auction setup. 
The results obtained from the second approach of estimating a separate AGARCH model for 
both regimes are presented in Table 7.12, Panels A and B. Overall these results do not 
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contradict the above arguments. Again, the AR(O) process is characterised by negative R2 
statistics which limit the overall significance of any inferences. Yet, the conditional 
heteroskedasticity equation is characterised by non-negligible changes across the regimes. 
Table 7.12: AGARCH Models for daily Nifty log returns 
Panel A: Before Call Auction Suspension 
Log Return AR(O) Process: 
Intercept R (bar) 2 
0.0043 -0.0070 
(1.81) (-0.03011 
Conditional Variance Equation: 
Coeff: to Coeff: at Coeff:, 61 
0.0 172 *** 0.2983 -0.0347 
(2.97) (2.08) (0.13) 
Wald Test Statistic for the Null Hypothesis that a, +13 0: 
0.8745 as compared to a Chi Squared (1) Critical Value of 2.71 at the 90% level of confidence. 
Panel B: After Call Auction Suspension 
Log Return AR(O) Process: 
Intercept R (b ar) 2 
0.0013 -0.0001 
(0.90) (-0.01811 
Conditional Variance Equation: 
Coeff: w Coeff: a, Coeff: 181 
0.0239 *** 0.1613 -0.6100 
(5.31) (1.49) (2.64) 
Wald Test Statistic for the Null Hypothesis that cr, 0: 
2.5161 as compared to a Chi Squared (1) Critical Value of 2.71 at the 90% level of confidence. 
90 observations were available for estimating the Before Suspension model, whilst 114 
observations were available for the After Suspension period. T-ratlos are shown in brackets 
underneath the respective coefficients. Significance at the 99%, 95% and 90% level of 
confidence is denoted by ***, ** and * respectively. The Adjusted k2 is shown in braces 
underneath the R2 statistic. 
The initial constant in the conditional volatility equation o), is highly significant. The increase 
in the intercept may indicate a higher overall conditional volatility following the call auction 
suspension. 
As regards the other components of the conditional standard deviation equation, the 
coefficient of a, is only signifi6ant in the "Before Period", whilst the coefficient of, 61 is only 
significant in the "After Period". The problem with the latter coefficient is that a negative and 
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significant lagged conditional volatility does not make sense outlined by Engle (2001). 
Alternative GARCH models were thus estimated, however the significantly negative lagged 
volatility component still prevailed. 75 
Relying on the above results we may state that in the call auction period, shocks had a higher 
impact on the conditional standard deviation in those periods immediately following the 
shock, whilst following call auction suspension, the response of the conditional standard 
deviation to lagged shocks decreased. Conversely, P, which is an AR effect of the conditional 
standard deviation is more significant in the "After Period". Thus, whilst the initial response 
to a shock is lower following auction suspension, the response "trails on" to a higher extent in 
the "After Period". These effects are shown in Figure 7.6 which traces the response of the 
conditional standard deviation to a1 unit shock in period t-1. 
I Fiqure 7.6: Conditional Volatilitv Resg)onse to a1 Unit shock In Period t-1 I 
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This leads on to the question as to which period is characterised by the overall higher 
volatility. Unlike most of the other tests, these models tend to favour the call auction period. 
Firstly, the intercept of the conditional volatility equation o) is lower in the call auction period, 
indicating a lower overall conditional volatility in the latter period. In addition, the volatility 
of the "Before Period" behaves more in line as expected in an efficient market, in that new 
shocks have an immediate impact on volatility - indicating that new information is priced in 
immediately, and the impact of news becomes less prominent in later periods. 
Overall, the GARCH tests seem inconclusive, given that whilst the first test points that the call 
auction period was characterised by a higher conditional volatility, the second test shows that 
75 The specifications AR(l)-AGARCH (1, I), AR(O)-EGARCH (1, I), and AR(l)-EGARCH(l, l) still resulted in a 
significantly negative lagged volatility for the "After Period". When an AR(O)-AGARCH (2,1) model was 
specified, this resulted in a significantly negative lagged volatility for the "Before Period", rather than the "After 
Period". 
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the conditional volatility seems be more in line with an efficient market in the call auction 
period. However, this inference as regards higher efficiency following the call auction 
suspension conflicts with the evidence presented in Chapter 6, where the Relative Return 
Dispersion decreased significantly following the auction suspension. 
7.5 Discussion 
This analysis considered changes in inter-day and intra-day volatility around the suspension of 
opening and closing call auctions on NSE. The original data set sampled at daily frequency 
was adjusted to take account of monthly seasonality of volatility as discovered in Chapter 5. 
The tests on intra-day data (Section 7.3) point at a significant drop in the response of the 
conditional variance to lagged shocks as well as a highly significant drop in the unconditional 
variance following the call auction suspension. In addition the post-suspension period is 
characterised by lower volatility in the middle-of-the.: day and the closing return distributions. 
The opening volatility was higher in the post-suspension period, yet tests on the 
reinforcements and reversals of price movements indicate that this higher volatility might have 
beenjustified. The reinforcement-reversal tests cast doubts as to whether any expected 
benefits of call auctions were materialising on NSE, since the call auction period is 
characterised by a relatively high amount of reversals of the opening returns. The tests on 
intra-day data thus seem to confirm the previous chapter's overall evidence against the 
efficacy of call auctions - particularly the shortcomings of the opening one. 
Tests on the seasonally-adjusted daily data (Section 7.4) revealed that the log returns were 
higher in absolute value during the call auction period; yet we cannot be sure whether this is a 
remnant of the seasonal volatility pattern on NSE - indeed the difference becomes 
insignificant when the four largest observations for the month of April are eliminated. 
Modelling volatility through an AGARCH process indicates higher conditional volatility in 
the call auction period through a positive dummy variable, although the latter is not significant 
at the 90% confidence level. Estimating separate AGARCIý models for the "Before Period" 
and the "After Period" yields potentially contrasting results, in that the conditional volatility 
seems higher following call auction suspension, and the impact of shocks (news) is more in 
line with an efficient market in the "Before Period". * 
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In trying to fit the puzzle together it might be sensible to give more weighting to the tests 
conducted on intra-day data on various grounds. Firstly, any benefits of call auctions might be 
expected to materialise in the shorter-term, whereas longer-term volatility should be more 
influenced by news rather than the market microstructure setup. Secondly, given that the 
intra-day data set spans over a period of around one and a half months it should be less prone 
to monthly seasonality whereas traces of seasonality might still be present in the seasonally- 
adjusted data set. Thirdly, the majority of the tests carried gut on daily data do not have 
sufficient statistical significance and some of the coefficients do not make economic sense. 
Finally, the daily data tests yield potentially conflicting results. 
Volatility seems higher during the call auction period, although we cannot rule out that this is 
due to the news release patterns on NSE. The tests conducted on intra-day data seem to 
favour thesuspension of the call auction. Perhaps the strongest result in this respect is the 
ratio of Return Reversals: Reinforcements. Reversals of opening returns tend to be more 
prominent in the call auction period and this raises the question of whether the expected 
benefits of opening call auctions were materialising on NSE. 
Overall, this (contrasting) evidence might not serve as a case for the universal suspension of 
call auctions - indeed this is by no means being hinted. Yet this evidence is useful from the 
point of view of market designers who should avoid thinking of call auctions as a carte 
blanche for lower market volatility and higher efficiency. Thought has to be laid on the actual 
design of auctions and to the possibilities that these might not attract sufficient trading activity 
as outlined by Schwartz (2000), and that they may be used to misguide traders' expectations 
as suggested by Biais, Hillion and Spatt (1999). 
One aspect of auction design which might be particularly challenging is transparency. Low 
levels of transparency, might imply that if the market clearing price deviates considerably 
from the true value of the asset, then the correctly-priced orders might remain undisplayed to 
the market at large. Conversely, increased transparency may facilitate collusion in between 
traders (since it might make it easier to infer the strategies of other participants) and it 
increases the cost of the "free option" problem related to limit orders (Madhavan, Porter and 
Weaver; 2005). Increased transparency may also translate in lower efficiency if it makes it 
easier for market participants to disseminate imprecise information which overshadows real 
news (Brandouy, Barneto and Leger; 2003). Indeed, according to Vickery (1961) the optimal 
auction structure when only one unit of the asset is available, involves sealed bids i. e. minimal 
transparency. Yet, this might not be applicable to those cases when multiple units are being 
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traded (Morgan; 2001). Klemperer (2000) suggested the use of an Anglo-Dutch auction 
where the initial phase of the auction is transparent, yet the final phase involves sealed bids. 
Despite this, the relevance of such an auction to securities markets is questionable: splitting 
the auction in two phases, would require the submission of at least two prices - this involves 
considerable human effort, and it is therefore likely to raise transaction costs prohibitively, say 
when a broker is required to trade fifty different stocks. In addition, an auction where the final 
phase is not transparent may reduce the traders' confidence in the procedure. 
Designers should also consider whether auctions might make sense in the particular 
circumstances; for example, the use of auctions to misguide participants may be more 
prevalent in India where markets were traditionally characterised by insider dealing and 
market manipulation as discussed by Shah and Sivakumar (2000) and Agarwal and Singh 
(undated). 
7.6 Conclusion 
This analysis employed a battery of tests on intra-day and inter-day data to assess the impact 
of the suspension of call auctions on NSE volatility. The empirical evidence is somewhat 
mixed - yet we may claim that we did not obtain any clear evidence that call auctions on NSE 
were resulting in significant benefits. This broadly confirms the conclusions obtained in the 
previous Chapter - in particular the likelihood that the opening call auction was less effective 
than one may expect. One possibility is that the auction setup on NSE was not suitable for the 
particular market characteristics as outlined in the previous section. 
These results add further evidence to that of the existing literature, and they also indicate other 
areas of required research. The latter include more theoretical and empirical modelling 
regarding call auction suitability within different market setups. The interaction of call 
auctions (or their absence) with other market microstructure features may yield invaluable 
insights as to why the expected theoretical benefits of call auctions may not always 
materialise. A crude answer as suggested in this analysis might be that auctions are at times 
incorrectly structured. Yet, the question still remains as to the factors which should be 
considered in assessing the desirability of auctions for particular markets, and how to design 
the "optimal" call auction for a given trading setup. 
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APPENDIX 7. 
Testing for ARCH Effects in Intra-Day Data sampled at one-minute Intervals 
Day Order( )Tests Order ( 5) Tests 
LM Test F-Test LM Test F-Test 
B01 1.73 1.72 1.17 0.23 
B02 66.57 82.16 10.89 2.20 
B03 0.30 0.30 27.36 5.83 
B04 1.50 1.49 16.78 3.46 
B05 5.44 5.48 23.53 4.95 
B06 1.67 1.66 15.42 3.16 
B07 60.52 73.02 66.04 16.06 
B08 5.01 5.04 12.08 2.45 
B09 15.22 15.8 72.67 18.13 
B10 6.90 6.98 5.06 1.01 
Bll 13.28 13.71 4.82 0.96 
B12 0.57 0.57 7.54 1.51 
B13 4.52 4.54 30.18 6.49 
B14 0.00 0.00 1.93 0.38 
B15 84.68 111.77 74.83 18.8 
A01 104.91 152.84 35.01 7.67 
A02 0.30 0.30 16.52 3.41 
A03 8.87 9.03 15.53 3.19 
A04 56.37 67.45 82.12 21.44 
A05 11.13 11.42 13.28 2.71 
A06 1.84. 1.84 15.53 3.19 
A07 0.13 0.13 6.98 1.40 
A08 0.03 0.03 9.77 1.97 
A09 0.17 0.17 5.85 1.17 
A10 10.42 10.67 13.72 2.8 ** 
All 1.05 1.05 3.45 0.68 
A12 1.77 1.76 5.14 1.02 
A13 1.24 1.24 3.36 0.66 
A14 12.31 12.67 19.28 4.01 
A15 0.01 0.01 * 5.98 1.19 
The table shows the results for various ARCH tests specifications on the 30 intra-day 
data sets. The time-series for each trading consisted of a number of observations 
ranging from 328 to 340. (The actual number of observations in respect of each trading 
day is shown in Table 7.3). Order (1) and Order (5) tests were conducted; both through 
LM methodology as outlined by Engle (1982), as well as the F-version of the tests. A 
rejection of the Null Jpothesis of No Arch Effects at the 95% level of confidence is 
denoted by **. The X Critical Values (95%) are 3.84 [for the Order (1) test] and 11,07 
(Order (5)). The F-Critical Values (95%) are: 3.89 [for the Order (1) test] and 2.27 [Order 
(5)]. 
247 
8. CONCLUSION 
CHAPTER 8: 
CONCLUSION 
This dissertation presents a series of original findings from a diversity of empirical techniques 
applied to data which were sampled at different frequencies. This concluding chapter 
highlights the motivation behind the research undertaken and summarises the main findings. 
It also discusses the contribution of this research to the existing literature and to finance 
practitioners. The findings are evaluated in the context of the limitations of the methodologies 
employed, and directions for ftiture research are pointed out. 
8.1 Motivation Behind the Undertaken Research 
The main topics tackled in the previous empirical chapters were selected on a number of 
grounds. Firstly, traditional financial theory has difficulty explaining asset price movements. 
The relatively new discipline of market microstructure offers an opportunity to account for 
part of the unexplained price fluctuations especially when these seem unrelated to 
fundamentals. Thus the empirical investigations in this dissertation offer the potential to 
further understand the price formation process. 
Another motivation behind the research was the increased importance being devoted to 
emerging markets on part of financial practitioners. Countries such as India and China are 
taking up a larger share of the global production of goods and services, yet it does not seem 
that the emergence of these economics has been accompanied by an equally prominent surge 
in academic interest. Researching the market microstructure setup of emerging markets 
presents a significant potential to extend existing literature, since the findings obtained when 
studying the former markets may differ from those prevailing in established ones, given the 
differing characteristics of emerging markets in terms of liquidity and efficiency. It is hoped 
that these empirical studies will contribute towards bridging this gap. 
There are additional factors which explain the choice of the actual market microstructure 
issues tackled in this dissertation. The issue of non-synchronous trading is important because 
it impacts on various inferences which may be obtained when analysing stock market data; for 
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instance the degree of market efficiency and whether there is any potential for abnormal 
profits emanating from delayed adjustments in the expectations of market participants. The 
finance discipline stands to gain from a deeper understanding of non-synchronous trading 
effects and further empirical evidence gleaned through various methodologies. 
The second investigation centred on volatility. Volatility is directly related to returns and to 
risks, and one important research question is whether markets are excessively volatile. The 
detection and the controlling of unjustified volatility is a central objective of market 
microstructure researchers and practitioners. The issue of whether volatility is justified or 
excessive is central to the market microstructure field, since it translates into whether asset 
prices exclusively reflect the underlying information, 'or whether they are additionally subject 
to other extraneous factors. 
The last two empirical investigations focused on the impacts of the suspension of the opening 
and closing call auctions on NSE. This issue falls within one of the most important branches 
of market microstructure i. e. the design of trading protocols and the evaluation of their 
effectiveness, The efficacy of call auctions as compa red to other trading setups attracted much 
attention in previous research. NSE proved an ideal empirical setting for the call auction 
investigation, given that the suspension occurred in the absence of any other changes in 
trading protocols. In addition, a further gap in the prior empirical literature on call auctions 
was that the latter tended to focus on the stock markets of the major industrial countries. 
Being an emerging market exchange, NSE features a significant proportion of less liquid 
securities, and this enabled the investigation of the differences in the impacts concerning more 
and less liquid securities on the market. 
Finally, the first two empirical investigations on non-synchronous trading and volatility are 
relevant in analysing subsequent issues. For instance some of the price movements noticed 
when modelling volatility on NSE, may be attributable to non-synchronous trading effects. 
Similarly, background knowledge of volatility seasonality is necessary to coherently analyse 
the impacts of the call auction suspension on NSE. 
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8.2 Summary of Main Findings and Conclusions 
8.2.1 The Impacts of Non-Synchronous Trading On Predictability 
The first empirical investigation employed various methodologies to model the predictability 
that non-synchronous trading effects may induce in the values of stock indices. Both daily 
data and higher frequency data were used in the investigation, since the latter is a prerequisite 
for capturing the typical intra-day variations in trading activity. Clear evidence of 
predictability between the Nifty and Midcap indices was obtained - in particular the Nifty 
index leads the Midcap index when considering a high frequency data set. 
The investigation proposed a test involving the analysis of trading break returns to infer 
whether predictability is mainly attributable to non-synchronous trading or an actual delayed 
adjustment on part of traders. When analysing the trading break returns it was noted that the 
lead-lag effects persist, and in such cases the predictability cannot be attributed to traders' 
delayed expectation adjustments since during an overnight period market participants have 
sufficient time to adjust their expected values of stocks. Thus the investigation indicated that 
lead-lag effects are mainly caused by non-synchronous trading, and that the predictability is 
not likely to result in abnormal profit opportunities. 
In line with previous studies, it was noted that non-synchronous trading is not the exclusive 
cause of the observed predictability. In particular, the feedback effect from the Midcap to the' 
Nifty index may not be attributed to non-synchronous trading given that the former index is 
composed of less liquid stocks as compared to the latter. A smaller capitalisation index may 
lead a larger capitalisation one, when markets are responding to news which mainly impact on 
smaller companies. Other possible sources of predictability on securities markets include 
market participants who tend to allocate higher priorities to the monitoring of larger stocks, 
large orders being split into smaller ones, securities hitting price limits, and traders "picking 
off' mispriced limit orders submitted earlier on. 
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8.2.2 The Seasonality of Stock Price Volatility and Its Connection with 
Excessive Price Movements 
The main aim of the second empirical chapter was to model volatility on NSE and to inquire 
whether it is justified or excessive. A battery of tests was applied to data sampled at different 
frequencies, and various instances of unjustified volatility emanating from the market setup or 
traders' behaviour were pinpointed. 
Rather than adopting the standard methodology of comparing stock price changes to 
information about expected dividends, the research question -was split up into two subsidiary 
ones. The first issue was whether the volatility is related to information flow, and this was 
tackled by applying existing theory on Monday effects and monthly seasonality to infer 
expected news patterns on NSE. It was then inquired whether volatility rises during those 
periods when new information becomes available. Increased volatility during the latter 
periods is likely to be the response to new information, and therefore it is more likely to be 
justified. The second related question concerns the relationship between volatility and returns. 
If volatility is considered as a measure of risk, finance theory would suggest that this should 
be positively related to returns. This question was investigated through GARCH-M models. 
The analysis identified typical volatility patterns in the index data, in line with prior empirical 
papers. These include peaks in volatility during the opening and the closing of the trading 
day, as well as the presence of a Monday effect in index data. Tests revealed that the Monday 
effect in index data is more attributable to market microstructure factors such as non- 
synchronous trading, since the Monday effect is not significant in the underlying stocks. NSE 
volatility tends to increase during the months of March and April, and this may be explained 
through an end-of-financial-year effect, coinciding with the Indian end-of-fiscal-year. The 
increased NSE volatility during the month of March seems unjustified, since it is not 
accompanied by higher return magnitudes of similar statistical significance. The higher 
volatility during April is accompanied by higher returns of Similar significance, a nd thus the 
pronounced April volatility seems related to new information, since the intra-day fluctuations 
materialise in returns at the end of the trading day. IýSE volatility abates during August and 
this may be attributed to a holiday effect. Finally, EGARCH-M models show that longer-tenn 
volatility seems unrelated to the returns on NSE and this indicates that volatility may be 
excessive. Thus the analysis highlighted different features which may potentially constitute 
unjustified volatility. 
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The findings of this investigation were also rich in terms of providing important evidence 
regarding issues which were not directly related to the main research question. The finding of 
Madureira andLeal (200 1) was confirmed, in that the Monday effect may appear in a stock 
index, but not in the underlying stocks. This shows the importance that researchers confirm 
Monday effects through individual stock data rather than relying on index data. The finding is 
also relevant from the point of view of market designers, since the Monday effect in index 
data might be due to index construction features or non-synchronous trading. The chapter also 
provided important evidence as regards the January effect often observed on other markets. 
The "January" effect on NSE was observed during the months of March and April, and this 
implies that it is likely that this effect is related to the end-of-financial-year of listed 
companies and/or the end of the fiscal year. The January effect is nonexistent on NSE during 
the month of January. 
8.2.3 The Impact of the Suspension of Opening and Closing Call 
Auctions 
The third empirical analysis considered the impact of the suspension of opening and closing 
call auctions by NSE in June 1999 - this maybe considered as the focal point of the 
dissertation. It was firstly established that the software problems which seem the main cause 
behind the suspension, were not affecting the pricing process on the exchange and that 
probably the software glitches mainly occurred during the closing auction held on the day 
prior suspension. 
The analysis compared the volatility, efficiency and liquidity of traded securities before and 
after suspension. In addition, the value of the auctions to shareholders was estimated using an 
event study to calculate the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for the sampled securities. 
Volatility, efficiency and liquidity broadly improved, although one measure of volatility 
deteriorated. It was noted that the abnormal returns during the event period were significant in 
terms of their magnitude, and their pattern was robust across different sub-samples of the 
stocks. Yet, we cannot speak of a clear-cut market reaction in terms of CARs since the latter 
were not uniformly positive or negative. 
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It was found that lower liquidity stocks traded less in the auctions as compared to other 
securities and they experienced the most gains following suspension. This is consistent with 
the observation of Schwartz (2000) regarding the pre-requisite of a "critical mass" of activity 
for auctions to be effective. Thus, the evidence suggests that opening and closing call 
auctions may not necessarily improve share trading in a less liquid emerging market. 
Still, the findings do not allow us to dismiss the theoretical conclusions of authors such as 
Madhavan (1992) and Economides and Schwartz (1995) predicting more efficient infon-nation 
aggregation in an auction setup, since the adverse impacts of the auctions discovered in the 
study may have been the result of a badly structured auction or a setup which was inadequate 
for the underlying NSE characteristics. 
8.2.4 A More Detailed Investigation of the Changes in Inter-Day and 
Intra-Day Volatility Following Call Auction Suspension 
The fourth empirical investigation studied the volatility impacts of the call auction suspension 
in further detail, in view of the contrasting evidence obtained in the former chapter. The 
analysis employed more rigorous measures of volatility, and applied various tests, ranging 
from GARCH models to the scrutiny of price movements and return distributions during the 
day. Tests were conducted on monthly and daily data as well as observations sampled at 
higher frequencies. The original data set sampled at daily frequency was adjusted to take 
account of monthly seasonality of volatility as discovered in the second empirical 
investigation. 
Tests on intra-day data pointed at a significant drop in the response of the conditional variance 
to lagged shocks as well as a highly significant drop in the unconditional variance following 
the call auction suspension. In addition the post-suspension period is characterised by lower 
volatility in the middle-of-the-day and the closing return distributions. The opening volatility 
was higher in the post-suspension period, yet tests on the reinforcements and reversals of price 
movements indicate that this higher volatility might have beenjustified. The reinforcement- 
reversal tests cast doubts as to whether any expected benefits of call auctions were 
materialising on NSE, since the call auction period is characterised by a relatively high 
amount of reversals of the opening returns. 
253 
8. CONCLUSION 
Tests on the seasonally-adjusted daily data revealed that the log returns were higher in 
absolute value during the call auction period; yet one cannot be sure whether this is a rcmnant 
of the seasonal volatility pattern on NSE. Estimating an AGARCH process indicates higher 
conditional volatility in the call auction period through a positive dummy variable, although 
the latter is not significant at the 90% confidence level. Estimating separate AGARCH 
models for the "Before Period" and the "After Period" yields inferences in the opposite 
direction, in that the conditional volatility, seems higher following auction suspension, and the 
impact of shocks (news) is more in line with an efficient market in the "Before Period". 
Overall, the empirical evidence obtained was somewhat mixed, but no clear evidence emerged 
that call auctions on NSE were resulting in significant benefits. This is broadly in line with 
the conclusions of the previous investigation. Volatility seems higher during the auction 
period, although one cannot rule out that this is due to the n, ews release patterns on NSE. One 
might also argue that the opening call auction was less effective than the closing one. 
8.3 Contributions to the Existing Literature 
Each of the empirical investigations endeavours to add knowledge to the particular sub-section 
of the market microstructure discipline covered. in the research. 
The empirical investigation on non-synchronous trading effects proposes a new methodology 
of inferring whether predictability is mainly the result of non-synchronous trading or whether 
it constitutes an actual delayed adjustment of traders' expectations. In this way, the analysis 
provided a new perspective on existing ideas. The findings of the chapter are directly relevant 
to the area of market efficiency, since factors such as non-synchronous trading and market 
participants "picking off' mispriced orders, may give the impression that traders are not 
adjusting their expectations immediately. This confirms the arguments that the main criterion 
for an inefficient market is the existence of profitable trading opportunities and not 
predictability. The investigation on non-synchronous trading effects differs from existing 
research in a number of ways. It was confirmed that non-synchronous trading effects may be 
detected through lead-lag effects in stock prices and it was formally shown that non- 
synchronicity tends to become more pronounced in high-frequency data given that the level of 
trading activity typically varies throughout the trading day. Prior studies tended to focus on 
the serial correlation structure or else lead-lag effects were tested for at lower sampling 
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, 
ftequencies. This explains why previous studies conducted through lower frequency data such 
as Chiao, Hung and Lee (2004) did not detect any significant causality. Given that most of the 
prior literature was based on daily data, the typical surges in trading activity at the end of the 
day probably diminished non-synchronous trading effects, and this might have implied an 
under-estimation of non-synchronicity. 
The empirical chapter on NSE volatility applied existing techniques to analyse the issue of 
excessive volatility in a novel way. Previous studies inferred whether volatility is excessive or 
otherwise by comparing stock price changes to information about expected dividends. Yet 
this approach cannot be readily applied to index data since stock indices do not directly yield 
dividends. In addition dividend data are inherently low frequency, implying that they are of 
limited use in the context of a high-frequency analysis. Thus, one main innovation of this 
investigation lies in the interpretation of different models and their possible connection with 
the detection of excessive volatility. These issues have not been sufficiently emphasised in 
prior literature. In addition, the analysis of NSE volatility fills a gap in the empirical literature 
related to the cause of the January effect - which when considering the Indian economy 
characteristics seems to be mainly related to the end-of-financial-year of quoted companies, 
coinciding with the end of the fiscal year. 
The investigations of the effectiveness of the call auction setup on NSE, adopted a novel 
approach in considering the impact of the suspension of opening and closing call auctions. 
These are probably the first studies of the impacts of such a suspension, and feature the 
inherent strength that other market protocols and arrangements remained unchanged. This 
feature enhances the robustness of the conclusions, in that any changes following the 
suspension are more likely to have been the result of the change concerning the call auction, 
whereas in previous studies, changes were typically accompanied by other reforms which 
make it difficult to infer the actual source of the outcomes. The findings have some important 
general implications. They support the argument that call auctions are not necessarily a 
superior method for opening and closing an otherwise continuous market. One cannot support 
the notion that the main disadvantage of call auctions is that they prohibit stocks from trading 
continuously given that indications of further disadvantages in terms of volatility, efficiency 
and liquidity were obtained. The benefits or costs of call auctions appear to depend on the 
composition of the shares being traded. In addition, the evidence points that it cannot be taken 
for granted that an opening or closing call auction will improve share trading in a less liquid 
emerging market. On the NSE, it appears to have been precisely the less liquid securities 
which gained least from the call auction system. 
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8.4 Practical Implications of the Findings 
The relevance of the above findings is not merely confined to the academic field, but also 
extends to market practitioners - with a particular relevance to market designers. One aspect 
which is common to the separate empirical studies tackled in the dissertation is market 
efficiency. Non-synchronous trading effects may be mistakenly interpreted as inefficiencies. 
Excessive volatility occurs due to market inefficiencies, and call auctions and other features of 
the trading setup are partly intended to increase pricing efficiency. In aiming to enhance 
pricing efficiency, market designers should endeavour to make inforination promptly available 
to the general markets. This should help in curtailing unjustified price movements and it 
should increase the efficacy of call auctions given that prices are formed usin g an updated 
information set. 
The studies also suggest other practical policies which should improve the trading process. 
The first empirical investigation provided evidence of predictability on the markets and it was 
noted that one potential predictability source constituted smart traders "picking off' stale 
orders which were left unmonitored. In tackling this issue, exchanges should consider 
increasing the variety of permitted order types. In particular, systems might be tailored to 
accommodate immediate-or-cancel orders which are annulled if they remain unsatisfied for a 
period of time.. Exchanges might also consider allowing adjustable limit orders, which are 
automatically updated depending on market movements. 
The empirical investigation on NSE volatility pinpointed various instances of unjustified 
market movements. Monday effects in the index were attributed to market microstructure 
factors such as inappropriate index construction or non-synchronous trading. In case of the 
latter possibility, one may assume that the non-trading periods do not occur due to insufficient 
trading requirements given that the Nifty index used in the study comprises the most liquid 
stocks on the exchange. Thus, one course of action which may be considered is to inquire 
whether and why traders might be holding back orders on Mondays - possibly due to a higher 
degree of information asymmetry. When considering the unjustified price movements during 
the month of March, one important issue to be tackled is whether these fluctuations are indeed 
"harmful" to market stability. Whilst the deviation of prices from fundamentals tends to be 
undesirable, one should keep in mind that such deviations may not always be of significant 
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concern and indeed the resulting speculation should help in generating liquidity and market 
activity. 
The third investigation related to the efficacy of call auctions. This is of high relevance to 
finance practice, especially when considering that most order-driven markets initiate their 
trading sessions with a call auction. At times call auctions are also used to terminate the 
trading day, and to re-initiate trading following a mid-day break or a trading halt. The finding 
that the expected benefits of call auctions may not always materialise, might imply that market 
designers should reconsider the transparency of the process. For instance, in the case of NSE 
only the best five prices on each side of the market were disseminated. This means that if the 
market is sufficiently overvalued or undervalued the orders submitted by traders having 
"correct expectations" might remain undisplayed. Similarly, the inside spread which is 
disseminated to the market might be subject to market manipulation; say a trader who would 
like to sell a large number of securities might post an order to buy a much lower number of 
those securities at a relatively high price in an attempt to raise the market price. A related 
issue is whether the pre-auction prices are displayed to the market at large, since this might 
make it easier for participants to infer the fundamental value of the asset. Despite this, a 
possible trade-off between transparency and efficiency becomes apparent when one considers 
that transparency may facilitate trader collusion, that it may increase the potential for 
participants to misguide the market by submitting misleading orders and that it may 
exacerbate the "free option" problem relating to limit orders. 
The investigation of the impacts of the call auction suspension on volatility yielded 
(contrasting) evidence which certainly does not constitute a case for the universal suspension 
of call auctions. Yet, the analysis is useful from the point of view of market designers who 
should avoid thinking of call auctions as a guarantee for lower market volatility. Thought has 
to be laid on the actual design of the auctions, the possibility that these might not attract 
sufficient trading activity, and whether they make sense in the particular circumstances. 
8.5 Limitations of the Research 
The limitations of the former investigations should be kept in mind in interpreting the results. 
One limitation which is common to most empirical research is that the behaviour of market 
participants is modelled as a time series whilst abstracting from modelling individual decision 
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making behaviour, which depends on personal and possibly subjective factors such as risk- 
return tradeoffs, inventory holdings and the urgency to trade. 
Other limitations emanate from the necessary assumptions made during the investigations. 
Throughout the dissertation, it was assumed that the index compositions do not change 
materially over the sample period. When using high frequency data, the sample of trading 
days was limited due to software restrictions and constraints on time available for the 
sampling process. The selection of a limited number of trading days leaves the possibility that 
the conclusions may have been peculiar to the particular period. Conversely, the daily time 
series typically spanned over longer periods - in some cases a five year-time series was used. 
The limitations inherent in working with such a long time period include the possibility of 
changes in market microstructure, most of which are unaccounted for. Some of these 
microstructure changes (for instance changes in price limits) may well affect the underlying 
volatility process. 
Reference has to be made to the inherent shortcomings of the methodologies applied in the 
investigations. There are limitations relating to OLSregression estimation, which assumes the 
absence of heteroskedasticity of returns. Given that the latter goes against the empirically 
observed "stylised facts" of stock market data, this limitation was addressed through 
modelling heteroskedasticity, thoroughly analysing diagnostic statistics of the market models, 
and applying alternative techniques such as the Kruskal-Wallis test where appropriate. 
A further methodological limitation is that GARCH methodology assumes that the error term 
follows a Markov process, despite contrary evidence that the error terms may depend on past 
values (Hansen; 1994). In addition, the GARCH processes utilised in the research exclude 
exogenous factors such as volatility on overseas markets. 
The limitations of event study methodology were described in detail in the respective chapter. 
Whilst the significance and the CARs pattern were estimated and cross-checked through non- 
parametric methodologies, further limitations still remain. These include the possibility that 
the results obtained may be particular to the sampled stocks, and the inherent assumption that 
the market model coefficients remain unchanged over the estimation period and the event 
window. 
Reference has to be made to the Reversal-Reinforcement tests which may be biased in favour 
of reinforcements (Madhavan, Richardson and Roomans; 1997). In addition, the underlying 
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news pattern may occasionally mean that in some Reversal instances, the initial volatility may 
have been justi fied, and similarly Reinforcements do not necessarily justify the opening 
return. 
Methodological limitations were discussed in more detail in the respective chapters. 
One further limitation derives from the specific focus of the research in the sense. that the 
topics should also be considered within a more general framework. For instance, the analysis 
of non-synchronous trading could also be assessed from a practitioner point of view, such as 
the possible price risk which may be induced due to the gap in between order submission and 
execution. The volatility investigation might have different implications when considered 
from the viewpoint of traders who regard volatility patterns as a profit opportunity. Similarly, 
the analyses of the call auction suspension abstracted from the possibilities that the auctions 
may have been of special relevance to specific trader categories such as institutional traders, or 
that they might have been more useftil during higher volatility days. 
8.6 Agenda for Further Research 
The Banner empirical investigations point at possible directions which may be taken in future 
research projects. 
The investigation on non-synchronous trading effects shows that the analysis of high- 
frequency data might offer potential for an even more detailed analysis of non-synchronicity. 
This rests on the notion that the increased trading activity at the opening and closing of the 
trading day reduces non-synchronous trading effects as compared to those prevailing during 
the rest of the day. In this way, most of the existing studies using daily closing prices might 
underestimate the degree of non-synchronicity. The analysis of individual stock high 
frequency data, offers potential for inferring how the degree of non-synchronicity varies 
across stocks with differing liquidity. In addition, further research is needed to shed light on 
the degree of predictability which may be exclusively attributed to non-synchronous trading as 
opposed to other sources of delayed price adjustment. 
The second major issue covered in the dissertation related to the nature of volatility in terms of 
whether it maybe deemed justified or excessive. Given the importance of this issue for 
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market microstructure, the discipline would benefit from additional methodologies which may 
be applied in answering such questions, in the absence of data about dividend expectations. 
The absence of a significant relationship between NSE volatility and returns might imply that 
investors are not being rewarded in line with the price risk which they bear. This leads to the 
question of whether "smart investors" should be holding stocks for a long term period, or 
whether a better risk-return combination may be achieved by taking advantage of volatility 
patterns, as done for instance by day traders. The empirical results also confirm that further 
research is required as to why index data tend to feature a Monday effect which might be 
absent in the underlying stocks. This finding entails a critical evaluation of the traditional 
notion that Monday effects are caused by the accumulation of news during the weekend as 
well as the features in index construction which may lead to a spurious Monday effect in index 
data. 
The investigations on the impacts of the call auction suspension were taken from the point of 
view of the general market. Whilst this may be consi dered as a sensible approach, ftirther 
research may be undertaken to assess the desirability of call auctions to specific trader 
categories such as large institutional traders. Additional research is also required on the 
linkages between call auctions and other features of the trading setup since the efficacy of 
auctions on particular trading venues may also depend on other intricate elements involved in 
the trading protocol. The interaction between auctions and transparency may be one potential 
avenue for future research. The information dissemination features of call auctions should be 
enhanced within a transparent setup, yet transparency may also facilitate trader collusion or 
the misguiding of participants through the submission of mispriced orders (or imprecise 
information as per the experimental study of Brandouy, Barneto and Leger; 2003). 
Overall, the investigations undertaken in this dissertation do not only offer contribution to 
finance practitioners and the academic field, but they also point at future directions which may 
be explored in further microstructure studies. 
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